Darshan
Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh [1994] INSC 451 (5 September 1994)
Ramaswamy,
K. Ramaswamy, K. Venkatachala N. (J)
CITATION:
1995 AIR 75 1994 SCC (6) 585 1994 SCALE (4)143
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
1.
Leave granted.
2. The
appeal arises from the judgment and decree dated 2-3- 1994 in RSA No. 31 of
1987 of Punjab & Haryana High Court.
The
respondent filed the suit for possession on 4-11-1982.
Admittedly,
he was a minor at the time of the death of his father. It is also an admitted
fact that he attained majority on 17-4-1977. He filed the suit for possession
of the plaint schedule portion within 12 years under Article 65 of the Schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963, Act 21 of 1963 (for short 'the Act'). It is
contended for the appellant that the suit ought to have been filed within three
years from the date of cessation of respondent's disability but it was filed
beyond three years and that, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. A
conjoint reading of Sections 6(1) and 8 of the Act shows that where a person is
entitled to institute a suit, the limitation begins to run for a minor or
insane or an idiot to institute the suit within the same period after the
disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time
specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule i.e. 3 years from the
date of cessation of disability. We find force in the contention.
3.
Section 3 of the Act posits that the period of limitation applicable to a suit
or other proceedings, if the period prescribed in the Schedule gets expired,
the suit or application becomes barred by limitation though the right may
subsist. However, Section 3 says that in particular circumstances, the
limitation gets modified by the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act.
587
Article 65 in Part V of the Schedule regulates limitation on the suits relating
to immovable property. For possession of immovable property or any interest
therein based on title, the period of limitation prescribed is 12 years which
begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the
plaintiff. Section 6 deals with legal disability under sub-section (1) thereof
where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the
execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be
reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, may institute the suit or make an
application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would
otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third
column of the Schedule. In other words, though in a given case, the defendant
may have perfected title by adverse possession during minority of the plaintiff
by remaining in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the
immovable property ascertaining his own exclusive right, title or interest in
immovable property to the knowledge of the plaintiff, on cessation of the
disability, even though the period of limitation prescribed in third column of
the Schedule might have expired by efflux of time, Section 6 elongates the
right and enlarges the limitation and entitles the minor, insane or idiot to
institute the suit or make the application within the same period prescribed in
the third column of the Schedule to the Act, after the disability to which the minor,
the insane or the idiot has been subjected to, ceased. Section 8 makes special
exception to Section 6. In other words, notwithstanding the availability of
limitation in the third column of the Schedule prescribed under the relevant
article, the suit or application shall be filed within three years from the
cessation of the disability or the death of a person affected thereby
engrafting the language thus:
"8.
Special exceptions.- Nothing in Section 6 or in Section 7 applies to suits to
enforce rights of preemptions, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than
three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person
affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application."
4. In other words, Section 8 is a proviso to Section 6 or 7.
A
combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate
article would be that a person under disability may sue after cessation of
disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time
specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule but special limitation
as an exception has been provided in Section 8 laying down that extended period
after cessation of the disability would not be beyond three years from the date
of cessation of the disability or death of the disabled person. Take for
instance, if a minor acquires a cause of action to sue for possession of
immovable property but due to being minor, Section 6 aids him to lay the suit
within the same period of 12 years after attaining majority.
Suppose
he dies, his legal representatives would be entitled to lay the suit within
three years from the date of his attaining majority though he may die after the
expiry of three years since his right to file the suit is extended only up to
three years from the date of his attaining majority. In other words, cessation
588 of disability or death whichever occurs earlier. The date of death of
disabled person does not provide further extended cause of action, a period
beyond three years after the disability ceases and death. Take another
instance, where a cause of action for possession has arisen when the minor was
at the age of 16 years. On his attaining majority, he gets three years' period
but Article 65 Column 3, gives him the right to file a suit within 12 years
from the date the defendant acquires prescriptive title. His cessation of
disability and expiry of three years under Section 8 does not take away his
right to file the suit within 12 years under Article 65. In other words the
benefit of Section 6 is available to him. Take a third case, where the cause of
action had arisen to a minor when he was at the age of 4 years. During his
minority, the 12 years' prescriptive period expired by efflux of time at his
attaining 16 years but on his becoming major, his disability ceases. Therefore,
he gets a further period of three years from the date of cessation of
disability to file a suit for recovery of the possession from the defendant who
claims adverse possession to the plaintiff. Thus considered Section 8 is a
special exception to Section 6 or 7 and the period of limitation though barred
under Section 3, remained available to persons under disability specified in
Section 6 or 7 and the right to lay the suit or application after disability
ceased under Section 6 or 7 is regulated by the limitation prescribed by
Section 8.
5. In
other words, in each case, the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting period
of limitation from the date of cessation of disability subject to the condition
that in no case the period extended by this process under Section 6 or 7 shall
exceed three years from the date of cessation of the disability. Considered
from this perspective, we are clearly of the opinion that the suit of the
respondent is barred by limitation. But unfortunately, the attention of the
High Court was not drawn to Section 8 of the Act which laid down to its contra
conclusion.
6.
However, we have to see whether it is a fit case for our interference under
Article 136 of the Constitution. All the courts including the High Court
concurrently found as a fact that the appellant is a stranger to the family of
the respondent and that he forged the 'Will', the last testamentary disposition
of the father of the respondent and on its basis the appellant wrongfully came into
the possession of the suit property. Thereby he had fraudulently brought a
fabricated 'Will' to gain wrongful possession of the suit property and was in
enjoyment thereof. After the judgment of the High Court, the respondent came
into possession of the suit property in execution of the decree. Therefore, we
decline to interfere in this appeal. However, we point out that the respondent
may not be entitled for mesne profits or damages against the appellant. The
appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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