& Ors Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors  INSC 111 (19 February 1998)
Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao M.Jagannadha Rao.J.
appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka in Writ Appeal Nos.8451-53 of 1996 dated 11.6.1997 by which, the High
Court dismissed the Writ appeals and confirmed the judgment of the learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos. 23657 to 23659 of 1992 dated 23.7.1996. In
so doing, the High Court followed the judgment of a Division Bench in Writ
Appeal No. 1821 of Commissioner, Dharwar & Others) whereby the judgment in
Writ petition No. 16302 of 1987 dated 23.3.1995 was affirmed.
point concerns the applicability of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter called the Central Act, 1984) for the purposes of the
Karnataka Acquisition of land for House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the
Karnataka Act, 1972) (Act 18 of 1973). Appellants contend that the new Section
11-A is attracted to proceedings for land acquisition under the Karnataka Act,
1972 while the respondents contend that the Section 11-A is not so attracted.
The High Court has held, in the above decisions that Section 11-A is not
attracted to the karnataka Act, 1972.
shall refer to the facts. The appellants claim to be tenants in regard to
Survey No. 11, Thyamagondalu village, Nelamangala Taluk, of an extent of 10
acres 27 guntas. The said land was endowed to Sri Rama Devaru. Under Section 5
of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the Land Tribunal is said to have
conferred occupancy rights on the appellants on 27.8.1975, Some issues
regarding cancellation of the 3rd appellant's right are said to be still
pending. Notification dated 19.12.83 under section 3(1) of the Karnataka Act,
1972 was published in the gazette on 9.2.84. Thereafter notification under
section 3(4) was published in the gazette on 14.3.85. On 17.6.85, the 3rd
appellant filed Writ Petition No. 9079 of 1985 and stay of dispossession was
granted on 1.7.1985. Appellants 1 & 2 filed Writ Petitions and similar
orders were passed on 8.7.85 and 9.7.1985. On 31.7.90, Writ petition of 3rd
appellant was dismissed. On 1.2.91, Writ petitions of appellants 1 & 2 were
also dismissed. Thereafter, fresh Writ Petition Nos. 23657 to 59 of 1992 were
filed on 10.1.1992 and stay of dispossession was again granted on 1.2.1992
provided that possession was not taken. On 23.7.96, the said writ petitions
were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. In the Writ Appeals Nos. 8451-53,
the Court again ordered on 30.9.96 stay of dispossession. On 11.6.1997, the
Writ appeals were dismissed. In case it is to be held that Section 11-A of the
Central Act, 1894 is to be applied to the Karnataka Act, 1972, even if the
period of stay orders is excluded. the position is that the 2 years period
specified in Section 11- A has expired inasmuch as till now no award has been
appellants are said to be in possession still.
High Court holds section 11-A not applicable because of doctrine of incorporation'
acquisition here is under the karnataka Act, 1972.
contention of the appellants in the High Court is that, because of section 5 of
the karnataka Act adopting the Central Act of 1984 in certain respects, section
11-A introduced in the Central Act in 1984 is applicable and the proceedings
must be deemed to have lapsed.
Division Bench of the High Court has followed its Commissioner & others
(W.A. No. 1821 of 1995) dated 10.6.1997 and held that section 11-A of the
Central Act, 1894 cannot be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972, even if the
award was not passed within 2 years as stipulated in section 11-A. The High
Court, after referring to sections 3 and 4 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 observed
provisions of sections 3 and r appear to be self-contained so far as the
procedure for acquisition of the land is concerned. The provisions of the
Central Act 1 of 1894 have been made applicable apparently for the purpose of
determination of the amount payable in respect of the land acquire under the
provisions of the Act and for making reference to the Court." The High
Court referred to section 5 of the Karnataka Act of 1972, which stated that the
procedure of the Central Act in respect of inquiry and award by the Dy.
Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of amount and the
payment of amount, applied. Then the High Court observed:
an adoption in the legal sense of the term is known as legislation by
referential incorporation.... Perusal of Section 5 however does not show that
the Central Act was adopted generally with respect to a subject as genus. As
already held, the said act was adopted by reference to the statute as it
existed at the time of incorporation. The Central Act was adopted, as noted
earlier, upto 1961 and not onwards. Section 11-A of the Act was admittedly
incorporated vide Act No. 69 of 1984, much less after the adoption of the
Central Act No. 1/1984".
High Court then observed that this aspect is covered by a decision rendered by
the same Court under the Bangalore Development Authority (ILR 1996 Karn. 1258)
wherein after referring to the principle of incorporation, it was held that
section 11-A was not attracted to the acquisition under that Act. The high
Court has applied that judgment to the present case which has arisen under the
Karnataka Act, 1972. In Iswarappa's case, the High Court has also held that the
purposes of the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central Act, 1894 are different,
they are meant to deal with different situations and they have provided
different modes of vesting of the acquired land in the State. Under the
Karnataka Act, a house site vests in the State on the publication of the
notification under Section 3(5) of that Act whereas land acquired under Central
Act, 1894 vests only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11 and not
otherwise. The provisions of the special law i.e. Karnataka Act, 1972 prevail
over provisions of a general law on the subject the Central Act. 1894. On the
above reasoning, the High Court in Iswarappa's case has held that the principle
of incorporation' applies and that section 11-A of the Central Act, 1894 cannot
be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972. The said judgment under appeal. It is the
correctness of the above view that falls for consideration before us.
of parties in this Court :
counsel for the respondents-State contends that the Karnataka Act being an Act
of 1972, the applicability of the provisions of the Central Act, 1894 as
modified by the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961
(hereinafter called the Karnataka Act, 1961) is restricted to what is
specifically stated in the body of Section 5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 and,
therefore amendments to the Central Act of 1894 subsequent to 1961, such as Section
11-A introduced in 1984 are not attracted to the Karnataka Act. 1972.
other hand, learned counsel for the appellants contends that Section 11-A
introduced into the Central Act, 1894 in 1984 has also to be read into the
Karnataka Act, 1972 for the following reasons :
words `mutatis mutatis' in section 5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 have the effect
of bringing in subsequent changes of the Central Act, 1894 into the karnataka
Central Act, 1894 is not merely "incorporated" but it is referred to
in section 5 as a piece of referential legislation.
even assuming that the Central Act was "incorporated" into the
Karnataka Act, 1972, the case on hand would fall within the following well
known exceptions to the said principle, namely, (a) Karnataka Act, 1972 does
not contain the full machinery for being treated as a complete code and has to
depend on the Central Act, 1894 for being functional, so far as
of compensation, are concerned.
provisions of the 1972 act and the Amendments introduced by the 1961 Act are
not sufficient to make the 1972 Act a complete code by itself.
Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central Act, 1894 are supplemental to each other.
Both the Acts are pari materia inasmuch as the subject matter of 1972 Act could
have otherwise come within the ambit of the Central Act. 1894 and the Karnataka
Act, 1972 does not deal with any subject other than acquisition of land.
Karnataka Act, 1972: contains only seven sections and no machinery for inquiry
shall initially refer to the provisions contained in the karnataka Act, 1972.
an Act "to provide for acquisition of lands for grant of house sites to
weaker sections of the people of the State". The preamble says:
"whereas it is expedient to provide for the acquisition of lands for the
public purposes of granting house sites to weaker sections of the people in the
State and for purposes connected therewith". Section 2(2) defines
notification' as the notification published in the gazette. Section 2(3)
defines weaker sections' as belonging to scheduled Castes and Tribes, `landless
labourers' and such other classes of persons to be notified depending on their
economic backwardness. Section 2(4) defines land' and person interested' as
having the same meaning given to those words in the Central Act, 1894 as
amended by the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961.
