Uma Shanker
& Ors Vs. Sarabjeet & Ors [1996] INSC 124 (23 January 1996)
Manohar
Sujata V. (J) Manohar Sujata V. (J) Punchhi, M.M. Mrs.Sujata V. Manohar, J.
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1005 1996 SCC (2) 371 JT 1996 (1) 476 1996 SCALE (1)479
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
respondent, Sarabjeet, was originally the sub- tenant of one Damri Lal, the
predecessor in title of the present appellants, in respect of lands situated
within the limits of the Municipal Board, Bhadohi, Tehsil Gyanpur, which are
the subject matter of this appeal. These lands, at all material times, were
governed by the provisions of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949.
Damri Lal
had brought a suit being Suit No.46 of 1955 against the respondent for ejectment
of the respondent from the suit lands under Section 154 of the Banaras State
Tenancy Act, 1949, in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhadohi. On
1.10.1955 the parties compromised the suit and a consent decree was accordingly
passed on 4.11.1955. The compromise which is dated 1.10.1955 and is signed by
both the parties including the respondent, states that the respondent
relinquishes his rights in the land in favour of Damri Lal. The respondent who
is the defendant there, has stated: "I have no concern in the land in
dispute and the crops standing thereon from today's date. A decree in favour of
the plaintiff against the defendant be passed........." Accordingly a
consent decree was passed.
According
to the appellants, under this compromise decree possession of the said lands
was surrendered by the respondent to Damri Lal. They further contend that the
respondent interfered with Damri Lal's possession in July 1957. As a result,
proceedings were initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code at
the instance of Damri Lal. These proceedings finally concluded on 30.3.1959.
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhadohi, held that the respondent was in
possession of the said lands. As a result, immediately thereafter on 12.4.1959,
a suit was filed by Damri Lal under Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy
Act before the Revenue Court for ejectment of the respondent and for recovery
of possession. Damri Lal, however, died during the pendency of the suit and the
present appellants were brought on the record of the suit in his place. The
suit remained stayed for several years. Ultimately, the trial court, by its
judgment and order dated 26.7.1969, held that the plaintiffs (appellants
herein) were entitled to succeed and passed a decree in their favour.
It was
contended before the Revenue
Court that the suit was
barred under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code because the proper remedy
was for the appellants to have executed the compromise decree which they had
obtained in the earlier proceedings. A separate suit was barred. This
contention was negatived by the trial court. It held that the appellants were
dispossessed after the consent decree and as a result of the order passed under
Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence a fresh cause of action had
accrued to the plaintiffs and they were entitled to maintain the suit.
In the
meanwhile, some time after the compromise decree, the respondent had filed Suit
No.709 of 1956 against Damri Lal in the Munsif's Court at Gyanpur for setting
aside of the compromise decree on the ground of fraud. The trial court held
that the compromise was valid and binding between the parties and this
conclusion was ultimately upheld by the High Court in its judgment and order
dated 28.4.1967. The attempt of the respondent to get out of the compromise
decree had, thus failed. It seems that in the interregnum, he took possession
of the lands which resulted in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal
Procedure Code at the instance of Damri Lal. It was, however, held there that
the respondent was in possession of the land. This compelled the appellants to
file the suit which has ultimately come before us.
After
the judgment of the trial court dated 26.7.69 in that suit decreeing the
plaintiff's suit for possession, an appeal was filed by the respondent before
the Addl. District Judge at Varanasi who
allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the Revenue court. The
District Court held that the suit under Section 159 of the Banaras Tenancy Act
was barred under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. It held that although
the respondent had surrendered his rights over the lands under the compromise
decree, that decree was not executed. The respondent had not been dispossessed
under the compromise decree. The remedy of the appellant was to execute the
compromise decree. In Second Appeal, the High Court has confirmed this
conclusion holding that in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Civil
Procedure Code the suit was not maintainable.
Both
the courts below seem to have ignored the terms of the compromise decree which
records that the respondent has given up from that day all rights over the land
including the standing crops thereon - clearly implying that the possession of
the land was given to Damri Lal from the date of the compromise. It is only on
this basis that criminal proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal
Procedure Code at the instance of Damri Lal can be understood. It was on
account of the dispossession of Damri Lal some time after the compromise decree
that it became necessary for him to resort to proceedings under Section 145 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. The respondent was at this time taking steps to
set aside the compromise decree by filing a suit. As the findings in the
criminal proceedings showed the respondent in possession, the present suit was
filed by Damri Lal.
On
assessment of evidence, the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion
that on account of the dispossession of Damri Lal after the compromise decree,
a fresh cause of action arose in his favour. There was no occasion for Damri Lal
to have the compromise decree executed since he was given possession under the
compromise decree. It was his dispossession thereafter which gave rise to the
next round of litigation. Such litigation is not barred under Section 47 of the
Civil Procedure Code. Section 47 bars a separate suit only in respect of
questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.
If there is a subsequent dispossession after the decree for possession is
complied with, a suit to obtain possession is not barred simply because there
was an earlier decree obtained by the plaintiff for possession which decree had
been complied with. In fact there will be no question of executing the earlier
decree when it has already been complied with.
Under
Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949, a person taking possession
of a plot of land without the written consent of the person entitled to admit
him to occupy his plot and otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of
law, is liable to ejectment under that section. The present suit was filed by
the appellant under Section 159 of the Banaras State Tenancy Act, 1949. The
High Court was not right in holding that the suit was not maintainable.
Learned
Advocate for the appellant has drawn our attention to a decision of this Court
in Brij Kishore Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Jaleshwar Prasad Singh and Ors. (AIR
1973 SC 1130). In that case a decree for partition had been obtained by the
parties on a compromise. Certain property came to the share of one Kishundeo
Singh. But Defendants 1 and 2 had been allowed to continue in possession with
the permission of Kishundeo Singh, acknowledging the title of Kishundeo Singh
to this property. The partition deed was not drawn up as the necessary stamp
paper was not produced. The Court, in a subsequent suit which was filed by Kishundeo
Singh for Khas possession, held that the suit was not barred by Section 47 of
the Civil Procedure Code. Under the compromise, Kishundeo Singh was in
constructive possession of the property and his suit for recovery of Khas
possession was not barred. The present suit is on a stronger footing because
under the compromise decree, possession was handed over to Damri Lal, of the
property in question. On his subsequent dispossession Damri Lal was entitled to
file a suit for possession on the basis of the title which he had acquired
under the compromise decree which has been held to be valid and binding between
the parties.
The
appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court is set
aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored with costs.
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