Jaywantraj
Punamiya & Ors Vs. M/S. H. Choksi & Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1997] INSC 106 (3
February 1997)
K.
RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D E
R
Leave
granted.
This
appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1997 passed by the Bombay High Court in
Civil Revision Application No.9/97. It is not in dispute that while the appeal
was pending an application under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC was filed for
recording the compromise. The appellate Court refused to record the compromise
and on revision, it was dismissed. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
The
compromise memo annexed as Annexure A at page 21 of the paper book records that
"We, the undersigned Shri Harshan A. Mehta, Director of H. Choksey &
Co. Pvt. Ltd. and MR. Jayavantraj Punamiya, Director of M/s Sundeep Plastics
Pvt. Ltd. do hereby appoint Shri Mohanlal S. Mehta to sell 2 galas being No.D/8
and AB/14, situate at Nandanvan Co- operative Industrial Estate Ltd. at
Thane." The High Court recorded the finding that it being a compromise
contingent upon the parties appointing Shri Mohanlal S. Mehta as a mediator, it
cannot be recorded under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. Shri Sitaramaih, learned
senior counsel for the appellants, contends that once parties have agreed o
refer the matter to a third party to settle their disputes, it can be enforced
under Order XXIII, Rule 3, CPC. In support of his contention, he relies upon a
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Akbari Begum vs. Rahmat Husain
& Ors. [AIR 1973 Allahabad 861 F.B.]. He also relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Katikara Chintamani Dora & Ors. vs. Guntreddi Annamnaidu
& Ors. [(1974) 2 SCR 655]. Having given consideration to the contention of
the learned counsel, we think that in the facts and circumstances of this case,
he is not right. It is seen that no doubt the parties have settled the terms of
the compromise for reference of the matter to Mohanlal S. Mehta, and as agreed
upon, he will dispose of the two galas and after adjusting the outstanding and
deducting the expenses, the balance would be given in equal shares to the
parties. Shri Sitaramaiah has placed before us the evidence of Shri Mehta
wherein he has suggested that he is willing to sell the property. IT has been
noted by the learned District Judge that Shri Mohanlal S. Mehta did not take
steps to sell the disputed flats.
Hence
it cannot be said that there is complete agreement.
The
compromise is a contingent contract dependant upon action of third party, i.e.,
making adjustment. Thus, the very object of recording the compromise is to
ensure that the dispute reaches its finality and does not lead to further
litigation. In this case, since the dispute was not finally resolved, but the
compromise was contingent upon action by Shri Mohanlal S. Mehta, it did not
receive finality in that perspective. The Allahabad High Court had to consider
the question in the context of reference to an arbitration for settlement of
the dispute pending in the suit. In that context, a full Bench came to lay down
the law as extracted herein:
"When
both parties make such admission simultaneously it amounts to an offer by one
and acceptance by the other. Such reciprocal admissions would therefore, be a
valid agreement between them.
Consideration
is good because there is reciprocity. The statement of the referee would then
be the admission of both the parties binding upon them. No doubt admissions are
not conclusive; but where there has been mutuality of this kind and they have
matured into an agreement, their conclusiveness follows from the principle of estoppel."
Equally, this Court in Katikana Chintamaani Dora's case had to consider the
point in the context of the dispute having arisen between the parties how had
agreed to abide by the decision of the court on the question whether a
particular village notified by the State Government is `estate' within the
meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estate Lands At, 1908 and whether the
decision was appealable once there was a compromise. In that context, this
Court had misunderstood the scope of controversy and though a part of the
decree had been settled, an appeal would lie. In view of the facts and
circumstances and the observations mentioned hereinbefore, we think that the
High Court was right in holding that the matter had not received finality and
though it is a part of the decree, it cannot be recorded under Order XXIII,
Rule 3, CPC.
The
appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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