Indian
Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation & Anr [1995] INSC 214 (7 April 1995)
J.S.
Verma & Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, Jj.
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
1.
Heard the learned Additional Solicitor General.
2. The
impugned judgment by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court overrules
the decision of a Division Bench in Municipal Corporation, Indore and Others v. Smt. Ratnaprabha Dhanda,
Indore and Another, 1989 MPLJ 20. The
challenge in this special leave petition is to the correctness of the Full
Bench decision. The question involved relates to the construction of Section
138(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 629 (for short the
"M.P. Act") which reads as under:- "The annual value of any
building shall notwithstanding anything contained in' any other law for the
time being in force be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which such
building, together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for
use or enjoyment therewith might reasonably at the time of assessment be
expected to be let from year to year, less any allowance of ten percent for the
cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building
in a state to command such gross annual rent." (emphasis supplied)
3. In
the High Court the matter was not res integra being concluded by the authority
of the direct decision by a 3- Judge Bench of this Court in Municipal
Corporation, Indore and Others v. Smt. Ratna Prabha and Others, 1977 (1) SCR
1017, on the correct construction of Section 138(b) of the M.P. Act. No other
direct decision of this Court is to the contrary. However, the Division Bench
of the High Court in a later case between the very same parties took a
different view on the construction of the same provision placing reliance on
some other decisions of this Court wherein the question arose for decision in
the context of a similar provision in some other statutes applicable in the
other States wherein there was no non-obstante clause as in the M.P. Act. The
Division Bench took the view that the de- cision of this Court in Ratna Prabha
(supra) was not binding on it even though it related to construction of the
same provision, namely, Section 138(b) of the M.P. Act since it was in conflict
with later decisions of this Court by co- equal Benches wan Daulat Rai Kapoor
etc. etc. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Another
etc. etc., 1980 (2) SCR 607 and Dr. Balbir Singh and Ors. etc. etc. v.
Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors., 1985 (2) SCR 439.
Accordingly, it proceeded on the basis that the decision of this Court in Ratna
Prabha (supra) is no longer good law binding on it.
This
situation gave rise to the need for a Full Bench to consider the correctness of
the view taken by the Division Bench. The Full Bench has overruled the decision
of the Division Bench. In our opinion, the Full Bench was right in its view
that the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha (supra) binds the High Court.
There is no ground to entertain this special leave petition which challenges
the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court.
4.The
only, direct decision of this Court on the construction of Section 138(b) of
the M.P. Act, with which we are concerned, is Ratna Prabha (supra). It referred
to the earlier decision in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Smt. Padma Debi and
Others, 1962 (3) SCR 49 and distinguished it on the ground that Section 127(a)
of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1923 on which the decision in Padma Debi
(supra) was based, did not contain a non obstante clause like that in Section
138(b) of the M.P. Act. The other earlier decisions of this Court in which
construction of similar provision in other statutes was involved were also
referred and distinguished in Ratna Prabha (supra); and it was then held as
under:- "As has been stated, clause (b) of section 138 of the Act provides
that the annual value of any building shall " notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force" be deemed to be
the gross annual rent for 630 which the building might "reasonably at the
time of the assessment be expected to be let from year to year". While
therefore the requirement of the law is that the reasonable letting value
should determine the annual value of the building, it has also been
specifically provided that this would be so "notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force". It appears to us
that it would be a proper interpretation of the provisions of clause (b) of
section 138 of the Act to hold that in a case where the standard rent of a building
has been fixed under section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,
and there is nothing to show that there has been fraud or collusion, that would
be its reasonable letting value, but, where this is not so, and the building
has never been let out and is being used in a manner where the question of
fixing its standard rent does not arise, it would be permissible to fix its
reasonable rent without regard to the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961. This view will, in our opinion, give proper
effect to the non-obstante clause in clause (b), with due regard to its other
provision that the letting value should be reasonable ".
We
have gone through the decision in Padma Debi's case (supra). There the premises
were on rent and section 127(a) of Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1923,
did not contain a non-obstante clause. That the section provided, inter alia,
was that the annual value shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which
the land or building might at the time of assessment "reasonably be
expected to let from year to year. " This Court examined the significance
of the word "reasonable" and held that it would be incongruous to
consider fixation of rent beyond the limits fixed by penal legislation as reasonable.
That view was taken with reference to the provisions of the Rent Control Act
which penalised the taking of a higher rent, and also made it irrecoverable.
