Indian
Oil Corporation Vs. Municipal Corporation, Jullundhar & Ors [1992] INSC 209
(20 October 1992)
[J.S.
VERMA AND DR. A.S. ANAND, JJ.]
ACT:
Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976:
S.113-Levy
of octroi-Indian Oil Corporation-Petroleum Products-Transportation to depot
within municipal limits for export therefrom to dealers outside municipal
limits at risk of IOC-Held transaction of re-export-Octroi duty-not chargeable
on such transaction.
Constitution
of India, 1950:
Article
246, Seventh Schedule, List Ii, Entry 52-Tax on entry of goods into local area
for consumption use or sale therein-State legislature-Power to legislate-held
Municipal Corporation cannot have authority more extensive than that of State
legislature.
Words
and Phrases:
"Imported
into the city"-s.113 of Punjab Municipal Corporation Act-Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
The
appellant, Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), had a depot, comprising a pipeline
terminal and LPG bottling plant, within the limits of Municipal Corporation, Jullundhar.
The IOC transported various petroleum products to the depot through underground
pipelines.
The
respondent Municipal Corporation raised a demand on the IOC for octroi. The IOC
deposited the octroi duty but filed appeals before the appellate authority
challenging the demand notice so far as it related to the petroleum products
imported to the depot for export by the IOC therefrom to its dealers for the
sale, use and consumption by persons other than IOC, outside the octroi limits.
The appeals were dismissed.
In the
writ petition before the High Court the IOC, besides impugning the judgment of
the appellate authority, challenged the validity of s. 113 of the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 authorising levy of octroi on articles and
animals imported within the municipal limits of the respondent Corporation
without any reference to the use, consumption or sale of the said goods, as
being beyond the power of the state Legislature in view of entry 52 of List II
of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India. It was contended that the
Municipal Corporation could not impose and demand octroi duty on the petroleum
products imported by the IOC to its depot for being exported at the risk of the
IOC to its dealers at their sale points situated outside the area of the Municipal
Corporation in as much as the petroleum products in such transactions only
entered the area of the Municipal Corporation for the purpose of re-export to
the place of business of its dealers and the property in such petroleum
products passes to the dealers only at their premises outside the Municipal
limits and not at the depot of the IOC and as such it could it could not be
said that any transaction takes place within the municipal limits of the
respondents for use, consumption or sale of the imported petroleum products and
thus attract any octroi duty.
The
respondent contended that the transactions by the IOC were sale simplicitor at
the depot within the municipal limits of the Corporation and the export of the
goods to the premises of the dealers outside the octroi limits was of no
consequence since the IOC received payment in advance as the sale proceeds from
its various dealers and collected the local taxes etc. like the sale tax and
MST from the dealers at its depot; that the IOC could not either in law or in
equity retain the octroi duty so collected.
The
High Court held S. 113 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 as intra vires,
and upheld the levy and demands of octroi duty by the Municipal Corporation. It
dismissed the writ petition holding that the property in the goods passed on to
that dealers as and when the goods were laden in the turck/lorries and that the
sale was complete at the depot of the IOC. The IOC filed the appeal by special
leave.
Allowing
the appeal, this Court
HELD:
1.1 Entry of goods within the local area for consumption use or sale therein is
made taxable by the State Legislature on the authority of Entry 52 of List II
of Schedule VII to the Constitution. The municipality deriving its power to tax
from the state Legislature cannot have any authority more extensive than that
of the state Legislature.
