Dr. H.
Mukherjee Vs. Union of India [1993] INSC 392 (28 September 1993)
Ahmadi,
A.M. (J) Ahmadi, A.M. (J) Punchhi, M.M. Ramaswamy, K.
CITATION:
1994 AIR 495 1994 SCC Supl. (1) 250 JT 1993 (5) 439 1993 SCALE (3)887
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J.- These appeals by special
leave are directed against the decision rendered by the Principal Bench of the
Central Administrative Tribunal on February 9, 1993t whereby it directed the
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (for short 'ACC') to reconsider the
suitability of Respondent 1, S.K. Bhargava for appointment to the post of Chief
Controller of Explosives without taking into consideration the adverse remarks
made in the year 1987 and the outcome of the Central Bureau of Investigation's
(for short 'CBI') inquiry in which he was exonerated and in the light of the
observations contained in its judgment. The facts giving rise to these two
appeals, briefly stated, are as under.
2. Shri
B.R. Dave, the Chief Controller of Explosives superannuated on June 30, 1984
but as no suitable candidate was available for appointment to the + (1993) 24
ATC 637 252 post he was granted reemployment for a period of one year i.e. from
July 1, 1984 to June 30, 1985. On his vacating the post w.e.f. July 1, 1985 as no suitable candidate was
available for manning the said post the seniormost Joint Chief Controller of
Explosives was appointed on ad hoc basis as Chief Controller of Explosives, w.e.f.
July 1, 1985. Dr H. Mukherjee who was the seniormost
Joint Chief Controller of Explosives thus functioned as the Chief Controller of
Explosives on an ad hoc basis w.e.f. July 1, 1985. The ACC approved the ad hoc
appointment on condition that he will vacate the post on regular appointment
being made in accordance with rules. It may be mentioned that under the
relevant rules the post of Chief Controller of Explosives could be filled in by
promotion/transfer on deputation (including short term contract) or by direct
recruitment.
Since
no suitable candidate was available for filling the post by promotion/transfer
a decision was taken to fill the post by direct recruitment. An advertisement
was issued inviting applications for appointment to the said post on July 13, 1985. Pursuant thereto one R.C. Srivastava
was selected for appointment but his selection was not approved by the ACC. A
fresh advertisement was issued by the Union Public Service Commission on February 7, 1987, in pursuance whereof Respondent 1
came to be selected on June
10, 1987.
On June 18, 1987 the approval of ACC was sought but
while the matter was pending before the ACC, a CBI inquiry was commenced,
against him in September 1987 in regard to some incident of 1985. This inquiry
ended in his exoneration in December 1987. After he came to be exonerated the
ACC took up the question regarding his appointment pursuant to the selection
made by UPSC. It, however, appears that in his confidential report pertaining
to the year 1987 an adverse comment was made to the following effect:
"[H]e
has not the ability to give leadership in a department which has all-India
jurisdiction. He has also been orally advised not to bring outside influence in
his service matters. He needs to develop a proper perspective about the role
and functioning of the department. He has not done any meritorious work."
The said adverse remarks were communicated to him on May 20, 1988. He made a representation for
expunging the said adverse remarks on June 10, 1988. His representation was partly
accepted by the order dated October 4, 1988,
in that, the remark 'He has not done any meritorious work' was ordered to be
expunged. Thereafter on December
7, 1988, the ACC took
the decision not to appoint him to the post in question. He challenged this
decision by moving the Central Administrative Tribunal which allowed the
application and gave directions as stated hereinabove. It is this order of the
Tribunal which is questioned in these appeals. As the issue involved is the
same we proceed to dispose of these appeals by this common judgment.
3. It
may be mentioned that on the facts narrated above the Tribunal came to the
following conclusion:
"In
the instant case no adverse remarks had been communicated to the appellant at
the time of selection of the appellant by the UPSC in June 1987 for the post of
Chief Controller of Explosives. There was no investigation or inquiry pending
against him in regard to any alleged misconduct on his part at that point of
time. That being so we are of the opinion that subsequent events such as
communication of remarks to the applicant for the year 198 7 and the CBI
inquiry initiated against him into alleged acts of misconduct 253 which was
dropped would have no bearing on the suitability of the applicant for the post
of Chief Controller of Explosives. The subsequent events and developments
should not be taken into account by the ACC while adjudging his
suitability." Proceeding further the Tribunal came to the conclusion that
since no reason was assigned by the ACC for rejecting the recommendation made
by the UPSC for the appointment of Respondent 1 as Chief Controller of
Explosives by way of direct recruitment the decision was vitiated. In this view
of the matter the Tribunal remitted the matter to the ACC to reconsider the
recommendation of the UPSC without taking into account the adverse remarks of
1987 and the outcome of the CBI inquiry. It further directed that the ACC may
take a decision in the light of the observations contained in the judgment
which we have extracted earlier.
