Sat
Pal @ Sadhu Vs. State of Haryana & Anr [1992] INSC 200 (19 August 1992)
Kuldip
Singh (J) Kuldip Singh (J) Ramaswamy, K.
CITATION:
1993 AIR 1218 1992 SCR (3) 898 1992 SCC (4) 172 JT 1992 (4) 530 1992 SCALE
(2)203
ACT:
Indian
Penal Code, 1860:
Sections
53-A, 55 and 302-Imprisonment for life-Nature of-Whether rigorous
imprisonment-No formal order issued by appropriate Government commuting
sentence under Section 55 IPC or Section 433 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code
for a term not exceeding 14 years- Whether a life convict entitled to be
released before 14 years of actual imprisonment.
Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973:
Sections
433 (b) and 433 (A)- Life convict-Completing 13 1/2 years actual imprisonment
and total period of 17 years imprisonment, including remissions-Whether
entitled to be released on the ground that Government must be deemed to have
commuted his sentence to 14 years.
HEAD NOTE:
The
petitioner, a life convict, having been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life, for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, filed a Writ
Petition before this Court challenging his continued detention in jail, and
sought an order in the nature of habeas corpus, claiming that he has served
more than the maximum sentence of imprisionment prescribed under law and
should, therefore, be released. According to the petitioner, he had undergone
about 13 years and six months actual imprisonment and total period of
imprisonment including remissions came to more than 17 years, and since he had
undergone more than 14 years, sentence including remissions, and the said
sentence was got executed in jail custody in the form of rigorous imprisonment,
the Government must be deemed to have commuted his sentence to 14 years, either
under Section 55, Indian Penal Code, 1860 or Section 433 (b), Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, notwithstanding that no formal order in that behalf was made
by the State Government and as such his continued detention in jail was illegal
and he was entitled to be released forthwith. It was contended that the law
laid down in Naib Singh v. State of Punjab & 899 Ors., [1983] 2 SCC 454,
needed reconsideration by a larger Bench.
Dismissing
the Writ Petition, this Court.
HELD:
1.1.
Admittedly, the petitioner's sentence has not been remitted fully nor commuted
for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years either under Section 55 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or under Section 433 (b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 by the appropriate Government.
Merely
because the petitioner has undergone 13 1/2 years actual rigorous imprisonment
and a total period of 17 years imprisonment, including remissions, the
Government cannot be deemed to have commuted his sentence, either under Section
55 of the Indian Penal Code or Section 433 (b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. In the absence of a specific order in this behalf by the appropriate
Government, the petitioner is not entitled to be released. [900E-F, 901E]
1.2.
It is the settled law that in view of Section 53- A, Indian Penal Code, 1860,
inserted by the Amending Act of 1955, the sentence of imprisonment for life
imposed on or after January 1, 1956 is executable in jails, that the nature of
punishment required to be suffered under a sentence of `imprisonment for life'
is rigorous imprisonment; that since Section 53 A (2), transportation for a
term has been equated to rigorous imprisonment for the same term, by necessary
implication the sentence of `transportation for life', now substituted by
`imprisonment for life' by Section 53-A(1) which is awardable for more serious,
or more grave or more heinous crimes must mean rigorous imprisonment for life,
that is to say, it cannot be anything but rigorous; and that it is not
necessary that, while passing the sentence of imprisonment for life a criminal
court should clarify the exact nature of punishment intended to be inflicted on
the accused. [902F-H, 903A-B, 901E] Naib Singh v. State of Punjab and others, [1983] 2 SCC 454,
relied on.
Kishori
Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64 and Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, [1961] 3 SCR 440, referred to.
1.3.
The reasoning and conclusions given in Naib Singh's case are correct and there
is no justification whatsoever to refer the points decided in that case to a
larger Bench. [903F] 900
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (CRL.) No.1385 of 1991.
(Under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India) B.S. Malik and Ashok Kumar Sharma for the petitioner.
Ms. Asha
and Ms. Indu Malhotra for the respondents.
The Judgement
of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH,J. Sat Pal alias Sadhu, the
petitioner, has challenged his continued detention in jail and is seeking an
order in the nature of habeas corpus claiming that he has served more than the
maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed under law and should, therefore, be
released.
The
petitioner was arrested on March 27, 1978
in a case registered under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. He was convicted on August 16, 1978 and was sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life. According to the petitioner he has undergone about 13
years and six months actual imprisonment and total period of imprisonment
including remissions comes to more than 17 years. Admittedly his sentence has
not been remitted fully nor commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14
years either under Section 55 Indian Penal Code or under Section 433B Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the appropriate government. However, the
petitioner's case is that he has undergone more than 14 years sentence
including remissions and since the said sentence was got executed in jail
custody in the form of rigorous imprisonment, the government must be deemed to
have commuted his sentence to 14 years either under Section 55 Indian Penal
Code or Section 433(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 notwithstanding that no
formal order in that behalf was made by the State Government and as such his
continued detention in jail is illegal and he is entitled to be released
forthwith. The argument has been advanced by Mr. Balwant Singh Malik, the
learned counsel for the petitioner on the following grounds:- [1]
"Imprisonment for life" as one of the punishments substituted for
"transportation for life" in Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code by
Amending Act 26 of 1955. No corresponding amendment has been made in the Code
of Criminal 901 Procedure, 1973 and there is no provision under the Code for
the execution of the sentence of "imprisonment for life", In the
absence of any provision for executing the sentence of "imprisonment for
life" in the Code of Civil Procedure the detention of life convicts in
prison is unlawful and illegal and as such the government, in order to legalise
detention, has necessarily to commute life sentence under Section 55 Indian
Penal Code or Section 433 (B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to one of the
rigorous imprisonment, which under the said provisions cannot legally exceed a
terms of 14 years. The petitioner having completed 14 years, he is entitled to
be released.
