Kundula
Bala Subrahmanyam & Anr Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] INSC 159 (26 March 1993)
Anand,
A.S. (J) Anand, A.S. (J) Singh N.P. (J)
CITATION:
1993 SCR (2) 666 1993 SCC (2) 684 JT 1993 (2) 559 1993 SCALE (2)214
ACT:
Evidence
Act 1872: Section 3--Appreciation of evidence--Criminal trial--Case based on
circumstantial evidence--Proof--Court's duty to scrutinize evidence--Motive,
oral dying declarations, medical evidence, conduct of accused immediately and
after the evidence, absconding of accused--Whether prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Evidence
Act, 1872: Section 32--Dying declaration--proof of--Acceptance by Court
when--More than two dying declarations--Trustworthy test--Court's duty.
The
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Object and purpose of--Cases relating to
harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young
brides--Causes--Solutions to such situations--Court's role what to be.
HEAD NOTE:
The
prosecution case was that on 23.8.1981 between 12-30 1.00 p.m., on hearing
screams and cry of the deceased, aged about 18 years, P.W.2 alongwith her
father PW3, and PW4 rushed to the house of the appellant They saw the father of
appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased) alongwith the husband and
mother-in-law of the deceased hurriedly com- ing out of the kitchen while the
deceased was lying on the floor engulfed in flames.
As the
appellant No. 1, did not respond to the request of PW2 to give her something to
extinguish the fire, PW2 requested the father of the appellant No. 1 to give a
bed- sheet or blanket while the father of the appellant No. 1 was passing on a
bed sheet to PW2, the appellant No. 2 (mother- in-law of the deceased)
objected. In the meanwhile PW2 took the bed sheet from the father of the
appellant No. 1 and tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased asked PW2 for
some water. PW3 removed the burning petticoat from the body of the deceased to
save her from further burning. While doing so he also received some burn
injuries. PW2 poured water into the deceased's mouth and enquired from her as
to what had happened.
667
The deceased told PW2 that her mother-in- law had poured kerosene over her and
her husband had set fire to her. The deceased asked for more water, which was
again given to her by PW2. The deceased's statement made to PW2 was overheard
by PW3 PW5 and some others who also reached the spot on hearing her cries.
PW5
went away to inform the matenal uncle of the deceased with one Ramakrishna on
his motor cycle. There PW5 found PW1, the brother of the deceased and informed
about the burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the deceased
telling PW2.
PW1
reached the house of the appellant with Ramakrishna on his motor cycle. He saw
a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there. The deceased was
lying on the floor and she had no clothes on her. PWl noticed that she had
received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her legs. On seeing her
plight, PWl started crying and hitting his head against a piller. When the
deceased noticed PW1 had come, she asked PW2 to bring her brother inside. PW2
went out and brought PWI to the kitchen. The deceased took the palm of her
brother, PWl into her own palms and told him to tell mother and father that her
mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her husband set her or fire. She
requested him that he should not fight, "anyhow she was dying." She
also told PWl to take back the cash given to her and to divide it amongst her
sisters in equal share and to get them married to nice persons. The appellant
No. 1, the husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen with folded hands
and begged her for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat what he had
done. PWI got wild and caught hold of the neck of the appellant No. 1. FIW2 and
PW3 rushed towards them and released the appellant No. 1 from the hold of PW1.
They sent PWI to another uncle's house and told the uncle to take care of PW1.
When PWI returned to the house of the deceased after one hour he saw that PW6,
a local Doctor, was giving first-aid to the deceased and she was lying on a cot
in the verandah. PW6 advised at about 3.30 p.m. to remove the deceased to the Government Hospital. The deceased was brought to the
hospital at about 5
p.m. At about 5.30 p.m., PW9, a doctor examined the deceased and declared her
dead.
PWl
along with his uncle went to the Police Station, adjacent to the hospital and
lodged the FIR. A case under section 302 IPC was registered 668 and police
investigation was started.
Both
the appellants were not found in the village when search for them was made by
the investigating officer. The appellant No. 1 surrendered in the Court on
10.11.1981 while the appellant No. 2 surrendered in the Court on 7.12.1981.
The
Trial Court held that there was no motive for the appellant to commit the crime;
that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could not be relied upon; that PW1 had made
improvements in his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore the oral
dying- declaration made to him could not be relied upon. The Trial Court also
held that there was unexplained delay in lodging report with the policy. It
acquitted the appellants, holding that the case was one of suicide and not of
murder.
The
State filed appeal in the High Court. The High Court held that the chain of the
established circumstances was complete and the circumstances were sufficient to
establish that the appellants alone had committed the crime of murder of the
deceased. The High Court convicted both the appellants for the offence under
section 302/34 IPC and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life.
Hence
this appeal before this Court under section 2(a) of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.
The
appellants contended that since the Trial Court had acquitted the appellants,
the High Court was not justified in recording an order or conviction, as the
findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be perverse; that the
dying declarations were not worthy of reliance and the motive was feeble and
not established; that the surrendering of the appellants themselves in the
court on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they had no
guilty-conscious and the prosecution was not justified in relying upon this
conduct as an adverse conduct against the appellants; and that since all
neighbors had become hostile, out of fear the appellants did not act either to
put off the fire or remove the deceased to the hospital.
