Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan  INSC 278 (17 August 1999)
A.P.Misra A.P. MISRA, J.
appellant, Kishan Lal, husband of deceased Smt. Sulochana has filed this appeal
against his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as I.P.C.) The High Court convicted the
appellant on an appeal filed by the State against an order of acquittal passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge. The brief facts are that Smt. Sulochana,
according to the prosecution case, was sleeping on the intervening night
between 11th and 12th
September, 1976 with
the mother of the appellant on a separate cot when she was burnt by sprinkling
kerosene oil on her chest. She was shifted to the hospital at Pilibanga at 2.00 a.m. Doctor of the hospital sent information to SHO
Police Station Lekhuwali on which investigation started. At 4.30 a.m. police recorded the statement of the deceased.
statement recorded by the police was not brought on the record by the
prosecution. She was initially treated at Pilibanga hospital and was later
shifted to Bikaner Hospital. While in the hospital on the 17th September, 1976, Smt. Sulochana gave birth to a
macerated male child.
On 28th October, 1976 skin grafting was done on her.
of the complainant is that deceased Smt. Sulochana has given an oral dying
declaration to her father, grandmother and uncle that she was burnt by the
appellant, his mother, father and brother. On 11th November, 1976 complaint was made by the father of the deceased Smt.
Sulochana that her daughter was burnt and on his said complaint a dying
declaration was recorded by the Magistrate.
On the 15th of November, 1976 all of a sudden the condition of Smt.
Sulochana deteriorated and she died in the evening. On the basis of the above
complaint dated 11th
November, 1976 a case
was registered against the accused and investigation was started. The police
after investigation could not find any sustainable evidence against the
appellant and other family members mentioned in the complaint, hence submitted
a complaint was filed by Chandu Lal, father of the deceased before the Court of
Judicial Magistrate First Class in which he referred to one dying declaration
dated 6th November,
1976 made to him, his
wife, grand-mother and other relatives apart from one dated 11.11.1976 before a
Magistrate. It also mentions oral extra-judicial confession alleged to have
been made by the appellant in a Panchayat. Though complaint was made against
four persons, namely, the appellant, his mother Poora, his father Banwari Lal
and his brother Om Prakash, but the Magistrate took cognizance only against the
appellant and his mother Smt. Poora under Section 302 read with Section 34,
trial, complainant produced 11 witnesses which included PW.10 Murarilal, Munsif
and Judicial Magistrate (who recorded the statement of Smt. Sulochana on 11th November, 1976) and PW.11 Dr. Sharad Chand Kalla
(who conducted the post-mortem examination on 16th November, 1976). It is significant to note that the complainant did
not examine either the Investigating Officer or called for police record which
contained the earliest version of the deceased, which is said to have been
recorded at 4.30 a.m.
on the 12th September, 1976 itself in which police finally
submitted final report.
complainant relied strongly on two dying declarations, one oral declaration, as
aforesaid, dated 6th
November, 1976 and the
other 11th November,
1976 recorded by a
Judicial Magistrate and extra judicial confessions made by the appellant before
Panchayat on two different occasions.
question raised for the appellant, when Smt. Sulochana was admitted in the
hospital on the 12th
September, 1976 why it
is only on 6th
November, 1976 for the
first time oral dying declaration is alleged to have been made by her to her
father, grand mother and uncle etc. The answer given is that she remained
unconscious during this period. The trial court disbelieved this fact on the
basis of the hospitals bed head ticket Ex.D.11. It held, it reveals that she
was not unconscious for all this period rather she was conscious from time to
time and had regained consciousness.
with the oral dying declaration, the trial court held that the three witnesses
had stated differently.
creates doubt. To one she stated that she saw one lady and three gents before
she became unconscious. To the second, she stated that she became unconscious
on seeing herself on fire and before the third witness she stated that she was
sleeping and when she woke up all the four accused set fire to her clothes. For
all these reasons the trial court disbelieved this story and consequently the
case that appellant Kishan Lal poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.
The trial court also rejected the extra-judicial confession as alleged by the
complainant by disbelieving the statement of witnesses in its support and held
them not trustworthy. Thus trial court acquitted both, the appellant and his
mother Smt. Poora. After acquittal, though earlier the police filed final
report referring the case and the trial proceeded only on a private complaint
the State filed an appeal against this acquittal both against the present
appellant and his mother Smt. Poora. The complainant did not file any appeal.
