The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. M/S.
Price Waterhouse & ANR [1997] INSC 600 (11 July 1997)
K.
RAMASWAMY, G. B. PATTANAIK
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
K. Ramaswamy,
J.
Leave
granted.
This
appeal by special leave arises from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of
Delhi, made on September
12, 1996 in Civil Writ
No. 676 of 1994.
The
Export-Import Bank of India (for short, the 'EXIM BANK)
commissioned the services of the respondent firm to assist it in the
preparation of a book entitled "India - Your Software Opportunity". The need for such booklet was
explained by the EXIM Bank at the inside cover of the booklet which reads as under
:
"The
information set out in this publication, meant for general guidance, has been
compiled by Price Waterhouse (India) at the
instance of the Export - Import Bank of India (EXIM BANK). While the booklet is not intended to be an exhaustive
Treatment of the subject, the information contained is based on sources and
interpretations of applicable Legal provisions believed to be reliable for
which, however, both Exim Bank and Price Waterhouse (India) are unable to assume any
Liability. For further information, clarifications and assistance, interested
parties may communicate with Price Waterhouse offices located at:
1102/1107,
Raheja Chambers, Nariman Point, Bombay - 400021. Telephones : 235138/2870466. Talex : (011) 5791. B-102, Himalaya House, 23, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi - 110001.
Telephones
: 3313591/3312656. Telex : (031) 63070." The appellant-Council had at
treated the said publication as amounting to solicitation of professional
attainments, violating clauses (6) and (7) of Part I of First Schedule to the
Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (for short, the 'Act') and called upon the
respondent by proceedings dated December 13, 1990 to send the name of the
members who were answerable to the charge of misconduct. On January 26, 1991, respondent No.2, Shri Amal Ganguli,
partner of the first respondent filed his written statement.
On
consideration thereof, by proceedings dated 5-6th August, 1991, the Council prima facie opined
that the second respondent and referred the case to the Disciplinary Committee
for enquiry and report. The Disciplinary Committee submitted its report on January 16, 1993. The Disciplinary Committee sent a
copy of the report to the second respondent informing him that if he so
desired, he may send his representation against the said report within 30 days.
By further letter dated July
6, 1993, it was
communicated to him that the report of the Disciplinary Committee would be
considered by the Council in its meeting from August 5 to 7, 1993 and that he can appear in person or through a
member.
On August 5, 1993, he sent a letter stating that the
report of the Disciplinary Authority may be accepted. On the even date, the
Council, after considering the report dated January 16, 1993 and the written submissions of the second respondent dated
5, 1993 came to the conclusion that further enquiry was necessary and decided
that the further enquiry should be made by the Disciplinary Committee. It was
communicated to him by letter dated December 21, 1993. On receipt thereof, the from
respondent on February 2, 1994, filed the above writ petition in the High Court
challenging the power of the Council to refer the matter to Disciplinary
Committee for further enquiry. The High Court in the impugned judgment opined
that by operation of the Regulation 16 made under the Act, the Council was
devoid of the power to direct the Disciplinary Committee to hold further
enquiry. Accordingly, it quashed the letter dated December 21, 1993 and allowed the writ petition. Thus, this appeal by special
leave.
Shri Vaidyanathan,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that the view taken by
the Division Bench is not correct in law. Section 21 of the Act read with
Regulation 16(3) and (4) gives power to the Council to direct the Disciplinary
Committee, which is a fact-finding committee, to make further enquiry and to
submit a report.
The
power under Section 21(2) of the Act should be used only after the Council
reaches the conclusion that the second respondent was not guilty of
professional misconduct of other misconduct. The council would take further
action only after consideration of further report to be submitted by the Disciplinary
Committee. The view of the High Court, therefore, is incorrect. If the view of
the High Court is upheld, the primacy would be given to the report of the
Disciplinary Committee denuding the power to the Council to maintain discipline
among the members of the Institute which is deleterious to maintain discipline
among its members.
Shri
P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other
hand, contends that the provisions, being penal in nature, require to be
construed strictly. The Disciplinary Committee is a high-power committee
constituted under the Act. If the Disciplinary Committee finds that the guilt
of misconduct has not been proved, the Council is left with no option but to
accept the finding of no-guilt and record the same under sub-section (2) of
Section 21. In case the finding of the Disciplinary Committee that the member
is guilty is not acceptable to the Council, only then, the Council has power to
remit to the Disciplinary Committee for further enquiry and the operation of
Regulation 16(4) would come into play. In that perspective, on a harmonious
interpretation of all the provisions, the finding of the high power committee,
namely, the Disciplinary Committee, should always be given primacy and serious
consideration by the Council before accepting or calling for further report.
