Arul Nadar
Vs. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms [1998] INSC 481 (22 September 1998)
M.M.
Punchhi, G.B.Pattanaik, And A.P. Misra, G.B. Pattanaik, J.
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the provisions
of Section 21-A of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land)
Act, 1961, would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case and the
appellant can derive benefit of the same, and if so, to what extent? When the
matter was listed before a Bench of two judges of this Court Their Lordships
felt that there is a conflict between two decisions of this Court both rendered
by two Hon'ble Judges, one in the case of V. Gopal Reddiar (dead) By Lrs. &
Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. - 1995 Supp. (2)
Supreme Court Cases 481, to which one of us was a party, namely (Hon'ble Punchhi,
J., as he then was), and the other in the case of A.G. Vardarajulu & Anr. vs.
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. - (1998) 4 Supreme
Court Cases 231, and that is how the matter has come before a three judge
Bench.
The
appellant was the owner of 43.55 standard acres of agricultural land. He also
purchased some land on 20.10.1961. The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of
Ceiling Land) Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as "The Act") came
into force on 5.4.1960. A proceeding under the Act was initiated by the authorised
officer who came to the conclusion that the appellant was in possession of 7.01
standard acres as surplus land, over and above the permitted ceiling area of 30
standard acres. The appellant challenged the said order of the authorised
officer by filing a Revision before Land Commissioner who ultimately remanded
the matter to the authorised officer for re-disposal. After the matter came
back on remand the authorised officer prepared a revised draft statement
indicating therein that the total surplus land in possession of the appellant
comes to 19.28 standard acres. It may be stated that subsequent acquisition
made by the appellant was taken into consideration for computing the surplus
land. The appellant - land owner filed objection to the said draft statement
contending inter alia that two settlement deeds have been executed in favour of
two minor sons on 28.4.1970 and on 2.5.1970 and those transfers are valid under
Section 21-A of the Act, and as such they should be excluded from the
computation of the ceiling surplus in the hands of the appellant and on such
exclusion the appellant cannot be said to have any excess land in his
possession. The authorised officer, however rejected the said objection and the
matter being carried in an appeal, the appeal was also dismissed.
The
appellant then preferred a Revision to the High Court and the High Court by the
impugned judgment in C.W.P No.3688 of 1982 having negatived the contention of the
appellant and having dismissed the Revision, the present appeal has been
preferred. The High Court considered the provisions of Section 21-A which came
into the Statute by Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970 with effect from 15th February,
1970, as well as Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the said Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970
and came to the conclusion that the proceedings in the present case having been
initiated under the Principal Act the same has to be continued and concluded thereunder
and, as such Section 21-A which was brought into the Statute by Tamil Nadu Land
Reforms (Reduction of Ceiling on Land), Act 1970 (Act XVII of 1970) will have
no application.
The
learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that in view of non-obstante
clause in Section 21-A and the legislatures having allowed a land owner to
transfer a part of his land between 15.2.1970 and 2.10.1970 the High Court
committed serious error in coming to the conclusion that Section 21-A has no
application to the present case. According to the learned counsel Section 21-A
has an overriding effect on all provisions of the Land Reform Act or even any
other law in force and, therefore, the said provision must have its full play
and cannot be restricted in any manner so as to exclude its operation to a proceeding
which had been initiated prior to coming into force of the said Tamil Nadu Act
XVII of 1970. In support of his contention reliance was placed on the decisions
of this court in the case of Susila Devi Ammal & Ors. vs. State of Madras -
1993 (1) Supreme Court Cases 462, and V. Gopal reddiar & Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 1995 Supp, (2)
Supreme Court Cases respondent - State on the other hand contended, that the
aforesaid interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Tamil Nadu Act
XVII of 1970, namely, to reduce the ceiling area from 30 standard acres to 15
standard acres and therefore, the High Court rightly held that Section 21-A
will have no application.
Before
examining the correctness of the rival submissions it would be appropriate for
us to notice the decision of this Court in Varadarajulu's case (supra) as a
Bench of this Court apparently thought that there is a conflict between the
said decision and the decision in V. Gopal Reddiar's case (supra). In Vardarajulu
(supra) the question for consideration was whether Section 21-A overrides
Section 3(42)? Section 3(42) defines Stridhana Land to mean any land held on
the date of commencement of the Land Reforms Act by any female member of a
family in her own name. The expression 'held' would have its meaning from
Section 3(19) which defines 'to hold land'. Section 21-A has absolutely no
connection with Section 3(42) in as much as under Section 21-A the legislature recongnises
certain transfers made between 15-2-1970 and 2-10-1970 to be valid.