3 deals with acquisition of land' and corresponds to section 4(1) of the
Central Act, 1894. Under Section 3(1) if the State Government is of opinion
that any land is required for the purpose of providing house sites to the
weaker sections of people who are house-less, that State Government may, by
notification give notice of its intention to acquire such land. Section 3(2)
requires the State Government to serve notice on the owner or occupier or
persons known to be interested in the land, to show cause, within 30 days of
service, why the land should not be acquired. Section 3(3) states that after
considering the causes, if any, shown and after giving an opportunity to be
heard, the Government may pass such order as it deems fit.
3(4) which corresponds to section 6(1) of the Central Act, 1894 states that the
Government shall, in case it decides to acquire, issue a declaration by
Section 3(5), on such declaration being published under Section 3(4) the land
shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Under
Section 3(6), once the land is so vested under Section 3(5), the Government
may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession to
surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Government or any person duly
authorized within 30 days. Section 3(7) permits possession to be taken by
Government, if the occupant does not surrender the land.
4 of the Act deals with "Amount payable". It will be noticed that to
some extent the above provisions deviate from the corresponding provisions of
the Central Act, 1894.
mainly concerned with Section 5. It deals with "Application of Central Act
1 of 1894" and reads as follows:
5: Application of Central Act 1 of 1894: The provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) as amended by the land Acquisition (Karnataka
Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961 shall, mutatis mutatis apply in respect of
enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the
apportionment of amount and the payment in respect of Land acquisition under
this Act." Section 6 deals with power of State Government to delegate its
powers (except those under Section 7). Section 7 deals with rule making power
and laying the same before the legislative.
the above, it will be seen that the Karnataka Act, 1972 contains only seven
sections and that it does not contain any independent machinery or provisions
for the purpose of inquiry, reference, award and apportionment and payment of
5 of Karnataka Act, 1972 speaks of amendments to the Central Act, 1894 by the
Karnataka Act 1961:
5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 refer to the application of the Central Act, 1894
as amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961. These amendments concern the following
section of the Central Act, 1894 - Sections 1(2), Section 3 (aa), (d), (e), (ee),
(f), proviso (iii) (g), (b); (1) 4(1A), 4(2), (3) (4, 5-5A(1), (2), (6) (1A),
(2) - (Section 8 is omitted), 9(2), (3),(4), 10(1), addition of proviso to 11,
12(1) (2), 12-A, 15-a, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26(2), 27(2),
28, 30-A, 34, 35 (1A) (1B) (ii), 35(2), 37-A, 45, 46, 50, 54. We are not
referring to the details of these amendments except to say that the Dy.
replaces the Collector, certain extra details are to be given in Sections 4, 6
notifications, the Section 4(1) notification has also be served on the owner or
occupier, report on Section 5-A inquiry is to be approved by the Government,
the State Government may revise the Dy.
orders, application for reference to Court is to be made within 90 days of
service of notice under section 12(2) and the Dy. Commissioner is to make a
reference to the Civil Court in 90 days failing which the affected party can
directly move the civil Court. In Section 24 certain other factors are
introduced for determining market value. Section 28 and 34 are amended fixing a
rate of interest of 5% rather than 6%. There are a few other amendments which
are not material in the present context.
will be noticed that for purposes of the Karnataka Act, 1972 the provisions in
the Central Act (as amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961) apply in respect of
inquiry, award by the Dy. Commissioner, in respect of the procedure for
reference to a Civil Court and an adjudication by the Civil Court on the
question of compensation and apportionment. On these aspects, there are - as
pointed out earlier, no provisions in the Karnataka Act, 1972.
words mutatis mutatis' in Section 5 bring in the latter Central amendments into
the Karnataka Act. 1972? One of the submissions for the appellant was that
Section 5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 states that the Central Act, 1894 (as
amended by Karnataka Act, 1961) shall, mutatis mutatis, apply in respect of
enquiry and award by the Dy.
the reference to Court, the apportionment of amount and the payment of amount
and that therefore the subsequent amendments in 1984 to the Central Act, 1894
have to be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972.