From this perspective, the view of the High Court is correct in law. He also
contends that the Council has not applied its mind to the imputation of
misconduct as reflected in paragraph 10 of the Special Leave Petition.
Therefore, it has not applied its mind and mechanically acted upon to refer to
the Disciplinary Committee for further enquiry. A reading of the publication
itself does not posit of any professional misconduct or other misconduct to be
dealt with under the Act. Therefore, there is no case made out warranting
interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Having
regard to the respective contentions, the question that arises for
consideration is: whether the view taken by the High Court is correct in law?
The High Court in the impugned judgment has held thus:
"The
scheme of Regulation 16 is clear and unambiguous that in case of disciplinary
committee concluding that a member is not guilty, it is the end of the matter
and the disciplinary proceedings have to be dropped by the Council.
In
case the report of the disciplinary committee finds the member guilty, another
opportunity is granted to the member to make representation and on
consideration of the report and the representation, if any, the Council can
cause further enquiry to be held. The finding of misconduct is a serious matter
for a member and casts a stigma on him and, therefore, it appears that Council
has been empowered to get a further enquiry conduct on being satisfied on the
representation of a member or otherwise even after receipt of a report from the
disciplinary committee to the effect that a member is guilty of misconduct.
There
is, however, no such power when disciplinary committee exonerates a member
since.
Regulation
16 does not permit further enquiry to be held by the disciplinary committee
when it has concluded that the member is not guilty of any professional or
other misconduct. When we compare old Regulation 14 with the present Regulation
16, we find a clear departure in the language of Regulation 16. Regulation 14
was wider in its scope and ambit. Under the said Regulation it was permissible
to cause further enquiry being held even where the report of the disciplinary
committee was that the member is not guilty of any professional or other
misconduct. Regulation 16 is narrow in its scope and ambit when compared to the
old Regulation 14.
The
Regulation cannot be without any purpose." On that basis, it was held that
the report of the Disciplinary Committee being that the respondent was not
guilty of any professional misconduct within the meaning of clauses (6) and (7)
of Part I of the First Schedule of the Act, the Council had no power to direct
Disciplinary Committee to hold further enquiry. With a view to appreciate the
correctness of the above view, it is necessary to look into the relevant
provisions of the Act and the Regulations made thereunder.
Section
2(b) defines 'Chartered Accountant' to mean a person who is a member of the
Institute. Section 2(c) defines 'Council' to mean the Council of the Institute.
Under
Section 2(e) 'Institute' means the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
constituted under the Act.
'Registered
Accountant' is define under Section 2(h) to mean any person who has been
enrolled on the register of Accountants maintained by the Central Government
under the Auditor's Certificates Rules, 1932. A member of the Institute shall
be deemed "to be in practice", when individually or in partnership
with Chartered Accountants in practice, he, in consideration of remuneration
received or to be received, as postulated by sub-section (2) thereof, engages
himself in the practice of accountancy or offers to perform or performs
services involving the auditing or verification of financial transactions,
books, accounts or records, or the preparation, verification or certification
of financial accounting and related statements or holds himself out to the
public as an accountant; or renders professional services or assistance in or
about matters of principle or detail relating to accounting procedure or the
recording presentation or certification of financial facts or date or renders
such other services as, in the opinion of the Council, are or may be rendered
by a chartered accountant in practice and the words 'to be in practice' with
their grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed
accordingly. The explanation is not relevant for the purpose, hence omitted.
Section 5 deals with "Fellows and Associates" of the Institute. Section
6 deals with certificate of practice. Section 7 deals with "Members to be
known as Chartered Accountants". Section 9 deals with the
"Constitution of the Council of the Institute" for the management of
the affairs of the Institute and for discharging the functions assigned to it
under the Act, the details thereof are not relevant for the purpose of this
case. The "duration and dissolution of the Council" is dealt with
under Section 14. Section 19 in Chapter IV deals with the "Register"
of Members, Chapter V with the heading 'Misconduct" which comprise. Sections
21, 22 and 22A. Section 21 is relevant for the purpose of this case which reads
as under:
"21.