Since
the State Legislature under a legislation enacted in exercise of the powers
conferred by Entry 52 of list II, is competent to levy a taxes only on the
entry of goods for " consumption, use or sale" into a local area, the
municipality cannot nuder such a legislation, have the power to levy tax in
respect of goods brought into the local area for purposed other than
consumption use or sale. Section 113 of the Act has therefore reasonably to be
read subject to the same limitation as are contained in Entry 52 List II of
Schedule VII.[69-E-G]
1.2
The expression "imported into the city" in section 113, has to be
interpreted as meaning "imported into the municipal limits for purposes of
consumption, use or sale" only. Thus construed in the limited sense,
section 113 of the Municipal Act is not ultra vires Entry 52 of List II of
Schedule VII Interpreting the expression as meaning "imported into the
city for any purpose and without any limitation, would amount to attributing to
the legislature an intention to give a go-by to the restrictions contained in
Entry 52 of List II. That is not permissible. [69-G-H; A- B]
1.3
The High court was right in holding that the provisions of section 113 of the
Municipal Act are not beyond the competence of the state Legislature and the
same are to be read along with Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII of the
constitution. [70-D-E] 2.1. The transaction whereunder the petroleum products
trans-ported to the depot of the IOC are meant for export from its depot inside
the octroi limits to outside the municipal limits to its dealers for sale use
and consumption by persons other than the IOC outside the octroi limits is a
transaction of re-export and the appropriation of the goods does not take place
at the depot but at the outlets of the dealers or the agents outside the
municipal limits. The octroi duty is, therefore, not chargeable on such a
transaction. The levy and collection of the octroi duty on such goods by the
Municipal Corporation is, therefore, not justified. [76-G-H;77-A] Burmah-shell
oil storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. Belgaum v. Belgaum Borough
Municipality Belgaum, Air 1963 SC 906 and Municipal council, Jodhpur v. M/s Parekh
Automobiles Ltd. and ors. [1990]1 SCC 367, relied on.
2.2.
The High court erred in not considering various clauses of the agreement or the
affidavits filed by the IOC before the appellate authority or the categorical
statement in the writ petition and rejoinder affidavit , showing that the risk
till delivery of products to the dealers continues to remain with the IOC and
the goods are re-exported at the risk of the IOC and not at the risk of the
dealers; and that the property in the goods passed on to the dealers only on
delivery of the products at their place of business and at no point of time
prior thereto. This evidence had a material bearing on the case and deserved
proper consideration and in the absence of any rebuttal should have been
considered i n its correct perspective. The Municipal Corporation took no steps
to produce any material to show that the delivery of the goods outside the
municipal limits was not at the risk and responsibility of the IOC.[72-C-D,
G;74-G-H; 75-A] 3.1. Since the IOC has collected the octroi duty from its
dealers and agents who have in turn passed on the burden to the consumer, there
is no equity in favour of the IOC to claim a refund of the same. [77-B-C]
3.2
The appellant shall not be entitled to any refund of the octroi duty already
deposited by it with the Municipal Corporation. The IOC shall not be liable to
pay the octroi duty , in respect of such transaction in future only on the
condition that it does not collect any octroi duty from its dealers or agents
in respect of the re- exported goods at the time of their appropriation outside
the municipal limits. Should the IOC collect any such octroi duty from its
dealers or agents, it shall remain liable to deposit the same with the
Municipal Corporation and shall not retain any such octroi duty for its own
benefit. [77-C- E]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1990.
Form
the judgment and order dated 2.6.89 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 3361 of 1984.
A.N Haksar,
Ms. Ritu Bhalla and S.S Shroff for the Appellant.
G.L Sanghi,
V.C. Mahajan, S.K Metha, Aman Vachhar, Tajinder Singh Dobia and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal
(N.P) for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. A.S. ANAND, J. The controversy in
this appeal, by special leave, directed against the judgment of the Division
bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, dated 2nd
of June 1989 in Writ petition No. 3361 of 1984, is rather limited.
The
appellant (hereinafter IOC) set up a pipe-line terminal and LPG bottling plant
at Suchi Pind in District Jullundhar. In 1983, the limits of the respondent,
Municipal Corporation Jullundhar, (hereinafter the Municipal Corporation) were
extended and depot of the appellant came to be included within the municipal
limits. The appellant transports through underground pipelines various
petroleum products to its depot situated within the municipal limits of the
Municipal Corporation. These petroleum products are meant:
(i)
either for use or consumption by the IOC within the limits of the Municipal
Corporation; or (ii) for sale by IOC though its dealers or by itself for
consumption within the octroi limits, by persons other than the IOC; or (iii)
for sale by the IOC through its dealers or by itself inside the octroi limits
and the vendee, after completion of sale, take those production outside the octroi
limits to outside the octroi limits for sale, use or consumption; and (iv) for
export by the IOC from its depot inside the octroi limits to outside the
municipal limits, to its dealers for sale, use and consumption by persons other
than the IOC, out side the octroi limits.
