I.B. Gupta Vs. State of U.P  INSC 32 (14 January 1994)
admitted facts in the present case are that on October 26, 1973, the respondent was appointed as Deputy Superintendent,
Government Approved School (now known as 'Juvenile Home'). Applications were
invited for the posts of Probation Officers (ad hoc), on April 11, 1980 from departmental female candidates
possessing requisite qualifications. The respondent applied for one of the
posts, and pursuant to her selection, was appointed as Probation Officer with
effect from June 2,
1980. On February 15, 1983, she proceeded on maternity leave
which was duly sanctioned on February 14, 1983
by the District Magistrate who is the Controlling Officer under the Probation
of Offenders Act, 1958. She resumed her duty on June 16, 1983 on the same post. It appears, however, that on February 4, 1983, an order was passed by the petitioner- State Government terminating her services. According to the
petitioners, the termination became necessary because in the meanwhile, there
were regular appointments through the Public Service Commission. According to
the respondent, the order of termination was not communicated to her before she
proceeded on maternity leave and hence the alleged termination should be deemed
to have been of no effect and she should be deemed to have continued in service
as Probation Officer. This is particularly so because she was allowed to resume
service as Probation Officer on her return from leave on June 16, 1983 and subsequently by an order of November 1, 1989, the Additional Director also duly
sanctioned the salary for the entire period of her leave from February 15, 1983 to June 15, 1983.
appears that, in between, the Government had passed an order on February 26, 1983 appointing the respondent as ad hoc
Probation Officer although she was on leave. She did not, of course, join the
service pursuant to this order.
another order was passed on June 4, 1983 against appointing her as ad hoc
Probation Officer but as stated earlier, since her leave was duly sanctioned on
February 14, 1983 and thereafter regularised by the order of November 1, 1989,
it will have to be presumed that she had continued in service as ad hoc
Probation Officer from her initial appointment, i.e., on June 2, 1980.
further appears that in the meanwhile, U.P. Regularisation of Ad Hoc
Appointments (on posts within the purview of U.P. Public Service Commission)
(Amendment) Rules, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') came into
force w.e.f. March 22,
1984. These rules made
tile Regularisation Rules of 1979 applicable to the persons appointed on or
before May 1, 1983. According to these rules, those
who had put in ad hoc service for three years and were 37 continuing in service
on the date of commencement of the rules, i.e., March 22, 1984, were to be regularised.
by an order of March 27, 1984, the respondent was reverted retrospectively, w.e.f.
February 29, 1984 to the post of Assistant Superintendent, District Shelter
Workshop which post she had never held and to which post she could not have
been reverted even otherwise since she was directly appointed as Probation
Officer though on ad hoc basis. On May 4, 1984, therefore, the respondent filed a
writ petition before the High Court. By virtue of the interim order, the order
of reversion was stayed and liberty was given to the petitioner-State
Government to post her on any other post with the salary scale equivalent to
that of Probation Officer. However, by the impugned order, the petitioner is
directed to consider the respondent for regularisation under the rules.
aforesaid facts make it clear that the petitioners had by their own actions,
viz., the sanction of leave on February 14, 1983 and its regularisation by the
order of November 1, 1989, have treated the respondent as being in continuous
service as ad hoc Probation Officer w.e.f. June 2, 1980. Hence she is entitled
to the benefit of the rules.
was in service on March
22, 1984 and on that day,
she had completed more than three years' service in the post held by her. The
attempt of the State Government to revert her by the order of March 27, 1984 w.e.f.
an earlier date, viz., February 29, 1984 was obviously mala fide and made with
the express purpose of depriving her of the benefit of the rules. This is apart
from the fact that the reversion order was bad in law since being a direct
appointee to the post of Probation Officer, she could not have been reverted to
any post much less to the post of Assistant Superintendent, District Shelter
Workshop which post she had never held. We are, therefore, of the view that she
is entitled to be regularised as Probation Officer under the rules. Her
seniority in that post will be fixed by the Government according to law. The
special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.
HANUMAN v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
respect of a murder that took place on September 11, 1978 one Shampooalias Surendra Pratap
Singh was tried for the offence punishable under Section302 of Indian Penal
Code. He was convicted by the Sessions Court. The prosecution also relied on a
dying declaration recorded by Dr I.B. Gupta and also by the Executive
Magistrate. The convicted accused preferred an appeal to the High Court.
High Court acquitted him. However, in the course of the judgment the High Court
commented on the conduct of Dr I.B. Gupta and observed that subsequently at the
instance of the Investigating Officer the dying declaration of the deceased was
interpolated as the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and
the same was not in conformity with regard to the participation of one Subhash.
Thereafter the following observation is made by the High Court :
entire conduct of Dr I.B. Gupta in the circumstances of the case is highly
undeserving of a Medical Officer. He is not fit to be retained in Government
service." 2.It may be mentioned here that the State had preferred an
appeal to this Court against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court
and as that appeal was pending in this Court Dr I.B. Gupta filed the present
appeal for expunging the remarks and special leave is granted. It appears that
the State appeal is abated since the respondent died. In this appeal it is
submitted that Dr I.B. Gupta, the appellant, only acted in discharge of his
official duty and it was a typographical mistake, namely, that the timing was 1.45 a.m. instead of 1.45 p.m. when the dying declaration was recorded and observation made is of
serious nature affecting his career and his promotion also.
have perused that part of the judgment of the High Court. The observation is
made mainly relying on the statement of the Investigating Officer who is said
to have recorded the statement of the doctor under Section 161 CrPC.
on the statement, the High Court reached the conclusion that the doctor also
connived to bring the dying declaration in conformity with the prosecution
observation in any event overlooks the fact that the Investigating Officer is
also responsible and the observation is not strictly called for against the
doctor who only treated the injured and attended on him at that stage. The
doctor has not disowned any of those irregularities which by themselves could
happen in discharge of his official duty but on the basis of those
irregularities the observation that he is not fit to be retained in Government
service is rather damaging and far- fetched, without any further inquiry as to
the alleged conduct of the doctor. Any such stricture which affects his career
rather amounts to condemn him without being heard.
these circumstances, this observation in tile form of stricture is quashed. The
appeal is allowed accordingly.