N. Kothari Vs. John Braganza  INSC 177 (4 May 1999)
N Santosh Hegde, G T Nanavati, SRINIVASAN, J.
this litigation had a chequered career, the scope of the dispute between the
parties is very limited.
respondent who was the plaintiff in Short-Cause Suit No.3120/81 on the file of
the City Civil Court at Bombay prayed for a permanent injunction restraining
the appellant herein from interfering with or disturbing his possession and
occupation of the suit property situated in Malad (East) Bombay. A perusal of
the plaint shows that the entire case of the respondent rested only on his
exclusive possession for several decades and not on any claim of title. Though
the respondent was not quite clear as to the origin of his possession, his
continuous and exclusive possession from May 1964 under a registered lease deed
was the basis of his claim. In the written statement filed by the appellant,
while denying claim of the respondent, there was no specific plea that the
appellant had title to the property and that the suit was not maintainable at
the instance of the respondent. No doubt, there was an incidental reference to
the appellant having become the owner of the property by virtue of a
dissolution of a partnership which the appellant had entered with the alleged
previous owner of the property.
trial court framed as many as four issues. There was no issue regarding title.
The crucial issue related to the plaintiff's possession of the suit property.
The suit was decreed on 26.4.82 by the Additional Principal Judge.
appellant filed First Appeal No.479 of 1982. The plaintiff was permitted to
amend the plaint and with the consent of the parties the First Appellate Court
set aside the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter for fresh disposal.The
scope of the remand was however limited by the Appellate Judge who permitted
the appellant herein to file additional written statement as against the
amended plaint. The Appellate Judge had also recorded the agreement of the
parties to the appointment of an architect as Commissioner in order to draw a
sketch map showing the site in question together with the structures thereon as
claimed by the plaintiff on the property in suit and the location of the
structures. The Court directed that no additional evidence should be allowed
accepting the evidence which may become consequential to the report of the
Commissioner who may be examined as Court Witness if necessary. 3. Thus the
scope of the remand having been expressly restricted, the parties did not raise
any question of title. The report filed by the architect-Commissioner was not
seriously objected to by either party and after considering the entire
evidence, the trial court passed a decree on 10.5.83 with regard to some portion
of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit with
regard to the rest.
Paragraph 90 of the judgment the trial Court stated thus:
parting with the case I would like to make it clear that the relief granted to
the plaintiff in this suit is based purely on the question of his possession
and threat of his being dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law. The
question of title of both the parties and their rights and remedies on the
strength of title are left open including their rights in respect of those
portions of the property in regard to which relief is granted in this
Both the parties being aggrieved by the judgment and decree filed appeals
before the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court who heard the
appeals started dictating the judgment on 10th August 1987 but thereafter he
heard the parties again, recorded additional evidence and completed the rest of
the judgment on 28.4.1989. The procedure adopted by the learned Judge has been
pointed out to be "somewhat unusual" by the Division Bench whose
judgment is now under appeal. In our opinion, the Division Bench has used a
very mild expression to describe the course adopted by the learned Single
Judge. In the course of delivering judgment for over a period of two years, the
learned Single Judge had permitted additional evidence not only ignoring the
provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C., but also the limited scope of the suit
in which there was no issue regarding title. Unfortunately, the learned Single
Judge travelled outside the scope of the suit and over-looking the earlier
order of remand passed by the High Court went on to record findings based on
the alleged title of the appellant to the suit property. The summary of his
conclusions is found in Paragraph 44 of his judgment which reads as follows:
The plaintiff has totally failed to prove his possession both of the structure
and of the open space.
Even assuming that the plaintiff has proved possession of the structure on the
date of the suit, he had badly failed to prove settled possession.
In case of open space, even such assumption is unconceivable.
The plaintiff is a rank trespasser whereas the defendant has fully established
his title to the open space and to the land below the structure.
Even assuming that the plaintiff was in possession of any portion of the suit
property, his conduct, both before the date of the suit and in the court during
the pendency of this litigation, fully disqualifies him from getting any
injunction against the defendant. This position follows from the general
principles of equity and from the necessary implications of Section 38 of the
Specific Relief Act as also from the express bar of Section 41 (1) of the said
If not for any other reason, at least on account of the doctrine of law that
possession follows title, the defendant must be held entitled to be in full
possession of the open space.
The plaintiff must be held to be exposed to the charge of offence of forgery
and perjury at least vis-a- vis the Receipt Ex.'B'.
Consequently learned Single Judge allowed the appeal of the appellant while
dismissing the appeal of the respondent and dismissed the entire suit. That
judgment of the Single Judge was challenged under the Letters Patent by the
respondent before the Division Bench. After pointing out the limited scope of
the suit, both before and after remand and the absence of any issue as to
title, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and
restored that of the trial court after considering the entire evidence on
record. It is that judgment of the Division Bench which is assailed before us
by the appellant.
With all the vehemence at his command, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant has urged the following contentions: (i) That the Letters Patent
Appeal was not maintainable; (ii) That the suit of the respondent based merely
on possession without any semblance of title was not maintainable against the
appellant who is the owner of the property; (iii) The respondent having
admitted the possession of the appellant prior to the suit in his notice could
not have maintained the suit for injunction. 7. We are at a loss to appreciate
how the appeal under Letters Patent was not maintainable. The learned counsel
contended that the remedy of the respondent was to file a second appeal under
Section 100 C.P.C. against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. However,
he realised his folly when he read out Section 100 C.P.C. and found that it
applied only to decrees passed in appeal by a Court subordinate to the High
Court. There can be no doubt whatever that the judgment of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court fell within the scope of Clause 15 of the Letters
Patent and the appeal was maintainable. We have to point out that the question
relating to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal was not raised
either before the Division Bench of the High Court or in the Special Leave
Petition filed in this Court. 8. The second contention of the learned senior
counsel is equally without any merit. He started by contending that the trial
court had found categorically that the appellant had title to the property.
made an attempt to read certain passages from the judgment of the trial court
to make good his contention. He could not succeed in doing so, particularly
when the trial court had in Paragraph 90 of its judgment left open the issue of
title as pointed out by us already. 9. Learned senior counsel drew our
attention to a notice issued by respondent's advocates and solicitors to the
appellant on 28.8.1990. In that notice reference was made to the appellant's
construction of boundary wall unlawfully thereby obstructing the right of way
of the respondent. A perusal of the notice only shows that what was referred to
therein was only the interference with the possession of the respondent and the
attempt on the part of the appellant to trespass on the suit property. There
was no admission whatever on the part of the respondent that the appellant was
in possession of any portion of the suit property.
was no substance whatever in the said contention of the learned counsel. 10.
Reliance was sought to be placed on the additional evidence admitted by the
learned Single Judge during the pendency of the appeals to prove that the
appellant had title to the property. It is settled law that in the absence of
any plea, no evidence is admissible. The Single Judge of the High Court
overlooked that when there was no plea or issue on the question of title, no
evidence whatever was admissible regarding the same. He acted beyond his
jurisdiction in permitting addditional evidence to be filed in appeals. 11. We
have already extracted the summary of conclusions arrived at by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court. That shows that his conclusions were vitiated
by his view that the appellant had title and possession followed title. It is
quite obvious that the learned Single Judge had not taken note of the principle
of possessory title or the principle of law that a person who has been in long
continuous possession can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any
person in the world other than the true owner. It is also well settled that
even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to
due process of law. 12. In the circumstances of the case, we do not find any
merit whatever in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.