words mutatis mutatis' have been explained by 1983 (2) SCC 82. It was stated by
Venkataramiah, J, (as he then was):
1 Jowitt's The Dictionary of English Law (1959) defines mutat is mutatis' as
with necessary changes in points in detail, meaning that matters or things are
generally the same, but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices and
of an earlier Act mutatis mutatis to a later Act, brings in the idea of
adaptations, but so for only as it is necessary for the purpose making an
change without altering the essential nature of the things changed subject of
course to express provisions made in the later Act".
therefore, the words mutatis mutatis' merely permit the application of the
Central Act, 1894 (as modified by Karnataka Act, 1961) with necessary changes
and without altering the essential nature of the thing changed then the said
principle is applicable to the Central Act, 1894 as it stood in 1972 with the
amendments brought about the Karnataka Act, 1961. Therefore the contention for
the appellant that subsequent changes made in the Central Act after 1972 also
get into the karnataka Act, 1972, cannot be accepted. That question again
depends upon whether the Central Act, 1894 has been incorporated' into the
Karnataka Act, 1972 or falls within the exceptions to the said principle or
whether Section 5 is to be treated as a pice of referential legislation'.
of referential legislation and exceptions to Incorporation - supplemental
legislation-' As the case before us, as we shall presently show, falls within
the exception' to the rule of incorporat ion', we shall refer to the relevant
rulings in this behalf.
leading case in which the broad principles were 1975 (2) SCC 377. On a
consideration of the case-law, it was stated by Fazal Ali, J. as follows:
a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed
provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and
are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This
principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:
Where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other.
Where the two Acts are in pari materia.
Where the amendment in the previous Act, is not imparted into the subsequent Act
also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and
Where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary
intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act."
that case, the position was that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adopted
the definition of public servant from Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code ,
Question was whether the subsequent amendments made in 1958 and 1964 to section
21 of the Penal Code enlarging the definition of public servant', could be read
into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Though it was held that the 1947
Act dealt with a specific offence of criminal misconduct, while the Penal Code
dealt with bribery' and were not in pari materia still, it was held that having
regard to the preamble and object of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and
the Penal code, there could be no doubt that the former Act was undoubtedly a
statute supplemental to the latter. hence it was held that the amendments of
1958 and 1964 in the I.P.C. should be read into the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, as the case fell within one of the exceptions to the principle of
[1982 (1) SCC 125], Section 69(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh
Adhiniyam (Act 23/73) stated that the special Area Development Authority under
that Act would, for the purpose of taxation have the powers which a Municipal
Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the M.P. Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956 or the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, as the case may be. Chandrachud,
C.J. gave two reasons as to why the subsequent amendments made in the 1956 and
1961 Acts could be read into the 1973 Act. One reason was that the Act of 1973
did not, in Section 69(d), incorporate any particular provision of the 1956 and
1961 Act but said that for the purposes of taxation' the Authority shall have
the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council would have
under the 1956 and 1961 Acts respectively. It was not therefore a case where
merely some provisions of one Act were bodily lifted into another. The other
reason was that the 1973 Act did not provide for any independent power of
taxation or any machinery of its own for the exercise of the power of taxation.
Further, the three Acts were supplemental to each other.
a similar case. Under Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
Special Importance) Act, 1957 it was said that the provisions of the Central
Excise and salt Act, 1944 and rules made thereunder - including those relating
to refunds and exemptions from duty - shall, so far as may be, apply in
relation to the levy and collection of the additional duties as they apply in
relation to the levy and collocating of the duties of excise on the goods specified
in sub-section (1). Now section 3(1) provided for levy and collection of
additional duties in respect of goods described in the First Schedule to the
1957 Act which were produced or manufactured' in India. It was held that the
definition of the term manufacture' enacted in the Central Excise and Salt Act,
1944 - as enlarged by Amendment Act 6 of 1980 - had to be read into the 1957
Act. It was observed that the Additional Duties Act, 1957 was merely
supplemental to the 1944 Act. While the 1944 Act imposed a general levy of
excise duty on all goods manufactured and produced, the aim of the 1957 Act was
to supplement the levy by an additional duty of the same nature on certain
goods. Unlike the Finance Act, the 1957 Act was incomplete as to the basis of the
charge and its provisions would become totally unworkable unless the concepts
of manufacture' and asses sable' value as determined under the 1944 Act were
carried into it.
