U.P.
Sales Tax Service Association Vs. Taxation Bar Association, Agra & Ors [1995] INSC 453 (1 September 1995)
Ramaswamy,
K. Ramaswamy, K. Hansaria B.L. (J) K. Ramaswamy, J.
CITATION:
1996 AIR 98 1995 SCC (5) 716 JT 1995 (6) 306 1995 SCALE (5)102
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
Leave
granted.
This
appeal by special leave arises from the order dated 14th October, 1993 of the Allahabad High Court made in Writ Petition No. Nil
of 1993 titled The Taxation Bar Asociation, Agra
through its General Secretary & Anr. vs. The state of U.P. through the
Secretary, Institutional Finance & Ors. Pursuant to our direction under
Article 139A (1) of the Constitution withdrawing the said writ petition to this
Court, we dispose of the same ourselves.
The
crucial question before us is whether the High Court could issue a writ or
direction prohibiting a statutory authority, viz., the Appellate Authority
under Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh sales Tax Act, 1948 [for short, the Act ]
from discharging the quasi-judicial functions; direction to the State
Government to withdraw all powers from it and transferring the pending cases
before the officer to any other authority? Whether advocates would be justified
to go on strike as a pressure group in that behalf? The impugned order is the
same, as prayed for in the main writ petition, which reads as under:
"Until
further orders of this Court, the respondent no.3 Satti Din is restrained from
discharging his function as Deputy Commissioner [Appeals] Sales Tax, Agra under Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. However,
it will be uponto the Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P. to transfer the cases
pending before respondent no.3 to some other Court".
The
facts not in controversy are that on 2nd September,1993, pursuant to a
resolution passed by the Taxation Bar Association, Agra, one Ramesh Chander
Gupta, Advocate and President of that Association along with two others met
respondent No.3, Satti Din, the appellate authority in his chamber and accused
him of "demanding illegal gratification in the discharge of his duties as
appellate authority and dissatisfaction widely prevailing amongst the advocates
and litigants". Allegations and counter-allegations of hurling abuses
against each other have been made resulting in widespread violence. It would
appear from the record that the members of the appellant- Association, the
staff of the office of the Deputy Commissioner and other staff of the
Government officers in Agra and some general public on the one
hand and advocates on the other hand alleged to have ben involved in violence.
Crimes
have been registered against each other, with which we are not concerned and it
would be inappropriate and inexpedient to mention them here in detail. Law will
take its own course. Suffice it to state that the 1st respondent appears to
have made a representation to the District Magistrate, Agra, who thereon asked Satti Din to go on leave on the
condition that advocates would withdraw the strike.
Though
Satti Din had initially gone on leave, the advocates continued strike. On his
superior officer`s instructions, Satti Din had rejoined duty as appellate
authority. On registration of the crime case against the advocates, it would
appear that on September 6, 1993, an emergency meeting of associations of Agra
and Firozabad was held and it was resolved to boycott and the courts and
observe total strike on September 7, 1993; and in a joint meeting of all the
Associations a resolution was passed resolving immediate enquiry into the
charges of corruption against, and transfer of, respondent No.3. They further
resolved to continue to boycott courts and go on indefinite strike called by
Taxation Bar Associations. The advocates made representation to the Governor on
4th September, 1993 and further representations to all
concerned. It would appear that they had also approached the Advocate General
to initiate contempt proceedings against the 3rd respondent and the Advocate
General also appears to have issued show cause notice to the 3rd respondent
under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. We are not concerned with the
legality or appropriateness of any of the said proceedings.
Suffice
it to state that when the indefinite strike evoked no response, the 1st
respondent filed the writ petition for a mandamus for the aforestated reliefs.
To
satisfy whether there is some substance in the allegations of corruption
imputed to the officer, we issued notice to the Government to produce his
confidential service records and also directed the Secretary to the Government
to file an affidavit, pursuant to which the Secretary has filed an affidavit
and has also produce confidential service records of the 3rd respondent. We
find no adverse remarks, much less any allegation of corruption made against
the 3rd respondent at any time. The Secretary has certified that the officer is
competent and honest, but an average officer.
