Kaptan
Singh & Ors Vs. State of M.P. & ANR [1997] INSC 456 (24 April 1997)
M.K.
MUKHERJEE, S.P. KURDUKAR
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
M.K.
MUKHERJEE, J.
Leave
granted.
The
six appellants before us were arraigned before the Sessions Judge, Morena for
rioting and the murder of Baijnath in the night between June 5 &6, 1983.
The trial Judge acquitted them of both the charges; and aggrieved thereby the
respondent No.2, who was the grandfather of the deceased, sent a registered
letter to the High Court. That letter was registered as a criminal revision and
notice was issued to the appellants. After hearing the parties the High Court
allowed the revision petition, set aside the acquittal of the appellants and
remanded the matter to the trial Court to pass a fresh judgment after hearing
the parties or, if need be, to hold a retrial. The above judgment of the High
Court is under challenge in this appeal.
In
assailing the judgment of the High Court Mr. Lalit, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellants submitted that the High Court exceeded its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr. P.C. in that it reappraised the entire
evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of
the trial Court on almost every point, which was legally impermissible. In
support of hes contention he relied upon the judgments of this Court in Chinnaswamy
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1962 S.C 1788), Mahendra Pratap vs, Sarjn
Singh (AIR 1968 S.C. 707), Khetra Basi vs. state of Orissa (AIR 1970 S.C. 272)
and P.N.J. Raju vs. B.P. Appadn (AIR 1975 S.C. 1854 ), Wherein the scope and
extent of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an
order of acquittal have been dealt with.
In Chinnaswamy
(supra) this Court held that though it was open to the High Court to set aside
an order of acquittal even at the instance of the private parties the revisional
jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when there was some
glaring defect in the procedure or there was a manifest error on a point of law
and consequently there had been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. This Court
Pointed out that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining
such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies but indicated some
cases which would justify the High Court to Interfere with an order of
acquittal in revision. The cases so indicated are:
where
the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the
accused or where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the
prosecution wished to produce or where the appeal Court has wrongly held
evidence which was admitted by the trial Court as not admissible or where
material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the
appeal Court or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of an offence. Which
is invalid under law. In the other Cases referred to above this Court
reiterated the principles laid down in Chinnaswamy (supra) and observed that
the revisional jurisdiction when invoked by a private complainant against all
order of acquittal ought not to be exercised lightly and that it could be
exercised only in exceptional case where the interests of public justice
required interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the
prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.
Apart
from the cases relied upon by Mr. Lalit, we find that in Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer
Singh (AIR 1981 SC 1415) a three judge Bench of this Court dealt with the power
exercisable under Section 401 Cr. P.C. In that case the high Court, after
referring to Chinnaswamy (supra), had said:
"
In the instant case, we find that this is a case of non-application of mind on
the part of the Court below. The Probative value of the First Information
Report (Ex.KA 19) has been entirely ignored. The individual testimony of the
eye witnesses has not been discussed and their reliable testimony has been
ignored, from which it follows that material evidence has not been considered
and it has been overlooked. The entire Judgment is full of inconsistencies. The
Court below has misquoted the evidence at some places, for example, while
dealing with the copy of statement (Ex.KA 18). The Judgment consists of faulty
reasoning and lack of judicial approach. Accepted canons for appreciating
evidence have been thrown to the wind. The conclusions on the question of
motive are against the weight of overwhelming evidence in the case. In our
opinion, the view expressed by the court below has resulted in grave
miscarriage of justice so far as the opposite parties Uma Shanker, Girja Shanker,
Gauri Shanker, Achhaibar, Jhabbar, Bansu, Ram Katul, Ayodhya Dube and Vindhyachal
are concerned. The above, in our opinion, are exceptional circumstances which
compel us to order retrial of the aforesaid opposite parties." In upholding
the above order of the High Court this Court observed as under:
"In
our view the High Court has given adequate reasons for interfering with the
acquittal and ordering a retrial of the appellants. We may add that the High
Court also expressed the view that the instances mentioned by this Court in Chinnaswamy
vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh as justifying
interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were
illustrative and not exhaustive. We agree with the view expressed by the High
Court and we only wish to say that the Criminal Justice System does not admit
of 'Pigeon holing' . If and the law do not fall neatly into slots, When a Court
starts laying down rules enumerated (1),(2),(3),(4) or (a),(b),(c),(d), it is
arranging for itself traps and pitfalls.
Categories,
classifications and compartments, which statute does not mention, all tend to
make law less flexible, less sensible and less just." From a conspectus of
the above decisions it follows that the revisional power of the High Court
while sitting in judgment over and order of acquittal should not be exercised
unless there exists a manifest illegality in the judgment or order of acquittal
or there is grave miscarriage of justice.
Read
in the context of the above principle of law we have no hesitation in
concluding that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case is patently
wrong and it has caused grave miscarriage of justice. The High Court was
therefore fully justified in setting aside the order of acquittal. From the judgment
of the trial Court we find that one of the grounds that largely weighed with it
for acquitting the appellants was that an Inspector of CID who had taken up the
investigation of the case and was examined by the defence (D.W.3) testified
that during his investigation he hound that the story as made out by the
prosecution was not true and on the Contrary the plea of the accused
(appellants) that in the night of the incident a dacoity with murder took place
in the house of Baijnath by unknown criminals and the appellants were
implicated falsely was true . It is trite that result of investigation can
State of Delhi (JT 1977 (3) SC 131), made the following comments while comments
while dealing with this issue:
"The
reliance of the trial Judge on the result of investigation to base is findings
is again patently wrong. If the observation of the trial judge in this regard
is taken to its logical conclusion it would mean that a finding of guilt can be
recorded against an accused without a trial, relying solely upon the police
report submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C., which is the outcome of an
investigation. The result of investigation under chapter XII of the Criminal
procedure code is a conclusion that an investigating officer draws on the basis
of materials collected during investigating officer draws on the basis of
materials collected during investigation and such conclusion can only form the
basis of a competent Court to take cognizance thereupon under Section 190(1)
(b) cr. p. c. and to proceed with the case for trial, where the materials
collected during investigation are to be translated into legal evidence, The
trial conclusion solely on the evidence adduced during the trial; and it cannot
rely on the investigation or the result thereof. Since this is law, elementary
principle of criminal law, we need not dilate on this point ." The High
Court was, therefore, fully justified in commenting upon the trial court's
impermissible and undue reliance on the evidence of DW 3 and , for that matter,
the result of his investigation . Incidentally it may be mentioned that
ignoring the report of investigation submitted by the Inspector the Magistrate
took cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellants and committed
the case to the court of Session. There are other patent infirmities in the
judgment of the trial Court to which the High Court has adverted but in case
any reason given by us for this comment of ours creates an unconscious
impression upon the trial Court, we refrain from doing so.
We,
therefore, find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it. Before parting with
this judgment we would like to observe that in complying with the directions of
the High Court, the trial Court should not be in any way influenced by any
observation made by the High Court touching the merits of the case.
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