Smt. Angoori
Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors [1997] INSC 62 (22 January 1997)
FAIZAN
UDDIN, SUHAS C. SEN SEN,
J.
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
This
is a case under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter described
as `the Act) which involves interpretation of the provisions of the Act on
which there are two conflicting judgments of this Court.
One Gopichand
filed a statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act in the office of the Competent
Authority, Meerut, on 24.10.76 in respect of two
properties:-
1. Khasra
No. 1685 measuring 1545 square metres situated at Beri Pura Road, Meerut City.
2. Khasra
Nos. 1969 and 1970 measuring 1630 square metres situated on Delhi Road, Meerut City. In this plot stood a factory having 493 square metres
of covered area and 1156 square metres of open land.
The
Competent Authority, after examination of the facts, held that an area
measuring 910.50 square metres was vacant land
of Gopi Chand.
An
objection under Section 8 (3) of the said Act was field on 26.9.77 by the legal
heirs of Gopi Chand who had died in the meantime. Their contention was that
there was no vacant surplus land and the order of the Competent Authority was
not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.
The
District Judge, Meerut, who heard the appeal, held that
the Competent Authority had wrongly construed Section 4(9) of the Act. That
provision, according to the District Judge, came into play only when there was
vacant land and other land having a building with a dwelling unit thereon.
In the
instant case, there was no dwelling unit but a factory. Therefore, the covered
area on which factory stood could not be taken into account in computation of
vacant land. The District Judge also pointed out that no constructions were
permissible on an area measuring 1358 square metres of land held by Gopi Chand.
However, construction was permissible on an area measuring 1384 square metres
permissible on an area measuring 1384 square metres which was well within the
ceiling limit prescribed by the Act.
The
decision of the District Judge was challenged before the High Court at Allahabad by the State of U.P. It held by the High Court that interpretation of
Section 2(g)(i) made by the District Judge was not correct. The controversy was
concluded by a judgment of that Court in the case of Prem Nath Duggal v. State
of U.P., which had been decided on
16.8.1984.
In the
appeal before us, a point was sought to be raised about the ownership of the
factory. That point, however, was not gone into and decided by the High Court.
Therefore,
this question cannot be raised at this stage. The only question that falls for
determination in this appeal is whether Gopi Chand at the material time held
vacant land in excess of ceiling limit fixed by the Act? `Dwelling unit', `land
appurtenant' and `vacant land' have been defined by Section 2:- "2. Definitions.
- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, ... ... ...
(e)
`dwelling unit', in relation to a building or a portion of a building, means a
unit of accommodation, in such building or portion, used solely for the purpose
of residence;
...
... ...
(g)
`land appurtenant', in relation to any building, means- (i) in an area where
there are building regulations, the minimum extent of land required under such
regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building, which
in no case shall exceed five hundred square metres;
or
(ii) in an area where there are no building regulations, an extent of five
hundred square metres five hundred square metres contiguous to the land
occupied by such building, and includes, in the case of any building
constructed before the appointed day with constructed before the appointed day
with a dwelling unit therein, an additional extent not exceeding five hundred
square metres of land, if any, contiguous to the minimum extent referred to in
sub-clause (i) or the extent referred to in sub-clause (ii), as the case may
be;
...
... ...
(q)
`vacant land' means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of
agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include- (i) land on which
construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in
force in the area in which such land is situated.
(ii)
in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any
building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on, the
appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land
appurtenant to such building; and (iii) in an area where there are no building
regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed
before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant
to such building:
Provided
that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose
of dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land
situated in a village within an urban agglomeration (described as a village in
there venue records), then, so much extent of the land as has been orinarily
used for the keeping of such cattle immediately before the appointed day shall
not be deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause." Section
3 of the Act lays down that except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and
from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any
vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. Ceiling limit has been defined in
Section 4 to mean:
"4.
Ceiling limit. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, in the
case of every person, the ceiling limit shall be,- (a) where the vacant land is
situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category A specified in
Schedule I, five hundred square metres;
(b) where
such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category B
specified in Schedule I, one thousand square metres;
(c) where
such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C
specified in Schedule I, one thousand five hundred square metres;
(d) where
such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category D
specified in Schedule I, two thousand square metres.
x x x x
x x x x (9) Where a person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on
which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein, the extent of such
other land occupied by the extent of such other land occupied by the building
unit therein, the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the
land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculating the
extent of vacant land held by such person." The dispute in this case turns
round the interpretation of sub-section (9) of Section 4 read with sub-section
(q) of Section 2 which defines "Vacant land".
The
controversy in this case is as to the object of the Act and how that object has
been achieved by various provisions and, in particular, sub-section (9) of Section
4 of the Act. If has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the
question of law raised in this case is not res integra any more. Section 4(9)
has been examined in several decisions of this Court and there is no scope for
any further debate on this issue.