4. In
view of the above, the short question which arises for consideration is whether
the Tribunal was justified in taking the view that events subsequent to the
recommendation made by the UPSC could not be taken into consideration for
deciding whether or not the candidate recommended was suitable for appointment
and whether the omission on the part of the ACC to state the reason for
departing from the recommendation of the UPSC was fatal and vitiated the
decision?
5.
Before we answer the questions which arise for consideration it, is necessary
to correct certain factual errors in the order of the Tribunal. It is not in
dispute that in the ACR for the year 1987 an adverse remark was made by the
reviewing authority which was duly communicated to Respondent 1. Respondent 1
had made a representation on June 10, 1988 for expunging that remark. That
remark was partially expunged by the order of October 4, 1988. The Tribunal
was, therefore, wrong in thinking that the representation was not disposed of
before the ACC decided on December 7, 1988 that Respondent 1 was not suitable
to be appointed to the post of Chief Controller of Explosives.
The
observation of the Tribunal in this behalf in the concluding line of paragraph
27 of the judgment is, therefore, factually inaccurate.
6. It
is indeed true that till the UPSC made the recommendation for the appointment
of Respondent 1 to the post of Chief Controller of Explosives on June 18, 1987,
there was no adverse remark in his ACRs but in the ACR of 1986 shown to us the
reviewing authority did state that he lacked the qualities of leadership.
However, since that remark was not communicated to him as it was not considered
to be adverse it had to be ignored. The learned counsel for Respondent 1 was,
therefore, right in saying that there was no adverse remark in the confidential
report of Respondent 1 up to the point of time when the UPSC made the
recommendation on June
18, 1987. However,
certain developments took place after that recommendation was made and before
ACC could reach a decision thereon. In September 1987 a CBI inquiry was
commenced against Respondent 1 and hence the ACC could not process the proposal
till the outcome of that inquiry. That inquiry ended in the exoneration of
Respondent 1 and immediately thereafter when the ACC took up the proposal it
was found that in the ACR of 1987 there was an adverse remark made by the
reviewing authority which was communicated to Respondent 1 on May 20, 1988 and
in regard to which Respondent 1 had made a representation on June 10, 1988.
Till that representation was disposed of on October 4, 1988 the ACC could not take 254 a
decision on the question whether or not to accept the recommendation of the
UPSC. That representation was partially allowed, in that, the last line in the
adverse remark came to be quashed whereas the rest of the adverse remark was
retained. The ACC, therefore, took into consideration the said adverse remark
and came to the conclusion that Respondent 1 was not suitable for appointment
to the high post of the Chief Controller of Explosives. This decision taken on December 7, 1988 was, therefore, based on an adverse
remark made subsequent to the recommendation of the UPSC. The question is
whether the ACC was justified in taking into consideration this subsequent
development for by-passing the recommendation of the UPSC.
The
second question is whether the ACC was bound to state the reason in support of
its decision? The Tribunal has come to the conclusion, relying on the decision
of this Court in Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab2 that the ACC was bound to give reasons for not accepting the
recommendation of the UPSC. Finding that no reasons were given by the ACC for
by-passing the recommendation of the UPSC, it held that the decision of the ACC
could not be sustained.
7. In Jatinder
Kumar case' the facts reveal that the Inspector General of Police, Punjab had
sent a requisition to the Selection Board to select and recommend 7 suitable
persons for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police.
While
the matter was pending consideration 50 more posts fell vacant whereupon the
Board was requested to recommend 57 persons for those posts. The candidates
were interviewed and physically tested on various dates. Before the select list
could be finalised the Inspector General of Police sent a further requisition
to recommend 170 more persons in anticipation of further vacancies likely to
occur on reorganisation of the police force. Thus in all 227 candidates were to
be selected by the Selection Board but the Board prepared a panel of 144
candidates only. It appears that the proposal for disbandment of the Punjab
Armed Police Battalion and creation of additional posts did not materialise and
hence the additional 170 posts were not available to be filled in by direct
recruitment. Out of the earlier 57 posts 9 were offered to the wards of the
deceased police officers and the remaining 48 posts were offered to candidates
recommended by the Board in the order of merit.
