Shangrila
Food Products Ltd. & Anr Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr
[1996] INSC 776 (9 July
1996)
Punchhi,
M.M.Punchhi, M.M.Manohar Sujata V. (J) Punchhi, J.
CITATION:
1996 SCC (5) 54 JT 1996 (6) 522 1996 SCALE (5)289
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
Leave
granted.
This
appeal is virtually against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of
the Bombay High Court dated 9- 11-1993
passed in Writ Petition No.2949 of 1993 against which Letters Patent Appeal
No.1 of 1994 was dismissed summarily by a Division Bench of that Court on 14-1-1994.
The
learned Single Judge was spared the ordeal of recounting the checkered history
of the litigation between the parties because of the reasonable stand taken by
both the sides. We assume that we too have been spared likewise and the parties
continue to be reasonable. It so happens that there is a building known as
Great Social Building situate at 60, Sir P.M. Road, Fort, Bombay, which once
belonged to the Great Social Life Insurance Co. Ltd. It appears that M/s. Interseas
Corporation had taken on rent the fourth floor of the said building sometime in
the year 1944. A portion carved out therefrom by a wooden partition was
apparently sublet by M/s. Interseas Corporation to the appellant M/s. Shangrila
Food Products Ltd. in July 1951. It also appears that M/s. S.M. Enterprises
also became sub- lessees of M/s. Interseas Corporation of another portion of
the property.
On the
setting up of the Life Insurance Corporation of India under the Life Insurance
Corporation of India Act, 1956 all the assets and liabilities of the said Great
Social Life Insurance Company were taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation
of India. It is appellants' case that in consequence thereof, M/s. Interseas
Corporation became the tenant of the Life Insurance Corporation and the
appellant company became the sub-tenant by operation of law in relation to the
premises in question. Further it is the case of the appellant company that it
has become a deemed tenant under the respondent Life Insurance Corporation
because of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control (Amendment)
Ordinance of 1959.
Legal
proceedings were initiated by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the
respondent herein, against the appellant Company and one of its shareholders-cum-Directors,
for possession of the premises in question under the provisions of The Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short "the
Act"). The Estate Officer after conducting the requisite inquiry as
contemplated under the Act passed an order of eviction of the original tenants
as also the appellant-Company holding it as unauthorised occupant being
unlawful sub-tenant of the original tenant. The Estate Officer also passed an
order for damages to the tune of about Rs.12 lakhs.
Being
aggrieved against the said order of eviction as well as damages, appeals were
preferred by the appellant Company as well as the original tenant before the
Principal Bench, City
Civil Court, Bombay. The appellate Court upheld the
order of eviction but reversed the order relating to damages, coming to the
conclusion that there was no evidence in support of the order. The said order
of eviction was thus challenged by the appellant Company before the High Court
of Bombay. But the respondent-Life Insurance Corporation of India, did not choose to file any Writ
Petition challenging those orders whereby its claim for damages had been negatived
by the appellate Court.
The
learned Single Judge of the High Court examined the files relating to the case
and entertained the belief that the Estate Officer had not dealt with the
matter satisfactorily inasmuch as material from the earlier litigation, which
had been fought prior to the instant proceedings, had per se been inducted into
the files and there was hardly any effective or clear discussion on the issue
whether the appellant Company was an unlawful sub- tenant and therefore in unauthorised
occupation. On the basis thereof, the learned Single Judge expressed his views
that the interest of justice required that the matter be remanded to the Estate
Officer for fresh decision. It is at that juncture that the learned counsel
appearing for the Life Insurance Corporation took exception to such course and
yet at the same time bargained that if remand be considered necessary, it
should open an opportunity to the Life Insurance Corporation to raise its claim
for damages in accordance with law. This plea was objected to by learned
counsel appearing for the appellants on the procedural plea that when the
appellate court had quashed the order of damages and there had not been any
petition preferred by the Life Insurance Corporation before the High Court, the
matter could not be raked up; all the more when it concerned the original
tenant as well, who had been deleted from the array of parties before the
learned Single Judge, by consent. In the result, the learned Single Judge held
as follows:
".
....I am of the clear view that if at all the matter is to be remanded to offer
opportunity to the petitioners to prove their case of lawful sub-tenancy, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, the interest of justice also require
that the Corporation as a public body should get an opportunity to press its
claim for tne damages, in the event prove that the petitioners were unlawful
sub- tenants and therefore in unauthorised occupation of public premises."
