Rajanna
Vs. Union of India [1995] INSC 226 (19 April 1995)
Verma,
Jagdish Saran (J) Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) Manohar Sujata V. (J) J.S. Verma,
J.:
CITATION:
1995 AIR 1966 1995 SCC Supl. (2) 601 JT 1995 (3) 632 1995 SCALE (2)852
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
1.
Leave granted.
2. The
only question for decision is: Whether the appellant is entitled to the ex-gratia
payment of Rs.50,000/- in accordance with the circular dated 13.6.1986 of the
Cabinet Secretariat of the Central Government providing for grant of exgratia
payment to the Special Protection Group (SPG) Personnel? The claim is on
account of the permanent partial disablement suffered by the appellant as a
result of certain injuries sustained by him in a motor accident on 20.6.1986
while travelling in a SPG vehicle.
The
material part of the circular providing for ex-gratia payment to be made to the
SPG personnel who suffer permanent partial disablement as a result of injuries
received while per- 635 forming actual VIP security duty is as under:
"(iii)
Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the SPG personnel who suffer
permanent partial disablement as a result of injuries received While performing
actual VIP security duty."
3. The
relevant facts are admitted. The appellant was a security assistant in the Special
Protection Group attached to the Cabinet Secretariat from 17.9.1985 and was
amongst the security personnel attached to the Prime Minister's Office. On
20.6.1986 the appellant was required to be on such duty at the South Block, New Delhi from 9.00 a.m. to 5.30
p.m. According to the
official arrangement some members of the SPG personnel including the appellant
were picked up by an official SPG vehicle from the staff quarters and the
vehicle was going to the South Block when it was involved in a road accident at
about 8.20 a.m. in which the appellant sustained certain injuries resulting in
his permanent partial disablement on account of shortening of one leg. As a
result of this disability the appellant be- came unsuitable for performance of
the security duty of VVIPs and was shifted to a less important posting which
also reduced his special allowance from 50% to 25%.
4. The
appellant claimed the ex-gratia payment of Rs.50,000/- in accordance with the
above circular dated 13.6.1986 on the ground that his permanent partial
disable,- ment was the result of injuries sustained by him while on duty. The
appellant's claim was rejected by letter dated 23.7.1992 which reads as under:
- "No.8/SPG-PF/85(136) Special Protection Group (Cabinet Secretariat) New
Delhi No. 1, Safdurjung
Lane, New Delhi 110001.
Dated 23 July 92.
M E M
O R A N D U M With reference to his representation for grant of ex-gratia
payment, Shri Rajanna, SA is hereby informed that his case was considered by
the Government carefully but could not be acceded to as the same was not
covered for the grant of ex-gratia payment under the rules and has since been
dropped.
Sd/-
Assistant Director (Admn.) TO Shri Rajanna, SA through AD (Tech), SPG"
5. The
appellant then filed O.A. No.2284 of 1992 before the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi for recovery of his claim of exgratia
payment of Rs.50,000/-. The claim was contested on the ground that the injuries
resulting in the permanent partial disablement of the appellant were not
sustained by him while performing "actual VIP security duty" as
required by the circular but in the motor accident which occurred before the
appellant had joined actual duty at 9.00 a.m. The Tribunal has rejected the appellant's claim accepting the defence.
Hence,
this appeal by special leave.
636
6. The
real question for decision is the meaning of the expression "actual VIP
security duty" in the above circular in the context of the provision for
"grant of exgratia payment to SPG personnel". The reasoning of the
tribunal which is supported by the learned Additional Solicitor General on
behalf of the respondent is that " actual VIP security duty" means
the actual period when the person is providing security to the VIP on
commencement of the duty hours and it does not include the journey to and from
the duty post. Is this the correct meaning of the expression in the present
context?
7. It
is well known that the Special Protection Group is the elite security force
formed initially in 1985 of specially trained personnel to provide security
cover to the Prime Minister of India; and sometime back the statute under which
it was constituted has been amended to extend the provision of such security
cover also to the former Prime Ministers. In view of the high quality of
personnel needed to constitute the SPG, some extra benefits are given to them
for the much greater risk they take and the greater danger to which they are
exposed. The above circular providing for grant of ex-gratia payment to the SPG
personnel in the event of sustaining injuries has the same object.
8. The
circular Annex. 'N' dated 24.1.1990 modifies the earlier circular dated
13.6.1986 and enhances the rates and enlarges the extent of application thereof
to the SPG personnel. It shows that provision is made for payment for in juries
sustained not only while perform in " actual VIP security duty" but
also while performing duty "other than actual security duty". Thus
ex-gratia payment according to the scheme is made even to those SPG personnel
who sustain injuries while performing duty "other than actual VIP security
duty". This is the concept of ex-gratia payment to SPG personnel under the
circular. An explanatory note in that circular is as under: - "For the
purpose of ex-gratia payment, the duty other them actual VIP duty would include
training also." This note indicates that even when a person belonging to
the SPG is on training, he would be treated to be on duty "other than
actual VIP security duty", and for injuries sustained by him during that period
he would be covered by the circular and entitled to payment thereunder, though
at a lesser rate. If this be the concept of the ex-gratia payment under the
circular, it is difficult to appreciate how a person posted for actual VIP
security duty and on his way for that purpose in an official SPG vehicle along
with other SPG personnel can be denied the benefit of that circular. The
intrinsic evidence in the circular is that it has to be construed liberally in favour
of the SPG personnel to promote the object of the scheme for grant of exgratia
payment to SPG personnel. Acceptance of the defence taken would frustrate the
very object of the scheme in the circu- lar.