The
Municipal Corporation raised a demand on the IOC for octroi for the period September 7,1983 to May, 1984. The demand was to the
tune of Rs. 40,26,230.17. The IOC challenged the demand notice by filing a writ
petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Since the IOC had approached
the High Court with first exhausting the statutory remedies under the Punjab
Municipal Act, The High court allowed the appellant to file a statutory appeal
under the Act against the demand notice before the Appellate Authority,
Commissioner of Jullundhar Division and kept the writ petition pending. The
High Court, however, directed the IOC to deposit arrears of octroi duty in
order to avail of the remedy of statutory appeals and commanded the Appellate
Authority to hear the appeals in accordance with law after condoning the delay
in the filing of the appeals.
Accordingly,
after the deposit of the arrears of octroi duty, the appeals were filed before
the Appellate Authority, Commissioner Jullundhar Division, Jullundhar. The
appeals, after a contest on merits, were dismissed by the Appellate Authority.
The IOC thereafter amended the writ petition and also challenged the order of
the Appellate Authority before the High Court.
In the
writ petition, the IOC inter alia challenged the validity of section 113 of the
Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 on the ground that it had authorised the
levy of octroi on articles and animals imported within the municipal limits of
the corporation without any reference to the use consumption or sale of the
said goods as being beyond the power of the state Legislature. Reliance was
placed on Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution in that behalf.
The IOC did not dispute its liability to pay octroi duty in relation to the
first three categories noticed above but it only disputed the authority of the
Municipal Corporation to impose and demand octroi duty in relation to the first
three categories noticed above but it only disputed the authority of the
Municipal Corporation to impose and demand octroi duty on the petroleum
products imported by the IOC within the limits of the Corporation which are
only exported to its dealers at their sale point s situated outside the area of
the Municipal Corporation. The IOC with in the limits of the corporation which
are on exported to its dealers at their sale points situated outside the area
of the Municipal Corporation. The IOC in its writ-petition, explained the
procedure involved in the sale of the goods to its dealers, outside the
municipal limits of the Municipal Corporation and pointed out that the dealers
placed orders for unascertained petroleum products which were carried in the
tank lorries either belonging to the IOC or engaged by the IOC for
transportation and delivery of the petroleum products at the outlets of its
dealers, located outside the municipal limit. The precise case of the
appellant-IOC was that the property in such of the petroleum products passes to
the dealers only at their premises and not at the depot of the IOC and, as such
it could not be said that any transaction takes place within the municipal
limits of the Municipal corporation for the use, consumption or sale of the
imported petroleum products.
It was
emphasised that the petroleum products in such transactions only entered the
area of the Municipal Corporation for the purpose of being re-exported to the
place of business of its dealers/ agents and it was asserted that the transaction
could not attract imposition of any octroi duty for no `sale, use or
consumption' took place within the octroi limits.
The
case of the Municipal Corporation on the other hands as pleaded and argued
before the High Court was that though no octroi duty is leviable or lived in
respect of articles brought by the IOC within the municipal limits of the
Municipal corporation for purposes other than consumption use or sale therein,
transactions in the instant case by the IOC were sale, simplistor at their depot
within the municipal limited of the Corporation and the export of the goods to
the premises of the dealers outside the octroi limits was of no consequence.
Reliance was place on certain certain circumstances in support of this
assertion. It was pointed out by the Municipal Corporation that the IOC
receives payment in advance either in cash or through a demand-draft, as the
sale proceeds, from its various dealers at its depot situated within the
municipal limits of the Corporation; that the IOC also collects the local taxes
etc.
like
the Sales Tax and MST from the dealers at their depots;
that
the IOC also collects delivery charges (based on kilometres covered) from its
dealers at its dealers at its depot for transportation of the products and from
these circumstances it was sought to be argued that the 'sale' to the dealers
was complete within the municipal limits of the Corporation and the export of
goods after the sale was complete could not effect the levy and collection of octroi
duty and it was argued that the IOC could not either in law or in equity retain
the octroi duty so collected.