Procedure in inquiries relating to misconduct of members of Institute (1) Where
on receipt of information by, or of a complaint made to it, the Council is
prima facie of opinion that any member of the Institute has been guilty of any
professional or other misconduct, the Council shall refer the case to the
Disciplinary Committee shall thereupon hold such enquiry and in such manner as
may be prescribed, and shall report the result of its inquiry to the Council.
(2) If
on receipt of such report the Council finds that the member of the Institute is
not guilty of any professional or other misconduct, it shall record its finding
accordingly and direct that the proceedings shall be filed or the complaint
shall be dismissed, as the case may be.
(3) If
on receipt of such report the Council finds that the member of the Institute is
guilty of any professional or other misconduct, it shall record a finding
accordingly and shall proceed in the manner laid down in the succeeding
sub-sections.
(4)
Where the finding is that a member of the Institute has been guilty of a
professional misconduct specified in the First Schedule, the Council shall
afford to the member of an opportunity of being heard before orders are passed
against him on the case, and may thereafter make any of the following orders,
namely:- (a) reprimand the member ;
(b) remove
the name of the member from the Register for such period, not exceeding five
years, as the Council thinks fit :
Provided
that where it appears to the Council that the case is one in which the name of
the member ought to be removed from the Register for a period exceeding five
years or permanently, it shall not make any order referred to in clause (a) or
clause (b), but shall forward the case to the High Court with its
recommendations thereon.
(5)
Where the misconduct in respect of which the Council has found any member of
the institute guilty is misconduct other than any such misconduct as is
referred to in sub-section (4), it shall forward the case to the High Court
with its recommendations thereon.
(6) On
receipt of any case under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), the High Court
shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause notice of the date
so fixed to be given to the member of the Institute concerned, the Council and
to the Central Government, and shall afford such member, and the Central
Government an opportunity of being heard, and may thereafter make any of the
following orders, namely :- (a) direct that the proceedings be filed, or
dismiss the complaint, as the case may be;
(b) reprimand
the member;
(c) remove
him from membership of the Institute either permanently or for such period as
the High Court thinks fit;
(d) refer
the case to the Council for further inquiry and report.
(7)
Where it appears to the High Court that the transfer of any case pending before
it to another High Court will promote the ends of justice or tend to the
general convenience of the parties, it may so transfer the case, subject to
such conditions, if any, as it thinks fit to impose, and the High Court to
which such case is transferred shall deal with it as if the case had been
forwarded to it by the Council.
Explanation
I:- In this section "High Court" means the highest civil court of
appeal, not including the Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction in the area in
which the person whose conduct is being inquired into carried on business, or
has his principal place of business at the commencement of the inquiry:
Provided
that where the case relating to two or more members of the Institute have to be
forwarded by the Council to different High Courts, the Central Government
shall, having regard to the ends of justice and the general convenience of the
parties, determine which of the High Courts to the exclusion of others shall
hear the cases against all the members.
Explanation
II:- For the purpose of this section "member of the Institute"
includes a person who was a member of the Institute on the date of the alleged
misconduct although he has ceased to be a member of the Institute at the time
of the inquiry.
(8)
For the purposes of any inquiry under this section, the Council and the
Disciplinary Committee shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil
court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following
matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath;
(b) the
discovery and production of any document; and (c) receiving evidence on
affidavit.
"Professional
misconduct" is defined in Section 22, which reads as under ;
"22.
Professional misconduct defined For the purposes of this Act, the expression
"professional misconduct" shall be deemed to include any act or
omission specified in any of eh Schedules, but nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or abridge in any way the power conferred or duty cast on
the Council under sub- section (1) of Section 21 to inquire into the conduct of
any member of the Institute under any other circumstances." The procedure
to enquire into the misconduct on the part of the members of the Institute is
dealt with in Section 21. Sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) are relevant
for the purpose of this case.
By
exercise of the power under Section 30, the Council is empowered to make
Regulations to carry out the object of the Act. Sub-section (2) postulates that
in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,
"such regulations may provide for all or any of the following
matters". Section 30(2) (s) speaks of "the exercise of disciplinary
powers conferred by the Act" and Section 30(2) (l) of "any other
matter which is requited to be or may be prescribed under the Act". Regulation
16 which was amended in 1988 read as under :
"Report
of the Disciplinary Committee.
(1)
The Disciplinary Committee shall submit its report to the Council.
(2)
Where the finding of the Disciplinary Committee is that the respondent is
guilty of professional and or other misconduct, a copy of the report of the
Disciplinary Committee shall be furnished to the respondent and he shall be
given the opportunity of marking a representation in writing to the Council.
