Ramjas
Foundation & Ors Vs. U.O.I. & Ors [1992] INSC 231 (13 November 1992)
[M.H. KANIA
, CJ., N.M. KASLIWAL AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.]
ACT:
Land
Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections
4, 6, 9 and 10-Notification- challenge to-Delay-Not properly explained effect
of.
HEADNOTE:
Notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in respect of
certain lands including the lands belonging to the appellant-foundation
situated at two different places.
The
appellant-Foundation filed objections. Subsequently notifications under
Sections 6 and Notices under Sections 9 and 10 were also issued. The
appellant-Foundation challenged the notifications in respect of the land
situated at one of the two places, by way of a Writ Petition before the High
Court and the same was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to
agitate the matter in a suit.
Thereupon,
the appellant-Foundation filed a suit and the same was dismissed by a Single
Judge of the High Court. The Letters Patent Appeal filed against that decision
is pending.
In
respect of the land situated at the other place, a Writ Petition was filed by
the appellant before the High Court, which came to be dismissed as withdrawn.
Thereafter,
another Writ Petition was filed by the appellant-Foundation before the High
Court challenging the notifications.
The
High Court having dismissed the Writ Petition, the appellant-Foundation
preferred the present appeal.
On
behalf of the appellants, it was contended that they filed their objections
under Section 5A of the Act, but the same were rejected without affording any
opportunity of personal hearing, and the denial of such opportunity invalidated
the notifications; and that the land of the appellants being wakf property it
ought to have been excluded on the basis of the notification under Section 4 of
the Act. Alternatively it was contended that the appellant has been running
several educational institutions on the very land and that if the exemption for
wakf property is not applicable to such educational and charitable institutions
run by Hindus or non-Muslims, then such a notification would be violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
The
Respondents contested the appeal on grounds of delay, laches and acquiescence
in fling the Writ Petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. It was also
stated that the appellants were given opportunity of personal hearing.
Dismissing
the appeal, this Court,
HELD:
1. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of
personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed
under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was totally baseless and
factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. It is well-settled that
a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under
Art.
226 of
the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal
the material facts. [431-F, G] Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., [1977] 1 SCR 71, referred to.
2. The
challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in
the notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands
of wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used
for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be
excluded. At a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the
aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties of
the Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory and violative under
Art. 14 of the Constitution as there was no reasonable ground to discriminate
such properties of Hindus or non-Muslims meant for charitable purposes. Thus
the challenge was in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act
alone and though in the prayer clause relief has been sought to quash the
notification under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act also which were issued in 1972,
no ground whatsoever has been pleaded in the writ petition nor raised in the
present appeal as to how the notifications under Sections 9 and 10 had any
concern for explaining the delay in respect of the Challenge to notification
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, Admittedly the notices under sections 9 and
10 issued appellants in 1972 were in respect of a portion of the land.
The
challenge on the other Land in the writ petition is in respect of notifications
under Sections 4 and 6 covering the entire land. There is no justification at
all in explaining the delay on the ground that no award has been passed nor the
appellants have been dispossessed so far. This cannot be an explanation for not
challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and in the
present case the appellants had themselves sought stay from this Court as early
as 15.11.1978 for not making and declaring the award and not to dispossess the
appellants. Thus there is no justification at all for the delay in not
challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on 13.11.1959 till 1973.
Even
notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1968 and 1969 but not
challenged till 1973. [435-H; 436-A-G] Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor
Delhi & Ors., [2975] 1 SCR 802, relied on.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 31.1.1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ
Petition No. 106 of 1978.
V.M. Tarkunde,
S.B. Wad, Mrs. J.S. Wad and Mrs. Tamali Wad for the Appellants.
K.T.S.
Tulsi, Solicitior General, T.C. Sharma and P. Parmeshwaran for the Respondents.
Kirpal
Singh and M.A. Krishna Moorthy for the Intervener.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J. This appeal by the Ramjas
Foundation, a society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1960 and five others who are the Secretary and trustees of the Ramjas
Foundation is directed against the order of the Delhi High Court dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the civil Writ Petition
No.106 of 1978 in limine.
On
November 13, 1959, the Chief Commissioner Delhi issued a Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act') Land measuring 34070 acres was notified as land likely to be acquired by
the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, the planned
development of Delhi.
The
following land was excluded from the scope of the notification:
(a)
Government land and evacues land;
(b) the
land already notified, either under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for
any Government Scheme;
(c) the
land already notified either under Section 4 o. under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, for House Building Cooperative Societies mentioned in
annexure-lII;
(d) the
land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious
institutions and Wakf property.
