Mr.France
B.Martins & ANR Vs. Mrs. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues [1999] INSC 297 (24
August 1999)
R.P.Sethi,
Saghir Ahmad SETHI,J.
The
appellants, promoters/developers of Perpetual Apartments, agreed to sell a flat
in the name of minor daughter of the respondent. According to the Agreement
between the parties, the price of the flat being Rs.2,10,000/- was to be paid
on or before September, 1985.
The
possession of the flat is stated to have been delivered to the respondent in
September, 1985 on payment of the whole of the agreed amount. Despite various
requests made, the appellant did not execute the sale deed on false pretexts.
In the
absence of the sale deed, the respondent- complainant could not efficaciously
enjoy the property for which she is stated to have paid the price. It was
submitted that as the construction of the flat was sub-standard, the
respondent-complainant had to incur an expense of Rs.26,000/- for immediate
repairs. Her petition filed on 19.6.1992 was dismissed by the Consumer Disputes
Redressal Forum, Goa (hereinafter referred to as
"the District Forum") on the ground of limitation vide order dated
19.10.1992.
The
appeal preferred by the respondent was accepted by the Goa State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the State
Commission") and the matter was remitted to the District Forum permitting
the respondent to amend her complaint. The District Forum again, vide its order
dated 31st March, 1993, dismissed the complaint as barred
by time. The respondent filed an appeal which was allowed by the State
Commission with a direction to the appellants for specific performance of the
Agreement.
The
revision filed by the appellant before the National Consumer Dispute Redressal
Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as
"the National Commission") was dismissed vide impugned order dated
31.1.1994. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has vehemently argued
that as the complaint filed by the respondent was barred by time, the State
Commission was not justified in issuing the directions which were confirmed by
the National Commission.
It is
contended that before insertion of Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the period of limitation for
preferring a claim was such period as is prescribed under the Limitation Act
and as according to him the complaint was filed by the respondent after seven
years, the same deserved dismissal. The argument, though attractive on the face
of it, has no substance when examined in depth. Admittedly, no period of
limitation had been prescribed in the Act before insertion of Section 24A vide
amendment made w.e.f. 18th
June, 1993.
Section
24A of the Act, for the first time, prescribed that the District Forum, the
State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless
the same was filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action
arose. Sub-section (2) of Section 24A authorises the Commission to entertain
complaint even after the period of limitation on the existence of sufficient
cause for not filing the complaint within the statutory period by recording its
reasons for condoning the delay. It is conceded before us that the provisions
of the Limitation Act, 1963 have not been specifically made applicable to the
proceedings under the Act. The Limitation Act does not extinguish a right but
only bars the remedy after a prescribed period of limitation. Section 2(j) of
the Limitation Act defines the "period of limitation" to mean the
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the
Schedule attached to the Limitation Act and "prescribed period" means
the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
It is not the case of the appellants that complaint filed by the respondent was
either a suit or an appeal or an application within the meaning of the
provisions of the Limitation Act. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, thought
it appropriate not to prescribe the period of limitation for proceedings under
the Act, the courts cannot apply the provisions by implication. It has to be
kept in mind that the Act was made for better protection of interests of
consumers and to make provision for the establishment of Consumer Councils and
other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and matters connected
therewith. The Act has been enacted to promote and protect the rights of
consumers such as: "(a) the right to be protected against marketing of
goods which are hazardous to life and property;
(b) the
right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and
price of goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices;
(c) the
right to be assured, wherever possible, access to an authority of goods at
competitive prices;
(d) the
right to be heard and to be assured that consumers interest will receive due
consideration at appropriate forums;
(e) the
right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices or unscrupulous
exploitation of consumers; and (f) right to consumer education." The
addition of Section 24A in the Act reflects the mind of the Legislature that
they had initially not intended to prescribe any period of limitation for
filing the complaints under the Act. The reliance of the learned counsel for
the appellants on New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
be
misplaced inasmuch as this Court in that case had only referred to the practice
of the Consumer Commissions of applying the provisions of the Limitation Act.
It is important to note that this Court did not approve the application of the
Limitation Act to the complaints under the Act but in the circumstances of the
case found that even on assumption of the applicability of the period
prescribed for a suit relating to similar relief as preferred under the Act,
the claim was barred by limitation. This Court held:
"Before
insertion of Section 24A in the Act with effect from June 18, 1993 the Act did not prescribe any
period of limitation for filing a complaint. It was, however, not disputed that
early to this the consumer commissions have been applying the Limitation Act,
1963 to find out if a complaint was barred by limitation or not. Since at the
time when the complaint in the present case was filed Section 24A was not
there, we therefore, fall back from the provisions of the Limitation Act.
Article 44 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, in relevant part is as under:
Description
of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 44 (b) On a
policy of insurance when the sum insured is payable after proof of the loss has
been given to or received by the insurers. Three years The date of the
occurrence causing the loss, or where the claim on the policy is denied either
partly or wholly, the date of such denial." We are, however clear that
prior to its amendment the, Act had not prescribed any period of limitation for
filing the complaints by the consumers. Assuming, but without holding, that the
provisions of the Limitation Act were applicable, we are of the opinion that
the appellants are not justified in urging that the claim preferred by the
respondent-complainant was barred by time. It is true that the Agreement was
executed somewhere in 1983 and the possession of the premises delivered to the
respondent-complainant in 1985. It is also evident that at no point of time the
appellants denied their liability to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the
respondent. No period for specific performance of Agreement had been prescribed
by the parties. The record produced before the authorities under the Act
reveals that the appellant had upto 30th August, 1991, been acknowledging liability to
deliver the legal possession of the flat to the respondent.
Vide a
notice sent to the respondent by the appellants through their counsel on 30th
August, 1991 had admitted that the respondent had paid a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-
and was liable to pay a further sum of Rs.20,000/- which the
respondent-complainant disputed. The complainant was intimated: "Notice is
therefore given to you requiring you to pay the said balance sum of Rs.20,000/-
within 15 days from the date and take legal possession of the flat failing
which our client shall be at liberty to charge you interest at the balance sum
payable to him at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the last
payment." The respondent-complainant could, at worst, assume on 30th August, 1991 that the appellants were not
interested in the specific performance of the contract between the parties.
Even if the period is computed from that date, the complaint was filed well
within time in terms of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. There
is no substance in the submission of the appellants that as the respondent had
allegedly not paid the whole amount, she was not entitled to the directions as
were issued by the State Commission. The respondent had categorically stated in
para 5 of her complaint that the consideration amount had been paid which was
not denied by the respondent. They had only stated that a sum of Rs.20,000/-
was still recoverable from her regarding which she had preferred the claim of
compensation for the repairs done to the flat as it was found to be constructed
of the sub-standard material. The findings of fact arrived at by the State
Commission do not require any interference. The National Commission was also
justified in holding that there was no error of jurisdiction or material
irregularity pertaining to the jurisdiction in the order of the State
Commission requiring any interference. There is, therefore, no merit in this
appeal which is accordingly dismissed but under the circumstances without any
order as to costs.
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