State of
A.P. Vs. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. [1994] INSC 271 (28 April 1994)
Jeevan
Reddy, B.P. (J) Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J) Punchhi, M.M.
CITATION:
1994 AIR 2364 1994 SCC (5) 100 JT 1994 (3) 456 1994 SCALE (2)726
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.- Rates of tax on
sales effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce are prescribed by
Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The rates prescribed vary
depending upon the person to 102 whom the goods are sold as well as the nature
of the goods.
A
reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) yields the following position:
(1) In
the case of sale to Government of any goods, the rate is 4%.[Section8(1)(a)].
(2) On
sale of goods of the description referred to in sub-section (3) to a registered
dealer other than the Government - @ 4%. [Section 8(1)(b)].
(3)In
the case of sales not falling under sub- section (1) of Section 8, the tax on
turnover shall be calculated at twice the rate applicable to the sale or
purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State, if they are declared
goods.
[Section
8(2)(a)].
(4)In
the case of sale of goods other than declared goods and not failing under
sub-section (1), tax shall be levied at the rate of 10% or at the rate
applicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside the appropriate State,
whichever is higher. [Section 8(2)(b)].
2.Sub-section
(2-A) provides for a lower rate of tax, or exemption from tax, as the case may
be, in certain situations which it is not necessary to notice here. Sub-section
(3) specifies the goods for the purpose of Section 8(1)(b); it is also not
necessary to notice the nature of these goods. Sub- section (4), which is the
main provision relevant for our purpose, reads thus:
"
(4) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to any sale in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes
to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner (a) a declaration duly
filled and signed by the registered dealer to whom the goods are sold
containing the prescribed particulars in a prescribed form obtained from the
prescribed authority; or (b)if the goods are sold to the Government, not being
a registered dealer, a certificate in the prescribed form duly filled and
signed by a duly authorised officer of the Government:
Provided
that the declaration referred to in clause (a) is furnished within the
prescribed time or within such further time as that authority may, for
sufficient cause, permit." [The proviso to sub-section (4) was added by
the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (Act 61 of 1972) with effect from 1-4-1973.]
3.
Sub-section (4) thus prescribes a condition for applicability of sub-section
(1) of Section 8. It says that if a dealer wishes to avail of the lower rate of
tax prescribed by sub-section (1), he has to comply with the requirements
prescribed by it. If the sale is to the Government [Section 8(1)(a)] the
selling dealer must produce before the prescribed authority (assessing authority)
a certificate in the prescribed form duly filled and signed by a duly authorised
officer of the Government. The rules made under the Act have prescribed the
form of the certificate contemplated by the clause it is called 'Form-D'.
Similarly, if the selling dealer says that he 103 (Jeevan Reddy, J.) has sold
the goods of the description referred to in sub-section (3) to a registered
dealer [Section 8(1)(b)] he shall have to produce a declaration duly filled and
signed by a registered dealer to whom the goods are sold containing the
prescribed particulars in the prescribed form obtained from the prescribed
authority. The Rules made under the Act have prescribed the form in which such
declaration has to be issued by the purchasing dealer it is called 'Form-C'. In
case form-D or Form-C is produced, the assessing authority would levy tax on
inter-State sales @ 4% only; otherwise the sales will attract the higher rate
of tax prescribed in sub-section (2).
4.Before
we deal with the proviso to sub-section (4), it would be appropriate to refer
to the rule relevant in this behalf. It is Rule 12. It is a lengthy rule
containing as many as ten sub- rules. Sub-rule (1) says that the certificate
and the declaration referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of
Section 8 shall be in Forms C and D respectively. The other provisions in
sub-rule (1) and sub-rules (2) to (6) deal with various aspects relating to the
said forms which it is not necessary to refer to for the purpose of this case.
Sub-rule (7) reads as follows:
"(7)
The declaration in Form 'C' or Form 'F' or the certificate in Form 'E-I' or
Form 'E-II' shall be furnished to the prescribed authority up to the time of
assessment by the first assessing authority:
Provided
that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the person concerned was
prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing such declaration or certificate
within the aforesaid time, that authority may allow such declaration or
certificate to be furnished within such further time as that authority may
permit." [It may be noted that proviso to sub-rule (7) was added in the
year 1972 with effect from 1-4-1972, i.e., the date on and from which the
proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 8 was added by the Amendment Act 61 of
1972.] Sub-rule (7), it is evident, deals with Form-C and certain other forms.
It does not deal with Form-D. The main limb of sub-rule says that the
declaration in Form-C shall be furnished to the prescribed authority (which
means the assessing authority) up to the time of assessment by the first
assessing authority.
