Ram Narayan
Prasad Vs. Atul Chander Mitra [1994] INSC 199 (29 March 1994)
Bharucha
S.P. (J) Bharucha S.P. (J) Kuldip Singh (J) Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J)
CITATION:
1994 SCC (4) 349 JT 1994 (3) 148 1994 SCALE (2)470
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.P. BHARUCHA, J.- The appellants were
the plaintiffs in a suit filed against the first respondent in the Court of the
Munsif 1st, Gaya (being TS No. 278 of 1971). It was
alleged in the plaint that the appellants were the sons and daughters of one Jaikishun
Lal who died on 1-7-1962, leaving them behind as his sole
heirs. The late Jaikishun Lal had purchased the suit property from the
defendant under a registered sale deed dated 30-4-1960. After the late Jaikishun Lal became the owner of the
property, the first respondent had requested him to let the suit property to
him on a monthly rental of Rs 90. The proposal was accepted and the first
respondent was inducted as a tenant on 1-5-1960.
On 18-5-1960, the first respondent had executed a "Kirayanama"
in favour of the late Jaikishun Lal in the aforementioned terms. The first
respondent paid some rent to the late Jaikishun Lal and thereafter to the
plaintiffs, the last of such payments having been made on 7-8-1962. The first appellant was a minor when Jaikishun Lal
died. Upon attaining majority the first appellant had filed a petition for
mutation of the Municipal Register in respect of the suit property. The first
respondent had filed objections thereto, which had been rejected. The
appellants were the owners of the suit property, the first respondent was their
tenant and he was in arrears of rent. Being a defaulter he was liable to be
evicted from the suit property. The appellants needed the suit property for
personal use. For the purposes of Jurisdiction and court fees, the suit was
"valued at Rs 1080 being the monthly rent of the house in suit for 12
months" and the appellants, on payment of court fees of Rs 157.50, prayed
for the following reliefs:
351
"(i) That a decree for ejectment of the defendant from the house in suit
be passed.
(ii)That
the defendant be ordered to vacate the house in suit within the period fixed by
the court failing which the plaintiffs be put in possession over the house in
suit through the processes of the court." 2.The first respondent filed a
written statement in which he claimed that in April 1960 he was in need of
money and had approached the late Jaikishun Lal for a loan. The late Jaikishun Lal
had insisted that the security for the loan should be in the form of a sale
deed with a clause for re- conveyance as also a "Kirayanama" showing
a monthly rent for the suit property of Rs 90. The first respondent being in
urgent need of money had executed these documents under undue influence and
compulsion. The first respondent denied that there was a relationship of
landlord and tenant between the appellants and himself.
3.The
first respondent moved a petition in the trial court averring that the court
"in view of the pleadings of the parties has to decide in respect of the
title not incidentally but in a full-fledged manner" and, therefore, the
appellants could not proceed with the suit unless ad valorem court fees on the
market value of the suit property were paid. Reliance was placed upon the
judgment reported in Sheo Shankar Prasad v. Barhan Mistry1. Upon this petition,
the trial court ordered thus:
"In
view of the pleadings of the parties. I am of the opinion that the Court has to
decide title, not incidentally but in a full-fledged manner. Under such
circumstances, in view of the reported decision in Sheo Shankar Prasad v. Barhan
Mistry1 the plaintiffs have to pay ad valorem court fee on the market value of
the suit property. According (?) the plaintiffs are directed to pay ad valorem
court fee on the market value of the suit property. If the plaintiffs are so
advised, they may file petition for amendment of the plaint in the light of
declaration of their title to the suit property."
4.The
appellants carried the matter to the Patna High Court by way of a civil revision
application. The same was dismissed in limine. From the order thereon the
appellants have preferred this appeal by special leave.
5.It
is necessary immediately to refer to the judgment of the Patna High Court
reported in Sheo Shankar Prasad v. Barhan Mistry1. Paragraph 2 of the judgment,
of a learned Single Judge, reads:
"The
plaintiff alleges that rent was paid up to December 1978 only and the
defendants have defaulted thereafter. The plaintiff alleges personal necessity
also. The defendants have seriously denied the title of the plaintiff to the katras
in question. Although initially the suits were filed as between the landlord
and tenant and court fee paid accordingly, but as a result of the defence, the
parties led evidence on the question of title to the property,- and the courts
have dealt with the question at 1 1985 PLJR 358 352 considerable length. It has
been repeatedly held by this Court, and I may mention a recent case on the
point, being SA No. 467 of 198 1, allowed on 17-4-1984, that before the Court
goes into the question of title not incidentally, but in a full-fledged manner
the plaintiff should be asked to pay ad valorem court fee. This has not been
done."
6.Learned
counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit had been valued for the
purposes of court fees upon the basis that the appellants were the landlords of
the suit property, that the first respondent was the tenant thereof, that he
was in arrears of rent and, therefore, was liable to be evicted therefrom. The
relief that was sought in the suit was the relief of eviction. The plaint had,
therefore, been correctly valued. The trial court was in error in requiring the
appellants to pay ad valorem court fees on the suit on the basis of the market
value of the suit property.
Learned
counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Patna High Court
referred to above.
7.Section
7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, sets out how court fees are to be computed upon
certain suits. By reason thereof, on a suit between a landlord and tenant for
the recovery of immovable property from the tenant, court fees are to be paid
"according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which
the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the
plaint".
8.In Sathappa
Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar2 this Court noted that the question of court
fees had to be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint
and its decision could not be influenced either by the pleas in the written
statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits. Though this was
stated upon a concession, we have no doubt that the statement lays down the law
correctly. For the purposes of valuation of the suit for determination of the
court fees payable thereon, what is relevant is the plaint. The averments made
and relief sought in the plaint determines the character of the suit for the
purposes of the court fees payable thereon. What is stated in the written
statement is not material in this regard. This view has also been taken by many
High Courts.
9.The
plaint in this case sought the relief of eviction of the first respondent from
the suit property upon the averments that the appellants were the landlords and
the first respondent was their tenant and he was in arrears of rent. The suit
could only be valued as an eviction suit, regardless of the fact that the first
respondent had denied the appellants' title to the suit property so that this
became an issue in the suit.
10.The
appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court dismissing the
plaintiffs' civil revision application and the order of the trial court
allowing the first respondent's petition for seeking payment of ad valorem
court fees on the market value of the suit property are set aside. The said petition
is dismissed.
2 1958
SCR 1024 : AIR 1958 SC 245 353 11.There shall be no order as to costs.
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