State
of Punjab & Anr Vs. Kashmir Singh [1996] INSC 1088 (6 September 1996)
B.P.
Jeevan Reddy, K.S. Paripoornan
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D
E R
Leave
granted.
Heard
counsel for the parties.
The
respondent was a driver in the service of the Punjab Roadways, Jallandhar.
There was an accident to the bus he was driving on 2.7.86. Number of passengers
were injured and the bus damaged. A F.I.R. WAS issued against the respondent
under Section 304-A of the I.P.C. and certain other provisions. He was also
suspended pending inquiry. A memo of charges was issued to him proposing to
hold a disciplinary inquiry on the charges of causing loss to the Corporation
by driving the bus rashly and negligently. An Inquiry Officer, Shri R.S.
Sharma, was appointed. White the proceedings were pending before the Inquiry
Officer, the Criminal Court acquitted the respondent under its judgment and
order dated 19.10.1988. After perusing the judgment of the Criminal Court, a
fresh disciplinary inquiry was ordered against the respondent for which purpose
a different Inquiry Officer was appointed. The disciplinary inquiry was
accordingly held and on the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer the
respondent was found guilty of the charges and dismissed from service.
The
respondent instituted a suit in the Court of Sub- Judge, Jallandhar for a
declaration that the order of dismissal was void and illegal and for
consequential benefits. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit but in
appeal the learned District Judge upheld the respondent's claim. The order of
dismissal was declared illegal and the respondent was held entitled to all the
benefits flowing from such declaration. The second appeal preferred by the
Corporation and the State of Punjab was
dismissed in limine by the High Court.
The
main ground upon which the learned District Judge has decreed the respondent's
suit is that inasmuch as the first Inquiry Officer (Shri R.S.Sharma) had
submitted his report which report was also acted upon, no second disciplinary
inquiry could have been ordered, particularly after acquittal by the Criminal
Court. We called upon the learned counsel for the respondent before us to show
us the evidence or the material on the basis of which the Appellate Court has
held that the first Inquiry Officer had submitted his report after the
conclusion of the inquiry and that it was also acted upon. We also asked the
learned counsel to clarify that do the words "the inquiry report of Shri R.S.Sharma
has been acted upon under Rule 9.1" in the Judgment of the learned District
Judge, mean. The learned counsel for the respondent is unable to point out any
evidence or explain the said observation. Indeed in the written submissions
filed by the learned counsel, Shri U.S.Prasad, it is stated "in all
fairness I must point out to your Lordships that Inquiry Report and order
imposing the punishment is not available". The basis of the judgment of
the first Appellate Court thus becomes untenable.
We
are, however, not inclined to dispose of the matter finally at this stage. We
have not been shown the copy of the judgment and order of the Criminal Court
acquitting the respondent. We have also not been shown the proceedings ordering
the fresh inquiry or the reasons in which the fresh disciplinary inquiry was
ordered, after the acquittal of the Criminal Court. These matters may require
further examination. Accordingly we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment
of the High Court to request the High Court to admit the second appeal
preferred by the appellants' and dispose it of on merits in accordance with
law.
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