another case where the legislation was held by itself to be unworkable' and supplemental
to another Act (1) SCC 733]. It was there held that the scope of exemption
under the head cotton fabrics' in schedule III item 7 of the Kerala General
Sales Tax Act, 1963 would depend upon the definition in item 19 of Schedule I
to Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 with reference to its amendments upto the
relevant date. hence it was held that the amendments to the Central Act were to
be read into the Kerala Act.
other rulings of this Court relating to land acquisition and which arose from
Karnataka are relevant in this context. In the State of Karnataka, there are two statutes,- the Mysore
Improvement Act, 1903 and the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945. In each of these Acts there is a provision
(Section 23 in the former and Section 27 in the latter) stating that the
acquisition under the Act "shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as
they are applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894" and also by
certain other provisions of these Acts. (The Mysore Act of 1894 and the Central
Act 1894 are almost identical).
both these Acts of 1903 and 1945 contained provisions which require
compensation to be paid with reference to the second notification which
publishes the declaration' (i.e. corresponding to Section 6 of the Central Act,
1894) and not the one which corresponds to Section 4 of the Central Act.
However in 1927, the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was amended by directing
compensation to be paid with reference to the first notification (corresponding
to Section 4 (1) of the Central Act). Question arose in two cases, one under
each of these Acts, as to whether the said amendment of 1927 would have to be
read into the said Acts.
far as the Bangalore Act of 1945 is concerned, H.Narayaniah [1976 (4) SCC 9].
This case presents no difficulty because the said Act was passed in 1945 and by
that, the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 already stood amended in 1927. The
reference in Section 27 of the 1945 Act to the Mysore Act of 1894 therefore
obviously included all the amendments made to the Mysore Land Acquisition 1894
by 1945 including the one made in 1927 and, therefore, compensation was to paid
only as per the first notification (i.e. the one corresponding to Section 4(1)
of the Central Act).
case more in point is the one in Special Land dealt with the Mysore Act of 1903
because the question there was whether the subsequent amendment of 1927 to the Mysore
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shifting the relevant date for fixing compensation
from the corresponding Section 6 notification to Section 4(1) notification,
would have to be read into the Mysore Act, 1903. It was held that it should -
notwithstanding certain obiter observation to the contrary in Naravanaih's
case. The provision in section 23 of the Mysore Act, 1903 read as follows:
23 The acquisition, otherwise than by agreement of land within or without the
city under this Act, shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are
applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act 1894 and by the following further
provisions, namely,." It was held by this Court that the amendments in
1927 to the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be read into the Mysore
Act, 1903. The decision of the Full Bench of Special Land Acquisition Officer,
[AIR 1972 Mysore 193] was overruled. In that context Beg J. (as he then was)
Section 23(1) of the (Mysore) Acquisition Act (1903) lays down, as we think it
does, the only procedure for award of compensation it has to be followed as it
exists at the time of acquisition proceedings. No one has a vented right in a
particular procedure. It is a fair interpretation of Section 23 of the Mysore
Act of 1903 to hold that it means that whichever may be the procedure there,
with regard to matters regulating compensation under the (Mysore) Acquisition
Act (1894) at the time of acquisition proceedings, will apply to acquisition
under the Mysore Act, (1903)"....
was enough to lay down, as Section 23 of the Mysore Act (1903) does, that the
general procedure found in the Acquisition Act (1894) will apply except to the
extent it was inapplicable. This means that amendments of the procedure in the
Acquisition Act, (1894) will apply if it is capable of application" (words
in brackets supplied).
the above passage (words in brackets supplied) is clear that when the mysore
act, 19903 adopted the procedure under the Mysore Act, 1894, the provisions of
the latter Act as they stood "at the time of acquisition" had to be
applied for regulating' the acquisition of land under the Mysore Act, 1903.
