Life
Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Shiva Prasad Tripathi & Ors
[1996] INSC 95 (18
January 1996)
Punchhi,
M.M.Punchhi, M.M.Venkataswami K. (J)
CITATION:
JT 1996 (2) 713 1996 SCALE (1)541
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
O R D
E R
Leave
granted.
This
is an appeal against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court dated 21-2-1995 passed in Civil Writ Petition No.276 of 1995 where under
certain directions have been made towards conferral of jurisdiction on the
Small Causes Court, Bombay which, prima facie, it is debarred to have.
The
respondent - Shiva Prasad Tripathi - was an employee of the appellant- Life
Insurance Corporation of India and on that basis was allotted the
premises owned and possessed by it. On expiry of the tenure of his service, the
respondent was required to vacate the premises. When he refused to do so, the
Estate Officer of the Corporation was brought into action in issuing a notice
to the respondent to show cause why appropriate orders under Section 7 of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 [for short 'the
Act'] be not passed against him. The cause shown by the respondent did not
appeal to the Estate Officer and thus an order of eviction was passed. The said
order was unsuccessfully challenged in appeal by the respondent before the City Civil Court at Bombay. The plea of the respondent before the appellate court that
he was a tenant in the disputed premises, having security of tenure, was not
entertained and the matter was left at large.
The
respondent then moved the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction so as to challenge
the orders of the Estate Officer as also that of the appellate authority.
Though the respondent could not demolish the grounds for eviction in the High
Court, he clung to the plea of despair that if he were to enter the Small
Causes Court to establish his tenancy rights, his possession in the
interregnums would not be protected by the Small Causes Court due to Section 10
of the Act, which reads as follows:
"10.
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by an estate
officer or appellate officer under this Act shall be final and shall not be
called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding
and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect
of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or
under this Act." The respondent was given a lee-way by the High Court on
taking the view that the question of tenancy pertains to property, which plea
was adjudicable before a court or a competent authority, and that court or
authority could issue an injunction or an interim direction, and no bar could
be erected to stop it towards the grant thereof. It is in these circumstances
that the High Court directed that the Judge, Small Causes Court, shall
adjudicate on the question of tenancy when raised by the respondent in the suit
and such court, in that event, would be able to issue any interim order or
injunction which the respondent may be found entitled to. In addition to that
the High Court also ordered that the impugned orders of the Estate Officer and
the appellate authority would remain suspended till the decision of the
application for an interim relief was filed before the Court of Small Causes. This
has raised the instant challenge.
We
regret to say that the orders of the High Court are bereft of any reasoning in
giving a complete go-by to the bar erected under section 10 of the Act. Section
10 had not to be viewed in isolation but had to be understood in the context of
the other provisions of the Act standing in support thereof. Clearly, a suit
for injunction to negate the orders of those two authorities stood barred under
Section 10. The legislative mandate was that the court by order cannot obstruct
the execution of the orders passed by the Estate Officer and the appellate
authority. The court's power, otherwise, to adjudicate on the question whether
a person was a tenant or not, in no way, has been taken away by Section 10. The
adjudication however would be declaratory in nature and may sexually end up in
a consequence. Nothing interim however is obtainable. We therefore do not agree
with the High Court that whatever stood achieved by the appellant under the
Act, would suffer deprival just because the plea of the respondent being a
tenant is debatable in the court. We, therefore, upset the impugned order of
the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition preferred by the respondent before
the High Court.
Learned
counsel for the respondent, however, has been successful in persuading us to
grant him a two-fold relief, namely, (i) the respondent shall not immediately
be disturbed and would get six months' time for vacating the premises; of
course, on his executing the usual undertaking before this Court to vacate the
premises, within a period of four weeks from today, the quantum of rent/damages
payable not forming part of, or made reference of in that undertaking; and (ii)
within a period of two months, the appellant shall be duty bound to clear the
retrial dues of the respondent such as Provident Fund, gratuity etc., as are
legally due to him, so that he has enough funds in his hands to seek an
alternate accommodation in the meantime.
The
appellant is, accordingly, directed.
The
question of rent/damages is left open. The appellant has gracefully given out
that should the respondent make a representation to the appellant for waiving
of rent/damages for the period for which those would be payable, the appellant
undertakes to consider that representation sympathetically. It is so ordered.
In
light of the above, this appeal stands allowed. For the respondent however,
this matter stands concluded finally because of the individual reliefs we have
granted to him. No costs.
Back
Pages: 1 2
