Dr Umrao
Singh Choudhary Vs. State of M.P [1994] INSC 279 (2 May 1994)
Ramaswamy,
K. Ramaswamy, K. Venkatachala N. (J)
CITATION:
1994 SCC (4) 328 1994 SCALE (2)1008
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
1.The
petitioner was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of Devi Ahilya Vishwavidyalaya
(University) on 5-9-1992 tinder Section 13 of Madhya Pradesh
Vishwavidyala Adhiniyam, 1973, for short 'Adhiniyam' for a period of four years
and he had joined on 17-9-1992. The Governor exercising the power
under Section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam issued a notification on 21-1-1994 and by operation thereof the petitioner had ceased
330 to be the Vice-Chancellor with effect from the said date.
On 22-1-1994 the petitioner had moved a writ petition in the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh to declare the action as mala fide, illegal, arbitrary,
impinging his right to continue in office till 17-9-1996 and was violative of principles of natural justice. The
Division Bench, by its order dated 21- 2-1994, in Misc. Petition No. 125 of 1994
dismissed the petition. Thus this petition by special leave.
2.Two
contentions were raised in the High Court as well as before us that the action
of the Governor is administrative and omission to give opportunity to the
petitioner is violative of principle of natural justice, apart from being a mala
fide exercise of powers by the State Government.
Since
the Misc. Petition was taken up for hearing at the admission stage, records had
been called for by the High Court and were made available by the Government. As
stated in the judgment, the High Court felt it expedient to dispose of the case
at the hearing stage itself. In those circumstances no counter-affidavit was
filed on behalf of the State Government. With a view to satisfy the tenability
of the contentions raised vis-a-vis the material made available by the
Government in support of the impugned order and to satisfy ourselves
independently, we sent for the records and the counsel today placed the records
before us.
We
have carefully gone through the record and also the note said to have been
submitted to the Governor for consideration before issuing the notification. We
have heard the counsel on both sides.
3.Undoubtedly
the petitioner was appointed under Section 13 of the Adhiniyam and Section 14
thereof provides an elaborate enquiry and reasonable opportunity for removal of
the Vice-Chancellor (Kulpati) from office before expiry of the term, obviously
as a measure of punishment. Section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam equally empowers the
State Government in a modified form to satisfy that :
"If
the State Government on receipt of a report or otherwise, is satisfied that
situation has arisen in which the administration of the University cannot be
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, without detriment to
the interests of the University, and it is expedient in the interest of the
University so to do, it may by notification, for reasons to be mentioned
therein, direct that the provision of Sections 13, 14, 20 to 25, 40, 47, 48, 54
and 68 shall, as from the date specified in the notification, apply to the
University, subject to the modifications specified in the Third Schedule."
On issuance thereof the Vice-Chancellor shall cease to hold office by operation
of sub- section (4) of Section 52, clause (ii) thus- "the Kulpati, holding
office immediately before the appointed date, shall notwithstanding that his
term of office has not expired, vacate his office." By operation thereof
the applicability of Sections 13 and 14 stood modified and the need to conduct
a regular enquiry against the petitioner was obviated. On issuance of the
notification under Section 52(1) and on and with effect from the said date the
Vice-Chancellor, by operation of Section 52(4) shall, 331 notwithstanding his
term of office had not been expired, is required to vacate his office. In other
words, he ceased to hold the office. It is found as a fact that the petitioner
ceased to hold office with effect from 21-1-1994 and the new incumbent had assumed
office.
4.Though
the contention of mala fides has been repeated by the learned Senior Counsel,
when we pointed out, that the petitioner had not made any specific allegation
against any specified officer or holder of the office, nor impleaded any
officer or holder of the office as a party respondent, in fairness, the learned
Senior Counsel did not pursue the line of argument. Nonetheless it was
contended that the petitioner was entitled to be afforded an opportunity of
being heard before passing the impugned notification and the order passed in
violation thereof offends the principle of natural justice. We find no force in
the contention.
Section
14 engrafts an elaborate procedure to conduct an enquiry against the
Vice-Chancellor and after giving reasonable opportunity, to take action thereon
for his removal from the office. Section 52 engrafts an exception thereto. The
condition precedent, however, is that the State Government should be satisfied,
obviously on objective consideration of the material relevant to the issue, as
on record, that the administration of the University cannot be carried out in
accordance with the provisions of the Act, without detriment to the interest of
the University, and that it is expedient in the interest of the University and
for proper administration thereof, to apply in a modified form, excluding the
application of Sections 13 and 14, etc.
and to
issue the notification under Section 52(1). By necessary implication, the
application of the principle of natural justice has been excluded. In view of
this statutory animation the contention that the petitioner is entitled to the
notice and an opportunity before taking action under Section 52(1) would be
self-defeating. The principle of natural justice does not supplant the law, but
supplements the law. Its application may be excluded, either expressly or by
necessary implication Section 52 in juxtaposition to Section 14, when
considered, the obvious inference would be that the principle of natural
justice stands excluded.
5.Obviously
for this reason, to satisfy ourselves whether the notification is founded upon
any record and whether the reasons given in support thereof, are relevant to
the issue, the record was summoned, and has been made available to us.
The
note placed before the Governor also was placed. It is an elaborate note,
pregnant with material details touching the maladministration of the
University. From the record we have seen that the Government considered the
above material and the Governor after due satisfaction had exercised the power
under Section 52(1). Though the High Court held that the action under Section
52 is legislative action, it is obviously illegal in the light of the decision
of this Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India' wherein this Court considered
the presidential proclamation under Article 356 and held that the action is not
beyond the ken of judicial review. The action 1 (1994) 3 SCC 1 332 under
Section 52 is only statutory action, but subject to judicial review. However,
the court would not sit in appeal over the opinion of the State Government. The
statute gives power to the State Government. The Governor exercised his power
with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in issuing the notification
under Section 52. Therefore, though it was a statutory notification, the
condition precedent is that the satisfaction of the State Government, i.e., the
Governor, with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is of the
situation mentioned in Section 52(1) and for reasons to be recorded therein,
for better administration of the University, the State Government was satisfied
that a situation had arisen in which the administration of the University could
not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyam and for
better administration whereof and to prevent the detriment to the interest of
the University, the State Government issued the notification "for the
reasons mentioned therein" and directed that the provisions mentioned
therein under Sections 13 and 14 shall not apply. When those facts are present
and the State Government were satisfied of the situation contemplated under
Section 52(1), though the court may differ from that formation of satisfaction
when the court is called upon in an appeal against the said satisfaction and
may come to a different conclusion, we would not be justified to differ from
the conclusion in our judicial review under Article 136 or of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Though the Academic Council etc. had
been dissolved, the correctness thereof is not the subject-matter of this
special leave petition. We are not called upon to enter into that question.
Therefore, from the records we are satisfied that the State Government were
justified in issuing the notification under Section 52(1) of the Adhiniyam.
6.The
special leave petition is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances
without costs.
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