[II]
The sentence of "life imprisonment" has not been defined either under
the Indian Penal Code or under any other law. It is no where provided that a
life convict has to undergo rigorous imprisonment. The Government by causing
the life convicts to be dealt with as a prisoner sentence to rigorous
imprisonment must be deemed to have commuted sentence of imprisonment for life
to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment under Section 55 Indian Penal Code or
Section 433 (B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for a term not exceeding 14
years.
The
arguments advanced by the learned counsel stand concluded against him by the judgement
of this court in Naib Singh v. State of Punjab and others, [1983] 2 SCC 454. In
the said case Naib Singh challenged his continued detention in jail on the
following grounds:- "In regard to the sentence of life imprisonment the
place where it has to be executed or carried out has to be appointed under
Section 32 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, and since the sentence of `imprisonment
for life' like the sentence of `transportation of life' could be executed only
by way of banishment or exile by the convict being `removed to the place or
places' required to be appointed by the State Government under Section 32 of
the Prisoners Act, the executing authorities were obliged to `execute' or
`carry out' the said sentence in jail indirectly by way of commuting if for
imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding 14 years under
Section 55, IPC or Section 433(b), CrPC, 1973. In other words in the 902
absence of any proper authority of law warranting the detention and execution
of the sentence of such life convict in jail, his detention in such jail
custody will have to be regarded as illegal and unlawful.
Nature
of sentence of life imprisonment is undefined and it is not necessarily
rigorous; but because the petitioner was made to undergo his sentence of life
imprisonment in jail and that too in rigorous manner for more than 14 years
(inclusive of remissions) his sentence should be deemed to have been commuted
by the State Government either under Section 55, IPC or under Section 433 (b), CrPC,
1973 without a formal order in that behalf and he be released forthwith."
This Court rejected both the contentions and dismissed the petition. V.D. Tulzapurkar,
J speaking for the Court held as under:- Under Section 32 of the Prisoners Act
a sentence of transportation either for a term or for life could be and a
sentence of life imprisonment can be made executable in local jails by
constituting such jails as the `places' within the meaning of Section 32 under
orders of the State Governments. Apart from Section 32 of the Prisoners Act,
Section 383 of CrPC, 1898 and Section 418 of CrPC, 1973 also contain the
necessary legal authority and power under which a criminal court can by issuing
a warrant direct the execution or carrying out of a sentence of life
imprisonment in local jails. Even since the sentence of transportation either
for a term or for life became executable in jails within the country and the
same position must obtain in regard to persons sentenced to imprisonment for life
on and after January 1, 1956 in view of Section 53-A, IPC inserted by the
Amending Act 26 of 1955.
The
nature of punishment required to be suffered under a sentence of `imprisonment
for life' awardable on and after January 1, 1956 is rigorous imprisonment. Earlier the sentence of
transportation either for life or for a term meant rigorous imprisonment in the
sense of exaction of hard labour from the convict. Since under Section 53 A (2)
transportation for a term has been equated to rigorous imprisonment for the
same term, 903 by necessary implication the sentence of `transportation for
life', now substituted by `imprisonment for life' by Section 53-A(1), which is
awardable for more serious, or more grave or more heinous crimes must mean
rigorous imprisonment for life, that is to say it cannot be anything but
rigorous.
It is
not necessary that while passing the sentence of imprisonment for life a
criminal court should keep in view the provisions of Section 60, IPC and choose
one or the other form so as to clarify the exact nature of punishment intended
to be inflicted on the accused. A distinction between `imprisonment for life'
and `imprisonment for a term' has been maintained in the Penal Code in several
of its provisions. Moreover, whenever an offender is punishable with
`imprisonment which may be of either description' within the meaning of Section
60 and therefore, that section would be inapplicable".
It is
not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgement in Naib
Singh's case is a complete answer to his arguments but he has vehemently argued
that the said judgement needs reconsideration by a larger Bench. The learned
counsel also made an attempt to challenge the correctness of the privy counsel judgement
in Kishori Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64 and of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse
v. State of Maharashtra, [1961] 3 SCR 440. Both these judgements have been
relied upon by this Court in Naib Singh's case.
We
have carefully read the judgement of this Court in Naib Singh's case and have
given our thoughtful consideration to the points dealt with and decided
therein.
We
respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by this Court
in the said judgement. We see no justification whatsoever to refer the points
decided in Naib Singh's case to a larger Bench. We , therefore, dismiss the
writ petition.
N.P.V.
Petition dismissed.
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