The
High court noticed that the parties were at variance as to whether the property
in the goods is conditionally appropriated to the contract and passed on to the
buyer at the depot of IOC at Jullundhar or at the dealers outlets and after
considering the submissions made and the pleadings of the parties held that the
property in the goods passed on to the dealers as and when the goods were laden
in the tank lorries and that the sale was complete at the depot of the IOC and
that it did not take place at the respective places of business of the dealers
and as such octroi duty was rightly levied and demanded.
The
High Court after extracting the provisions of section 113 of the Municpal Act
and Entry 52 of List II of the VII schedule, which read thus:
"113.
Levy of octroi.- Except as hereinafter provided, the Corporation shall levy octroi
on articles and animals imported into the city, at such rates as may be
specified by the Government".
Entry
52 of List II provides:
"Taxes
on the entry of goods into the local area for consumption, use or sale
therein." opined that the words and phrases employed in section 113 of the
Municipal Act were of wide content and general connotation and since the power
of the state Legislature are circumscribed by List II of schedule VII the state
Ligislature could not empower the municipal committees to levy tax only on the
entry of goods within the local area when those goods were not meant for
consumption, use or sale within that area. It rightly held that the authority
of the state Legislature in those matters is subject to the restrictions
imposed by Entry 52 and since source of power of section 113 of the Municipal
Act is traceable to Entry 52, the wide language employed in section 113 of the
Municipal Act had to be read down to mean that the Municipal corporation could
levy octroi on articles and animals imported into a local area for consumption,
use or sale therein and construing the provisions of section 113 in that manner
held the same to be intra-vires.
We are
in agreement with the High Court that the provisions of section 113 of the
Municipal Act are not beyond the competence of the state Legislature and the
same are to be read alongwith Entry 52 of List II of schedule VII of the
Constitution.
Entry
of goods within the local for area for consumption, use or sale therein is made
taxable by the state Legislature on the authority of Entry 52 of List
legislature and it obviously cannot have any authority more extensive than the
authority of the state Legislature. since the state Legislature in view of
Entry of goods for" consumption use or sale' into a local area, the
municipality cannot under a legislation, enacted in exercise of the powers
conferred by Entry 52 of List II, have the power to levy tax in respect of good
brought into the local area for purposes other than consumption, use or sale. section
113 of the Act has, therefore, reasonably to be read subject to the same
limitation as are contained in Entry 52 of to be read subject to the same
limitation as are contained in Entry 52 of List II of schedule VII. The
expression " imported into the city" used in section 113 of the Act,
as meaning "imported into the city for any purpose and without any
limitation", would amount to attributing to the legislature an intention
to give a go-by to the restrictions contained in Entry 52 of List II. That is
not permissible. The expression " imported into the city" in section
113, therefore, has to be interpreted as meaning " imported into the
municipal limits for purpose of consumption, use or sale" only. thus,
construed in the limited sense, section 113 of the Municipal Act is not ultra vires
Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII. In fairness to the learned counsel for the
appellant, it must be recorded, that the finding the High court regarding vires
of section 113 of the Municipal Act was not seriously questioned before us.
There
is no dispute before us on the legal issue, namely, that no octroi is leviable
on the goods re-exported by the IOC from its depot inside the octroi limits to
outside such limits to its dealers where those goods are meant 'for use,
consumption or sale' by the consumers outside the octroi limits.
The
only controversy before us is whether the transaction within the municipal
limits reflected in category (4) above, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, can be treated to be sale to the dealers at the depot or is only in the
nature of re-export. Learned counsel for the respondent-Municipal Corporation
did not dispute that if the transaction is only in the nature of re-export, it
is not exigible to the levy of the octroi duty but he asserted that the finding
recorded by the High Court on that aspect did not call for any interference and
that the nature of the transaction could not call for any interference and that
the nature of the transaction could not be said to be 're- export' With a view
to resolve the controversy, we shall have to examine the agreement executed
between the IOC and its dealers and other relevant material produced before the
authorities as also the pleadings of the parties. We must, however, hasten to
add that the pleadings, both before the High Court as also before the appellate
authority, were neither clear non specific on this issue and left much to be
desire. But mere vagueness of the pleadings or their confused state cannot
relieve us of our obligation to sift the material and ascertain the true nature
of the transaction.