It
would appear from the record that the allegation of demand of illegal
gratification was mentioned for the first time by Ramesh Chander Gupta on 2nd September, 1993. To support the imputations, he
filed a copy of the decision dated 28th July, 1993 rendered by the 3rd respondent in
the matter of M/s. Ashok Auto Sales Nunihai, Agra v. Asstt. Commissioner [Assessment].
The
allegation of Ramesh Chander Gupta is that the 3rd respondent was demanding in
every case 25 percent of the assessable tax as illegal gratification and he was
dismissing the appeals in which illegal gratification was not paid. It is not
his case that he paid the alleged demanded amount. In the abovesaid appeal, the
assessee filed his return for the year 1989-90 and the admitted liability was
of Rs.16,38,121.38. The turnover was about 10 crores. The disputed tax amount
was Rs.93,07,457.02. The 3rd respondent allowed the appeal and reduced the tax
liability from Rs.93,07,457.02 and assessed the tax for Rs.70,21,943.70. Except
the allegation on this occasion, and repetition thereafter by the other
advocates, no allegation of corruption was imputed to the 3rd respondent at any
point of time earlier to 2nd
September, 1993. It
appears from the affidavit filed by one of the advocates before the Sales Tax
Commissioner that the 3rd respondent dismissed his appeals for default.
We
searched for the reasons for the trouble. In the face of the Government`s
undisputed record of integrity of the officer and in the absence of any
allegation of corruption prior to 2nd September, 1993 and in the face of
dismissal of the appeals for default, it would apear that the 3rd respondent
was not easily conceding to the prayer for adjournments but was disposing of
the matters on merits.
Thus,
he appears to have irked or incurred the displeasure of the advocates, who, it
may be, invented the imputation to avoid inconvenient officer. The
consequential strike was carried out by the advocates but to no success. When
it was proved to be ineffective, they tapped judicial process under Article 226
of the Constitution on October
13, 1993 and the High
Court at the admission stage issued the interim direction practically allowing
the writ petition on October
14, 1993.
From
these facts the question that emerges is whether the High Court, at the
instance of the advocates and the Bar, could prohibited the quasi-judicial
statutory authority from discharging the statutory duties and whether was
justified in directing the Government to withdraw the functions from him and
transfer the same to some other jurisdiction? Judicial review is the basic
structure of our Constitution which entrusts that power to the Judiciary.
Judiciary
is the sentinel on the qui vive to protect the liberty and rights of the
citizens, apart from keeping the other organs of the State exercising that
process within the confines of the Constitution and the laws, Articles 323A and
323B empower the Parliament and the appropriate legislature to make law to constitute
Tribunals to adjudicate the disputes, complaints or offences with respect to
all or any of the matters specified therein. Sub-clause 2 (a) of Article 323B
provides for constitution of the Tribunal "for levy, assessment,
collection and enforcement of any tax". A glance at the provisions in
Section 9 of the Act shows that any dealer or other person aggrieved by an
order of the assessing authority, other than those passed under excluded
sections, is provided with a right of appeal to the appellate authority. It
also regulates the procedure for disposal of the appeal and in some cases the
orders attain finality and in some cases the orders are appealable to the Sales
Tax Tribunal. The appellate authority has power, after giving opportunity of
hearing, to confirm or annul or modify the order of the assessing officer, and
to reduce or enhance the amount of assessment or penalty arising from the
orders of the assessing authority. It is also empowered to set aside the order
and to direct re-assessment or to pass fresh order after specified enquiry or
to direct fresh enquiry and to submit a report within the specified time.
Section
9 of CPC envisages to exclude taking congnizance of civil dispute by express
provisions or by necessary implication. It would thus be clear that as regards
assessment, levy and collection of sales tax or penalty under the Act, though
the dispute in relation thereto is a cognizable civil dispute by a civil court
of competent jurisdiction, the statute by necessary implication takes out the
disputes covered by the Act from the jurisdiction of the civil court and gives
exclusive jurisdiction to the appellate authority and a further revision to the
Tribunal with ultimate power of judicial review by the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution.
It is
fundamental that if rule of law is to have any meaning and content, the
authority of the court or a statutory authority and the confidence of the
public in them should not be allowed to be shaken, diluted or undermined.