On
behalf of the respondents, it has been pointed out that the object of the Act
is to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons. If
a person owns several houses in an urban area and a plot of vacant land of less
than 2000 square metres falling within category `D', to allow such a person to
continue to use and enjoy the vacant plot of land regardless of the other lands
occupied by buildings owned by him, will not subserve the object of the Act and
the Act should not e construed in a manner to defeat the object. Any land
occupied by buildings cannot be treated as vacant land as defined in Section 2
(q). There cannot be any dispute about that proposition. But what Section 4(9)
has done is to introduce a rule of computation of vacant land by which is if a
person who owns vacant land also holds another plot of land on which there is a
building, then the vacant land held by such a person has to be computed after
taking into account the land occupied by building and also the land appurtenant
thereto. In other words, although any land occupied by building and the land
appurtenant thereto will not otherwise come within the mischief of the
definition of vacant land as given in Section 2(q), by virtue of the provisions
of sub-section (9) of Section 4 of the Act, such land will have to bed taken
into reckoning for the purpose of computation of vacant land under sub-section
(9) of Section 4.
There
is considerable force in this argument and the case of State of U.P. and Others
v. L.J. Johnson and others, (1983) 4 SCC 110, lends support to this
contention., On behalf of the appellant, however, it has been contended that
the points decided by this Court in Johnson's Case were examined further by a
larger Bench of this Court in the case of Meera Gupta (Smt.) v. State of West
Bengal and Others, (1992) SCC 494, where the scope and effect of various
provision of Section 4 including sub-section (9) were closely examined with
reference to the meaning attributed to vacant land by Section 2(q)(ii) and
(iii). It has been emphasised in that judgment that- "The interpretation
we have put to the provisions pertinently relate to sub-clauses (ii) and (iii)
of clause (q) of Section 2. Johnson's Case as said before, is a case under
sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2." On behalf of the respondents,
it has been pointed out that it will not be right to regard Johnson's Case
(supra) as a case dealing with Section 2(q) (i) of the Act only. As many as 200
and odd appeals were disposed of by the judgment in Johnson's Case. The Court
interpreted Section 4(9) with reference to Section 2(q) generally. There is no
reason to presume that the case was confined only to sub-clause (i) of Section
2(q). Specific reference has been made to Section 2(q) (ii) and (iii) of the
Act in paragraph 24 in the following words:
"In
the ultimate analysis the position is quite clear that Section 4(9)
contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land
on which there is a building with a dwelling unit, the extent of land occupied
by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall be taken into account in
calculating the extent of the vacant land. This sub-section has to be read in
conjunction with Section 2(q)(ii) and (iii). A combined reading of these two
statutory provisions would lead to the irresistible inference that in cases
which fall within the third category mentioned above, the- (1) total area of
the land of a landholder is first to be determined and if the total area, built
or unbuilt, falls below 2000 sq. metres in category D area, there would be no
question of any excess land, (2) Where, however, there is a building and a
dwelling unit then the area beneath the building and the dwelling unit would
have to be excluded while computing the ceiling. Further, if there are any
bylaws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant, the landholder would
be allowed to set apart the said land to the maximum extent of 500 sq. metres.
He would also be allowed to retain an additional area of 500 sq. metres for the
beneficial use of the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little
compound also for various purposes." After discussing the matter further
in para 25, it was concluded in para 26:- "The argument that once a plot
contains a building, the whole of the plot would be exempt from the ceiling
area cannot be countenanced on a plain and simple interpretation of Section 2(q)(ii)
read with Section 4(9). In fact Section 4(9) itself puts the matter beyond
controversy by qualifying the words `other land occupied by the building and
the land appurtenant thereto'. The expression ` thereto' manifestly shows that
the intention of the legislature was to refer to the land on which the building
or the dwelling unit stands. In other words, the vacant land which contains a
building would include appurtenant land or any other land situated in that
particular plot." In Meera Gupta's case (supra) a larger Bench considered
Johnson's case. Presumably this Court's attention was not drawn to the
aforesaid analysis of Section 4(9) read with Section 2(q)(ii) and (iii) made by
Fazal Ali, J. in Johnson's case. Johnson's case was distinguished in para 11 of
the case in the following words:- "In these appeals, we are mainly
concerned with the interpretation of Section 4(9) and the allied construction
of Sections 2(g) and 2(q)(ii) and (iii) of the Act and their impact on Section
4(9). It follows, therefore, that once the view taken in Johnson's case in
regard to this question is reversed all the matters will have to go back to the
competent authority for a decision in the light of the view taken by this
Court. This will be the ultimate outcome because in all the allied matters
there is only a cryptic order disposing of the concerned matter in accordance
with the view taken by the High Court in Johnson's case in regard to the
interpretation of Section 4(9). The remaining questions raised by the
landholders will have to be resolved and the actual computation of excess land,
if any, would have to be undertaken by the competent authority on remand."
It has been contended that Johnson's Case had specifically dealt with the
definition of vacant land as given in Section 2(q) (ii) and (iii). It will not
be right to say that the Johnson's Case was confined to Section 2(q) (i) of the
Act.
There
is some force in this contention. The principle laid down in Meera Gupta's case
has been applied in the case of Atma Ram Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1993)
Supp. 1 SCC 1.
Since Meera
Gupta's case was decided by a Bench of three Judges, the contention raised by
the respondents should be considered by a larger Bench. This case may be placed
before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate direction.
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