The
respondent-State submitted that the findings of the Trial Court were not only
conjectural but also perverse and the evidence of the wit- 669 nesses was
disbelieved on mere surmises; that the Trial Court did,not properly discuss the
two dying declarations made by the deceased and since the dying declarations
have been proved by reliable evidence, these by themselves could form the basis
of conviction of the appellants; that the High Court after a careful appraisal
of the evidence had rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court which
suffered from illegality as well as manifest error and perversity,, and that
the prosecution had established the case against the appellants beyond every
reasonable doubt and their appeal deserved to be dismissed.
Dismissing
the appeal, this Court,
HELD:
1.01.
In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully
proved and these circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the
established circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap in the
chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent with his
innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the
evidence and deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter find whether
the chain of the established circumstances is complete or not before passing an
order of conviction. [679 E-F]
1.02.In
a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance as
its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning.
The
motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry. [679 H]
1.03.The
evidence led by the prosecution to establish, the existence of motive is wholly
reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has successfully established
that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to commit the crime
because of her parents not agreeing to get the land registered in the name of
the first appellant and their insistence to have the land registered in the
name of their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been conclusively
established by the prosecution. [682 D]
1.04.Both
the dying declarations are oral. They have been made to friends and to the
brother of the deceased respectively. In view of the close relationship of the
witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were 670 made, it becomes
necessary for the court to carefully scruitinize and appreciate the evidence of
the witnesses to the dying declarations- [683. B]
1.05.PW1
is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but mere
relationship cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise
found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of events, the
deceased who was on the verge of her death would have conveyed to her near and
dear ones the circumstances leading to her receiving the burn injuries. PW1 has
given a very consistent statement and has reproduced the words of the deceased
clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination
to discredit his testimony at all. [683 C-D]
1.6.Despite
searching cross-examination of both PW2 and PW3, nothing has been brought out
in their cross-examination to discredit them or doubt their veracity at all.
After carefully analysing their evidence, it is found that PWs 2 and 3 as
witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.[684 F]
1.07.From
the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 3, both the dying declarations are provedto have
been made by the deceased.
They
are the statements made by thedeceased and relate to the circumstances leading
to her death. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and
appear to have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course
of events. They have a ring of truth about them. [684 G]
1.08The
medical evidence, fully corroborates the prosecution case and lendssupport to
the dying declaration and more particularly the manner inwhich the deceased had
been set on fire.[686 D]
1.09.The
normal human conduct of any person finding someone engulfed in flames would be
to make all efforts to put off the flames and. save the life of the person.
Though, the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they did not
do anything of the kind. They rendered no first-aid to the deceased. Their
conduct at the time of the occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their
guilt and is inconsistent with their innocence. The appellants did not even
accompany the deceased to the hospital in the matador van. Had the husband not
been a party to the crime, one would have expected that he would be the first
person to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone
unturned 671 to save her life. An innocent mother-in- law would have also done
the same, even if she had no love or emotional feelings for her
daughter-in-law. Neither the husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took
any steps to remove the deceased to the hospital let alone accompany her to the
hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consistent
only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying declarations,
that the mother- in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had lit
fire and put her on flames. [686 H, 687 A-D]
1.10.The
prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the conduct of both the
appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediatelythereafter is
consistent only with the hypothesis-of the guilt of the appellants and
inconsistent with their innocence. [688 B]
1.11.Absconding
by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the
hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent
persons may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and
arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances, the
absconding of the appellants assumes Importance and significance. The
prosecution has successfully established this circumstance also to connect the
appellants with the crime. [688 E-F]
1.12.The
prosecution has successfully established all the circumstances appearing in the
evidence against the appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the
chain of the established circumstances is complete and has no gaps whatsoever
and the same conclusively establishes that the appellants and appellants alone
committed the crime of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner
suggested by the prosecution. All the established circumstances are consistent
only with the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone who committed the
crime and the circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than
their guilt. [688 G-H, 687 A]
2.01.Under
Section 32, when a statement Is made by a person, as to the cause of death or
as to any of the circumstances which result In his death, in cases in which the
cause of that person's death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in
writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is
admissible in evidence.
The
statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that
category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a lit mental
condition. [684 H, 685 A-B] 672
2.02.A
dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special
sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue
statement The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth
of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or circumstances
leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a
sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of
the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of
the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful scrutiny of the
courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the
court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any embelishment
such a dying declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording conviction
even without looking for any coroboration. If there are more than one dying
declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations
to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The
Court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are
consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying
upon the same. [685 C-E]
2.03.Both
the dying declarations are consistent with each other in all material facts and
particulars. That the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the
dying declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the defence
in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in the course of
arguments both in the High Court and before this Court. Both the dying
declarations have passed the test of credit worthiness and they suffer from no
infirmity whatsoever. [685 F-G]
2.04.The
prosecution has successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstantial
evidence in the case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying
declarations implicating both, the appellants and disclosing the manner in
which she had been put on fire shortly before her death.
This
circumstance, therefore, has been established by the prosecution beyond every
reasonable doubt by clear and cogent evidence. [685 G-H]
3.01.There
has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted
suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides. This growing cult of
violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on sending shock
waves to the civilised society whenever it happens, continues unabated. There
is a constant erosion of the basic 673 human values of tolerance and the spirit
of "live and let live'. Lack of education and economic dependence of women
have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime. It is the woman who plays
a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with
the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in
the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. [689 C-D]
3.02.Awakening
of the collective consciousness is the need of the day. Change of heart and
attitude is what is needed.