9. The
admitted facts clearly show the appellant sustained injuries resulting in his
permanent partial disablement in a motor accident when he was travelling from
the staff quarters to the South Block for duty in the official SPG vehicle
provided for that purpose. This road journey was not in his private vehicle or
a public transport in which any member of the public could travel but in an
official SPG vehicle meant for carrying the SPG person- 637 nel on duty. On
these facts, it cannot be doubted that there would be notional extension of the
actual duty to include the journey of this kind in the official SPG vehicle
between the staff quarters and South Block. The principle under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for determining whether an accident arose out of and in the
course of the employment of the workman should be equally applicable to the circular
since both have the same object. It is, therefore, useful to refer to some
decisions of this Court on the point under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
10. In
Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja & Ors., AIR 1958 C 881,
the general rule was indicated thus :- " As a rule, the employment of a
workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does
not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from
the place of employment being excluded. It is now well-settled, however, that
this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises
so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and
in leaving the actual place of work. 'Mere may be some reasonable extension in
both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his
employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises.
The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very
carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the
course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory
of notional extension." ".....It is well settled that when a workman
is on is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is
there as anyother member of the public and is not there in the course of ins
employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him
to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment
he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course
of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which
comes within the theory of national extension, outside of which the employer is
not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to
him............" (Para 8) (emphasis supplied) In the facts
of that case the employer was held not liable only because the accident
occurred when the workman was travelling in a boat not provided by the employer
but a public transport in which any other member of the public could travel and
it was not incumbent on the workman to adopt that mode of travel. Applying the
test in the present case, it is clear that since the appellant was travelling
in the official SPG vehicle in which he was required to travel from the staff
quarters to the South Block, that vehicle not being available to anyone other
than the SPG personnel, the appellant was at a place or a point or an area
which came within the theory of notional extension of the official premises for
performance of "actual VIP security duty". In other words, that
official SPG vehicle was a notional extension of the official premises and,
therefore, the appellant was deemed to be on actual VIP security duty, while travelling
in it from the staff quarters to the South Block in these circumstances.
638
11. In
Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, 1970 (1) SCR
869, the test for this pur- pose was indicated as under :- "To come within
the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of
employment. The words "in the course of the employment" mean "in
the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is
incidental to it." The words "arising out of employment" are
understood to mean that "during the, course of the employment, injury has
resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which unless
engaged in die duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the
workman would not otherwise have suffered." In other words there must be a
causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression
"arising out of employment" is again not confined to the more nature
of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such to its nature,
its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of these
factors the workman is brought within the scene of special danger the injury
would be one which arises out of employment". To put it differently if the
accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the
employment, the claim for compensation must succeed. unless of course the
workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent
act............".
(Pages
872-873) (emphasis supplied) This indicates that there must be a causal
relationship between the accident and the employment- or the accident must be
related to a risk which is an incident to the employment. The House of Lords in
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley,
[1917] A.C. 352, relied on in the above decision, indicated the test as under:
"'There
is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate applicable,
because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is generally of
some real assistance. It is this : Was it part of the injured person's
employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If )*a,
the accident arose out of his employment.............." (emphasis
supplied)
12. In
Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 33, Fourth Edition, the summary is stated
thus:
"490.
ACCIDENT TRAVELLING TO AND FROM WORK.
The
course of employment normally begins when the employee reaches his place of
work. To extend it to the journey to and from work it must be shown that, in travelling
by the particular method and route and at the particular time, the employee was
fulfilling an express or implied term of his contract of service. One way of
doing this is to establish that the home is the employee's base from which it
is his duty to work and that he was travelling by direct route from his home to
a place where he was required to work, but that is only one way of showing
this; the real question at issue is whether on the particular journey he was travelling
in the performance of a duty, or whether the journey was incidental to the
performance of that duty and not merely preparatory to the performance of it.
If the place where the accident occurs is a private road or on the employer's
property, the accident is in the course of the em- ployment because he is then
at the scene 639 of the accident by reason only of his em- ployment and he has
reached the sphere of his employment. The test is whether the employee was
exposed to the particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took
the same risks as those incurred by any member of the public using the
highway." (Pages 369-370) "
496.
ACCIDENTS TRAVELLING T0 OR FROM WORK IN EMPLOYER' S TRANSPORT.
An
accident happening while an employed earner is, with the express or implied permission
of his employer, travelling as a passenger to or from his place of work In any
vehicle which is being operated by or on behalf of his employer, or which is
provided by some other person in pursuance of arrangements made with his
employer, must be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his employment,
even though the employed earner is not obliged to travel by that vehicle, if it
would have been deemed so to have arisen if he had been under an obligation to
travel by it provided that the vehicle is not operated in the ordinary course
of a public transport service." (Page 374) (emphasis supplied) 13.There
can be no doubt that there was a causal relationship between the accident in
which the appellant sustained the injuries and his employment in the SPG for
actual VEP security duty; and it was an incident of his employment to travel
from the staff quarters to the South Block in the SPG vehicle according to the
official ar- rangement. In our opinion, the meaning of the expression
"actual VIP security duty" in the above circular must be the same as
that of the words "in the course of the employment" in the Workmen's
Compensation Act; and, therefore, the test for determining the liability for
payment under the circular should also be the same. In our view, the tribunal
was in error in making an unduly strict and narrow construction of the
expression used in the circular.
14.We
are constrained to observe that the concerned authorities must adopt a humane
approach and construe the circular liberally to advance its object instead of
taking such a rigid and pedantic stand. Unless properly implemented, the scheme
in the circular would be frustrated resulting in failure to achieve the avowed
purpose.
15.Consequently,
the appeal is allowed with Rs.10,000/- as costs.
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