The
courts of justice and all tribunals exercising judicial functions from the
highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions
directly connected with the administration of justice. It is that expectation
and confidence of all those, who have or likely to have business in that court
or tribunal, which should be maintained so that the court/tribunal perform all
their functions on a higher level of rectitude without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will. Casting defamatory expressions upon the character,
ability or integrity of the judge/judicial officer/authority undermines the
dignity of the court/authority and it would tend to create distrust in the
popular mind and impedes confidence of the people in the courts/tribunals which
is of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and
liberties.
The
protection to the judges/judicial officer/authority is not personal but
accorded to protect the institution of the judiciary from undermining the
public confidence in the efficacy of judicial process. The protection,
therefore, is for fearless crucial process. Any scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory
or malicious attack on the judicial officer/authority beyond condonable limits,
amounts to scandalising the court/tribunal amenable to not only conviction for
its contempt but also liable to libel or defamation and damages personally or
group libel.
Maintenance
of dignity of the court/judicial officer or quasi-judicial authority is,
therefore, one of the cardinal principles of rule of law embedded in judicial
review, any uncalled for statement or allegation against the judicial
officer/statutory authorities, casting aspersions of court`s integrity or
corruption would justify initiation of appropriate action for scandalising the
court or tribunal or vindication of authority or majesty of the court/tribunal.
The
accusation of the judicial officer or authority or arbitrary and corrupt
conduct undermines their authority and rudely shakes them and public confidence
in proper dispensation of justice. It is of necessity to protect dignity or
authority of the judicial officer to maintain the stream of justice pure and
unobstructed. The judicial officer/authority needs protection personally. Therefore,
making wild allegations of corruption against the presiding officer amounts to scandalising
the court/statutory authority. Imputation of motives of corruption to the
judicial oficer/authority by any person or group of persons is a serious inroad
into the efficacy of judicial process and threat to judicial independence and
needs to be dealt with strong arm of law.
In
Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1954 SC
10] a Constitutional Bench of this Court held that a resolution passed by the
Bar Association expressing want of confidence in the judicial officers amounts
to scandalising the court to undermine its authority and thereby committed
contempt of the court.
In Tarini
Mohan & Ors. v. Pleaders [AIR 1923 Calcutta 212] the facts were that
pursuit to the resolution passed by the Bar Association to boycott the
subordinate court as a protest against courts for alleged ill-treatment of
pleaders, the petitioner-pleaders refused to appear in the court. Action was
drawn up under Section 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act against several
pleaders for their failure to appear in the court in matters which were
entrusted to them by their clients. The Full Bench of the High Court held that
pleaders deliberately abstained from attending the court and took part in a
concerted movement to boycott the court a course of conduct held not justified.
The pleaders had duties and obligations to their clients in respect of suits
and matters entrusted to them which were pending in the that court. They had
duty and obligation to co-operate with the court in the orderly administration
of justice. By the course which they had adopted, the pleaders violated and
neglected those duties and obligation in both those respects. If the pleaders
thought they had a just cause of complaint, they had two courses open to them -
to make a representation to the District judge or to the High Court.
Thus
boycotting the court was held to be highhanded and unjustified and further
action was dropped with the hope that those observations would be sufficient to
prevent any further recurrence of conduct of a similar nature with the warning
that if the conduct was repeated the consequences might be of serious nature.
This
ratio was followed In the matter of a pleader [AIR 1924 Rangoon 320] wherein
also in pursuance of the resolution of the local Bar Association to boycott to
court, a pleader refrained from appearing in the court without obtaining his client`s
consent and left his client undefended as a result of which his client was
detained in jail for about a month more. The Division Bench held that the
pleader was guilty of unprofessional conduct and the subsequent consent given
by the client did not affect his liability.
It has
ben a frequent spectacle in the recent past to witness that advocates strikes
work and boycott the courts at the slightest provocation overlooking the harm
caused to the judicial system in general and the litigant public in particular
and to themselves in the estimate of the general public. An advocate is an
officer of the court and enjoys a special status in the society. The workers in
furtherance of collective bargaining organism strike as per the provisions of
the Industrial Disputes Act as a last resort to compel the management to
concede their legitimate demands.