While,
therefore, we are in agreement with the view taken in Padma Debi's case (supra)
that it would not be reasonable to consider fixation of rent beyond the limits
fixed by the Rent Control Act as reasonable, it would not be a proper
interpretation of section 138(b) to hold that as no standard rent has been
fixed so far in respect of die Viram Lodge, the Municipal Commissioner was
justified in adopting another suitable criterion for determining the annual
value of the building. There is in fact nothing in the Act to make it
obligatory for the Commissioner to follow the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act in spite of the non- obstante clause and to limit the
annual value to any standard rent that the building might fetch under that Act.
xxx xxx
xxx The High Court did not properly appreciate the difference between the wording
of section 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1923, and section
138(b) of the Act, and committed an error in thinking that this was virtually
similar to Padma Debi's case. " (at pages 10 1 9-20 of SCR) (emphasis
supplied)
5. In Dewan
Daulat Rai (supra), an other 3-Judge Bench of this Court while construing a
similar provision in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 referred to the decision in
RatnaPrabha (supra) and distinguished it on the ground that there was n non-obstante
clause in the relevant provision of the Punjab Municipal Act and therefore, the
decision in Ratna Prab (supra) had no application. No doubt, i doing so, a
reservation was expressed 631 about the view taken in Ratna Prabha (supra) on
the basis of the existence of the non-obstante clause in Section 138(b) of the
M.P. Act but that cannot have the effect of overruling the decision of this
Court in Ratna Prabha (supra) inasmuch as a later co-equal Bench could not
overrule it and could only refer it for reconsideration to a larger Bench,
which it did not do.
6. In
Dr. Balbir Singh (supra), after pointing out that the relevant provisions in
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
were almost identical, the decision in Dewan Daulat Rai (supra) was followed by
another 3-Judge Bench. No reference was made therein to the decision of this
Court in Ratna Prabha (supra).
7.
Recently, another 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Morvi Municipality v. State of
Gujarat and Ors., 1993 (2) SCR 803, dealt with the same question with reference
to the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. It referred to the
earlier decisions and indicated that the presence of the non-obstante clause
"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law" in Section
138(b) of the M.P. Act distinguished the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha
(supra); and since in the Gujarat act there was no such non-obstante clause
that decision had no application to the Gujarat Act.
8. It
is thus clear that the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha (supra) on the
construction of Section 138(b) of the M.P. Act has all along been understood
and justified on the basis of the presence of the non-obstante clause in
Section 138(b) of the M.P. Act and the later decisions have distinguished it on
that ground. That is the basis on which the decision in Padma Debi (supra) was
distinguished in Ratna Prabha (supra) itself It is also obvious that a Bench of
3-Judges only in the later decisions could not overrule the decision of this
Court in Ratna Prabha, 1977 (1) SCR 10 1 7 and, therefore, none of the later
decisions could be so read to have that effect. The Division Bench of the High
Court in 1989 MLJ 20 was clearly in error in taking the view that the decision
of this Court in Ratna Prabha (supra) was not binding on it. In doing so, the
Division Bench of the High Court did something which even a later co-equal
Bench of this Court did not and could not do. The view taken by the Division
Bench of the High Court in 1989 MPLJ 20 pro- ceeds on a total misunderstanding
of the law of precedents and Article 141 of the Constitution of India, to which
it referred. But for the fact that the view of the Division Bench of the High
court proceeds on a misapprehensions of the law of precedents and Article 141
of the Constitution, it would be exposed to the criticism of an aberration in
judicial discipline. The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court was,
therefore, rightly overruled by the Full Bench in the impugned judgment.
9. The
other submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is a plea for
reconsideration of the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha, 1977 (1) SCR
1017, which can arise only in this Court and was not available in the High
Court. The decision in Ratna Prabha (supra), the only direct decision of this
Court on the construction of Section 138(b) of the M.P. Act has held the field
for a long time and has formed the basis of assessment of the annual value in
the State of Madhya
Pradesh since then.
That decision is based 632 on the presence of the non-obstante clause in the
M.P. Act and distinguishes the earlier larger Bench decision in Padma Debi
(supra) on that ground. There can be no doubt that the view taken by this Court
in Ratna Prabha (supra) is a reasonably permissible construction of Section
138(b) of the M.P. Act. In the later decisions of this Court, Ratna Prabha
(supra) was invariably distinguished and not referred for reconsideration by a
larger Bench. There is thus no ground now for reconsideration of the decision
in Ratna Prabha (supra).
10. In
The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income- tax, Bombay North, 1965
(2) SCR 908, the correct approach in this behalf was indicated as under:-
"........ In exercising this inherent power, however, this Court would
naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant
to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier
decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial
reasons to do so When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court
should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for
such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably
possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion
is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court
should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other
valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should
be revised.......".
(at
page 921 of SCR) (emphasis supplied) 11.In our opinion, the test indicated in Keshav
Mills (supra) for reconsideration of a decision of this Court is not satisfied
in the present case and, therefore, we are unable to entertain the plea for
reconsideration of the decision in Rama Prabha.
12.The
special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed for the above reasons.
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