As the
remaining candidates recommended by the Board could not be appointed for want
of vacancies, writ petitions were filed in the High Court but they were
rejected by a learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench to which a
Letters Patent Appeal was preferred. Thereupon an appeal was preferred by
special leave to this Court wherein the question raised was whether the
selection of a candidate by the Selection Board confers an unfettered right to
be appointed on the recommendation made by the said Board.
Dealing
with this contention this Court after referring to the duties to be performed
by the Union or State Public Service Commissions
under Article 320 observed that the establishment of an independent body like
Public Service Commission is to ensure selection of best available persons for
appointment in a post to avoid arbitrariness and nepotism in the matter of
appointment. The selection by the Commission, however, is only a recommendation
and the final authority for appointment is the Government. This Court,
therefore, pointed out that the Government may accept the recommendation or may
decline to do so but if it chooses not to accept the recommendation of the
Commission, the Constitution enjoins the Government to 2 (1985) 1 SCC 122: 1985
SCC (L&S) 174: (1985) 1 SCR 899 255 place on the table of legislature
concerned its reasons for so doing. The Government is made answerable to the
legislature for any departure, vide Article 323 of the Constitution. This Court
further pointed out that this, however, did not clothe the candidate with any
right to appointment pursuant to the recommendation of the Commission. If,
however, the vacancy is to be filled up the Government must make the
appointment in the order of merit fixed by the Commission. So also the
Government cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list but
it is always open to the Government to decide how many appointments it will
make. It will thus be seen that this Court clearly laid down that the selection
made by the Commission is only recommendatory in nature and the Government may
or may not accept the same but if it chooses not to accept the same, Article
323 enjoins it to place on the table of the legislature its reasons or report
for not accepting the recommendation. Article 323 provides that it shall be the
duty of the Commission to present annually to the President/Governor a report
as to the work done by the Commission and on receipt of such report the latter
shall cause a copy thereof together with a memorandum explaining, as respects
the cases, if any, where the advice of the Commission was not accepted, the reasons
for such non- acceptance to be laid before the legislature concerned.
Thus
the reasons have to be communicated to the legislature if the advice of the
Commission has not been accepted while placing a copy of the report as to the
work done by the Commission before the legislature concerned. On a plain
reading of the said Article it is, therefore, clear that the reasons have to be
assigned in a memorandum to be placed along with a copy of the report of the
Commission before the legislature concerned. Therefore, the decision in Jatinder
Kumar case' is not an authority for the proposition that when the ACC does not
accept the recommendation of the UPSC it is bound to communicate the reasons
for departing from the said recommendation to either the UPSC or the candidate
concerned. All that Article 323 requires is that along with the copy of the
report of the Commission a memorandum containing the reasons for declining to
accept the recommendations of the UPSC shall be placed before the House of
Parliament. In the instant case the reason for declining to accept the
recommendation of the UPSC is the adverse remark made in the confidential
report for the year 1987.
Therefore,
the Tribunal is not right in coming to the conclusion that no reason had been
given by the ACC for departing from the recommendation of the UPSC. In order to
satisfy our conscious that the ACC had given due consideration to the
recommendation made by the UPSC we called for the relevant file on which the
ACC took its decision and satisfied ourselves that it had declined to appoint
Respondent 1 as the Chief Controller of Explosives on account of the adverse
remark in the ACR for the year 1987.
8. It
is obvious from what we have stated above that this Court clearly observed in Jatinder
Kumar case' that the selection made by the Commission was only recommendatory
in nature and it was open to the Government to either accept the recommendation
or to depart therefrom. Observations on which the Tribunal relies merely convey
that if the Government does not depart from the recommendation of the
Commission the Government must make the appointments strictly adhering to the
order of merit as recommended by the Commission. It cannot disturb the order of
merit according to its own sweet will except for good reasons, namely, bad
conduct or character but that does not 256 mean that the Government cannot
depart from the recommendation of the Commission. If it departs from the
recommendation it must ultimately comply with the requirement of Article 323 of
the Constitution. There is nothing in that article or in the rules to suggest
that the Government cannot take into consideration the developments subsequent
to the selection made by the UPSC. Such a view would not be in public interest
and may lead to serious complications if the Government is enjoined to make the
appointment notwithstanding certain serious matters having come to its notice
subsequent to the recommendation made by the Commission. Counsel for Respondent
1, however, submitted that a line of demarcation must be drawn somewhere
because the Government cannot be allowed to delay its decision till adverse
circumstances appear against the candidate recommended for appointment. He
submitted that this demarcation must coincide with the date on which the recommendation
is made by the Commission and at any rate must be confined to a reasonable
period subsequent thereto.