It is
not necessary to go into the question whether the advocates, like workmen, have
any right at all to go on strike or boycott court. In Federal Trade Commission
vs. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association et al. [493 US 411 : 107 L ED 2d
851] (1989) the Attorneys who regularly accepted court appointments to
represent indigent defendants in minor felony and misdemeanor cases before the
District of Columbia Superior Court sought an increase in the statutorily fixed
fees they were paid for the work they had done. when their lobbying efforts to
get increase in the fees failed, all the attorneys, as a group, agreed among
themselves that they would not accept any new cases after a certain date, if
the District of Columbia had not passed legislation providing for an increase
in their fees. The trial lawyers` association to which the attorneys belonged
supported and publicised their agreement. When they were not accepting the
briefs which affected the District`s criminal justice system, the Federal Trade
Commission [FTC] filed a complaint against the trial lawyers` association
complaining that they had entered into a conspiracy to fix prices and go in for
a boycott which was an unfair method of competition violating Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act [15 USCS 45]. The administrative law judge
rejected various defences of the association and recommended that the complaint
to browbeat the boycott be dismissed.
The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the FTC order holding
that the attorneys are protected by Federal Constitution`s First Amendment etc.
On certiorari, majority of U.S.A. Supreme Court speaking through Stevens, J.
held that the lawyers had no protection of the First Amendment [free speech]
and the action of the group of attorneys to boycott the courts constituted
restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of Shernan Act against
unfair method of competition. Though the object was enactment of a favourable
legislation, the boycott was the means by which the attorneys sought to obtain favourable
legislation. The Federal Constitution`s First Amendment does not protect them.
Shri
K.K. Venugopal, a leading senior member of this bar and ex-president of the
Supreme Court Bar Association, in this article "The Legal Profession at
the Turn of the Century" [(1989) 1 NLSJ 121], opined that boycott amounts
to contempt of court and the advocates participating in the strike keep their
clients as hostages and their interests in jeopardy. Shri P.P.Rao, another
senior member of this Bar and former President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association in his article "Strike by Professionals" published in
Indian Advocate - journal of the Bar Association of India [Vol. XXIII 1991
(Part I)] - opined that it amounts to professional misconduct. Shri H.M. Seervai,
a noted distinguished jurist in his article "Lawyers Strike and the Duty
of the Supreme Court" republished in the Indian Advocate [Vol. XXIII 1991
(Part I)], opined that lawyers ought to know that at least as long as lawful
redress is available to aggrieved lawyers, there is no justification for
lawyers to join in an illegal conspiracy to commit a gross, criminal contempt
of court, thereby striking at the heart of the liberty conferred on every
person by our Constitution. Strike is an attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice. The principle is that those who have duties to
discharge in a court of justice are protected by the law and are shielded by
the law to discharge those duties, the advocates in return have duty to protect
the courts. For once conceded that lawyers are above the law and the law
courts, there can be no limit to lawyers taking the law into their hands to
paralyses the working of the courts. "In my submission", he said that
"it is high time that the Supreme Court and the High Court make it clear
beyond doubt that they will not tolerate any interference from anybody or
authority in the daily administration of justice. For in no other way can the
Supreme Court and the High Court maintain the high position and exercise the
great powers conferred by the Constitution and the law to do justice without
fear or favour, affection or ill-will." Shri Nariman, yet another learned
senior members of this Court and President of the Bar Association of India and
Editor of the Indian Advocate - in his article "Boycott - a lawyer's`s
weapon" published in the Journal `Indian Advocate` [Vol. XVIII 1978 Nos. 1
& 2], opined that when the lawyers boycott the courts, confidence in the
administration of justice is shaken. The longer the boycott the greater the
jeopardy to the system. The boycotting of a court by members privileged to practise,
there is virtually holding justice to ransom. It certainly contributes to the law`s
delays. An absention from the courts by those who have held themselves out as practising,
there is a threat to the administration of law and undermines the rule of law
which is the bedrock of our Constitution. He ended with a quotation by Sir
Norman Macleod [AIR 1920 Bombay 168] that "those who live by
the law should keep the law".