5.At
this stage, we may consider the reasons for which the proviso to sub-section
(4) was added by the Amending Act 61 of 1972 and the proviso to sub-rule (7) of
Rule 12 was inserted. In STO v. K.I. Abraham1, it was held by this Court that
the phrase "in the prescribed manner" occurring in Section 8(4) of
the Act confers upon the rule-making authority the power to prescribe a rule
stating the particulars to be mentioned in the prescribed form, the nature and
the value of the goods sold, the parties to whom they are sold and to which
authority the- form is to be furnished but that it does not authorise the
rule-making authority to prescribe a time-limit within which the 1 (1967) 20
STC 367: AIR 1967 SC 1823: (1967) 3 SCR 518 104 declaration is to be filed by
the registered dealer. With a view to remedy the lacuna pointed out by this
Court, Parliament enacted the aforesaid (Amendment) Act 61 of 1972. The proviso
empowers the rule-making authority to prescribe the time within which Form-C,
i.e., the declaration referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (4) is to be
furnished. The proviso not only empowers the rule-making authority to prescribe
such time but also to provide that for sufficient reasons, the assessing authority
may permit the said forms to be filled within the time prescribed. Pursuant to
the said proviso, the rule-making authority introduced the proviso to sub-rule
(7). While the main limb of sub-rule (7) says that Form-C can be furnished
"up to the time of the assessment by the first assessing authority",
the proviso says that if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the dealer
was prevented by sufficient cause from furnishing such certificate "within
the aforesaid time-limit" he may allow such certificate to be furnished
within such further time as he may permit. Reading sub-rule (7) as a whole it
follows that Form-C shall be furnished up to the time of assessment by the
first assessing authority but in a proper case the prescribed authority (which
means in the context the assessing authority) may permit such forms to be filed
within such further time as he may permit.
This
necessarily means that the assessing authority will complete the assessment but
at the same time permit the dealer to file Form-C within the time specified by
him. In case the dealer files form-C within the time specified, it is obvious,
the assessing authority will revise the order of assessment granting the
requisite relief.
6.Having
noticed the relevant provisions of law, we may now turn to the question arising
in these matters. It is this: Where a dealer does not furnish Form-C before the
first assessing authority up to the time of assessment, can he be permitted to
file the said forms in the appeal preferred by him, i.e., before the first or
the second appellate authority? In other words, the question is whether the
appellate authority, whether the first or the second appellate authority has
the power to receive Form-C in appeal and to grant relief, in case the dealer
satisfies the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not
producing the said certificate before the first assessing authority? The
Revenue says that the appellate authorities have no such power inasmuch as Rule
12 expressly provides that such forms shall be furnished "up to the time
of assessment by the first assessing authority" and also because power to
extend the time for filing these forms is vested by the proviso to sub-rule
only in the assessing authority. The contention is that sub- section (4) of
Section 8 read with sub-rule (7) of Rule 12 provides for a benefit, for a
partial exemption from the tax liability. If any dealer wishes to avail of such
benefit or partial exemption, he has to comply with the relevant provisions
strictly and fully. The benefit of the said provisions can be extended only if
the relevant conditions are satisfied and in the manner prescribed by the Act
and the Rule and in no other manner.
The
requirements prescribed by Rule 12(7) have to be followed in letter and spirit.
No equities are involved in such a matter nor can the concept of substantial
compliance be invoked in such a case. On the other hand, the dealers' case is
that the 105 (Jeevan Reddy, J.) power of the appellate authority is
co-extensive with that of the first assessing authority and, therefore, what
can be done by the first assessing authority can equally be done by the
appellate authority, whether first or the second appellate authority, It is
pointed out that the power of appeal under the State Sales Tax enactments
concerned herein [which have to be read into the Central Sales Tax Act by
virtue of Section (9)] is different in character and scope from an appeal under
the Code of Civil Procedure. An appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu and
Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax enactments has the power not only to confirm, reduce
or annul the orders under appeal but also to enhance the tax liability even
though the appeal is preferred by the dealer. In short, the appeal in
particular the first appeal is in the nature of a reassessment where the whole
assessment is open even though the dealer may have filed the appeal confined to
certain aspects. The learned counsel for the dealers point out that no
particular sanctity attaches to the use of the appellation "first assessing
authority" in sub-rule (7) of Rule
12.