The
aforesaid land measuring 34070 acres included land measuring about 872 bighas,
9 biswas situated in Chowkri Mubarikabad and measuring about 730 bighas
situated in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd, belonging to the Ramjas Foundation.
The
present appeal relates to the land situated in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd. The Ramjas
Foundation on December
11, 1959 filed
objections under Section 5A of the Act for the entire land situated in Mubarikabad
as well as Sadhurakhurd. The Lt. Governor of Delhi subsequently issued notifications under Section 6 of the
Act on 15.4.1968, 27.4.1968, 15.5.1968, 19.8.1968, 14.1.1969 and 18.1.1969. The
Lt. Governor also issued notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act on December 27, 1972 for Sadhurakhurd land. As regards
the land in Mubarikabad notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on February 28, 1968. Ramjas Foundation filed a writ
petition in may, 1968 in the Delhi High Court challenging the action of the
Government in acquiring their lands situated in Mubarikabad. In the said writ
petition Sachar, J. (as he then was) who heard the petition was of the view
that the matter ought to be tried in a suit instead of writ proceedings. He,
therefore, by his order dated August 10, 1971
permitted the Ramjas Foundation to withdraw the petition with liberty to
agitate the matter in a suit and as such the writ petition was dismissed as
withdrawn.
The Ramjas
Foundation then filed a suit in the Delhi High Court on November 8, 1971 for quashing the notifications
issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in respect of the land situated in Mubarikabad.
The suit was dismissed by Awadh Behari Rohtagi, J. of the Delhi High Court by order dated 21.3.1977
reported in AIR 1977 Delhi 261. Learned Counsel for the
appellants brought to our notice that Letters Patent Appeal before the Division
Bench of the High Court is pending against the aforesaid Judgment of the
Learned Single Judge.
So far
as the land situated in Sadhurakhurd with which we are concerned in the present
appeal a Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 was filed in the High Court and the
same was dismissed as withdrawn on 30th March, 1977. Thereafter another Writ Petition
No. 106 of 1978 was filed challenging the notifications issued under Sections
4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act and the same was dismissed by the High Court by the
impugned order dated January
31, 1978 in limine as
already mentioned above.
We
have heard Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the appellants
and Mr. Tulsi, Learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the
respondents. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants
had submitted their objections under Section 5A of the Act on 11.12.1959 but
the same were rejected without affording any opportunity of personal hearing.
It was submitted that it was mandatory on the part of the respondents to have
given an opportunity of personal hearing specially when the same was desired
and a denial of such opportunity of personal hearing invalidates the
notifications issued under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act. Reliance in respect of
the above contention is placed on Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. v.
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., [19771 1 SCR 71.
It was
also contended on behalf of the appellants that the notification issued under
Section 4 of the Act itself excludes the land of wakf property. It has thus
been contended that so far as the land in question is concerned the same being
also a wakf property as such ought to have been exempted under the notification
itself. It was submitted that Ramjas Foundation is an educational charitable
society which is running several schools and post graduate college in Delhi and several educational
institutions are being run on the alleged acquired land itself. As an
alternative argument it was submitted that in case this Hon'ble Court takes the view that wakf property
mentioned in the alleged notification does not include the educational and
charitable institutions run by Hindus or non-Muslims then such notification is
void for violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
As
regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory provisions of Section
5A of the Act in. not affording an opportunity of personal hearing while
deciding such objections, we granted an opportunity to the Learned Additional
Solicitor General to place material after examining the original record. We
granted, this opportunity to the respondents on account of the reason that the
writ petition had been dismissed by the High Court in limine without issuing
notice to the respondents and as such the respondents had not been given any
opportunity before the High Court to place any material to refute the
allegations made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional Solicitor
General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an order of the
Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi dated
23.2.1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes of identification
has been marked as Annexure 'X'. A copy of the said Annexure 'X' was also given
to the Learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order
dated 22.3.1968 clearly shows that the Ramjas Foundation Society was
represented through Sh. Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was given a personal
hearing. From a perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure 'X' dated 23.2.1968
it is clear that full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to
the Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas
Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh objections if so desired, but
Sh. Ratan Lal Gupta, Learned Advocate for the Petitioner society declined and
stated that there was nothing more to add in the previous objection petition.
After bringing the said document Annexure 'X' to the notice of the Learned
counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came
forward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising
the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in
respect of the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was totally
baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. lt is well
settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the
Court under Art.
226 of
the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal
the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of
personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was
one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in
the Special Leave Petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such
ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not.
The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from
this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the Special Leave
Petition was filed in 1978 itself.