In a
recent article by R.D. Sharma published in Pioneer dated 9th August, 1994, it is stated that law courts do
not belong to the lawyers alone. They belong to the people.
Lawyers
must realise the untold harships and miseries to which the litigants are
subjected to and the extent to which the cause of justice suffers on each day
they boycott the courts on one pretext or another. It is this realisation which
needs to be asserted vigorously than ever before. It is, therefore, stated that
the public image of the lawyers admittedly is at its nadir and if remedial
steps are not initiated from within, a day will come when society finds it
convenient to dispense with them altogether. If it happens, it will be bad not
only for the profession but also for freedom, democracy and rule of law in the
country.
In
Court of its own motion v. Mr. B.D. Kaushik & Ors. [1991 (4) Delhi Lawyer
316], a full Court of the Delhi High Court was constrained to consider the
outrageous conduct on the part of M/s. B.D. Kaushik, Rajinder Kumar, Rajiv Khosla,
Jugal Wadhwa, R.N. Vats, Jatin Singh and P.S. Rathee, contemners in that case.
The contemners, aided and abetted by others in large number stormed various
court rooms on September 26, 1991 at about 10.30 a.m., When Judges were
transacting their judicial functions; they individually and collectively stood
on the chairs, tables and dais of the Court Masters and acted in amazing
manner, shouted abuses and slogans such as "Chief Justice and Judges Hai Hai,
Murdabad". They also prevented various lawyers from discharging their
judicial functions as oficers of the Court and also stoped the litigants from
conducting their cases in the Court. In a threatening tone they also shouted at
the Judges saying "Stop the work, we will not allow the courts to function
and you should retire to your chambers".
They
insisted upon the Chief Justice in his Court to listen to their Memorandum to
be read by Rajiv Khosla which was read by B.D. Kaushik, the President of the
Association. The contents of the Memorandum scandalised or tended to lower the
authority of the High Court. This outrageous and unbecoming episode continued
to linger on and hover in the High Court till almost 12.30 p.m. The conscience of the Court was shocked due to the
contumacious conduct of the contemners for initiation of the Court`s suo mottu
action under Article 215 of the Constitution. The Full Bench, per majority,
held that the contempt committed by the contemners is gravest and that it could
not be imagined that any contempt worse than that was possible, as the contempt
was committed not by laymen but by those who are officers of the Courts.
In
Common Cause v. Union of India [1995 (1) SCALE 6], this Court is directly
grappling with the problem of strike by Advocates. Noticing that it was not
necessary to go into the wider question whether members of the profession could
at all go on strike or boycott courts, it was felt that a committee be
constituted in that behalf to suggest steps to be taken to prevent such boycott
or strike. The committee suggested that, instead of the Court going into the
wider question, interim arrangements be made to see whether it would be
workable. The suggestions made on November 13, 1994 were incorporated in the
order passed by this Court as an interim measure that the Advocates should not
resort to the strike or boycott the court or abstain from court except in
serious, rarest of rare cases; instead, they should resort to peaceful
demonstration so as to avoid causing hardship to the litigant public.
The
Court indicated as under :
"(1)
In the rare instance where any association of lawyers (including statutory Bar
Councils) considers it imperative to call upon and/or advise members of the
legal profession to abstain from appearing in courts on any occasion, it must
be left open to any individual member/members of that association to be free to
appear without let, fer or hindrance or any other coercive step.
(2)No
such member who appears in court or otherwise practices his legal profession,
shall be visited with any adverse or penal consequences, whatever, by any
association of lawyers, and shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of
expulsion therefrom.
(3)The
above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing lawyers in courts
such as, for instance, wearing of arm bands and other forms of protest disrupt
the court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any
such forms of protest shall not however be derogatory to the court or to the
profession.
