Lakhjit
Singh Vs. State of Punjab [1993] INSC 170 (31 March 1993)
Reddy,
K. Jayachandra (J) Reddy, K. Jayachandra (J) Ray, G.N. (J)
CITATION:
1994 SCC Supl. (1) 173
ACT:
HEAD NOTE:
ORDER
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This appeal pursuant to the special leave granted, is directed against the
judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court. There are
two appellants, viz., Lakhjit Singh (original accused 1) and Sukhpal Kaur
(original accused 2).
These
two appellants, along with one Vir Singh (original accused 3) were tried for
offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and convicted by the
trial court and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a
fine of Rs 2000 and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six
months. All of them preferred an appeal, but the High Court acquitted Vir Singh
(A-3) and confirmed the convictions of the two appellants.
3.
Appellant 1 is the son of appellant 2 and Vir Singh (A- 3). They are the
residents of Village Abul Khurana in Faridkot district. The deceased Kailo was
the wife of Lakhjit Singh (A-1). On February 16, 1981, the marriage between Lakhjit Singh
and the deceased took place.
According
to the prosecution, the three accused were demanding dowry and they used to
ill-treat the deceased.
About
18/19 days prior to the occurrence, the deceased went to her parent's house. On
July 19, 1981, the husband went to his in-law's
house to bring his wife back to his own house and on July 22, 1981, he returned to his village along
with the deceased. On July
25, 198 1, the
deceased complained of pain and Lakhjit Singh, the husband called a doctor (DW
3) for treatment who gave her an injection. Thereafter they took the deceased
to Malout Mandi to Dr Goyal (PW 1) for her treatment. He examined her and told
that the deceased suffered a heart attack and had expired. They brought back
the dead body to their house. Then the husband himself made a complaint to the
Sub-Inspector who happened to be present there in the village. An inquest was
held and the dead body was sent for post mortem. Doctor (PW 2) who conducted
the postmortem sent the viscera to the chemical examiner. The report revealed
that organo-phosphorus compound was found in the stomach, small intestines,
large intestines, liver, spleen, kidney and brain of the deceased. On receipt
of the report, a formal FIR was recorded and a case registered under Section
306 Indian Penal Code. When the case came up for trial, a charge was framed
under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and they proceeded with the trial.
Regarding the motive, viz., the cruelty part of it, PWs 4 and 5 were examined.
The other main witnesses are the doctors. The accused pleaded not guilty. The
trial court taking the circumstances into consideration and relying on the
postmortem evidence as well as the chemical examiner's report, held that it was
a case of poisoning and the circumstances were enough to convict all the three
accused and accordingly convicted them. All of them preferred an appeal to the
High Court and the High Court while acquitting A-3 the father-in-law of the
deceased, confirmed the convictions of the two appellants - the husband and the
mother-in-law of the deceased. Hence, this appeal is by the two
convicted-accused.
4. The
learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the courts mainly on
suspicion and conjecture have reached the conclusion that the two appellants
were responsible for administering poison to the deceased and that it could be
a case of accidental death or at the most, suicide, and, at any rate, there is
no evidence whatsoever that the two accused were harassing her and, therefore,
176 question of cruelty against her does not arise in this case and, as a
result of which, none of them can be found guilty.
5.
Theory of accident is based on the ground that the deceased was also working in
the field in which insecticide was sprayed and she could have inhaled and that
could have caused her death. We see no force in this submission because the
chemical examination report shows that poisoning was present in almost all the
organs. Therefore, it is clearly a case where the poison must have been
consumed or somebody must have administered the same. The next question is
whether there is any evidence to connect these appellants with the administration
of poison. The trial court as well as the High Court held that the conduct of
the accused, viz., in giving the first information report to the effect that
she was subjected to heart attack and the suppression of the fact of unnatural
death would result in drawing an adverse inference and these and other
circumstances, would be enough to reach a conclusion that these accused must
have administered the poison. The High Court also took into consideration the
background viz., there was a demand for dowry and within 5 months after the
marriage this death took place, and, therefore, a strong case arises against
the accused, particularly, when they suppressed or tried to destroy the
evidence and create false evidence.