They also point out that the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is
expressly empowered by the Regulations made under the Act to receive additional
evidence which too indicates the power of the Tribunal to receive Form-C by way
of additional evidence. Almost all the High Courts except the Madhya Pradesh
High Court have upheld the contentions urged by the dealers. In Madras High
Court, a Bench had taken the view in State of TN. v. Chellaram Garments (P) Ltd.2 that the appellate authority has no
such power and that the only course open to it in such a case is to send the
matter back to the assessing authority for the purpose of considering the entertainability
of Form-C. [Indeed, this appears to be the view taken by the Madras High Court
in two earlier decisions, viz., Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore
Division, Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons3 and Deputy
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madras Division v. Manohar Brothers4]. Later
on, however, a Full Bench of that Court held in State of TN. v. Arulmurugan & Co.5 that the appellate
authorities do have such powers, disagreeing with the earlier judgment in Chellaram
Garments2.
7.The
matters before us are from two States, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act provides that the tax
under the Act shall be levied and collected by the Government of India in
accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) says that
the machinery under the respective State Sales Tax enactments shall be the
machinery for assessing, reassessing and calculating the Central Sales Tax on
behalf of the Government of India. The authorities under the State enactment
can exercise all or any of the powers conferred upon them by the relevant State
enactment for the purposes of assessing, reassessing and calculating the
Central Sales Tax. All the provisions of the State 2 (1979) 44 STC 239 (mad) 3
(1962)13 STC 680 (Mad):AIR 1963 Mad 125 4 (1962) 13 STC 686 (Mad) : AIR 1962
Mad 410 5 (1982) 51 STC 381 (Mad) 106 enactments relating to assessment,
appeals, revisions, reviews and other proceedings are made equally applicable
for the said purpose. In view of this, it would be relevant to notice the
nature and character of the appellate power under the aforesaid two State
enactments. Section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 provides
for an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the orders passed
by the appropriate authority under the sections specified therein. Sub-section
(3) of Section 31 provides that in an appeal against an order of assessment,
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall have the power to "confirm,
reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both", to set
aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh
assessment after such further enquiry as may be directed, as also to pass such
other orders as he may think fit. Similar powers are available even where the
appeal is against an order other than an order of assessment.
Section
31-A provides for an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner against the orders
specified therein. Sub-section (3) of Section 31-A confers powers upon the
Deputy Commissioner similar to those conferred by Section 31(3). Section 36
provides for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against the orders of the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Deputy Commissioner. Sub-
section (3) of Section 36 again is in the same terms as sub- section (3) of
Section 31 and sub-section (3) of Section 31-A.
The
position under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act is no different.
Section 19 provides for an appeal to the specified authority. Sub-section (3)
of Section 19 [which corresponds to sub-section (3) of Section 31 in the Tamil Nadu
Act] reads:
"(3)
The appellate authority may, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being
heard and subject to such rules of procedure as may be prescribed:
(a)
confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty,or both; or (b)
set aside the assessment or penalty, or both, and direct the assessing
authority to pass a fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed;
or (c) pass such other orders as it may think fit." 8.Sub-section (4) says
that before passing orders under sub- section (3), the appellate authority may
make such enquiry as it thinks fit or remand the case to any subordinate
officer or authority for inquiry and report on any specified point or points.
Section 21 provides for a second appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and
sub-section (4) of Section 21 is again in the same terms as Section 19(3). In
exercise of the power conferred upon it by sub-section (3) of the Andhra
Pradesh Act, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has made certain Regulations
regulating its procedure and disposal of its business. Regulation 11 empowers
the Tribunal inter alia to receive additional evidence. Sub- regulation (1) is
practically in the same terms as Rule 27 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Regulation 11 (1) reads as below:
107 (Jeevan
Reddy, J.) "
11.
Fresh evidence and witnesses.- (1) The party or the respondent shall not be
entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, before
the Tribunal, but-
(a) if
the authority from whose order the appeal is preferred has refused to admit
evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
(b) if
the party or the respondent seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the
Appellate Tribunal that such evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence,
was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the
time when the order under appeal was passed, or
(c)if
the Tribunal requires any documents to be produced or any witnesses to be
examined to enable it to pass orders, or
(d)for
any other sufficient reason the Tribunal may allow such evidence or documents
to be produced or witnesses examined:
Provided
that the other party shall, in such cases, be entitled to produce rebutting
evidence, if any."