This was because the Mysore Act, 1903 said that the "general
procedure" under the Mysore Act, 1894 applied except to the extent it was
view, the above rulings of this Court are more in point and are directly
applicable to the Karnataka Act, 1972. But, before we draw our final
conclusions, it is necessary to refer to three more rulings, one decided by the
Privy Council and two decided by this Court recently and state why, in our
opinion, those decisions are distinguishable.
of the Privy Council is the one in 1931 PC 148]. There the provisions of the
Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 (Act 13/1911) fell for consideration.
Act coupled with its schedule contained provisions not only for issuing
relevant notification in regard to acquisition but also for reference to a
Tribunal for passing an award relating to compensation. By Act 18 of 1911 a
right of appeal was given to the High Court against the Award of the Tribunal.
Under the Act, there was no further right of appeal to the Privy Council. In
1921, the Central Act, 1894 was amended in two respects, one by introducing
Section 26(2) which deemed the award of the reference Court a decree' and the
reasons a Judgment' and the other an amendment in Section 54 of the Central
Act, 1894 giving a right of appeal to the Privy Council from any decree passed
by the High Court from an award of the reference Court. Now the Calcutta Act,
1911 contained a provision in Section 69 that the "Board may acquire land
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying out the purposes of the
Act". Section 70 related to the constitution of a Tribunal - as detailed
in Section 72 - for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in
reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the land Acquisition
Act, 1894. However, Section 71 modified the Central Act, 1894 as follows:
71: Modification of Land Act, 1894: For the purpose of acquiring land under the
said Act for the Board –
the Tribunal shall (except for the purpose of Section 54 of that Act) be deemed
to be the Court, and the President of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the
Judge, under the said Act.
said act shall be subject to the further modifications indicated in the
award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894." The modification made by section 71 (a) was
crucial to the case.
77 referred to the passing of the award' by the Tribunal under the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, for determining the compensation,
appellant, the Secretary of State, contended that the appeal to the Privy
Council lay because the amendment to the Central Act in 1921 by substituting
Section 26(2) which deemed the award' a decree' had to be read into the
Calcutta Act, 1911 and if that was done, then an appeal would lie, under
Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 to the Privy Council. The respondents
contended that such a telescoping of Section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894
into the Calcutta Act, 1911 would be repugnant to the express words in Section
71(a): "except for the purposes of Section 54 of the Act".
said contention of the respondents was accepted by the privy Council. Their
Lordships also Lord Wrenbury in Ex parte St. Sepulchre (1864) [33 L.J. Ch. 372]
to the effect that it will not be possible to read the provisions of an earlier
Act into a latter Act, if the earlier Act "gives in itself a complete rule
on the subject matter" It was also observed that the provision in Section
70(a) of the Calcutta Act, 1911 deliberately excluding Section 54 of the
Central Act, 1894 was "an indication of the local legislature's intention
that there should be, under the special Code applicable to the Improvement
Trust, no appeals beyond the High Court".
other words, two reasons were given by their lordships as to why section 26(2)
of the Central Act, 1894 could not be read into the Calcutta Act, 1911. One was
that reading Section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 into the Calcutta Act, 1911
would be repugnant to Section 70(a) of the Calcutta Act, 1911 which expressly
excluded Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 from the purview of the Calcutta
Act. The other was that such telescoping would not be permissible if the latter
statute which, in certain respects, referred to an earlier statute, was
otherwise a complete Code by itself. This is clear from the fact that the
Calcutta Act, 1911 Contains 177 sections and a schedule, Chapter III relates to
schemes and publication of notifications in that behalf and Chapter IV deals
with acquisition and disposal of land containing sections 68 to 81; among
these, section 70 deals with reference to the Tribunal: Section 77 deals with
passing of award by the Tribunal; Section 71(b) and the Schedule to the Act
(which contains 14 clauses) deals with various matters relating to
notifications as well as fixation of market value. On the other hand, we have
no such elaborate machinery provided in the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Act has
only seven sections.