The
High Court referred to the copy of the Memorandum of Agreement between the IOC
and its dealers, which had been filed by the Municipal corporation as Annexure
R-7 to the written statement and observed that the agreement did not contain
any clause which could lead to the conclusion that the property in the goods
did not pass to the dealers when the goos contacted to br supplied were
separated from the main bulk and located in the tank lorries. Observed the High
Court that the goods, on their separation from the unascertained bulk, became
ascertained and the property in such ascertained goods passed on to the dealers
as soon as they got ascertained., The High Court also opined that the terms of
the contract did not lend themselves to the construction that the property in
the goods was not transferred to the dealer at the time the goods were loaded
in the tank lorries for transmission to the buyers. It found that the IOC had
not placed on the file any document to show that the IOC had reserved the right
of disposal of the goods even after they had been delivered to the carrier for
the purpose of supply to the buyer which could have altered the nature of the
transaction. Relying upon the bills and cash memos prepared and the payments
received by the IOC within the municipal limits of Jullundhar, the High Court
held that the sale was complete at the depot of IOC and did not take place at
the respective places of business of the dealers outside the municipal limits.
The Court held that the property in the goods passes to the dealers at the depot
of IOC and rejected the case of the IOC to the effect that the property in the
goods passes to the dealers only on their delivery at the place at the time of
delivery only.
The
High court then went on to say that since the goods were not re-export as contended
by the IOC, it was liable to pay the octroi duty on the sale of their products
within the municipal limits of Jullundhar Municipality to their dealers,
irrespective of the fact whether the goods were ultimately sold, used and/or
consumed by persons, other than the IOC and the dealers, outside the municipal
limits.
In our
opinion, the circumstances relied upon by the High Court to negative the case
of the IOC were not sufficient much less clinching to come to the conclusion
that the transaction, as per the fourth category, in the facts and
circumstances of this case, was not 're-export'.
From a
perusal of the order of the appellate authority, we find that some affidavits
had been filed by the IOC of their dealers to establish that the title in the
property of the goods passes on to the dealers only after delivery and till
that time the goods remained in the ownership of IOC.
In
reply, the Municipal Corporation had only submitted before the appellate
authority that the affidavits were 'not correct' and that it had been wrongly
stated in the affidavits that the petroleum products were supplied at the
responsibility of IOC or that any loss or damage in the transportation was to
be made good by the IOC till they reach the dealer. No material was placed by
the Municipal Corporation to controvert the averments made in the affidavits of
the dealers. The appellate authority, however, did not express any opinion on
the correctness or otherwise of those affidavits. it virtually ignored the same
without assigning any reasons. much less satisfactory ones. Even the High Court
did not advert to, much less consider and discuss, the effect of the
affidavits. In the affidavits , it had been clearly stated that the goods were
transported from the depot to the outlets of the dealers at the risk of IOC and
the property in the goods palled on to the dealers only on delivery of the
products at their place of business and at no point of time prior thereto. This
evidence had a material being on the case and deserved proper consideration and
in the absence of any rebuttal should have been considered in its correct
perspective. IN the writ petition, in para(5) also, it had been asserted by IOC
that the goods were sold outside the municipal limits and delivered to the
dealers at the risk and responsibility of the IOC. In para (ii) of the writ
petition also, it was averred as follows:
"
It is, thus, clear that there is neither any consumption nor sale of the said
quantity within the octroi limits of the respondent Corporation, and the
respondent Corporation cannot make a demand for octroi." While reply to
paragraph 5 of the writ petition was simply to the effect that contents were
'not correct' the reply to paragraph (ii) in the counter affidavit also did not
controvert the position and the Municipal Corporation remained content by
stating that "the IOC be directed to place on record documents and bills
through which the sales are conducted'. The Municipal Corporation was aware of
the affidavits which had been filed by the dealers before the appellate
authority yet it took no steps to produce any material to show that the
delivery of the goods outside the municipal limits was not at risk and
responsibility of the IOC. Reference in this connection may also be made to the
replication/rejoinder, filed by IOC to the written statement, in which inter alia
it was stated:
"
It may again be mentioned here that transit loses is the responsibility of the
petitioner Corporation and the dealer measures the quantity received by him at
his destination and claims credit for the short fall. In fact, at the delivery
voucher the shortages is recorded as is clear from Annexure P-7. There are many
other incidents where for shortage credit has been given to the dealer and also
where the supplies have been diverted. It is incorrect to say that the
transportation is done by the dealers and they have their own arrangements for
the said purpose.
