Union of India & Ors Vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar
& Ors [1996] INSC 363 (11 March 1996)
Ramaswamy,
K.Ramaswamy, K.G.B. Pattanaik (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1352 1996 SCC (3) 491 JT 1996 (3) 671 1996 SCALE (3)119
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D
E R
Leave
granted.
We
have heard the counsel on both sides.
Notification
under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short the `Act'] was
published on November
6, 1958 acquiring the
land for housing scheme. The same came to be challenged on the ground that the
appellant had proposed to use the land for the district center i.e., commercial
purpose. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the
notification holding that the property acquired was for housing scheme which
cannot be used for commercial purpose, namely, District Center. On appeal, the Division Bench of
Delhi High Court in LPA No.1 of 1977 by order dated February 6, 1884 confirmed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave.
It is
contended for the respondents that since the acquisition is for housing scheme,
the land cannot be used for commercial purpose, namely, District Center. Therefore, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench
have rightly disapproved the change of the user contrary to the purpose
notified in section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. We find no force in the
contention. It is conceded by the learned counsel that the construction of the District Center for commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt
it was sought to be contended in the High Court that in a housing scheme,
providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one of the composite
purposes and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. However, the
contention was rejected by the High Court. We need not go to that part.
Suffice
it to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought to be acquired for
public purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore, when the
notification has mentioned that the land is sought to be acquired for housing
scheme but it is sought to be used for district Center, the public purpose does
not cease to be public purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the
notification under section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a
colorable one. The notification under section 4(1) could not have been quashed
on the ground that the land is sought to be used for District Center, namely, for commercial purpose. It is obvious that the
lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only the public purpose of
providing facilities of commercial purpose, namely, District Center as conceded by the learned counsel in fairness to be a
public purpose. The notification under section 4(1) cannot be quashed on the
ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in quashing the
notification on the ground of change of user.
It is
next contended that the first respondent is entitled to be provided with
alternative site. It is stated in the additional affidavit filed in this Court,
pursuant to the direction issued earlier,. that a private company by name Sunlight
Assurance , New Delhi had floated a scheme Sunlight
Estate, which was not approved by the competent authority, i.e., either MCD or
DDA. But some persons purchased plots and to purchase peace with them a
compromise was entered into and they have been allotted alternative sites. It
is contended that the respondents also similarly are entitled to alternative
sites. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court that the
land of the first respondent was not the subject matter of the acquisition and that,
therefore, he is not entitled to the alternative site. In the
additional-affidavit also it was mentioned that since the first respondent had
constructed a house and has been living therein, he is not entitled to
alternative site and if the house of the appellant is acquired, action would be
taken according to law. It is also stated by the counsel for respondent Nos.2
to 4 that they have also constructed houses and they are also entitled to
alternative sites. Since that controversy was not raised before us, we did not
have an occasion to go into the question whether they have constructed the
house either prior to or after the notification etc. Under these circumstances,
we cannot go into that question because the question of providing alternative
sites was not addressed before the learned single Judge or the Division Bench.
If they are otherwise entitled according to the practice prevailing, they are
at liberty to make a representation to the competent authority and have the
matter examined according to the practice.
The appeals
is accordingly allowed. The orders of the High Court are set aside. The writ
petition stands dismissed. No costs.
Back
Pages: 1 2