Before dealing with how the High Court dealt with this case it is necessary to
refer to some basic facts.
marriage of deceased Smt. Sulochana with the appellant was held on 17th July, 1975. There arose some dispute between
her father Chandu Lal and father of the appellant Banwari Lal regarding the
amount paid in the marriage. The prosecution case is that the appellant (Kishan
Lal), her mother in law (Smt. Poora), her father in law (Shri Banwari Lal) and
brother in law (Om Prakash) continuously pressurised Smt. Sulochana to bring
Rs.5100/- from her father. On the 12th of September, 1976 she was given beating by her husband. He took all her
ornaments and threatened her that she would be killed. After midnight, at about 1 a.m. when Smt. Sulochna was sleeping with her mother-in-law-Poora the
accused persons poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.
High Court with reference to the dying declaration dated 11th November, 1976 before a Magistrate held; though in
the said statement she did not name the appellant or any accused persons but
the tenor of her statement clearly reveals that she indirectly named her
husband and mother in law as the persons who took part in her burning.
reference to the alleged earlier dying declaration dated 6.11.1976 made before
her father, grand-mother, uncle and other relatives, the High Court believed
the statement of Chandu Lal PW.1, Shri Ram PW.3 and Mst. Sajna PW.6 viz. the
father, uncle and grandmother of the deceased. The High Court further accepted
the extra-judicial confession by believing the statements of Chandu Lal PW.1, Ganesh
Dutt PW.2, Shri Ram PW.3 Khubi Ram PW.4 and Hans Raj PW.5. The High Court
recorded that these witnesses have stated before the Panchayat that in the one
held in Rai Singh Nagar School, the appellant, Smt. Poora - the mother, Banwari Lal - the
father, admitted their guilt and sought for forgiveness. The findings of the
trial court thus were set aside with reference to this extra-judicial
confession. Though the High Court recorded that P.W.1, P.W.3, P.W.4 and P.W.5
were brothers learned judges believed this extra-judicial confessions on the
basis of deposition of Ganesh Dutt PW.2 who was Pujari of the family of the
deceased father. The High Court further recorded even if the extra-judicial confession
was ignored the evidence of dying declaration leads to the irresistible
conclusion that appellant was the person who burnt Smt. Sulochana.
necessary to point out that during the pendency of the said appeal before the
High Court, accused Smt.
the mother of the appellant died. Hence the case against her abated. Aggrieved
by this judgment of the High Court which set aside the judgement of acquittal,
the present appeal has been filed by the appellant. The judgement of High Court
reveals that conviction by it is based on two dying declarations and the
alleged extra judicial confession.
have heard learned counsel for the parties. With reference to the dying
declaration dated 11th
November, 1976 made
before the Magistrate, it is not in dispute that the deceased did not name any
accused including the appellant.
also not in dispute that at this point of time she was fully conscious and gave
statement before the Magistrate.
relevant portion recorded therein is reproduced here under :- Then I felt
falling of the drops. I got up and started running and at that time I got fire.
At the time of getting fire I saw one lady and two/three gents standing there.
This incident took place in the house of my in-laws at Pilibanga. On specific
questions being put by the Magistrate as to who were those persons, she could
not name any. This part of her statement is also reproduced hereunder :- Who
were the persons: Due to the fire darkness came in my eyes, I became
unconscious and fell down and I could not recognise the lady and the gents
dying declaration does not in any way help the prosecution. When admittedly at
this point of time she was fully conscious, still she could not name any of the
accused. She states she could not recognise any because of fire darkness coming
in her eyes. This dying declaration could in no way be said to implicate the
appellant. If at all, it runs counter to the alleged earlier dying declaration.
The other oral dying declaration is dated 6th November, 1976, which is said to have been deposed
by her to her father PW.1, her uncle PW.3 and grandmother PW.5. The High Court
seems to have taken great strain to believe the deposition of these witnesses.
We have examined the testimony of these witnesses. There are serious
discrepancies in their testimony with reference to this dying declaration,
apart from the fact that they are closely related to the deceased being father,
grand mother and uncle. They made different statements with respect to the same
declaration made by her to them. The trial court has in detail rightly recorded
such discrepancies and did not believe the story of this other oral dying
it is significant that the oral dying declaration is said to have been made
five days before the dying declaration made to the Magistrate. It is incredible
to note that according to the complaint she regained consciousness on the 6th of November, 1976 and when she gave the first oral
dying declaration, she named accused therein.
the second dying declaration dated 11th of November, 1976 made before a
Magistrate she did not name any of the accused even on specific question being
asked by the Magistrate.
these two dying declarations, we find not only that they gave two conflicting
versions but there is inter se discrepancies in the depositions of the
witnesses given in support of the other dying declaration dated 6.11.1976.
Finally, in the dying declaration before a Magistrate on which possibly more
reliance could have been placed the deceased did not name any of the accused.
Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that these two dying declarations do not
bring home the guilt of the appellant.
Court, therefore, erred in placing reliance on it by erroneously evaluating
proceed to examine the principle of evaluation of any dying declaration. There
is distinction between the evaluation of dying declaration under the English
Law and that under the Indian Law. Under the English Law, credence and the
relevancy of a dying declaration is only when person making such statement is
in hopeless condition and expecting an imminent death. So under the English Law
for its admissibility, the declarant should have been in actual danger of death
at the time when they are made, and that he should have had a full apprehension
of his danger and the death should have ensued. Under the Indian Law the dying
declaration is relevant whether the person who makes it was or was not under
expectation of death at the time of declaration. Dying declaration is
admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. Under the
English Law, the admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending
death produces in a mans mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and
virtuous man under oath. The general principle on which this species of
evidence are admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when
every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak only the truth. If evidence in a case reveals
that declarant has reached this state while making declaration then within the
sphere of the Indian Law, while testing the credibility of such dying
declaration weightage can be given. Of course depending on other relevant facts
and circumstances of case.
incident is said to have taken place on the night of 11th and 12th September, 1976. She died on the 15th of November, 1976 and post-mortem was conducted on 16th November, 1976. In other words the date of
post-mortem is more than two months after the alleged incidence of burning.
this light we proceed to examine the post- mortem report and the deposition of
doctor Mr. Sharad Chand Kala P.W.11.
post-mortem report we find the doctor recorded that all her organs to be
healthy, namely, skull, brain, the spinal cord, ribs, larynx, trachea, lungs,
heart, lever spleen and kidney, etc. The cause of the death according to the
doctor is syncope which is attributable to heart. This report does not record
even deep burns on the body of the deceased. Thus on its basis no inference
could be drawn that she died on account of the alleged burn injuries. In his
deposition this doctor, Kala P.W. 11, deposed;
superficial burns of the patient had been cured.
were wounds of deep burn which I had not recorded in the post-mortem.
is the state of medical evidence, which only records, the superficial burns
which has been cured and does not record any deep burn. On the basis of this
medical evidence how could any inference be drawn that cause of death after
more than two months of the incidence was because of the burn injuries. This
coupled with the evidence during this period, she gave birth to a dead child
and on her person a skin grafting was done. For this additional reason also no
reliance can be placed on the said two dying declarations.
present case, as aforesaid the dying declaration was after two months of the
not at a time when the deceased was expecting imminent death. Neither the
post-mortem nor deposition of doctor carry any definite inference that the
cause of death was on account of burning. There is a conflict between two dying
declarations, in one there is inter se inconsistency as revealed in the
depositions of witnesses, in the other no naming of any accused, when made
before a Magistrate. On such an evidence trial court rightly declined to base a
conviction. The High Court committed manifest error in placing reliance on it.
as the extra-judicial confession is concerned it is said that the same was made
by the accused at Panchayat on two occasions. First Panchayat is alleged to
have taken place at Chak 22 P.S. and the other in the school at Raisinghnagar.
The fathers testimony in cross- examination when confronted with his statement
in Ex.D.2 (made by him during the enquiry made under Section 202 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure) wherein he did not name any of the accused persons, he made
the usual answer that the name might not have been recorded by mistake. But in
the alleged second Panchayat, the names of large number of persons were
referred to as to have confessed their guilt, including the appellant. It
includes even the names of those who are not even accused. It is alleged that
they sought for the pardon of the local leaders for this guilt.
find even in this alleged confession, there is no mention that the accused had
burnt the deceased Smt. Sulochana. The alleged confession by large number of
persons is more in a general and vague term. Before a confession is relied on
it must be clear and unequivocal, whether it is in a judicial or in an extra
facts discussed above we have no hesitation to hold that reliance should not
have been placed on the so called confessions. The trial court rightly rejected
it but unfortunately the High Court very casually accepted it which cannot be
the present case is a complaint case. The complainant has not attempted to
bring on record the earliest version of the deceased which is said to have been
recorded by police at 4.30
a.m. on the date of
incident itself. The prosecution has not examined the Investigating Officer.
Prosecution has not thus proved the guilt of the appellant by any cogent
evidence. In this background, we hold that the High Court has committed an
error by setting aside the acquittal of the appellant and convicting him under
Section 302 I.P.C. The finding recorded by the trial court were based on proper
evaluation and proper appreciation of evidence on record.
the present appeal of the appellant is allowed. His conviction and sentence
under section 302 read with section 34 IPC are set aside. We restore the order
of acquittal. If the accused is in jail he shall be set at liberty unless
required in connection with some other case.