If man
were to regain his harmony with others and replace hatred, greed, selfishness
and anger by mutual love, trust and understanding and if woman were to receive
education and become economically independent, the possibility of this
pernicious social evil dying a natural death may not remain a dream only.
[690-D]
3.03.The
legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has amended the laws and
provided for stringent punishments in such case and even permitted the raising
of presumptions against the accused in cases of unnatural deaths of the brides
within the first seven years of their marriage. [690 H]
3.04.The
Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been amended from time to
time, but this piece of social legislation, keeping in view the growing menance
of the social evil, also does not appear to have served much purpose as dowry
seekers are hardly brought to book and convictions recorded are rather few.
[691 A]
3.05.Laws
are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social movement of educating women
of their rights, to conquer the menace, is what is needed more particularly in
rural areas where women are still largely uneducated and less aware of their
rights and fall an easy prey to their exploitation. [691 B]
3.06.The
role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and it is
expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner
and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities
or insignificant lacune in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would
receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by
the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases
involving crime against women. [691 C] 674 State (Delhi Administration) v. Lavnan
& Ors., Crl. Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, referred to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 629 of 1985.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1985 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 1983.
K.Madhava
Reddy, A. Subba Rao and A.D.N. Rao for the Appellants.
G. Prabhakar
for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR.ANAND, J. The curse of dowry has
claimed yet another victim. Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam, the husband of the
deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani and his mother Kundula Annapurna (mother-in-law
of the deceased) have filed this appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the judgment
of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated 25.6.1985, setting aside
the judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, East Godavari Division
and convicting both the appellants for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and
sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for life.
On
23rd of August, 1981, between 12.30.1.00 p.m. on hearing screams and cry of
deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani, at that time aged about 18 years, Pulapa Lakshmi
PW2, Vempati Paparao PW3 and Vempati Radha PW4, rushed to the house of the
appellant and found both the appellants along with the father of appellant No.
1 (father-in-law of the deceased) hurriedly coming out of the kitchen while the
deceased was lying on the floor engulfed in flames. Since, the appellants or
the father-in-law of the deceased were making no attempts to put off the
flames, PW2 asked appellant No. 1 to give her something so that she could
extinguish the fire.
He,
however, did not respond. She then requested first appellant's father to give
something to her so that the fire could be put off. The father of appellant No.
1 enquired if he should get a bucket of water. PW2, thereupon, requested him to
give either a bed-sheet or a blanket. The father of appellant No. 1 then
brought out a bed sheet (Bontha) from the cot and 675 as he was passing it on,
to PW2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, appellant No. 2, told her husband
not to give the bontha to PW2. PW2, in the meanwhile, took the bontha from the
father of the first appellant and tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased
turned her side. She was alive.
The
deceased asked PW2 for some water. Since, the petticoat of the deceased was
burning, PW3, the father of PW2, who had also rushed along with her to the
house of the appellant broke the thread of the petticoat to save her from
further burning and threw away the burning garments In the process, he also
received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water into the mouth of the deceased
and enquired from her as to what had happened. The deceased told her that
"her mother-in-law had poured kerosene over her and her husband had set
fire to her". The deceased again felt thirsty and asked for more water
which was again given to her by PW2. The above statement made by the deceased
to PW2 was overheard by PW3 and some others, who had also reached on hearing
the cries.
Vempati
Nagabhushanam PW5, another immediate neighbor of the appellants living only
about 2 yards away also heard the cries of the deceased and rushed to the house
of the appellant. He noticed PW3 was pulling out the petticoat of the deceased
while PW2 was attempting to extinguish fire.
He saw
PW2 pouring water into the mouth of the deceased. He also heard the statement
made by the deceased to PW2 about the manner in which she had been set on fire.
PW5 thereupon went away to inform the maternal uncle of the deceased at Malakapalli.
On the way, he met one Ramakrishna coming on a motor-cycle and at his request
Ramakrishna gave him a ride to Malakapalli. On reaching the house of the
maternal uncle of the deceased, they found the brother of the deceased Vempati Sreerama
Krishna Sreeram PWl was also present there.
He
conveyed to them the information regarding the burning of the deceased and also
what he had heard the deceased telling PW2. Ramarao and PWl then went on the
same motorcycle to Dharmavaram. PWl reached the house of the appellant and saw
a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there.
The
deceased was lying on the floor and at that time she had no clothes on her. He
noticed that she had received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her
legs. On seeing her plight, PW1 started crying and hitting his head against a
pillar. When the deceased noticed that PW1 had come, she asked PW2 to call her
brother PWl inside. PW2 thereupon went out and brought PW1 to the kitchen where
the deceased took the palm of PWl into her own palms and told him in Hindi
"please tell mother and father as I am 676 telling you. My mother-in- law
poured kerosene on me and my husband set fire. You tell father and mother about
this.
Don't
fight. Anyhow I am dying." She also told her brother PW1 to take back the
cash given to her and divide it amongst the sisters in equal share and get them
married off to nice persons. At this juncture, the first appellant, husband of
the deceased came inside the kitchen and with folded hands begged the deceased
for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat what he had done and therefore
he may be pardoned.