9.It
appears that the Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh enactments have generally
adopted the provisions relating to appeals in the Indian Income Tax Act,
1922/Income Tax Act, 1961. Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Indian Income
Tax Act, 1922 provided that "in disposing of an appeal, the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, (a) confirm,
reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment and
direct the Income Tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such
further inquiry as the Income Tax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner may direct, and the Income Tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to
make such fresh assessment and determine where necessary the amount of tax
payable on the basis of such fresh assessment." Construing the said
provision, it was held by Chagla, C.J., (speaking for the Bench comprising
himself and Tendolkar, J.) in Narrondas Manordass v. CIP6 that:
"...
in giving the power of enhancing the assessment, the Legislature has strikingly
deviated from the ordinary principles that govern the court of appeal. Although
the Department cannot appeal against the order of the Income Tax Officer and
although the appeal is only by the assessee, even so the Legislature confers
upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the power to make an order which is
obviously to the prejudice of the appellant. Therefore, although the appellant
may only complain of particular points in the assessment and he may be
satisfied with regard to the rest of the assessment, the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner's powers are not confined to consider only these points 6 (1957)
31 ITR 909 (Bom) 108 about which the assessee has a grievance but he may
consider those points about which the assessee is satisfied and order the
enhancement of the assessment. Now, it is clear that going by the plain words
used by the Legislature there are no words of limitation or qualification upon
the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in enhancing the assessment
or setting aside the assessment and directing a fresh assessment to be made by
the Income Tax Officer.... It is clear that the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner has been constituted a revising authority against the decisions of
the Income Tax Officer; a revising authority not in the narrow sense of
revising those matters about which the assessee makes a grievance, but a
revising authority in the sense that once the appeal is before him he can
revise not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the Income Tax Officer
but he can revise every process which led to the ultimate computation or
assessment. In other words, what he can revise is not merely the ultimate
amount which is liable to tax, but he is entitled to revise the various
decisions given by the Income Tax Officer in the course of the assessment and
also the various incomes or deductions which came in for consideration of the
Income Tax Officer." The said view was affirmed by this Court in CIT v. MacMillan
& Co. 7 10.Clearly, therefore, the power of appeal under the said two
enactments is altogether different from the power of the appellate courts under
the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if the appeal by the dealer is confined to a
particular aspect of assessment, it is open to the appellate authorities to
enhance the assessment. They can also annul the order of assessment and order a
fresh assessment. As held by Chagla, C.J., the appellate authorities under the
said enactments are in the nature of the revising authorities "not in the
narrow sense of revising those matters about which the assessee has a
grievance, but a revising authority in the sense that once the appeal is before
him, he can revise not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the Income
Tax Officer, but he can revise every process which led to the ultimate
computation or assessment". In such a situation, it is idle to contend
that because of the language of Rule 12(7), the appellate authorities cannot do
what the first assessing authority could do.
11.We
are unable to agree with the Revenue's contention that because Rule 12(7)
speaks of "up to the time of assessment by the first assessing
authority" or for that matter the proviso to the said sub-rule it
excludes, by necessary implication, the appellate authorities. The decision in
MacMillan7 furnishes a complete answer to this contention. We may elaborate.
Section 13 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (corresponding to Section 145 of
the present Act) read as follows:
"13.
Income, profits and gains shall be computed, for the purposes of Sections 10 and
12, in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee
7 (1958) 33 ITR 182: AIR 1958 SC 207: 1958 SCR 689 109 (Jeevan Reddy, J.)
Provided that, if no method of accounting has been regularly employed, or if
the method employed is such that, in the opinion of the Income Tax Officer, the
income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced there from, then the
computation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner as the Income Tax
Officer may determine." 12.Relying upon the words "in the opinion of
the Income Tax Officer" occurring in the proviso to Section 13, it was
contended by the assessee that the power or duty of rejecting the method of
accounting on the ground that income, profits and gain cannot be properly
deduced there from is given to the Income Tax Officer alone and not to any
other authority in the hierarchy of authorities mentioned in Section 5 of the
Act. On the other hand, the contention of the Revenue was that reading Section
13 together with Section 31(3), it should be held that the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner has the same jurisdiction as that of the Income Tax Officer in the
said matter. Rejecting the contention put forward by the assessee, this Court
made the following observations, which deserve to be quoted at length in view
of their relevance to the contention urged by the Revenue before us:
"We
are unable to accept this line of argument as correct, and our reasons are
these. Firstly, we think that learned counsel is reading more into the
expression 'in tile opinion of the Income Tax Officer' occurring in the proviso
to Section 13 than what is warranted by the language used.
