Bhoomireddy
Chenna Reddy & Anr Vs. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa & Anr [1996] INSC 1524
(28 November 1996)
K. Ramaswamy,
G.T. Nanavati
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D
E R
The
appellants are sons of the brother of Bhoomireddy Pedda Chennaiah. The
respondents are the sons of the sister of Laxmamma, widow of Pedda Chennaiah. Pedda
Chennaiah during his life time had bequeathed all his properties to his wife Laxmamma
by his registered will dated May 12, 1947 with right to enjoy the property with
vested reminder in the respondents with absolute right and he died on May 25,
1947, Laxmamma held the property during her life time and she died on October
21, 1965. When the appellants started interfering with the possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties, the respondents filed O. S. No.
187/69 in the Court of District Munsif at Anantapur for a perpetual injunction.
The trial Court decreed it. On appeal, the Additional District Judge confirmed
the same. In the Second Appeal No. 437/77, by judgment and decree dated February 21, 1979 the learned single Judge of Andhra
Pradesh dismissed the same. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Mr. K.
Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, is right in
his contention that Laxamamma having for the properties under the will executed
by her husband Pedda Chennaiah, as a limited owner, after Hindu Succession Act,
1956 came into force she became an absolute owner as her limited right of
enjoying the property during her life time for her maintenance ripened into an
absolute estate under Section 14 (1) of that Act and that she died as a full
owner of the said properties. The legal position in this behalf is settled by
this Court in C. Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors. vs. Idol of Shri Swaminathanswami
Thirukoil & Anr. [(1996) 8 SCC 5251, wherein it has been held that the
properties given to the wife by the husband under his will for maintenance must
be construed to have been acquired by the wife, in view of her pre-existing
right to maintenance. When properties are thus bequeath for its enjoyment in
life, it cannot be said to be a right acquired for the first time under the
Will but it has to be considered as a reflection of the pre-existing right. After
1956, her limited right got enlarged into absolute right by operation of
Section 14(1) of the said Act. She will have to be treated as having become an
absolute owner. However, the real question which arises for consideration is:
whether an injunction could have been granted in favour of the respondents in
view of the facts of this case? It is seen that even during the life time of Laxmamma,
after the demise of Pedda Chennaiah, the respondents came in possession of the
property and were enjoying the same right from 1947. The properties were
mutated in their name. It is also an admitted fact that in 1951, the appellants
themselves had purchased some of the properties, the subject matter of the
will, from the respondents. In view of these facts, the question arises whether
an injunction can be granted against the appellants? The trial Court as well as
the appellate Court have concurrently found as a fact thus;
"The
lands were transferred in the name of the respondents and pattas also were
granted to them and they were in possession and enjoyment of the property since
the death of their testator, Voluminous evidence clearly demonstrated the fact.
In view of the admission made by the appellants that the respondents were in
possession of the part of the properties purchased from the respondents, it
would clearly indicate that the respondents remain in possession of the
property right from the date of the death of the testator. Under these
circumstances, the injunction was rightly granted against the appellants."
Shri K. Madhava Reddy has contended that no injunction can be granted against a
true owner. As a proposition of law, it is indisputable. But the question is:
whether the appellants have become owners of the property? Several imponderable
things would arise until that declaration is given to them. It is seen that
when the respondents have been in possession and got their names mutated in
assertion of their right, right from 1947, may be it was open to them to
contend that they remained in possession in assertion of their own right even
to the knowledge of the appellants and the appellants had acquiesced to it. The
admitted purchase of the properties from them by the appellants themselves may
lend assurance to that assertion. Therefore, it would be open to them to raise
that plea, had the appellants asserted their right. But it is a fact that no
such issues wee raised as no such plea was taken. Under these circumstances, we
think that the injunction, due to the above documentary evidence and admitted
facts, was rightly granted against the appellants.
The
appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Back
Pages: 1 2