(4)Office
bearers of a Bar Association (including Bar Council) responsible for taking
decisions mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are
implemented in the spirit of what is stated in clauses (1), (2) and (3)
above." Accordingly, the court directed the members of the bar to adopt
further course of action in terms thereof. Instead of working that order in its
letter and spirit and given a trial, strikes or boycotts of courts/tribunals
are being continued abegging. When in writ petition No. 553/94 titled Supreme
Court bar Association v. State of U.P. & Ors., Concerning contempt of the
High Court by some of the members of the Bar Association of Allahabad High
Court and the police officials had come up for orders, pursuant to a suggestion
made by the Bar by order dated February 21, 1995, this Court directed the
Attorney General to convene a meeting of some of the leading senior members of
the Bar of the Supreme Court to suggest ways and means to tackle the problem of
strike or boycott by the Advocates. Pursuant thereto, the Attorney General for
India held two meetings, whereat they reached consensus that a Standing
Committee be constituted at different levels of courts to consider complaints
and to manage the crisis. Similar views appears to have also been expressed by
the Bar Council of India and also the Bar council of State of U.P. The problem was relegated to be considered in the
Common Cause case (supra).
However,
it would be imperative to remind ourselves that self-regulation alone would
retrieve the profession from lost social respect and enable the members of the
profession to keep the law as useful instrument of social order.
In
this case, the respondent-Association and the advocates resorted to boycott the
courts on the specious plea of non-transfer of Satti Din, the appellate
authority, who seems to be honest and willing to discharge his duties
diligently. When the Government stuck to its stand and did not yield to the
pressure despite the strike, the Bar Association filed writ petition in the
High Court. Question is whether the High Court was justified in entertaining
the writ petition and issuing the directions quoted above. The High Court has
power to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent a court or tribunal from
proceeding further when the inferior court or tribunal [a] proceeds to act without
or inexcess of jurisdiction, [b] proceeds to act in violation of the rules of
natural justice, [c] proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or
unconstitutional, or [d] proceeds to act in contravention of the fundamental
rights.
None of
these situations indisputably arises in this case.
As
noted above, Section 9 of the Act is a complete code in itself for conferment
of jurisdiction on the appellate authority, the procedure for dispensation and
the power to pass orders thereon. The appellate authority was acting in
furtherance thereof. it has, therefore, to be seen whether the High Court was
justified in issuing orders restraining the authority from exercising those
statutory powers and further to deprive that authority to exercise those powers
by transferring the same to any other jurisdiction.
S. Govinda
Menon vs. Union of India & Anr. [AIR 1967
SC1274] relied on by the 1st respondent is of no avail. In that case the acts
and omissions were imputed to the officer, doubting his integrity, good faith
and devotion to duty expected of a civil servant, though integral to the
discharge of statutory functions under the Madras Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The question was whether the officer is
amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction when his conduct or integrity was subject
of disciplinary enquiry under All India Services [Discipline and Appeal] Rules,
1955. It was held therein that he was amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction and
action for misconduct. This case has no relevance to the facts of the present
case.
The
decision in Dwarka Nath vs. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur & Anr. [AIR 1966 SC 81] also is of no
assistance to the 1st respondent. Though this court was considering the scope
and nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, there is no
doubt now as regards the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Courts. however
wide its power be, the question is whether a writ or order of prohibition could
be issued prohibiting a statutory authority from discharging its statutory
functions or transferring those functions to another jurisdiction.
Having
given our anxious and careful consideration, we are of the considered view that
the High Court does not have the aforesaid power. Exercise of such power
generates its rippling effect on the subordinate judiciary and statuary
functionaries. On slightest pretext by the aggrieved parties or displeased
members of the bar, by their concerted action they would browbeat the judicial
officers or authorities, who would always be deterred from discharging their
duties according to law without fear or favour or ill- will. Therefore, we hold
that writ petition is not maintainable. The impugned orders are clearly and
palpably illegal and are accordingly quashed.
Before
parting with the case, we are distressed to notice, as rightly pointed out by
the learned solicitor General, that an advocate instead of arming himself with
armory of precedents, was armed with licensed revolver and was attending the
courts with licensed fore-arm. He pretended to provide himself with the
revolver to shoot in self-defence. It is regrettable that advocates attend
court with fire arms; it is not befitting to the dignity of the legal
profession and is a distressing feature. Such conduct being not consistent with
the dignity of the legal profession, to maintain and enhance which the 1st
respondent is formed, the same needs to be deprecated.
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