State of
Haryana Vs. Randhir Singh [1993] INSC 394
(29 September 1993)
Ahmadi,
A.M. (J) Ahmadi, A.M. (J) Venkatachala N. (J)
CITATION:
1995 SCC Supl. (1) 144
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
The
short question which arises in these two appeals is in regard to the
jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit challenging the
imposition of penalty of withholding of certain increments on the delinquent
having been found guilty of misconduct under the relevant Civil SerVices
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The trial court dismissed the suit holding
that it had no jurisdiction since according to it the case was covered by
Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Item No. 11 of Schedule
III thereof. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge, Rohtak reversed
this order of the trial court holding that the delinquent-plaintiffs had not
contended breach of any standing orders but had merely contended that the
impugned orders were governed under the 1952 Rules referred to earlier and,
therefore, the right or liability arose under common law and hence attracted
Principle No. 2 laid down in the judgment of this Court in Premier Automobiles
Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke1. The High Court refused to interfere with the
view taken by the appellate court. The averments in the plaint would primarily
govern the question of jurisdiction. Although the plaint is not before us it is
clear from paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment of the learned Additional
District Judge, Rohtak that the delinquent-plaintiffs had not challenged the
orders on the ground that they violated any standing orders but had based the
challenge in 1 (1976) 1 SCC 496: 1976 SCC (L&S) 70: AIR 1975 SC 2238 145
common law contending that their case was governed under the Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1952. The learned Additional District Judge
has, therefore, recorded a finding that the case set out in the plaint was not
based on Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act or on the language of the
standing orders but was essentially based on the provisions contained in the
1952 Rules and, therefore, the rights and liabilities arose under common law
and would attract Principle No. 2 of the Premier Automobiles1 judgment. In the
absence of anything to show to the contrary we think that the High Court was
right in not interfering with the order passed by the lower appellate court and
we too do not see any reason to do so in exercise of our extraordinary power
under Article 136 of the Constitution. In the result, both the appeals fail and
are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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