The
transportation is done by the Indian oil Corporation and by the transport
contractors of the Indian oil Corporation..........It is absolutely incorrect
to suggest that the supplies are insureds and that insurance premium is paid by
the carriers. The supplies are never insured. Of course, the vehicles are
insured and insurance premium is paid by the owner of the vehicle it is,
therefore, wrong to assert that the sale takes place within the municipal
limits. The Municipal Corporation has no right to levy octroi on the supplies
which are neither consumed nor used or sold within its territorial
limits." Indeed the pleadings, as already observed, are vague and
nonspecific but the High Court did not deal with the pleadings at all and
dismissed the case of the petitioners by simply stating that " we are not
impressed". We cannot concur with the approach. The High Court should have
considered the totality of the material on the record including the pleadings
and other material on the record including the pleadings and other material,
before coming to any final conclusion. The observation that the agreement (Ex.
R-7) did not have any clause from which it could be said that the title in the
goods passed on at the outlet of the dealers or that the IOC was under no
obligation to make good any loss incurred during transportation of the goods
from the depot to the places of business of the dealers, is not justified on a
careful reading of the terms of the agreement. The terms of the agreements
executed between the IOC and its dealers (Ex. R-7) and particularly paras 25,
26 and 34 which read as follows:
"
25. The quantities of petroleum and other allied products stated to be
delivered by the Corporation as measured by the Corporation's measuring devices
of means shall be final and binding upon the parties hereto. A receipt signed
by or on behalf of the Dealer at the time of delivery by the Corporation of
petroleum products will be conclusive evidence that the products mentioned
therein were in (accord) with the specification therefor mentioned hereunder
and that the quantities of such mentioned in the receipt are correct, and the
Dealer shall thereafter be precluded from any claim against the Corporation for
compensation or otherwise on the ground of short (quantification) of such
products.
26.
The Dealer shall be responsible for all loss, contamination, damage or shortage
of or to the products whether partial or entire and no claim will be
entertained by the Corporation therefore under any circumstances except in
cases where the Corporation is satisfied that loss arose from leakage from
underground tank or pipes which the Dealer could not reasonably have discovered
and of which the Dealer gave immediate notice to the corporation on discovery.
34.
All expenses in connection with or incidental to the storage, handling, sale
and distribution of the Corporation's products shall be done by the Dealer. The
Dealer shall be solely responsible for the payment of all local and other taxes
in respect of the sale of the Corporation's products." lend credence to
the case as set up by the IOC and go to show that in respect of the goods which
were re-exported by the IOC to its dealers outside the municipal limits. the
risk, till the delivery of the goods at the premises of the dealers, continued
to remain with the IOC which was also obliged to make good any loss during
transit and therefor the transaction by the IOC with the dealers or agents as
reflected in category four (supra) did not amount to any sale at the depot
within the municipal limits of the Municipal Corporation. The High court did
not consider various clauses of the agreement referred to herein above or the
effect of the affidavits which had been filed by IOB before the Appellate
Commissioner or the categorical statement in the writ petition and rejoinder
affidavit, showing that the risk till delivery of the products to the dealers
continues to remain with the IOC and the goods are re-exported at the risk of
the IOC and not at the risk of the dealers while rejecting the case of the IOC.
In Burmah-shell
oil storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd., Belgaum. v. Belgaum Borough Municipality, Belgaum, AIR 1963 SC 906 a somewhat similar
question arose.
A
Constitution Bench of this Court held that the company which dealt with
petroleum products was liable to pay octroi tax on goods brought into the local
area (a) to be consumed by itself or sold by it to consumers and (b) for sale
to dealers who in their turn sold the goods to consumers within the municipal
limits irrespective of whither such consumers brought him for use in the area
or outside it but that the company was " not liable to octroi in respect
of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re-exported."
