Nihal Chand
Rameshwar Dass Vs. Vinod Rastogi [1994] INSC 335 (13 May 1994)
Mukherjee
M.K. (J) Mukherjee M.K. (J) Mohan, S. (J)
CITATION:
1994 SCC (4) 325 JT 1994 (4) 113 1994 SCALE (2)967
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.- The tenants in a
suit for eviction are the appellants before us. Though the landlord-respondent
sought eviction of the tenants on various grounds the only ground which
survives for our consideration in this appeal is of illegal subletting. According
to the landlord the tenants had without his consent sublet the verandah of the
tenanted premises to certain individuals, namely, Zinda Hasan, Abdul Rashid and
Dhunna, who were doing business there. The defence of the tenants, so far as
this ground was concerned, was one of denial.
2.The
trial court answered all the issues regarding the grounds of eviction against
the landlord and dismissed the suit. In appeal the first appellate court,
however, on an exhaustive analysis of the evidence adduced during trial,
reached a conclusion to the contrary so far as the issue of subletting was
concerned and decreed the suit. The High Court dismissed the second appeal
preferred by the tenant affirming the factual findings recorded by the first
appellate court. Hence this appeal by special leave.
3.The
learned counsel appearing for the appellants first submitted that both the
appellate courts failed to consider that in order to constitute subletting
there must be parting with legal possession, that is, possession with the right
to include and also the right to exclude others and that the evidence on record
did not justify such a conclusion. In support of this contention he relied upon
the judgments of this Court in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H. C. Sharma I and
Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana2.
4.As
we find that both the appellate courts have considered the evidence in the
light of the above proposition of law we are unable to accept the contention of
the learned counsel for the appellants. The first appellate court dealt with
and discussed the entire evidence adduced during trial, including the evidence
of the Rent Control Inspector who had visited the suit premises in connection
with a proceeding earlier initiated between the parties before the Rent
Controller, and concluded that one of the three alleged subtenants viz. Zinda Hasan
was in possession of the verandah of the demised premises and was carrying on
his business. It further found that the said subtenant was 1 (1988) 1 SCC 70 2
(1989) 3 SCC 56 327 in possession with the consent and approval of the tenants
but without the consent of the landlord. In the second appeal the High Court
also considered the evidence and agreed with the finding of the first appellate
court that Zinda Hasan was in exclusive possession of the premises in question.
The above concurrent finding of fact, based on proper appreciation of evidence,
cannot be disturbed in this appeal.
5.The
other contention raised on behalf of the appellants was that even if it was
assumed that there was parting with possession still it could not be said that
the appellants had sublet the premises as there was not an iota of evidence to
prove that rent was a consideration for the grant. On this aspect of the
matter, while the first appellate court recorded the following finding :
"From
the facts discussed above, it is proved that the subtenant was not sitting in
the verandah with the consent of landlord. It is rather proved that he had been
occupying with the consent of the tenant-defendant. It can be presumed in the
circumstances of the case that he has been occupying as subtenant." The
High Court stated as under:
I am
clearly of the view that in the absence of any plea or reliable evidence
suggesting any other kind of legal relationship existing between the defendant
and those persons and on the finding that Zinda Hasan and others were in
exclusive possession of the premises in question the lower appellate court was
fully justified in concluding that the appellants had sublet the
premises." 6.The findings so recorded are in conformity with the following
observations made by this Court in the case of Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri and
Co.3 (SCC p. 43, para 59) "If exclusive possession is established, and the
version of the respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the
transaction is found acceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of
the case, it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an inference that
the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is
open to th e respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the
guise of licences are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between
the tenant and the subtenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is
not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference.
The
burden of making good a case of subletting is, of course, on the appellants.
The burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the party's case
is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion. If at the conclusion of
the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard,
he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant
throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party
bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence
adduced by the party during the 3 (1989) 1 SCC 19 328 trial. In the
circumstances of the case, we think, that, appellants have been forced by the
Courts below to have established exclusive possession of the ice-cream vendor
of a part of the demised premises and the explanation of the transaction
offered by the respondent having been found by the courts below to be
unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the courts to
draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that
the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There
is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to the situation
as found." and have got to be accepted, as in this case also the
appellants did not explain for what consideration they had allowed Zinda Hasan
to occupy part of the tenanted premises; and, on the contrary, denied to have
parted with possession.
This
contention of the appellants therefore also falls.
7.As
no other point was urged in support of the appeal it falls and is dismissed.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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