It may
be further noted that a common objection petition under Section 5A of the Act
in respect of both the lands situated in Mubarikabad as well as in Sadhurakhurd
was filed on 11.12.1959 through Sh. Ratan lal Gupta, Advocate. The said
objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate and
disposed of by one common order Annexure 'X' and we cannot believe an ipse dixit
explanation made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the
appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing being given to Shri
Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. It is also important to note that no such objection
was taken in respect of land in Mubarikabad.
Another
ground on which the present appeal has been contested is the ground of delay, laches
and acquiescence in filing the writ petition challenging the acquisition
proceedings. As already mentioned above a common notification was issued under
Section 4 of the Act for an area of 34070 acres of land needed for planned
development of Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about, six
thousand objections were filed under Section 5A of the Act. The objections were
overruled. On March 18,
1966, the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area.
Thereafter, in 1970 notices were issued under Section 9(1) of the Act and some
of the persons who had received such notices challenged the validity of
acquisition proceedings by filing writ petitions before the High Court of
Delhi. The High Court negatived all the contentions raised in those cases and
dismissed the writ petitions. Thereafter appeals by grant of special leave
against the judgment of the Delhi High Court as well as writ petitions filed
directly under Art. 32 of the Constitution were heard and disposed of by this
Court by a common Judgment reported in Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor
Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802. In the aforesaid case a Constitution Bench
of this Court held that in the case of an acquisition of a large area of land
comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of
the purpose can only be with regard to the acquisition of the whole area.
Unlike
in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be practically
difficult to specify the particular purpose for which each and every item of
land comprised in the area is needed.
It was
further held in the above case that about six thousand objections were filed
under Section 5A by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions
were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the acquisition
proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the
objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter. The High
Court was of the view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the
Government in completing the acquisition proceedings. The conclusion of the
High Court was held to be correct. It was also held in the above case that the
writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay
on the part of the petitioners. In the above case this Court had found that the
appellants of that case had not moved in the matter even after the declaration
under Section 6 was published in 1966. They approached the High Court with
their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under Section 9 were issued
to them. This Court then observed as under:
"There
was apparently no reason why the writ petitions should have waited till 1972 to
come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in
1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not
specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is sine qua non for initiation
of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and
allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis
that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were
valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to
them at the time when tile notification was published would be putting a
premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on
the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners".
The
delay and laches in the case before us are even worse than those in the above
cited Aflatoon's case. The appellants had initially filed a writ petition No.
213/73 challenging the notification dated 13.11.1959 under Section 4 of the Act
and notification dated 27.4.1968 under Section 6 of the Act with respect to 245
bighas and 1 biswas of land situated in the revenue estate of Sadhurakhurd and
the notices dated 27.12.1972 under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act issued by the
Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi with respect to Khasra No. 1040/353 (12 bighas
and 8 biswas). On 30.3.1977 Shri M.C. Gupta, Learned counsel for the Ramjas
Foundation stated that he had instructions from his clients to state that they
did not want to press the petition and wish to withdraw it. The statement of Sh.
Gupta had been separately recorded. The Court, in these circumstances permitted
to withdraw the petition and dismissed the same as withdrawn. lt is important
to note that in the statement Sh. M.C.Gupta, Learned counsel for the
petitioners stated as under:
"I
may be permitted to withdraw this petition in view of the Judgment delivered by
Hon. Mr. Justice Awadh Behari in Suit 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977, between the parties, wherein the
contentions urged were precisely the same as urged in this petition, my clients
reserved the opportunity to file a fresh suit if so necessitated by the
circumstances in future." It may be noted that the reference with regard
to suit No. 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977 is in respect of the land of
petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is surprising that though the
opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants again filed a
writ petition No. 106 of 1978 in the High Court on 7.1.1978 which was
ultimately dismissed by the High Court in limine on 31st January, 1978 by a
Division Bench comprising of T.P.S. Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this writ
petition No. 106 of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to mention that
the permission to withdraw the petition No. 213 of 1973 was granted on the
statement of Sh. M.C. Gupta that his clients reserved the liberty to file a
fresh suit and not writ. Thus no liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh
writ petition. In any case there were no fresh ground or circumstances available
to the appellants to file a fresh writ petition No. 106 of 1978 on 7.1.1978 on
identical grounds when the earlier writ petition No. 213 of 1973 had been
dismissed as withdrawn on 30.3.1977. Nothing had happened between 30.3.1977 and
7.1.1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to the appellants to file the writ
petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh Behari, J. had dismissed the suit No. 451 of
1971 by order dated 21.3.1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and he was
also one of the Judges of the Division Bench who passed the impugned order
dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ petition in limine as he was fully
aware of the entire background of this litigation. The appellants are
themselves responsible for creating confusion in initiating separate proceedings
at different period of time in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad and
Sadhurakhurd though challenge to the acquisition proceedings was on common
grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of
such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In case, as sought
to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants,
the appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit filed in respect
of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the
writ petition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd
as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on 21.3.1977. We
find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land
situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition
on 30th March, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a
fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on 7.1.1978 instead of
suit.