PWl
got wild and caught hold of the neck of the first appellant. PW2 and PW3 rushed
towards them and released the first appellant from the hold of PW1 and sent PWl
to another uncle's house and told the uncle that since PWl was in an agitated
mood he should take care of him. Within an hour, however, PWl went back to the
house of the deceased and by that time, a local Doctor PW6, Dr. R. Radha krishnamurthy
had arrived at the house and was giving first-aid to her and she was lying on a
cot in the verandah. PW6 at about 3.30 p.m. advised the removal of the deceased
to the Government Hospital at Kovvur. A matador van was secured and at about 4.30 p.m. PW1, Ramarao, his maternal uncle, the wife of Ramarao
and some other neighbors took the deceased to the Government Hospital at Kovvur in the matador van reaching there at about 5 p.m.
At
about 5.30 p.m., Dr. K. Parameswaradas PW9 examined
the deceased and declared her dead. PWl thereupon went to the police station
which is adjacent to the hospital alongwith his uncle and lodged the report
Ex.P4 with the Head Constable Md. Navabjani PW12. A case under section 302 IPC
was registered and information was sent to Inspector of Police G. Scendavce Rao
PW14 on telephone. After collecting a copy of the FIR, PW14 proceeded to the
Government Hospital and from there went to the scene of occurrence. He seized
M.0's 1 to 3, drew the site plan of the scene of occurrence and examined PWs 1
to 5 and PW9 at Dharmavaram. He also held the inquest proceedings from 6.30
a.m. to 8.30 a.m. on August 24 1981 and after getting the postmortem conducted
handed over the dead-body to the family of the deceased. PW9 Dr. K. Parameswaradas
who conducted the postmortem examination in his report Ex.Pl8 noted extensive
burns to the extent of 90% on the body of the deceased and opined that the
deceased had died due to the extensive burns all over the body and that the
injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
During the investigation, the investigating officer made a request for the
preservation of viscera of the deceased so that it could be sent for chemical
examination, as according to the state- 677 ment of PW6, the deceased had
allegedly told him that she had consumed dettol to commit suicide and since she
could not bear the pain she had set herself on fire. The report of the chemical
examiner Ex.Pl6, however, revealed that no poison was detected and that the death
had been caused due to extensive burns. Further investigation into the case
was, carried out by Md. Baduruddin PW15, Inspector of the Crime Branch. During
the investigation, the father of the deceased Venkataramana handed over letters
Exs.Pl-P3 to the investigating officer. Both the appellants had made themselves
scarce and were not found in the village when search for them was made by the
investigating officer. The first appellant surrendered in the court on
10.11.1981 while the second appellant surrendered in the court on 7th of
December, 1981.
After
the investigation was over, challan was filed and both the appellants were sent
up for trial in the Court of Sessions Judge East Godavari Division at Rajahmundry.
At the
trial, the prosecution inter alia relied upon the following circumstances with
a view to connect the appellant with the crime:-
(1)
Motive;
(2)
Two dying declarations made to PW2 and to PW1;
(3)
Medical Evidence;
(4)
Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the occurrence;
(5) Absconding
of the appellants.
The
appellants when examined under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code
denied their involvement and stated the case to be a false one. They, however,
produced no defence.
The
learned Trial Court did not accept the prosecution version and held that there
was no motive for the appellant to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2
to 4 could not be relied upon; that PWI had made improvements in his statements
recorded at the trial and, therefore, the oral dying declaration made to him
could not be relied upon. The Trial court also held that there had been
unexplained delay in lodging report with the police. The Trial Court placed
reliance on the testimony of hostile 678 witness PW6 and held that the case was
one of suicide and not of murder. On those findings, the learned Sessions Judge
acquitted both the appellants.
On an
appeal, filed by the State, a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh set aside the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and convicted both
the appellants for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC. Speaking for the
Division Bench, K. Ramaswamy J. (as His Lordship then was) found no hesitation
to hold PWl as a witness of truth and a wholly reliable witness and also opined
that the evidence of 'PWs 2 and 3 was trustworthy and reliable. The dying
declarations made by the deceased to PW2 and subsequently to PWl were believed
and relied upon. It was held that report Ex.P4 had been given by PWl
immediately after the deceased was declared dead by the Doctor and therefore
there was no delay much less unexplained delay in lodging the report.
While
dealing with the conduct of the appellant, it was opined that their conduct was
inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis that
appellant no. 2 had committed the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased and
appellant No. 1 had lit fire. With regard to the existence of motive, it was
held that the appellants were actuated with a motive to do away with the life
of the deceased for not getting the land registered in the name of the first
appellant. Finally, the High Court found that the chain of the established
circumstances was complete and the circumstances were sufficient to conclusive
establish that the appellants and the appellants alone had committed the crime
of murder of the deceased. The High Court held that the consideration of
evidence on record and the reasoning of the Trial Court was most unsatisfactory
and could not be sustained and therefore set aside the order of acquittal and
convicted both the appellants for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and
sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life.
Appearing
for the appellants before us, Mr. Madhav Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel
urged that since the Trial Court had acquitted the appellants, the High Court
was not justified in recording an order of conviction as the findings recorded
by the Trial Court could not be said to be perverse. It was argued that the
dying declarations were not worthy of reliance and the motive was feeble and
not established. Learned counsel submitted that the surrendering of the
appellants themselves in the court on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was
enough to show that they had no 679 guilty conscious and the prosecution was
not justified in relying upon the conduct as an adverse conduct against the
appellants. While explaining the conduct of the appellants at the time of and
after the occurrence, he submitted that since all neighbors had become hostile,
out of fear the appellants did not act either to put off the fire or remove the
deceased to the hospital.