(3)
The Council shall consider the report of the Disciplinary Committee along with
the representation in writing of the respondent, if any, and if, in its
opinion, a further enquiry is necessary, shall cause such further enquiry to be
made whereupon a further enquiry to be made whereupon a further report shall be
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee.
(4)
The Council shall, on the consideration of the report and the further report,
if any, and the representation in writing of the respondent, if any, record its
findings.
Provided
that if the report of the Disciplinary Committee is that the respondent is not
guilty of any professional or other misconduct, the Council shall not record
its findings contrary to the report of the Disciplinary Committee.
(5)
The finding of the Council shall be communicated to the complainant and the
respondent." Section 21 read with Regulation 16 would indicate that where
the Council, upon receipt of information by, or of a complaint made to it, is
prima facie of opinion that any member of the Institute has been guilty of any
professional or other misconduct defined under Section 22 of the Act, it is
enjoined to refer the case to the Disciplinary Committee.
The
Disciplinary Committee shall, thereupon, hold such enquiry and in such a manner
as may be prescribed and shall report the result of its enquiry to the Council.
If on receipt of such report, the Council finds that the member of the
institution is not guilty of any professional or other misconduct, it shall
record a finding under sub-section (2) thereof and accordingly direct that the
proceedings shall be filed or complaint shall be dismissed, as the case may be.
As
seen earlier, under Regulation 16(1), it shall be the duty of the Disciplinary
Committee to submit its report to the Council under clause (1) thereof. In
case, the finding of guilt of a member of professional misconduct/other
misconduct is reported by the Disciplinary Committee, a copy thereof shall be
furnished to the delinquent member and he shall be given an opportunity to make
representation in writing to the Council. This would be done under
sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 16. Thereon, by operation of sub-regulation
(3), the Council shall consider the report of the Disciplinary Committee along
with the representation in writing of the delinquent member, if any.
If on
consideration thereof, the Council is of the opinion that the further enquiry
is necessary, it shall direct such further enquiry to be made, whereupon a
further report shall be submitted by the Disciplinary Committee. Sub-regulation
(4) of Regulation 16 envisages that the Council shall, on the consideration of
the report and the further report, if any, and the representation in writing of
the respondent record its findings. Under the proviso thereto, if the report of
the Disciplinary Committee is that the respondent is not guilty of any
professional or other misconduct, the Council shall not record its findings
contrary to the report of the Disciplinary Committee. Sub-section (3) also
envisages that if on receipt of such report the Council finds that the member
of the Institute is guilty of any professional or other misconduct, it shall
record a finding accordingly and shall proceed in the manner laid down in the
succeeding sub-sections, namely, sub-section (4), (5) and (6) in awarding appropriate
punishment or may refer to the High Court, under sub-section (6), for award of
higher penalties which the High Court may deal with under sub- section (7)
thereof.
A
combined reading of the above statutory provisions would indicate that in case
the Council finds that the report of the Disciplinary Committee recording
"no-guilt" is not correct or relevant material was not considered by
the Disciplinary Committee, the Council has the power the call further report
from the Disciplinary Committee. Though prima facie the arguments of Shri P.P. Rao
is attractive, on deeper probe, it is difficult to give acceptance to the
contention that the report of "no-guilt" by the Disciplinary
Committee should be given primacy as it would deplete the content of the power to
maintain discipline among the members of the power to maintain discipline among
the members of the Institute. The ultimate control over conduct of the members
is by the Council. The Disciplinary Committee is a fact-finding body which is a
body subordinate to the Council as a fact-finding body which is a body
subordinate to the Council as a fact-finding authority. If its finding of guilt
or non-guilt receives finality, it denudes the Council of the power to direct
further appropriate enquiry into the professional or other misconduct not
adequately dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee. Similarly, the Council
would be disabled to exercise effective vigil and supervision over the
professional or other misconduct of the members of the Institute. The Parliament
has invested that power with the Council and the construction suggested allows
the tail to wag while the controlling body, the council lamentably look at it.