Whether
the method of accounting is regularly employed or not is undoubtedly a matter
which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can go into when he has size in of
the appeal. It is not challenged that if the Income Tax Officer decides against
the assessee and determines that the income, profits and gains cannot properly
be deduced from the assessee's method of accounting, the determination is
liable to be set aside on appeal by the assessee. What then is the reason for
holding that a subjective determination or the determination of a named
authority (whatever expression may be used) is inviolate in one case but not so
in the other? We have carefully examined the other sections of the Act to which
learned counsel for the respondent has referred; but we are unable to agree
with him that the language used therein supports the very subtle distinction
that he has drawn. Let us take, for example, Section 23 which deals with
assessment. Under sub-section (3), the Income Tax Officer assesses the total
income of the assessee and determines the sum payable on the basis of such
assessment; under sub-section (4) the Income Tax Officer makes the assessment
to the 'best of his judgment' an expression much stronger than 'in the opinion
of the Income Tax Officer'. It is not disputed that in an appeal from an
assessment under Section 23, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can interfere
with the determination or judgment of the Income Tax Officer, and in such an
appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can make his own assessment and
exercise the power which the Income Tax Officer could exercise. Since 1939 an
appeal lies from a 'best of judgment' assessment 110 made under sub-section (4)
of Section 23, but the right is restricted to 'the amount of income assessed or
the amount of tax determined'. Why can he not then interfere with the opinion
of the Income Tax Officer under the proviso to Section 13? It is contended that
both sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 23 prescribed objective conditions for
the exercise of the power referred to therein. It is true that under both
sub-sections the assessment must be a fair and honest estimate and not arbitrary
or capricious. Apart from that, however, we do not see what other distinctive,
objective conditions there are which put those sub-sections in a different
category.
The
words 'in the opinion of the Income Tax Officer' are not to be construed in the
sense of a mere discretionary power; but in the context of the words used in
the proviso to Section 13 they impose a statutory duty on the Income Tax
Officer to examine in every case the method of accounting and to see (i)
whether or not it Is regularly employed, and (ii) to determine whether the
income, profits and gains can properly be deduced therefrom.
Section
30 of the Act gives the assessee a right of appeal in respect of certain orders
including an order of assessment made under Section 23. Section 31 deals with
the hearing of an appeal and powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
Before disposing of the appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, if he
thinks fit, make a further enquiry himself or cause it to be made by the Income
Tax Officer, and in disposing of the appeal he may, in the case of an order of
assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment;
he may
set it aside and order a fresh assessment.
There
is nothing in the language of Section 31 of the Act which imposes any
restriction on the powers of an Appellate Assistant Commissioner so as to
prevent him from exercising the power under the proviso to Section 13. The
restriction, if any, must be inferred from the language of the proviso itself.
It is contended that the use of the words 'in the opinion of the Income Tax
Officer' in the second part of the proviso to Section 13 suggests a complete
elimination of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's jurisdiction to decide
for the first time that the method of accounting is such that the income,
profits and gains cannot be properly deduced therefrom. It is true that the
decision as to the method of accounting is to be arrived at first by the Income
Tax Officer after a careful scrutiny of the accounts whether they are simple or
complicated, and the power is to be reasonably and judicially exercised, which
excludes any subjective or arbitrary decision by the Income Tax Officer.
It
cannot, however, be said that a power so exercised is clothed with finality and
wou ld be excluded from review by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner; and in
reviewing the order the appellate authority can exercise the same powers which
the Income Tax Officer could exercise."
13.
The aforesaid observations show that the mere use of the words "the first
assessing authority" in sub-rule (7) of Rule 12 cannot and does not mean,
in the context and scheme of the enactments concerned herein, that the 111
appellate authorities do not have the power to receive Form-C in appeal. This
power can of course be exercised only where sufficient cause is shown by the
dealer for not filing them up to the time of assessment before the first
assessing authority. If in a given case, a dealer had obtained further time
from the first assessing authority and yet failed to produce them before him,
it is obvious that the appellate authority would adopt a stiffer standard in
judging the sufficient cause shown by the dealer for not producing them
earlier. It is necessary to reiterate that receipt of those forms in appeal
cannot be a matter of course; it should be allowed only where sufficient cause
is established by the dealer for not producing them before the first assessing
authority as contemplated by Rule 12(7). The requirement of the said sub-rule
cannot be excluded from consideration by the appellate court, while judging the
sufficiency of the cause shown. It must be remembered that that is the primary
obligation of the dealer and his failure to abide by it must be properly
explained. Insofar as the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal under the Andhra Pradesh
Act is concerned, it is governed by Regulation 11(1) referred to hereinabove
which again is nothing but a reiteration of the very same power.
14.The
reasoning in the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Arulmurugan
& Co.5 is practically on the same lines as indicated above. We are in
agreement with the said view. It is also brought to our notice that the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has taken the same view in Rajeswari Stone Polisherv v.
State of A. P.8 15.For the above reasons, the appeals (all of them preferred by
the States of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh) are dismissed.
There
shall be no order as to costs.
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