In
reply, learned counsel for the State argued that the findings of the Trial
Court were not only conjectural but also perverse and the evidence of the
witnesses was disbelieved on mere surmises. It was submitted that the Trial
Court did not property discuss the two dying declarations mad by the deceased
and since the dying declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, those
by themselves could form the basis of conviction of the appellants. It was then
submitted that the High Court after a careful appraisal of the evidence had
rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court which suffered from
illegality as well as manifest error and perversity.
Learned
counsel submitted that the prosecution had established the case against the
appellants beyond every reasonable doubt and their appeals deserve to be
dismissed.
Admittedly,
there is no eye-witness in the case. The case is sought to be established by
the prosecution from circumstantial evidence. In a case based on
circumstantial, evidence, the settled law is that the circumstance from which
the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved an these circumstances
must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover,
all the established circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap
in the chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only wit
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent wit
his innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the
evidence and deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter fin whether
the chain of the established circumstances is complete or no before passing an
order of conviction. It is in the light of the above principles that we shall
deal with various circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
(1)Motive:
In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive as sums great significance
as its existence is an enlightening factor in process of presumptive reasoning.
The
motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry.
680 On
18.5.1979, marriage between the appellant and the deceased was solemnised. The
deceased aged about 18 years was prosecuting her Intermediate course of study
at that time. She was the eldest of the five children of one Vempati Venkataramana,
who at the relevant time was working as an Assistant Engineer with the Railways
at Gorakhpur. At the time of the marriage, the
parents of the deceased had agreed to give Rs. 50,000 in cash, 50 sovereigns of
gold and two acres of land as dowry. The cash was paid at the time of the
marriage itself alongwith 15 sovereigns of gold. The parents of the deceased
had promised to give the remaining 35 gold sovereigns and get the land also
registered subsequently, though the possession of the land measuring about 3.70
acres was given to the appellant No. 1. The mother-in-law of the deceased and
her husband had been pressurising the deceased all along to bring the remaining
sovereigns and also to get the land registered in the name of the first
appellant. She conveyed it to her mother PW7.
While
the parents of the deceased agreed to get the land registered in the name of
the deceased, the first appellant and his parents were insisting that the land
should be got registered in his name and not in the name of the deceased.
Since
that desire was not fulfilled, the deceased was being continuously harassed and
ill-treated. A strick vigil was kept on her at the house of her in-laws and she
was not even allowed to meet anybody nor were the neighbors permitted to come
and meet or talk to her. She was being prevented from writing letters to her
family also, but stealthy, she wrote letters Exs.Pl-3 and got them posted
through a neighbor.
The
contents of those letters are rather revealing and expose the extent of the
harassment to which the deceased was being subjected to by her mother-in-law
and her husband.
After
seeing the contents of the letters and with a view to find out the cause of her
distress, PW1, her brother went to Dharmavaram on August 22, 1981, to the house of the deceased. The deceased, however, was
so terrorised that she could not speak to him freely. She was surrounded by her
husband and her mother-in-law, who did not talk to PWl at all to show their
indifference. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and particularly
that of the mother of the deceased PW7, the immediate provocation was the
insistence of the appellants that the land be got registered in the name of the
husband and the reluctance' of the parents of the deceased to do so and instead
their desire to get it registered in the name of the deceased. The oral
evidence led by the prosecution in this behalf is wholly consistent. In her
letter Ex.P2, the 681 deceased had clearly mentioned that she was getting her
letters posted through PW4. She requested her sisters to write letters to her
in Hindi so that her in-laws, who did not know Hindi, could not know what was
being written. In one of her letters, a part of which was addressed to her
sister, she wrote:
".......I
am not going to anybody's house.
One
day I went to the house of sister-in-law Radha to deliver the letter secretly.
Their mood was changed on account of going to their house. That is why I
stopped going." Do not mention even a single word in your letter that I
have been writing to you. Ask mother not to worry. On hearing about your
results write a letter without fail. If I get an opportunity I will definitely
write a letter..." In her letter Ex.P1 to her father, she wrote:
Father
I am feeling much bore here because no one come to our house nor I am allowed
to go their house Please always write letters. So that I may be satisfied in
seeing your letters. If I may not give reply to your letter then you please
don't mind it. You know here's conditions. Rest is O.K. Father you also take
care of your health." In the same letter while addressing her sisters, she
wrote:
The
lock is opened. I am writing this letter secretly. In reply do not write that
you have received the letter. If you write like that these people will become more
angry She also wrote to her sister:
not at
house and there is no watch over me. I am getting the letters posted through
sister- in-law Radha secretly. You write letters mostly in Hindi only so that
even if they chanced to fall in the hands of any one, they cannot understand The
tenor of her letters disclose the distressing state of affairs at the house 682
of her-in-laws. These letters coupled with the evidence of her mother go to
show how the deceased was being tormented and harassed. It is indeed a shame
and pity that within just two years of her marriage, her dream of a happy
married life was shattered and she found herself almost as a prisoner and 'a
frightened chicken' who had to write letters to her parents and sisters
'secretly' for the fear that if her in- laws came to know they would
"become more angry'.
She
had to request her sisters to reply to her letters in Hindi so that "even
if they chanced to fall in the hands of anyone, they cannot understand".