Such a construction would be deleterious to the maintenance of discipline or
the professional conduct on the part of the members of the Institute or
Associate Members of the Institute, as the case may be. It is true that the
discipline sought to be maintained is penal in nature; nonetheless, maintenance
of discipline or professional or other conduct of the members or associate
members is salutary and paramount to maintain public confidence in the members
of the Institute and to inculcate sense of discipline and excellence in the
performance of the functions as member of the Institute or associate member of
the Institute, as the case may be. The contrary view would easily defeat the
purpose of the Act and the object behind the regulatory measures envisaged in
Section 21 of the Act. Regulation 16 is only an enabling provision to conduct
by the Disciplinary Committee which is a fact-finding subordinate delegated
body whose finding is not conclusive on the non-guilt of the professional or
other misconduct of the member of the Institute. A combined reading of relevant
provisions in Section 21 and Regulation 16 does indicate that the recording of
a finding of guilt or non-guilt by the Council is mandatory to take further
action or to dismiss the complaint or for further process. The Council is
required to consider independently the explanation submitted by the member and
the evidence adduced in the enquiry before the Disciplinary Committee and the
report of the Disciplinary Committee. It provides an in- built mechanism under
which the Council itself is required to examine the case of professional or
other misconduct of a member of the Institute or associate member, taking the
aid of the report submitted by the Disciplinary Committee, the evidence adduced
before the Committee and the explanation offered by the delinquent member.
Entire material constitutes the record of the proceedings before the Council to
reach a finding whether or not the delinquent member committed professional or
other misconduct, Otherwise, the primacy accorded to the report of the
Disciplinary Committee attains finality, denuding the Council of the power of
discipline over the member of the Institute; that would render deleterious
effect on the maintenance of discipline among the members or associate members
of the Institute. In this behalf, it is necessary to consider the view of this Court
prior to the amendment of the Regulations in 1988. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K.
Ratna & Ors. [(1986) 4 SCC 537], this Court, in paragraph 11, summed up the
legal position as under :
"It
is apparent that in the scheme incorporated in Section 21 of the Act there are
separate functionaries, the Disciplinary Committee, the Council and, in certain
cases, the High Court. The controlling authority is the Council, which is only
logical for the Council is the governing body of the Institute. When the
Council receives information or a complaint alleging that a member of the
Institute is guilty of misconduct, and it is prima facie of opinion that there
is substance in the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee plays a
subordinate role. It conducts an inquiry into the allegations. Since the
inquiry is into allegations of misconduct by the member, it possesses the
character of a quasi- judicial proceeding. The Disciplinary Committee
thereafter submits a report of the result of the inquiry to the Council. The
Disciplinary Committee is merely a Committee of the Institute with a function
specifically limited by the provisions of the Act. As a subordinate body, it
reports of the Council, the governing body. The report will contain a statement
of the allegations, the defence entered by the member, a record of the evidence
and the conclusions are the conclusions of the Committee. They are tentative
only.
They
cannot be regarded as 'findings'. The Disciplinary Committee is not vested by the
Act with power to render any findings.
It is
the Council which is empowered to find whether the member is guilty of
misconduct.
Both
Section 21(2) and Section 21(3) are clear as to that. If on receipt of the
report the Council finds that the member is not guilty of misconduct, Section
21(3) requites it to record a finding accordingly, and thereafter to proceed in
the manner laid down in the succeeding sub-sections. So, the finding by the
Council is the determinative decision as to the guilt of the member, and
because it is determinative the Act requires it to be recorded. A
responsibility so grave as the determination that a member is guilty of
misconduct, and the recording of that finding, has been specifically assigned
by the Act to the governing body, the Council. It is also apparent that it is
only upon a finding being recorded by the Council that the Act moves forward to
the final stage of penalisation. The recording of the finding by the Council is
the jurisdictional springboard for the penalty proceeding which follows."
And in paragraph 13, it was held that "at this point, it is necessary to
advert to the fundamental character of the power conferred on the Council. The
Council is empowered to find a member guilty of misconduct. The penalty which
follows is so harsh that it may result in the removal from the Register of
members for substantial number of years." In that case, the question was:
whether the delinquent member was entitled to hearing before the delinquent
member was entitled to a hearing before the Council reached the conclusion of
the guilt of professional misconduct. In that perspective, this Court read into
it the principle of natural justice and held that an opportunity of hearing is
a facet of fair procedure and accordingly the delinquent member was entitled to
a hearing before the Council, prior to the Council recorded the finding of
guilt of professional misconduct. Here, it may be illustrated that the effect
of giving primacy to the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Committee is to
make it conclusive. Take for instance, where the Committee records a finding of
guilt of professional misconduct. When the matter comes up before the Council
and the Council finds that the evidence adduced before the Disciplinary
Committee in proof of professional or other misconduct is not established, then
the Committee will not have any power to record a finding except to call for a
further finding from the Disciplinary Committee in that behalf which does not
appear to be warranted. If the Council reaches the conclusion that professional
or other misconduct was not proved, without calling for any further finding, it
can straightaway exonerate the delinquent member of the charge of professional
or other misconduct and would drop the action or dismiss the complaint. On the
other hand, if the finding of not guilt recorded by the Disciplinary Committee
is not consistent with the evidence on record, then the Disciplinary Committee
will be denuded of the power to call for further report, obviously, rendering Regulation
16(3) as surplusage. It is settled rule of interpretation that all the
provisions would be read together harmoniously so as to give effect to all the
provisions as a consistent whole rendering no part of the provisions as surplusage.