6. In
a case of circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt by independent evidence and the circumstances so proved, must
form a complete chain without giving room to any other hypotheses and should be
consistent with only the guilt of the accused.
In the
instant case, there is some evidence which we will consider later about the
demand of dowry and about ill- treatment, which could be a strong reason for
committing suicide also. Unless some other material connect the accused with
administration of poison. on mere suspicion or conjecture they cannot be found
guilty. Both the courts below by suspicion and by drawing adverse inferences,
however, held that the accused must have administered the poison. This is again
only on the basis of a strong suspicion. So far as the earliest information
given by the first appellant is concerned, it is not as if there is no basis
whatsoever, to suspect to that it was a case of heart attack. As a matter of
fact, PW 2 who performed the autopsy, gave an opinion that the death was due to
presence of organo-phosphorus compound and heart attack. Therefore, it cannot
be concluded that in the initial stages they suppressed the truth and wanted to
create false evidence.
For
these reasons we find it difficult to hold that the appellants were responsible
for administration of poison and thus guilty of offence punishable under
Section 302 Indian Penal Code.
7. The
next question is whether an offence under Section 304-B or 306 is made out. It
is true that the accused was tried only under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and
it is submitted that question of drawing a presumption attracted under Section
113-A or 113-B does not arise. Section 113-B deals with the presumption of
dowry death. In the instant case, taking the medical evidence as such, it can
only be held that at the most the prosecution has proved that the death could
be suicide and Section 304-B or the presumption under Section 113-B Evidence
Act cannot be invoked because Section 304-B came into effect only on November
19, 1986 i.e. much later than when this offence took place.
177
Therefore, we are left with the other offenses punishable under Section 306
Indian Penal Code.
8.
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act provides for the prosecution of suicide and
lays down that where there is a suicide committed by woman and when the
question arises whether the husband or any other relative had abetted the same
and if this suicide is within seven years from the date of marriage and if she
had been subjected to cruelty then it will be assumed that they abetted the
suicide. In this case, in their evidence, PW 4 and PW 5 have deposed that there
had been a demand of dowry by the mother-in-law, husband as well as by the
father-in-law. The mother of the deceased PW 3, however, in her deposition, has
stated that the deceased complained to her that the mother-in-law was demanding
dowry and harassing her for the same and that the other two were silent about
it. Therefore, the inference is that connivance of the other two also was there
when the deceased was being treated accordingly. Therefore, the cruelty part of
it meted out to the deceased is proved.
9. The
learned counsel, however, submits that since the charge was for the offence
punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, the accused were not put to
notice to meet a charge also made against them under Section 306 IPC and,
therefore, they are prejudiced by not framing a charge under Section 306 Indian
Penal Code and; therefore, presumption under Section 113-A of Indian Evidence
Act cannot be drawn and consequently a conviction under Section 306 cannot be
awarded. We are unable to agree. The facts and circumstances of the case have
been put forward against the accused under Section 313 CrPC and when there was
a demand for dowry it cannot be said that the accused are prejudiced because
the cross-examination of the witnesses, as well as the answers given under
Section 313 of the CrPC would show that they had enough of notice of the
allegations which attract Section 306 Indian Penal Code also. That apart, what
all Section II 3-A of Evidence Act says is that the court, having regard to the
other circumstances of the case can presume. Therefore, the circumstances in
this case would show that the accused have been demanding dowry even within a
short period after the marriage and the deceased also had to live in her
parent's house and it is the husband who went and brought her back. The
deceased followed him and unfortunately, the incident has taken place. Since
there is no direct evidence regarding administration of poison to the deceased
as such, the only course left is to hold that the prosecution has proved only
suicide. In these circumstances, Section 306 is attracted. For these reasons, the
conviction of the appellants under Section 302 and sentence of imprisonment for
life are set aside.
Instead,
they are convicted under Section 306 Indian Penal Code and each of them is
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and sentence of fine of
Rupees 2000 with default clause are confirmed. Subject to this modification the
appeal is disposed of. If the appellants have already served out the sentence
of 5 years, they need not be sent to jail again.
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