One can only imagine the plight of this young bride and the sadistic behavior
born out of greed for dowry of her husband and mother-in-law.
Not
having been able to get the land registered in the name of the first appellant
appears to have frustrated them to the extent of murdering the young wife.
The
evidence led by the prosecution to establish the existence of motive is wholly
reliable and is also consistent. The prosecution has successfully established
that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to commit the crime
because of her parents not agreeing to get the land registered in the name of
the first appellant and their insistence to have the land registered in the
name of their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been conclusively
established by the prosecution and we have no hesitation to hold that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing the existence of the motive for both
the appellants to commit the crime conclusively and positively and we agree
with the finding of the High Court in that behalf.
2.Dying
Declarations: The next piece of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the
prosecution are two dying declarations made by the deceased. According to the
prosecution case, the deceased made the first dying declara- tion before PW2
when she after hearing her cries came to the house and found both the
appellants and the father of appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen and the
deceased lying on the floor engulfed in flames. According to PW2, the deceased
told her that her mother- in-law had poured kerosene on her and her husband had
set her on fire. This statement was also heard by PW3 & PW5. The second
dying declaration was made by the deceased to her brother PW1, after he was
called by her to the kitchen. The deceased, according to the prosecution case,
on meeting her brother, took the palm of PWl into her own palms and inter-alia
told to him that "her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and her husband
set fire to her". The statement made by the deceased to 683 PW1 was in
Hindi. Both the statements, as noticed above, relate to the circumstances
leading to the cause of her death, as according to the medical evidence, the
deceased died of 90% burn injuries. Both the dying declarations are oral. They
have been made to friends and to the brother of the deceased respectively. In
view of the close relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral dying
declarations were made, it becomes necessary for us to carefully scrutinize and
appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to the dying declaration.
We
have already adverted to the evidence of these witnesses (PW1, PW2, PW3) while
narrating the prosecution case.
Indeed,
PWl is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but
mere relationship cannot be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is
otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of
events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death would have conveyed to
her near and dear ones the circumstances leading to her receiving the burn
injuries. PW1 has given a very consistent statement and has reproduced the
words of the deceased clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been brought out in
the cross examination to discredit his testimony at all. He had at the earliest
point of time disclosed as to what the deceased had told to him. The
discrepancy pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants as to whether the
dying declaration was made to him by his sister when she was lying on the cot
in the verandah, as stated in FIR Ex.P4, or while she was lying on the floor of
the kitchen, is of an insignificant nature and could be either out of confusion
or the gap of time between the making of the two statements. Moreover, PW1 was
not at all cross-examined on the alleged discrepancy when he gave evidence in
Court. No explanation whatsoever was sought from him about the so called
discrepancy. PW1, the brother of the deceased appears to us to be a truthful
witness and his testimony has impressed us. He did not implicate the father of
the appellant and gave evidence only about what he was actually told by his
sister. From our appreciation of the evidence of PW1, we agree with the view
expressed by the High Court that "considering the case from all
perspectives we have no hesitation to hold that P.W.1 is a witness of truth
worthy of acceptance and so he is wholly a reliable witness. Ex.P4 is a
voluntary statement given by P.W.1 and it lends corroboration to the evidence
of P.W.1."
Coming
now to the evidence of PWs2 and 3. The substratum of their evidence with regard
to the dying declaration is that while that they were 684 in the kitchen of
their own house, taking tea, they heard the cry of a lady and rushed to the
house of the deceased, being her close neighbors. They saw the deceased
engulfed in flames sprawled on the floor of the kitchen. They also saw both the
appellants as well as the father of appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen
to the verandah. The distance between the house of PWs2 and 3 from the house of
appellant is only 2 yards. After PW2 took a bontha from the father-in-law of
the deceased, to the annoyance of appellant No. 2, with a view to extinguish
the fire, the deceased, on enquiry by the witness as to what had happened told
her that 'my mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and my husband set me on fire".
The deceased had not implicated her father-in- law, though he was also present
there' PW3, father of PW2, had assisted PW2 to extinguish the flames and it was
he who broke the string of the petticoat of the deceased and threw it away. In
the process PW3 himself suffered burn injuries.
His
injuries were examined by the Doctor and found to be caused by fire. The Trial
Court doubted the testimony of PW3 on the ground that he had made some
improvement in his evidence in court when he stated that he had heard the
deceased screaming and saying that she was "being killed".
He had
not stated so in his statement recorded during the investigation. This, in our
opinion, is hardly an improvement of any consequence because both in his
statement in court as well as the one recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC he has
deposed that it was on hearing the 'screams' of the deceased that he and his
daughter rushed to the house of the decased. In any event the so called
improvement was not sufficient to discard his testimony. Despite searching
cross-examination of both these witnesses, nothing has been brought out in
their cross-examination to discredit them or doubt their veracity at all. After
carefully analysing their evidence, we find PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy of
credence and trustworthy.
From
the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, both the dying declarations are proved to have
been made by the deceased.
They
are the statements made by the deceased and relate to the circumstances leading
to her death. Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other and
appear to have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the natural course
of events. They have a ring of truth about them.
Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay
evidence is not admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by
cross-examination, it is not credit-worthy. Under Section 32, when 685 a
statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the
circumstances which result in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
person's death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made
by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in
evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration,
falls in that category provided it has been made by the deceased while in a fit
mental condition.