Otherwise,
by process of interpretation, a part of the provision or a clause would be
rendered otiose. Keeping this legal principles, perspectives, practical effect
and contents of the power of the Disciplinary Committee or Council in the
backdrop of our above consideration, we are of the considered view that the
view expressed by the High Court is clearly incorrect and it would defeat the
object of the Act of maintaining professional standards of the professional
conduct or other conduct consistent with the dignity of the profession of the
accountants. We, therefore, hold that the Council has the power to call for
further report from the Disciplinary Committee on non-guilt of the professional
or other misconduct of the respondent. In this backdrop, the proviso to sub-regulation
(4) of Regulation 16 becomes relevant. In case, on the second occasion, the
report of the Disciplinary Committee still holds the delinquent member not
guilt holds the delinquent member not guilty, there is no option left to the
Council except, by operation of proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 16
read with Section 21(2), as the Council is enjoined, to record finding of no
guilt since the power of calling for further report would stand exhausted. Any
other view, in our considered opinion, would defeat the object of the Act.
The
contention of Shri Rao that the Council had not applied its mind to the facts
of this case is not correct.
In
fact, the proceedings dated December 21, 1993, viz., "on consideration of
the report of Disciplinary Committee and your written statement, the Council
decided that further enquiry in the case was necessary to be made by the
Disciplinary Committee keeping in view the following issues:
1.
What were the terms and details of engagement accepted by your firm from EXIM
Bank relating to publication of booklet entitled, "India - Your Software Opportunity"?
2.
Were the contents of 'insertion' in the booklet containing your firms name and
address in accordance with the engagement accepted?
3.
Whether you/your firm had rendered assistance, as offered in the 'insertion',
to the "interested parties"?
4.
Whether you/your firm had communicated with the "interested parties"
for rendering information, clarifications and assistance?
5.
Whether you/your firm's communications with the "interested parties"
were limited to providing information and clarifications on the matters
contained in the booklet?
6.
Nature of assistance provided by you/your firm to the "interested
parties"?
7.
Whether the remuneration accepted by you/your firm from the EXIM Bank included
the jobs of rendering information, clarifications and assistance to the
"interested parties"?
8.
Whether you/your firm had accepted remuneration from the "interested
parties" for rendering information, clarifications and assistance
separately?
9.
Whether you/your firm had received any professional work from the
"interested parties" communicated or contracted pursuant to
publication of the booklet or from their associates?
10.
Whether the communications effected by you/your firm with the "interested
parties" were either on your or your firm's letter-head? If so, the manner
and style of signing the letters." do indicate the active application of
its mind and consideration to various aspects mentioned in the questionnaire
based thereon and, therefore, it is not a case of mechanical incantation of the
provisions in sub- regulation (3) of Regulation 16. It is true that in para 10
of the Special Leave Petition, they have mentioned that what they are required
to consider is the report and not the evidence adduced before the Disciplinary
Committee is only a mistaken impression of the Council as projected, but by
reason thereof, it is difficult to conclude that the Council has not applied
its mind to the relevant facts before calling for further report.
Though
Shri Rao sought to impress upon us that on a reading of the report originally
taken note of from the cover of the booklet of the EXIM Bank, it does not
constitute professional misconduct. We decline to go into that question for the
reason that any finding recorded by this Court would adversely affect either
party. Therefore, we do not propose to express any opinion in that behalf. It
is for the Council to consider the same, after the receipt of further report
from the Disciplinary Committee. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the
judgment of the High Court and uphold the direction issued by the Council to
Disciplinary Committee to make further enquiry and to submit a further report
in that behalf.
The
appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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