T. Hamza
Vs. The State of Kerala [1999] INSC 262 (11 August 1999)
K.T.Thomas,
D.P.Mohapatra, D. P. MOHAPATRA. J.
This
appeal filed by the accused in Sessions case No. 100/90 of the Court of
Sessions Kozhikode Division, is directed against the Judgment and order of
conviction and sentence u/s 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (for short ' the NDPS Act'), and sentence of 10 years R.I.
and a fine of Ra. I lakh, which was confirmed.In 'appeal by the High Court of Kerala
with slight modification regarding the default sentence which was reduced from
2 years to I year R.I.
The
charge against the appellant was that on 18.7.1990 at 6.05 P.M. he was found in possession of 1750 milligram of
brown sugar at AKG Memorial over-bridge at Francis Road in. Nagaram, in viola- tion of the provisions of the NDPS
Act and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 21 of the NDPS Act.
The
case of the prosecution, shortly stated is that the sub-inspector of police, Chemmangad
Police Station, having received information that the accused was selling brown
sugar went along with two constables PW2 and CV2 to the scene of occur rence.
On searching the accused nine small poly- thene bags containing brown sugar
were found in his possession. The articles were seized. The articles were found
on weighing as 1750 milligram. After completing the procedural paraphernalia a
sample was sent for chemical analysis. The sample which was sent for chemical
analysis was found to be diacetyl morphine (Heroin) commonly known as brown
sugar.
The
prosecution mainly relied on the evidence. of Shri T.Raman PW I, the police
officer, who effected the searched and seizure and other witnesses to establish
the charge of illegal possession of brown sugar. The Courts below on
appreciation of the evidence on record accepted the prosecution case and passed
the order of conviction and sen- tence as noted earlier.
The
main thrust of the arguments of Shri Somnath Mukherjee, learned sounsel for the
appel- lant was that the Courts below erred in placing reliance on the recovery
of the brown sugar from the appellant since the mandatory requirements
prescribed u/s 50 of the NDPS Act had not been followed by the police officer
before making the search which led to the seizure of the articles.
The
contention of Shri K.M.K.Nair, learned counsel for the respondent on the other
hand was that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of Section
50 of the NDPS Act, inasmuch as the police officer (PWI) had asked the accused
whether he would like to be produced before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer
to which he replied in the negative.
The
question that falls for determination is whether on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case as revealed from the evidence on record the search of
the person of the accused and the recov- ery of the packets of brown sugar from
his posses- sion was vitiated on account of non-compliance with the
requirements of section 50 of the NDPS Act. From the discussions in the
impugned judgments it appears that the contention did n.ot find favour with the
courts.
Sub-section(1)
of Section 50 which is the relevant provision in this regard reads thus ;
"50
Conditions under which search of person shall be conducted - (1) When any
officer duly authorised under section 42 is about, to search any person under
the provisions of section 41, section 42 or section 43, he shall, if such
person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay t,o the nearest Gazetted
Officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 or to the nearest
Magistrate." On a bare reading of the provision it is clear that the
statute provides a reasonable safe- guard bo the accused before a search of his
person is made by an officer authorised under section 42 to make it.
The
provision is also intended to avoid criticism of arbitrary and high handed
action against authorised officers. The Legislature in its wisdom considered it
necessary to provide such a statutory safeguard to lend credibility to the
procedure keeping in view the severe punishment prescribed in the statute.
Various questions relating to interprets.tion of section 50, obligatory
character of the provisions therein and the consequence of non-compliance with
the require- ments have been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in the case of State detailed discussion of the various contentions raised and
the previous decisions of the Court in the matter this Court held as follows;
"
To be searched before a Gazetted Offi- cer or a Magistrate, if the suspect so
requires, is an extremely valuable right which the legislature has given to the
concerned person having regard to the grave consequences that may entail the
possession of illicit articles under the NDPS Act. It appears to have been incor-
porated in the Act keeping in view the severity of the punishment. The
rationale behind the provision is even otherwise manifest.
The
search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would impart much more
authenticity and credit-worthiness to the search and seizure proceeding. It
would .3,180 verily strengthen the prosecu- tion case. There is, thus, no Justifica-
tion for the empowered officer, who goes to search the person, on prior informa-
tion, to effect the search, of not in- forming the concerned person of the
existence of his right to have his search conducted before a Gazetted Officer
or a Magistrate, so as to enable him to avail of that right. It is, however,
not neces- sary to give the information to the person to be searched about his
right in writing. It is sufficient if such infor- mation is communicated to the
concerned person orally arid as far as possible in the presence of some
independent and respectable persons witnesaing the arrest and search. The
prosecution must, howev- er, at the trial, establish that the empowered officer
had conveyed the infor- mation to the concerned person of his right of being
searched in the presence of the Magistrate or a. Gazetted Officer, at the time
of the intended search. Courts have to be satisfied at the trial of the case
about due compliance with the requirements provided in Section 50. No
presumption under Section 54 of the Act can be raised against an accused,
unless the prosecution establishes it to the satisfaction of the court, that
the requirements of Section 50 were duly complied with." In para 55 of the
judgment the conclu- sions arrived at by the Court have been summed up thus :
"On
the basis of the reasoning and .dis- cussion above, the following conclusions
arise:
1.