A
dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special
sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most unlikely to make any untrue
statement. The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the
truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or
circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration, therefore, enjoys
almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the
mouth of the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the
evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the test of careful
scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very important and a reliable piece of
evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and
free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself, can be
sufficient for recording conviction even without looking for any corroboration.
If there are more than one dying declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise
all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of
being trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the different dying
declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before
accepting and relying upon the same. Having read the evidence of PWs 1-3 with
great care and attention, we are of the view that their testimony is based on
intrinsic truth.
Both
the dying declarations are consistent with each other in all material facts and
particulars. That the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the
dying declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been doubted by the defence
in the course of cross-examination of the witnesses nor even in the course of
arguments both in the High Court and before us. Both the dying declarations
have passed the test of creditworthiness and they suffer from no infirmity
whatsoever. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has
successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstantial evidence in the
case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying declarations implicating
both the appellants and disclosing the manner in which she had been put on fire
shortly before her death. This circumstance, therefore, has been established by
the prosecution beyond every reasonable 686 doubt by clear and cogent evidence.
3.Medical
Evidence: The next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the medical
evidence which has been provided by the testimony of Dr. Parameswaradas PW9. He
deposed that the deceased had died of 90% burns and that kerosene smell was
emitting from the deadbody. According to the report of the chemical examiner,
no poison was found in the viscera. The chemical examiner's report, coupled
with the other evidence on record belies the suggestion made by the defence
during the cross-examination of some witnesses that with a view to commit
suicide, the deceased had drunk dettol and when she could not bear the pain on
account of consumption of dettol, she herself poured kerosene oil on herself
and set herself on fire. Rightly, this defence case was not pursued before us
with any amount of seriousness by the learned counsel for the appellants.. The
medical evidence, therefore fully corroborates the prosecution case and lends
support to the dying declaration and more particularly the manner in which the
deceased had been set on fire.
4.
Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the evidence:
The
conduct of the appellants, son and mother, both at the time when the deceased
lay burning on the floor of the kitchen and afterwards till she succumbed to
the burn injuries is the next circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to
connect the appellants with the crime.
From
the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 4, who are the immediate neighbors of the
appellant and the deceased, they had heard the cry of the deceased and rushed
to her house. PWs 2 and 3 found the deceased lying on the floor of the kitchen
engulfed in flames while both the appellants and father-in- law of the deceased
were coming out of the kitchen in the verandah. None of the two appellants or
the father-in-law made any attempt whatsoever to extinguish the fire and save
the deceased. The raised no alarm. They stood there as if waiting for her
death, rather than make any effort to save her. Their conduct, thus, runs
consistent with the hypothesis of their guilt and betrays that of an innocent
persons. In their statements under Section 313 of Cr. PC they did not deny
their presence in the house at the time of the occurrence, but denied their
involvement in the crime.
The
normal human conduct of any person finding someone engulfed in flames would be
to make all efforts to put off the flames and save the life of the person.
Though, the appellants were the closest relations 687 of the deceased, they did
not do anything of the kind. Let alone making any effort to extinguish the
fire, according to PW2 when the father-in-law of the deceased, at her request,
was giving her the bontha to extinguish the flames, appellant no. 2, the
mother-in-law of the deceased, objected to the same. This conduct speaks
volumes about the extent of hatred which the mother-in-law exhibited towards
her daughter-in-law. They rendered no first-aid to the deceased. Their conduct
at the time of the occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their guilt
and is inconsistent with their ingnocence the appellants did not even accompany
the deceased to the hospital in the matador van. Had the husband not been a
party to the crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person
to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave no stone
unturned to save her life. An innocent mother-in- law would have also done the
same, even if she had no love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law.
Neither the husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to
remove the deceased to the hospital, let alone accompany her to the hospital.
This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with
the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the
mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had lit fire and put
her on flames. Mr. Reddy, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants submitted that since the neighbors and other relations of the
deceased had almost taken over the house and the person of the daughter-
in-law, the appellants were afraid of being beaten and as such they rendered no
aid to the deceased needs a notice only to be rejected. No suggestion
whatsoever on these lines was made to any of the witnesses and in any event
such an explanation betrays common sense. Since, the deceased had admittedly
suffered burn injuries in the kitchen of her house, there was an obligation on
the part of the appellants and the father-in-law of the deceased, who have
admitted their presence in the house at the time of occurrence, to explain the
circumstances leading to the deceased dying of 90% burn injuries. None has been
offered. The theory of suicide was put up only as an argument of despair. While
discussing the motive and the dying declarations, we have come to the
conclusion that the deceased died as a result of the designed move on the part
of both the appellants to put an end to her life and she did not commit suicide
as was sought to be suggested during cross-examination by the defence to some
witnesses. The theory of suicide has no legs to stand upon. The conduct of the
appellants who did not try to extinguish the fire or 688 render any first-aid
to her, also totally betrays the theory of suicide and we agree with the High
Court that the theory as set up by the appellants is highly unbelievable or
acceptable. The prosecution has, thus, successfully established that the
conduct of both the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and
immediately thereafter is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the appellants and inconsistent with their innoncence.
5)
Absconding. Prosecution has also relied upon the circumstances of the
absconding of the appellants to prove its case.