Independently,
of all the circumstances mentioned above, we shall now consider the question of
delay and laches in filing the writ petition No. 106 of 1978 and the earlier
writ petition No. 213 of 1973 relating to lands in Sadhurakhurd. Mr. Tarkunde,
Learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that there is no limitation
prescribed for filing the writ petition and the question of delay and laches
has to be examined independently in the facts and circumstances of each case.
He has argued that the appellants are continuing in possession uptil date and
though challenge has been made to the validity of notifications issued under
Section 4 in 1959, Section 6 in 1968 and 1969 and Section 9 and 10 in 19722,
there is no delay, since no award has been passed so far and no loss has occasioned
to the respondents due to lapse of time. It has been submitted that there was
no change of circumstances during the intervening period and the delay had been
fully explained on the aforesaid grounds. It has also been argued that
notifications under Sections 9 and 10 were issued in 1972 and soon there after
the appellants came forward with a writ petition No. 213 of 1973 challenging
the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act. We find no
force at all in the above contentions.
It is
an admitted fact that notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued as
early as 1959 and all the notifications under Section 6 of the Act in relation
to the land of the appellants in Sadhurakhurd were issued in 1968 and 1969. The
challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in
the notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands
of wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used
for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be
excluded. At a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the
aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties of
the Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory and violative under
Art. 14 of the (Constitution as there was no reasonable ground to discriminate
such properties of Hindus or non-Muslims also meant for charitable purposes. So
far as the notifications under Section 6 of the Act are concerned the same were
attacked on the ground that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to
hear the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act. Thus it is abundantly
clear that the challenge was in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6
of the Act alone and though in the prayer clause relief had been sought to
quash the notification under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act also which were
issued in 1972 but no ground whatsoever has been pleaded in the writ petition
nor raised before us as to how the notifications under Sections 9 and 10 had
any concern for explaining the delay in respect of the challenge to
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. It is worthwhile to note that
according to the appellants own showing the notices under Sections 9 and 10 issued
to the appellants in 1972 were in respect of the land being Khasra No. 1040/353
which related to 12 bighas and 8 biswas only. The challenge on the other hand
in the writ petition is in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6
covering the entire land measuring about 730 bighas situate in village Sadhurakhurd.
We find no justification at all in explaining the delay on the ground that no
award has been passed nor the appellants have been dispossessed so far. This
cannot be an explanation for not challenging the notifications under Sections 4
and 6 of the 9Act and in the present case the appellants had themselves sought
stay from this Court as early as 15.11.1978 for not making and declaring the
award and not to dispossess the appellants. Thus we find no justification at
all for the delay in not challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on
13.11.1959 till 1973. Even notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued
in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged till 1973. As already mentioned above in Aflatoon's
case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that even
after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act published in 1966, the
appellants had approached with their writ petitions in 1970 when the notices
under Section 9 were issued to them the writ petitions were liable to be
dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior
counsel made strenuous effort to distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground
that in the aforesaid case the Court was influenced with the fact that the
petitioners had sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete
(emphasis added) the acquisition proceedings. Much emphasis has been laid on
the word 'to complete' the acquisition proceedings. We find no force in this submission
as the facts narrated in the above case clearly shows that the petitioners in
those cases had filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1970 and in the
Supreme Court in 1972 after the issuance of notices under Sections 4, 6 and 9
of the Act. The use of the word complete' was not of much significance and the
main reasoning of the case was that grounds to attack the notification under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were available at the time of publication of such
notifications.
In the
facts and circumstances of the case before us the appellants were also sitting
on the fence and did not take any steps of challenging the notification under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act till 1973 though the grounds now sought to be urged
were available to the appellants as soon as such notifications were issued.
Thus viewing the matter from any angle we are clearly of the view that the writ
petition was also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on
the part of the appellants apart from other grounds already dealt by us. In the
face of the aforesaid view taken by us, it is not necessary at all to go on
other questions raised in the case. We decline to express any opinion on any
questions of law raised in the appeal.
In the
result we dismiss this appeal with costs. In view of the dismissal of the
appeal itself all interim orders stand vacated automatically.
G.N. Appeal
dismissed.
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