That when an empowered officer or a duly authorised officer acting on prior
information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the
concerned person of his right under Sub-section(l) of Section 50 of being taken
to the nearest Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the
search» However, such information may not necessarily be in writing;
(2)
That failure to inform the concerned person about the existence of his right to
be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to
an accused.
(3)
That a search made, by an empowered officer, on prior information, without
informing the person of his right that, if he s:) requires, he ahall be taken
before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts,
failure to conduct his search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, may
not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article
suspect and vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit
article auspect ar)d vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where
the conviction has been 'recorded only on the basis of the possession of the
illicit article, recovered from his person « during a search conducted in
violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act;
(4)
That there is indeed need to protect society from criminals. The societal
intent in safety will suffer if persons who commit crimes are let off because
the evidence against them is to be treated as if it does not exist. The answer,
therefore, is that the investigating agency must follow the procedure as
envisaged by the statute scrupulously, and the failure to do so must be viewed
by the higher authorities seriously inviting action against the concerned
official so that the laxity on the part of the investigating authority is
curbed. lit every case the end result is important but the means to achieve it
must remain above board. The remedy cannot be worse than the disease itself.
The legitimacy of judicial process may come under cloud if the court is seen to
condone acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating agency during search
operations and may also undermine respect for law and. may have the effect of
unconscionably compromising the administration of justice. That cannot be
permitted. An accused is entitled to a fair trial. A conviction resulting from
an unfair trial is contrary bo our concept of Justice.
The
use of evidence collected in breach of the safeguards provided by Section 50 at
the trial, would render the trial unfair.
(5)
That whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50 have been duly
observed would have to be determined by the Court on the basis of evidence led
at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way or the other, would be relevant
for recording an order of conviction or acquittal. Without giving an
opportunity to the prosecution to establish, at the trial, that the provisions
of Section 50, and particularly the safeguards provided therein were duly
complied with, it would not be permissible to cut- short a criminal trial:
(6)
That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50
for the benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any
opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but,
hold that failure to inform the concerned person of his right as emanating from
Sub-section(l) of Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect
and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law;
(7)
That an illicit article seized from the person of an accused during search conducted
in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot be used
as evidence of proof of unlawful possession of the contraband on the accused
though any other material recovered during that search may be relied upon by
the prosecution, in other proceedings, against an accused, notwithstanding the
recovery of that material during an illegal search;
(8) A
presumption under Section 54 of the Act can only be raise after the prosecution
has established that the accused was found to be in posses- sion of the
contraband in a search conducted in accordance with the mandate of Section
50. An
illegal search cannot entitle the prosecution to caise a presumption under
Section 54 of the Act;
(9)
That the judgment in Pooran Mal's case cannot be understood to have laid down
that an illicit article seized during a search of a person, on prior
information, conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act,
can by itself be used as evidence of unlawful possession of the illicit article
on the person from whom the contraband has been seized during the illegal
search;
(10)
That the judgment in All Mustaffa's case correctly interprets and distinguishes
the jadgment in Pooran Mal's case and the broad observa- tions made in Pirthi Chand'o
case and Jasbir Singh's case are not in tune with the correct exposition of law
as laid down in Pooran Mal's case." Testing the case in hand on the
touchstone of the principles laid down in the aforementioned decision the
conclusion is inevitable that the requirements of section 50(1) of the NDPS Act
were not complied before making the search of the person of the accused. The
trial court in para 10 of its judgment while discussing the evidence of PWI
observed that the witnessadmitted that before searching the accused he did not
ask him whether he should be searched in presence of a Gazetted Officer. The
Court further observed that the witness was not aware whether the inquiry about
the Gazetted Officer should be made before the search was effected.
In
paragraph 12 of the judgment referring to the evidence of PW 2 the Police
Constable who accompanied PWI to the place of search, the Court observed that
the witness admitted that before the search was made, no question was put to
the accused whether he should be searched in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted
Officer. In paragraph 6 of the judgment the Court observed that on seeing the
police party the accused had attempted to escape but was apprehended; it was
then that the accused was questioned by PW1 and he answered that he was having
brown sugar; the accused had taken out the bags and the same were handed over
to PW1 and it was then that the accused was asked as to whether the presence of
a Gazetted Officer was required to which he answered in the negative, The High
Court placing reliance on the decision of the that the search and seizure in
the case has not been adversely effected by non- compliance with the provisions
of section 50(1) of the NDPS Act.
The
position i^ clear and it was also not seriously disputed before us that there
was no compliance of the provisions of section 50(1) of the Act before the
search and seizure in the case were effected. Therefore the search and seizure
thus effected cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. The learned counsel for
the State fairly accepted the position and in our view rightly that the
prosecution caae of illegal possession of the contraband article is based
entirely on the search of the person of the accused leading to recovery of the
article and there is no other evidence in support of the charge. It follows.
therefore,
that the judgment and order of conviction against the appellant by the Sessions
Court which was confirmed by the High Court is clearly unsustainable.
Accordingly,
the appeal ie allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court confirming the judginent
and order of conviction of the hesa 10113 Court is set aside. The appellant is
acquitted. He shall be released forthwith unless his detention is required in
any other case.
Back