But if
the transfer or had no right to transfer question of legislature validating
such transfer would not arise. In Varadarajulu's case (supra) the said question
really arose for consideration and this Court held that since the transferer
was not holding the land as 'Stridhana land' the provisions of Section 21-A
will have no application. In V. Gopal Reddiar's case (supra) the question for
consideration was whether a proceeding under the parent Act of 58 of 1961
having been initiated but had not been concluded and Tamil Nadu Land Reforms
(Reduction of Ceiling on Land) Act 1970 having come into force whether Section
21-A brought into the statue by virtue of Act XVII of 1970 would apply and this
Court answered in affirmative. We, therefore, do not find any inconsistency
between the decision of the Court in Vardarajulu and Gopal Reddiar, the two
operating in different fields. In M.K. Harihara Iyer vs. Authorised Officer,
Land Reforms Tiruneveli - 1990 (supp.) SCC 182 a Three Judge Bench of this
Court considered the question of applicability of Section 21-A vis-a-vis
Section 22 thereof and came to hold that Section 21-A which begins with the
words 'Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 clearly overrides
Section 22 and, therefore, the transactions referred to in Section 21-A cannot
be the subject matter of enquiry under Section 22. The interpretation of
Section 21-A came up again in the case of Susila Devi (supra). In the said case
certain partitions in the family had taken place within the interregnum. But
the High Court had come to the conclusion that the Authorised Officer shall
calculate the ceiling area under Section 23 as if no transfer had taken place.
This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and came to hold that while
reducing the ceiling area of a person from 30 standard acres to 15 standard
acres under Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970 the legislatures have granted the
transfer holiday for a small period between 15.2.70 to 2.10.70 as contained in
Section 21-A and the said provision would apply notwithstanding anything
contained in Section 22 or any other provision of the Act or any other law for
the time being in force, and, therefore, while computing the ceiling, the
transfers if falls within any other clause of Section 21-A have to be given
effect to. This decision was also relied on in Gopal Reddiar's case (supra) and
it was held that for the purpose of determining the final holding under the
modified Principal Act the amended Section 23 will have to be applied to the
ceiling holding determined under the original Principal Act and for that
purpose the sale transactions between the two dates, namely, 15.2.70 and
1.10.70 will have to be ignored. It was also held that while pendency of the
ceiling proceedings under the Principal Act, Act XVII of 70 having come into
force and inserting Section 21-A into the Parent Act, if any land has been
voluntarily transferred to an educational institution between the two dates
then said land has to be excluded under Section 21-A. In other words Section
21-A was made applicable to a proceeding which had been initiated under the
Parent Act and was pending when said Section 21-A was brought on to the Statute
book. In view of the aforesaid two decisions and on examining the provisions of
Tamil Nadu Act XVII of 1970 more particularly Section 21-A, we have no
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the said provision does apply to a
proceeding which was pending on the date the aforesaid provision was inserted
in the parent Act even though the proceeding might have been initiated under
the Parent Act itself and the High Court committed error in holding that
Section 21-A will have no application as the ceiling proceeding had been
initiated under the Parent Act.
We may
notice at this stage the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent that the object of the Act being to further reduce the
ceiling area.
Section
21-A, if is made applicable to the pending proceeding then said object would be
frustrated. We are afraid that this contention cannot be sustained in as much
as when the language of a statute is unambiguous, in interpreting the
provisions thereof it is not necessary to look into the legislative intent or
the object of the Act.
As has
been stated by this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vijay Anand
Maharaj 1963 (1) Supreme Court Reports p.1, "When a language is plain and
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a
statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself." In the Sussex Peerage case
(1844) 11 CI&F 85, p.143 Tindal C.J. stated thus "If the works of the
statue are in themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary
than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense and the words
themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the
lawgiver." That apart, while the legislature intended to reduce the
ceiling area from 30 standard acres to 15 standard acres they themselves
provided for a transfer holiday by inserting Section 21-A as has been held by
this Court in Susila Devi's case (supra) and there would be no justification to
give any restrictive meaning to the said provision of Section 21-A where the
legislature indicated that the aforesaid provision is notwithstanding anything
contained in Section 22 or in any other provision of the Act or in any other
law for the time being in force. In this view of the matter it would not be
appropriate for us to give any restrictive meaning to Section 21-A of the Act
as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent.
In the
aforesaid premises the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the
authorities under the Act are set aside and we hold that the provisions of
Section 21-A would apply to the facts of the case for computation of ceiling
provided, however, all the necessary ingredients of the said provision are
attracted. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the matter is remanded back
to the authorised officer for recomputation of the ceiling in the light of the
law laid down by us in this judgment.
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