A
closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time of the
occurrence and immediately thereafter is also the circumstance relating to
their absconding. Md. Badruddin PW15, the investigating officer, deposed that
he had taken up the investigation of the case and having examined PWsl-4 had
caused search to be made for the accused but they were not found in the village
and despite search, they could not be traced. Appellant No. 1 surrendered
before the court on 10.11.1981 while appellant No. 2 surrundered in the court
on 7.12.1981. No explanation, worth the name, much less a satisfactory
explanation has been furnished by the appellants about their absence from the
village till they surrendered in the court in the face of such a gruesome
'tragedy'. Indeed, absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance
consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not
unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely
involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with the
other circumstances which we have discussed above, the absconding of the
appellants assumes importance and significance. The prosecution has
successfully established this circumstance also to connect the appellants with
the crime- In view of the above discussion and our appraisal and analysis
of-the evidence on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the. prosecution
has successfully established all the circumstances appearing in the, evidence
against the appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the chain of
the established circumstances is complete and has no gaps whatsoever and the
same conclusively establishes that the appellants and appellants alone
committed the crime of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner
suggested by the prosecution. All the established circumstances are consistent
only with the hypothesis that it was the appellants alone 689 who committed. the
crime And the circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than
their guilt. It is most unfortunate that the husband of the deceased not only
failed to perform his duties and obligations as husband to protect and take
care of his wife as per the marriage vows and instead joined his mother in the
most degrading and cold blooded murder of the young innocent bride.
Of
late there has been an alarming increase in cases relating to harassment,
torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides. This
growing cult of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on
sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens, continues
unabated. There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of tolerance
and the spirit of "live and let live'. Lack of education and economic
dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime.
It is
more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported cases it is the woman who
plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case,
with the husband either acting as a mute spectator or even an active
participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. In
many cases, it has been noticed that the husband, even after marriage,
continues to be 'Mamma's baby and the umbilical cord appears not to have been
cut even at that stage. We are here tempted to recall the observations of R.N. Mishra,
J. (as His Lordship then was) in State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman &
Ors. Cr. Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, while dealing with a
bride burning case. It was observed:
"Marriage,
according to the community to which parties belong, is sacramental and is
believed to have been ordained in heaven. The religious rites performed at the
marriage altar clearly indicate that the man accepts the woman as his
better-half by assuring her protection as guardian, ensuring food and
necessaries of life as the provider, guaranteeing companionship as the mate and
by resolving that the pleasures and sorrows in the pursuit of life shall be
shared with her and Dharma shall be observed. If this be the concept marriage,
there would be no scope to look for worldly considerations, particularly dowry.
When a girl is transplanted from her natural setting into 690 an alien family,
the care expected is bound to be more than in the case of a plant. Plant has
fife but the girl has a more developed one. Human emotions are unknown to the
plant life. In the growing years in the natural setting the girl- now a
bride-has formed her own habits, gathered her own impressions, developed her
own aptitudes and got used to a way of life. In the new setting some of these
have to be accepted and some she has to surrender. This process of adaptation
is not and cannot be one-sided. Give and take, live and let live, are the ways
of life and when the bride is received in the new family she must have a
feeling of welcome and by the fond bonds of love and affection, grace and
generosity, attachment and consideration that she may receive in the family of
the husband, she will get into a new mould; the mould which would last for her
life. She has to get used to a new set of relationships one type with the
husband, another with the parents-in-law, a different one with the other
superiors and yet a different one with the younger ones in the family. For this
she would require loving guidance. The elders in the family, including the
mother-in-law, are expected to show her the way. The husband has to stand as a
mountain of support ready to protect her and espouse her cause where she is on
the right and equally ready to cover her either by pulling her up or protecting
her willingly taking the responsibility on to himself when she is At fault. The
process has to be a natural one and there has to be exhibition of cooperation
and willingness from every side.
Otherwise
how would the transplant succeed?" Awakening of the collective
consciousness is the need of the day. Change of heart and, attittide is what is
needed. If man were to regain his harmony with others and replace hatred,
greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love, trust and understanding and if
woman were to receive education and become economically independent, the
possibility of this pernicious social evit dying a natural death may not remain
a dream only. The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has
amended the laws and provided for stringent punishments in such cases and even
permitted the raising of presumptions against an accused in cases of unnatural
deaths of 691 the brides within the first seven years of their marriage., The
Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been amended from time to
time, but this piece of soicial legislation, keeping in view the growing menance
of the social evil also does not appear to have served much purpose as dowry
seekers are hardly brought to book and convictions recorded are rather few.
Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social movement of educating
women of their rights, to conquer the menance, is what is needed more
particularly in rural areas where women are still largely uneducated and less
aware of their rights and fall an easy prey to their exploitation. The role of
courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and-it is expected
that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not
allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or
insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive
encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the
crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases
involving crime against women. The verdict of acquittal made by the Trial Court
in this cast is an apt illustration of the lack of sensitivity on the part of
the Trial Court. It recorded the verdict of acquittal on mere surmises and
conjectures and disregarded the evidence of the witnesses for wholly
insufficient and insignificant reasons. It ignored the vital factors of the
case without even properly discussing the same.
The
High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in convicting the appellants for
the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 readwith Section 34 IPC and
sentencing each one of them to suffer imprisonment for life.
We
uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants for the offence under
Section 302/34 IPC and dismiss their appeal. The appellants were directed to be
released on bail by this Court on 30.3.1989. Their bail bonds are cancelled and
they are directed to be taken in to custody to suffer the remaining period of
their sentence.
V.P.R.
Appeal dismissed.
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