Again, in Municipal Council, Jodhpur v. M/s Parekh Automobiles Ltd. and ors.,
[1990]1 SCC 367, the precise question which was involved was as to whether octroi
was leviable on the goods imported within the municipal limits, stored in its
depot there and exported therefore for use or consumption of the ultimated
consumer outside the municipal limits. That case related to the sale of
petroleum products by the IOC from its depot within the municipal limits of Jodhpur, Rajasthan, to its dealers outside
the municipal limits. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case
and various clauses of the agreement (which is identical to the agreement in
the present case) Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as is Lordship then was) dealt with
the case put by the Indian oil Corporation Respondent No. 2 and Noticed:
"
According to respondent 2, it had allotted the retail outlets to various
dealers under dealer's agreement. Under the terms of the said agreement,
respondent 2 was obliged to transport petroleum products out of its depots and
supplied petroleum products to its dealers at the destination in its own truck
tankers or the tankers of its contractors and obtained the signatures of the
dealers of the retail and obtained the signatures of the dealers of the retail
outlet in token of he delivery of the goods and till the supplies were made at
the destination the goods were at the risk of respondent 2.
It was
further alleged by respondent 2 that the pump tank and other outfits which were
fitted at the retail outlets belonged to it and these were its property. It
was, therefore, alleged that the goods supplied at re tail outlets situated
outside the limits of Municipal Council, Jodhpur were sold at the retail
outlets where the deliveries were made and not at Jodhpur although the dealers
were required to deposit the price of the petroleum products in respondent 2's
account in the bank unless they were allowed credit facilities but the sale
took place only whin respondent 2 delivered its products at the dealers retail
outlets outside the municipal limits as per the terms of the dealer's
agreement. The appellant, Municipal Council, had, however, disputed the
aforesaid position. It contended that whenever the sale was made at the Jodhpur depot at Jodhpur, octroi was chargeable irrespective
of the fact where it was consumed or used.." The Court then referred to
the finding of the High court that the Municipal Corporation had no
jurisdiction levy octroi on the goods so exported and accorded its approval of
that finding. It upheld the order of the High court restraining the Municipal
Corporation to levy octroi on goods re-exported by IOC to its dealers or agents
for the use of ultimate user outside the octroi limits of Municipal
Corporation.
Both
the above noted judgments clearly support the case of the appellant.
On a
consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the opinion that both the judgments of this Court, noticed above, have direct
application to the facts and circumstances of this case. On the basis of the
material on record, we are satisfied that the transaction covered by category
(4) above, viz., where the petroleum products transported to the depot of the
IOC are meant for export from its depot inside the octroi limits to outside the
municipal limits to its dealers for sale, use and consumption of re-export and
that the appropriation of the goods does not take place at the depot but at the
outlets of the dealers or the agents outside the municipal limits. The octroi
duty is , therefore, not chargeable on such a transaction. The levy and
collection of the octroi duty on such goods by the Municipal Corporation is,
therefore, not justified. The judgement in writ petition No. 3361 of 1984 is,
therefore, set aside and the appeal accordingly allowed but without any as to
order as to costs.
Before
parting with the appeal, we would however, like to take note of the submission
made on behalf of the Municipal Corporation with regard to the question of
refund of the octroi duty, already deposited by the appellant. The question of
refund, in our opnion, does not arise. The IOC has collected the octroi duty
from its dealers and agents, who have in turn passed on the burden to the
consumer. Thus, having collected the octroi duty, there is no equity in favour
of the IOC to claim a refund of the same. Learned counsel for the appellant
also conceded that the question of refund, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, does not arise and we, therefore, hold that the appellant shall not
be entitled to any refund of the octroi duty, already deposited by the
appellant with the Municipal Corporation. We also clarify that the IOC shall
not be liable to pay the octroi duty, in respect of the transaction covered by
the 4th category, hereafter, only on the condition that the IOC does not
collect any octroi duty from its dealers or agents in respect of the
re-exported goods at the time of their appropriation outside the municipal limits.
Should the IOC collect any such octroi duty from its dealers or agents, it
shall remain liable to deposit the same with the Municipal Corporation and
shall not retain such octroi duty for its own benefit.
R.P. Appeal
allowed.
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