Karnataka Act does not contain any separate procedure for inquiry, award not
does it constitute a Tribunal in the place of the reference Court as done by
the Calcutta Act of 1911. That is why we are of the view that the Privy Council
decision is clearly distinguishable.
other two recent decisions of this Court in Gauri to acquisition under the UP Avas
Vikas Parishad Adhinyam 1965. We shall refer to the scheme of the UP Act, 1965
Chapter III of that Act deals with formulation of schemes and issue of
notifications (sections 15 to 49); Chapter V deals with land acquisition etc.
Sections 55 to 63, Chapter VI with constitution of Tribunal and its purposes,
section 55 of the Act reads as follows:
55(1): Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the
purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894) as amended in its application to
Utter Pradesh, which for the purpose shall be subject to the modifications
specified in the schedule to this Act".
64 (1) says that the Tribunal shall perform the functions of the reference
Court under the Central Act, 1894 as modified by the Schedule, in the matter of
determining the compensation. Section 66 says that the Award of the Tribunal
shall, in case of land acquisition under Central Act, 1894 as modified by the
Schedule, be deemed to be an award of the Court under the Central Act and
shall, subject to section 54 of that Act, be final. Section 67 says award of
the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a decree and the UP Act, 1965 contains an
elaborate machinery like the Calcutta Act, 1911.
Shankar's case, decided by K.Ramaswamy & Sahai, JJ. the notifications for
acquisition under Section 28 (1) were of the year 1973 while the notifications
under Section 32 (1) were of 1977. Before 1948, the Allahabad High Court had
taken the view that the notification under Section 32 (1) corresponding to
declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Central Act need not be issued within 3
years of the notification under Section 28(1) corresponding to section 4(1) of
the Central Act. In cases arising after 1948, it was also held by the Allahabad
High Court that Section 11-A was not applicable to the UP Act. Gauri Shankar's
case related to the 3 year rule in the proviso to Section 6 of the Central Act.
K.Ramaswamy, J. held (para 8) that the principle of incorporation' applied and
that the provisions of Section 28, 32 of the UP Act, 1965 were a separate and
complete code, that Section 55 read with clause (2) of the Schedule, which
contained the need for issuing the preliminary and final notification under
sections 28 and 32 of the UP Act, formed an integral scheme (para 25). The
Schedule amended Sections 4, 6, 17 and 23 of the Central Act, 1894. It was
pointed out that Section 28(2) and Section 32 (1) related to the publication of
notifications without prescribing any limitation and that the UP Act 1965 was
"a complete code in itself". It was also held that the Act was not
otherwise unworkable or ineffectual, though it may be incompatible with the
provisos to Section 6(1) of L.A. Act (para 33). On the other hand, sahai, J.
held that the principle of incorporation' did not apply but that of facts, it
was not a fit case for interference inasmuch as the Parishad had already taken
possession. In that view of the matter, both the learned Judges directed
compensation as on the date when the notification corresponding to Section 6
declaration was issued. We shall next to refer to the recent judgment in Jainul
Islam's case where the opinion of K.Ramaswamy, J. was accepted.
question which arose in Jainul Islam's case [1998 (1) SCALE 185] under the same
UP Act. 1965 was whether Section 23(1-A), Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the
Central Act, 1894 as amended in 1984, were attracted to the UP Act.
the view of K.Ramaswamy, J. in Gauri Shankar's case [1994 (1) SCC 92], Agrawal,
J. held that the principle of incorporation' applied and therefore the above
amendments of 1948 to the Central Act, 1894 did not apply.
was also made to the Privy Council Judgment in Society Ltd. [AIR 1931 PC 149].