We are
afraid no hard and fast line can be drawn in this connection. Besides, in the
instant case we do not find as a fact that the Government had deliberately
delayed its decision. In fact immediately after the recommendation was made by
the Commission on June
18, 1987, the CBI
inquiry commenced in September 1987 and ended in December 1987. The ACC could
not take a decision during the pendency of the inquiry. Immediately after the
inquiry concluded and Respondent 1 was exonerated, the ACC proceeded to process
the proposal and found an adverse remark in the ACR for the year 1987. This
adverse remark was immediately communicated to Respondent 1 and after his
representation was disposed of in October 1988 and his appeal against the
decision also failed, the ACC took the final decision on December 7, 1988.
In the
circumstances it cannot be said that the ACC had deliberately delayed the
decision. Assuming the decision taken by the ACC is justiciable, there can be
no doubt that it can be challenged only on the ground that it smacks of mala
fides or arbitrariness. The facts do not reveal that the decision taken by the
ACC was either mala fide or arbitrary.
9.
Counsel for Respondent 1 then placed reliance on two decisions, namely Asha Kaul
(Mrs) v. State of J & K3 and Jagtar Singh v. Director, Central Bureau of
Investigation4.
In our
view both these decisions do not assist Respondent 1.
The
former was a case pertaining to the approval and publication of the select list
of District Munsifs prepared by the J & K Public Service Commission.
Several complaints were received in regard to the select lists prepared by the
Commission and forwarded to the Government. The Government found prima facie
substance in the complaints and, therefore, kept the lists pending. However,
the High Court kept on pressing for approval as it was keen to fill in the
existing vacancies. The Government, therefore, approved thirteen names and
published the list. Those persons were duly appointed but in the meantime a
writ petition was filed for a mandamus to command the Government to approve the
lists prepared by the Commission. On the Advocate-General's statement that the
matter was under the active consideration of the Government, the petition was
dismissed. Since the Government did not accord approval a fresh writ petition
was filed which came to be allowed against which decision the appeals by
special leave came to this Court. In the backdrop of 3 (1993) 2 SCC 573: 1993
SCC (L&S) 637: (1993) 24 ATC 576: JT (1993) 2 SC 688 4 1993 Supp (3) SCC
49: 1993 SCC (L&S) 922: (1993) 25 ATC 8 1: JT (1993) 2 SC 703 257 these
facts, this Court, while repelling the extreme submission that the Government
as the appointing authority wields absolute power to approve or disapprove of
the list at its sweet will, observed, that where the Government is satisfied
after due inquiry that the selection has been vitiated on account of violation
of rules or for the reason that it smacks of corruption, favouritism, nepotism
or the like, it may refuse to approve the list in which case it must record the
reasons for its action and produce the same in court, if and when called upon,
besides placing the same before the legislature as required by Article 323 of
the Constitution. This decision is not an authority for the proposition that
the Government must make an order disapproving the list along with the reasons
therefore and convey the same to the High Court or the Commission. All that it
says is that the Government must record its reasons for the disapproval on the
file and if its action is questioned in court it must disclose the same to the
court if called upon to do so. That requirement has been satisfied in the
present case. The Tribunal, however, wrongly thought that subsequent events
could not be taken into consideration and that is why it directed the ACC to
reconsider its decision without noticing the adverse entry as well as the
contents of the CBI report. In fact to satisfy ourselves we perused the file
and found that the reason for disapproval was stated on the file. The
subsequent decision turned on its own facts as the Court came to the conclusion
that the material placed before the Court did not justify Government's refusal
to make the appointment. Therefore, neither of the two decisions on which
reliance is placed come to the rescue of Respondent 1.
It
seems well settled that the function of the Public Service Commission being
advisory, the Government may for valid reasons to be recorded on the file,
disapprove of the advice or recommendation tendered by the Commission, which
decision can, if at all, be tested on the limited ground of it being thoroughly
arbitrary, mala fide or capricious.
10. In
view of the above discussion we cannot sustain the impugned decision of the
Tribunal. We, therefore, allow the two Civil Appeal Nos. 3671 & 3671-A of
1993, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and direct that the petitions
filed in the Tribunal shall stand dismissed. We, however, make no order as to
costs. In view of the order allowing the appeals, Mr Dholakia concedes that
Civil Appeal No. 3668 of 1993 is rendered infructuous. It will stand so
disposed of with no order as to costs.
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