Ramti Devi
Vs. Union of India [1994] INSC 536 (20 October 1994)
Ramaswamy,
K. Ramaswamy, K. Bharucha S.P. (J) Mukherjee M.K. (J)
CITATION:
1995 SCC (1) 198 JT 1995 (1) 223 1994 SCALE (4)676
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
1.This
appeal by special leave arises against the judgment and decree of the Delhi
High Court in RFA No. 59 of 1978 dated 26-2-1979. The plaintiff appellant filed the
suit for declaration that she is the absolute owner and is in possession of the
house bearing old Municipal No. 5925 and new Municipal No. 4477, Ward No. XI,
situated at Plot No. 7/18, Darya Ganj, Delhi. She claimed to have purchased the property from one Kaushalya Devi
under a sale deed dated 11-
5-1946 registered on 29-5-1946 and thereby she is said to be the owner. Shri Ratti
Ram had no right title or interest to alienate the property by the sale deed
dated 29-1-1947 which was said to have been
executed to stifle the prosecution intended to be lodged against him. The trial
court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court confirmed it.
2.The
question is whether the suit is within limitation. In the evidence, it was
admitted that she had knowledge of the execution and registration of the sale
deed on 29-1-1947.
Initially
a suit was filed in 1959 but was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file
fresh suit. Admittedly, the present suit was filed on 30-7-1966. The question, therefore, is whether the suit is
within limitation.
Article
59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, relied on by the appellant
herself, postulates that to cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for
the rescission of a contract, the limitation is three years and it begins to
run when the plaintiff entitles to have the instrument or the decree cancelled
or set aside or when the contract rescinded first became known to him. As seen,
when the appellant had knowledge of it on 29-1-1949 itself the limitation began to run
from that date and the three years' limitation has hopelessly been barred on
the date when the suit was filed. It is contended by Shri VM. Tarkunde, learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant, that the counsel in the trial court was not
right in relying upon Article 59.
Article
113 is the relevant article. The limitation does not begin to run as the sale
deed document is void as it was executed to stifle the prosecution. Since the
appellant having been remained in possession, the only declaration that could
be sought and obtained is that she is the owner and that the document does not
bind the appellant. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the learned
counsel. As seen, the recitals of the documents would show that the sale deed
was executed for valuable consideration to discharge pre-existing debts and it
is a registered document. Apart from the prohibition under Section 92 of the Evidence
Act to adduce oral evidence to contradict the terms of the recital therein, no
issue in this behalf on the 200 voidity of the sale deed or its binding nature
was raised nor a finding recorded that the sale deed is void under Section 23
of the Contract Act. Pleading itself is not sufficient. Since the appellant is
seeking to have the document avoided or cancelled, necessarily, a declaration
has to be given by the court in that behalf. Until the document is avoided or
cancelled by proper declaration, the duly registered document remains valid and
binds the parties. So the suit necessarily has to be laid within three years
from the date when the cause of action had occurred. Since the cause of action
had arisen on 29-1- 1947, the date on which the sale deed was executed and
registered and the suit was filed on 30-7-1966, the suit is hopelessly barred by
limitation. The courts below, therefore, were right in dismissing the suit. The
appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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