Sonic Electrochem
& Anr Vs. Sales Tax Officer & Ors [1998] INSC 403 (11 August 1998)
S.P.
Bharucha, G.B. Pattanaik Pattanaik, J.
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
THE 11
THE DAY OR AUGUST, 1998 Present:
Hon'ble
Mr. Justice S.P. Bharucha Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.B. Pattanaik Vivek Gambhir,
Adv. for the appellants Ms. Hamantika Wahi, Adv. for the Respondents
The
following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
The
short question that arises in this appeal is whether JET - MAT produced by the
appellant would come within Entry 129 of Schedule II Part A of the Gujarat
Sales Tax Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') issued under Section
49 of the Act. The said entry at the relevant point of time read thus:------------------------------------------------------------
S.No. Description of goods Rate of sales tax Rate of purchase tax
------------------------------------------------------------ 129 Mosquito
Twelve paise Twelve paise in Repellents in the rupee the rupee
------------------------------------------------------------ Though in the High
Court appellant had challenged the validity of Entry 129 of Schedule II Part A
of the Act on the ground that it violates Article 14 of the Constitution and
the High Court negatived the same, the appellant in this appeal does not
challenge the said conclusion of the High Court. After examining different
entries the High Court by the impugned judgement came to the conclusion that
JET MAT is nothing but a mosquito repellent within the ambit of Entry 129, and
therefore, is taxable.
Mr.
Salve learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the JET
MAT manufactured by the appellant is an insecticide and not a repellent would
therefore could be exempted from tax under entry 98 to the extent contained
therein and the conclusion of the High Court that it is a repellent and as such
taxable under Entry 129 is erroneous. In support of this contention Mr. Salve
referred to the Certificate of Registration in favour of the appellant issued
under Section 9(3) of the Insecticides Act, 1968, the leaflet and the approved
label of the commodity in question, the formulation contents of the said
commodity and the chemistry of the active ingredients and submitted that all
these documents unequivocally indicate the product in question to be an insecticide.
The learned counsel also submitted that an exemption notification has to be
construed broadly and widely as has been held by this Court in the case of
BOMBAY CHEMICAL PVT. LTD. V. COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY, 1995 Supp (2)
SCC 646, and consequently there would be no justification not to hold the JET
MAT to be an insecticide and as such exempted from levy of sales tax on the
sale and purchase of the same under Entry 98 of the Act. Mr. Salve also in this
connection placed reliance on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Misc.
Petition
No. 1452 of 1989, wherein the Madhya Pradesh High Court held the product to be
an insecticide and a judgment of the Orissa High Court in OJC No. 8126 of 1992,
wherein the Orissa High Court took the view that the JET MAT was a pesticide
and as such exempted under the notification issued under Section 6 of the Orissa
Sales Tax Act. Mr. Dholakia, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent on the other hand contended that the product of the appellant is
nothing but a mosquito repellent coming within the ambit of Entry 129 of the
Act and a repellent does not cease to be so merely because by its action
mosquitoes are also killed.
According
to Mr. Dholakia the High Court was fully justified in its conclusion that the
product manufactured by the appellant comes within the ambit of Entry 129.
It may
be noticed that prior to August, 1990, namely, before insertion of Entry 129
the product in question with which we are concerned was being taxed under the
residuary Entry 13 of Schedule III of the Act. With effect from 1.8.1990 Entry
129 was inserted in Schedule II Part A of the Act and a notification was also
issued under Section 49(2) granting partial exemption to the sale or purchase
of pesticides and insecticides under Entry 98. In view of the specific Entry
129 dealing with mosquito repellents it is difficult to accept the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant that the product in question will not
come within the ambit of Entry 129 since one of its constituents 'd- Allethrin
4%' happens to be an insecticide. The product JET MAT which is the trade name
containing 'd-Allethrin 4%' and is commercially known as 'Mosquito Repellent
Mat' in our considered opinion is a mosquito repellent notwithstanding the fact
that it not only repels the mosquitoes but also is capable of killing the
mosquitoes. It is difficult to hold that it is an insecticide entitled for
partial exemption under Entry 98 of the Act. In the Madhya Pradesh case on
which Mr. Salve relied upon the question for consideration was whether the
product in question is liable to Sales Tax at the rate of 3% under Entry 18 of
Part IV of Schedule II or at the rate of 12% under Entry 1 of Part VI of
Schedule II. Entry 18 of Part IV of Schedule II provided for levy of tax for
insecticides. The other competing entry, namely, Entry 1 of Part VI of Schedule
II has not been quoted anywhere in the judgment nor has it been discussed and
on the other hand the learned Judges have merely held that JET MAT could be an
insecticide coming within Entry 18 of Part IV of Schedule II. In the Orissa
case under the notification issued under Section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
pesticide was exempted from levy of sales tax and the question for
consideration was whether the 'Mosquito Repellent Mat' produced under the trade
name of 'JET MAT' containing 'd-Allethrin 4%' could be entitled to the
exemption in question. The case of the Revenue was that it is an insecticide
and not pesticide. The court came to hold that 'insecticide' will come within
the expression 'pesticide' for the purpose of exemption. The aforesaid two
decisions dealing with different entries under two different Sales Tax Acts can
have no bearing in interpreting the provisions of Gujarat Sales Tax Act with
which we are concerned in the present case. In the case in hand when Entry 129
clearly stipulates that Mosquito Repellent is taxable and the rate of tax has
been provided therein and in view of our conclusion that the appellant's
product in question is also a Mosquito Repellent, we see no infirmity with the
impugned judgment of the High Court requiring our interference. The appeal,
accordingly, fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no
order as to costs.
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