(emphasis ours) As a result, both the orders of the Estate Officer dated
17-3-1992 passed in Cases No.187/187-A of 1991 in proceedings under Section 5
and 7 of the Act and the appellate order of the Principal Judge, City Civil
Court, Bombay, in Miscellaneous Appeal No.85 of 1992 were quashed in putting
the matter back on the file of the Estate Officer, to be dealt with in
accordance with law. It was made clear that the orders were set aside only
insofar as the appellant company was concerned and not in respect of other
parties.
This
orders as said before, was left uninterfered with by the Letters Patent Bench.
The
aggrieved appellant Company maintains that the High Court could not have
deprived it of the advantage gained by the orders of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, in rejecting the petition under
Section 7 of the Act relating to the question of damages. It is asserted that
the High Court has deprived the appellant-Company a validly accrued right,
gained under the processual law of the country. Under the Act, Section 2(f)
defines 'rent' in relation to any public premises, to mean the consideration
payable periodically for the authorised occupation of the premises, together
with certain inclusions. Sections 4 and 5 provide for issuance of notice to
show-cause against an order of eviction and the ultimate eviction of the unauthorised
occupant. Section 7 confers power on the Estate Officer to require payment of
rent or damages in respect of public premises. If a person is an authorised
occupant, he can be required to pay the rent within such time and in such instalments
as may be specified in the order. Likewise, an unauthorised occupant of any
public premises may be required by the Estate Officer to pay damages within
such time and in such instalments as may be stipulated in the order. Of course,
the Estate Officer in assessing damages would have regard to such principles of
assessment of damages as may be prescribed as also to assess damages on account
of use and occupation of such premises. It is thus plain and clear that unless
the occupant is first adjudged as an unauthorised occupant, his liability to
pay damages does not arise. In other words, if he is an authorised occupant, he
may be required to pay rent but not damages. The quality of occupation and the
quality of recompense for the use and occupation of the public premises go hand
in hand and are inter-dependent. Such is the scheme of the Act.
The
inherent temper of restraint of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution was posed and pressed into service by learned counsel for the
appellants contending that the High Court should not have opened up a finalised
litigation relatable to damages to barter a remand on the question of the
quality of occupation of the appellant Company, i.e. whether it was authorised
or unauthorised. It was maintained that by conducts the Life Insurance
Corporation, respondent, had submitted to those orders and had not put them to
challenge in proceedings under Article 226 and or Article 227 of the
Constitution. On that axis it was asserted that the direction on remand to
resettle the question of damages may be quashed, maintaining the other
direction and order with regard to the nature of occupation. Regretfully we are
not persuaded to adopt such course.
It is
well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution can take cognisance of the entire facts and
circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties
complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being
extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of
equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If
there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorty, before invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair
advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before
granting relief. What precisely has been done by the learned Single Judge, is
clear from the above emphasised words which be re- read with advantage. The
question of claim to damages and their ascertainment would only arise in the
event of the Life Insurance Corporation, respondent, succeeding to prove that
the appellant Company was an unlawful sub-tenant and therefore in unauthorised
occupation of public premises. If the finding were to go in favour of the
appellant Company and it is proved to be a lawful sub-tenant and hence not an unauthorised
occupant, the direction to adjudge the claim for damages would be rendered
sterile and otiose. It is only in the event of the appellant Company being held
to be an unlawful sub-tenant and hence an unauthorised occupant that the claim
for damages would be determinable. We see therefore no fault in the High Court
adopting such course in order to balance the equities between the contestants
especially when it otherwise had power of superintendance under Article 227 of
the Constitution in addition. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that when the
occupation of the premises in question was a factor in continuation the
liability to pay for the use and occupation thereof, be it in the form of rent
or damages, was also a continuing factor. The cause of justice, as viewed by
the High Court, did clearly warrant that both these questions be viewed
inter-dependently. For those who seek equity must bow to equity.
Besides,
it is noteworthy that the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, had negatived the claim of damages on taking a technical
view of the matter because in his view the assessment had been made more no
assumptions than on concrete evidence which was required to be adduced. Nowhere
was the finding recorded by that Court that damages were altogether not due or
that the appellant Company was not liable; the period involved therein being
from 1-3-1979 to 28-2-1992. Much time has elapsed thereafter. The respondent Company
continues to be in possession of the premises in question. It would in any case
be liable to pay for the use and occupation thereof and that liability was only
required to be given a legal, character, depending upon the quality of
occupation. The High Court, in our view, committed no wrong in putting the
negated claim of damages on the scale of justice as a balancer, before granting
relief, in setting aside the orders of eviction and effecting a remand, for
fresh disposal in accordance with law.
For
the foregoing reasons, we find no case is made out for our interference. As a
result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, with costs.
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