After considering the various provisions of the UP Act, 1965, it was held (para
21), that provisions of Section 55 and Schedule to the Act were "on the
same lines" as the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 and
that the principles laid down by the Privy Council were equally applicable.
Adverting Narasimhan [1975 (2) SCC 377], it was observed that the UP Act, 1965
and the Central Act, 1894 did not come within the exceptions and that the
provisions of the UP Act, 1965 were not supplemental' to each other, nor was
the UP Act in pari materia with the Central Act because it dealt with other
matters which did not fall within the ambit of the Central Act. The UP Act was
self contained and complete . Agrawal, J. observed (para 23) as follows:
Adhinyam and the L.A. Act cannot be regarded supplemental to each other. The Adhinyam
contains provisions regarding acquisition of land which are complete and self-
contained. Nor can the provisions in the Adhinyam be said to be in pari materia
with the L.A. Act because the Adhinyam also deals with matters which do not
fall within the ambit of the L.A. Act".
view, these three rulings, namely Secretary of 149], Gauri Shankar's case [1994
(1) SCC 92] and Jainul Islam's case [1998 (1) Scale 185], are clearly
distinguishable. As pointed out earlier the Karnataka Act, 1972 has only 7
Sections which deal with the issuance of notification corresponding to Sections
4 and 6, and 9 of Central Act and certain other minor modification relating to
acquisition and payment of compensation. The Act has no provision for a
separate inquiry or award or reference to a Tribunal, or a machinery for
payment of compensation of apportionment. The Central Act, 1894 alone is to
apply in so far as it related to inquiry and award, the reference to Court, the
apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of lands acquired
under the Act'. There are no detailed provisions as in the Calcutta Act, 1911
or as in the UP Act, 1965.
of the view that the Karnataka Act, 1972 clearly comes within the exceptions
stated in M.V. Narasimhan's case for the following reasons:
there being no detailed machinery whatsoever in the Karnataka Act, 1972, that
Act cannot be treated as a self-contained or complete Code. Secondly, the
Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central Act, 1894 (as amended by the Karnataka Act,
1961) are supplemental to each other for unless the Central Act supplements the
karnataka Act, the latter cannot function. Thirdly, these acts are in pari materia
because the karnataka Act, 1972 - unlike the Calcutta Act, 1911 and the UP Act,
1965 - does not deal with any other subject but deals with the same subject of
land acquisition which otherwise would have fallen within the ambit of the
Central Act, 1894. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the
amendments made in 1948 to the Central Act, 1894 including Section 11-A have to
be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972, so far as enquiry, award, reference to
Court, apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of land
acquired under the Act.
the prescribed period under section 11-A has elapsed and it is stated that even
now, the award is not passed. Therefore, it is clear that the conditions of
section 11-A are violated, and accordingly, the entire land acquisition
proceedings including the notifications under section 3(1) and 3(4) of the
Karnataka Act, 1972 lapse. We declare accordingly.
parting with the case, we may say that in this appeal we are concerned only
with the question whether section 11-A as introduced by the Amendment in 1984
to the Central Act 1894 could be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972 and we have
held that it should be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972 because there is not
such provision in the Karnataka Act, 1972 as amended by the Karnataka Act,
question as to the telescoping of other amendments brought to the Central Act,
1894 by the 1984 amendment and the consequential impact thereof is not before
us and we should not be understood as deciding any such matter. If the question
of applicability of any other amendment brought by the Central Act in 1984 to
the Karnataka Act, 1972 arises in Karnataka, such a question may have to be
in the impugned Judgment, certain rulings under the Bangalore Development Act,
1976 have been followed. We have gone by the provisions of the Karnataka Act,
1972. We are not to be understood as having said anything with regard to the
Bangalore Development Act, 1976.
in fact told that some that some appeals are pending in this Court in regard to
the said Act of 1976.
result, the appeals are allowed and it is declared that the notifications
issued under the Act under Section 3(1) and Section 3(4) have lapsed.