Bhoop
Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors [1992] INSC 137
(29 April 1992)
Verma,
Jagdish Saran (J) Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) Sharma, L.M. (J) Anand, A.S. (J)
CITATION:
1992 AIR 1414 1992 SCR (2) 969 1992 SCC (3) 136 JT 1992 (3) 322 1992 SCALE
(1)954
ACT:
Constitution
of India, 1950:- Articles 14 and 311-Police agitation-Services of several
police constables terminated-Many constables filed writ petitions and were
reinstated-Petitioner one such dismissed constable-Challenged his termination
order after 22 years-No explanation offered for delay-Not entitled to relief
merely because others have been reinstated-Refusal of relief-Held not
discriminatory-Relief of reinstatement-To be granted to one who is diligent.
HEAD NOTE:
A
large number of police constables participated in a mass agitation on April 14, 1967. The services of the agitating
police constables were terminated on that account without specifying that
reason for the termination. Apart from termination, many of these police
constables were also prosecuted. As a result of the demand by some Members of
Parliament, many of the dismissed constables were taken back in service as
fresh entrants and the Home Minister also directed withdrawal of the
prosecution against them.
Some
of these dismissed constables who were not taken back in service even as fresh
entrants filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1969 and 1970 which were
allowed by the High Court on October 1, 1975,
quashing the orders of their termination. Subsequently, some other constables
whose services were similarly terminated also filed writ petitions in the High
Court in 1978, which too were allowed, rejecting the objection raised on the
ground of delay and laches.
Another
set of similarly dismissed constables then filed writ petitions in the High
Court challenging the termination of their services contending that their claim
was identical with that of the petitioners in the writ petitions filed in 1978.
These petitions were transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal which
held that they were entitled to the same 970 relief as was granted in the writ
petitions field in the High Court in 1978. Appeals to this Court by the Delhi
Administration against this decision were dismissed.
Lt.
Governor of Delhi and others v. Dharampal and others,
[1990] 4 SCC 13.
The
petitioner in the Special Leave petition claimed to be a similarly dismissed
police constable and filed a petition before the Central Administrative
Tribunal for re- instatement in service and consequential benefits on the
ground that his case and claim was similar to that of the police constables who
had succeeded in the earlier rounds of litigation.
The
Tribunal rejected the application on the ground that it was highly belated and
there was no cogent explanation for the inordinate delay of 22 years in filing
the application on 13th
March, 1989 after
termination of the service in 1967.
In the
appeal to this Court, it was contended that the petitioner was entitled to the
relief of reinstatement like the others dismissed with him and then reinstated
and the question of delay or laches does not arise, and that the Delhi
Administration was duty bound to reinstate him along with others and in not
doing so, it has discriminated him.
Dismissing
the special leave petition, this Court,
HELD :
1. It is expected of a Government servant who has a legitimate claim to
approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period, assuming
no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating
the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for
years. During the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience
and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by lateral entry of a
person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the
period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making
the claim. Apart from the consequential benefits of reinstatement without
actually working, the impact on the administrative set-up and on other employees
is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless the delay
is satisfactorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant. This is a
971 material fact to be given due weight while considering the argument of
discrimination for deciding whether the petitioner is in the same class as
those who challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were
consequently granted the relief of reinstatement. [974 G-975 B] In the instant
case, the petitioner was appointed in 1964 and his service terminated after
about three years in 1967. It is in 1989, after a lapse of about 22 years from
the date of termination of his service that the petitioner chose to assail his
dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that some of the dismissed constables challenged
their dismissal as early as in 1969 and 1970, within a period of two to three
years and others too did so after the success of the first batch in getting
reinstated. No. attempt has been made by the petitioner to explain why he chose
to be silent so long if he too was interested in being reinstated and had not
abandoned his claim, if any. [974 D, E]
2. The
lapse of such a long unexplained period of several years in the case of the
petitioner is a strong reason to not classify him with the other dismissed
constables who approached the Court earlier and got reinstatement. It was clear
to the petitioner latest in 1978 when the second batch of petitions were filed
that the petitioner also will have to file a petition for getting
reinstatement. Even then he chose to wait till 1989, Dharmpal's case also being
decided in 1987. The argument of discrimination is, therefore, not available to
the petitioner. [975 C, D]
3.
Inordinate and unexplained delay or lapse is by itself a ground to refuse
relief to the petitioner irrespective of the merits of his claim. If a person
entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise
to a reasonable belief in the minds of others that he is not interested in
claiming that relief.
Others
are then justified in acting on that belief. It is more so in service matters
where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. [975 E]
4. A
person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a
period of 22 years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay,
merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of
their earlier petitions being allowed. [975 F]
5.
Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle
and, therefore any relief claimed on that basis must itself be 972 founded on
equity and not be alien to that concept, [975 G] In the instant case, grant of
the relief to the petitioner would be inequitable instead of its refusal being
discriminatory as asserted on behalf of the petitioner. [975 H-976 a]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave petition (C) No. 1485 of 1992.
From
the Order and Judgment dated 30.9.1991 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi in R.A. No. 162 of 1991 in O.A. No.
753 of 1989.
Govind
Mukhoty, A.P. Singh and K.N. Rai for the Petitioner.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. The petitioner was appointed a
constable in the Delhi Armed Police in 1964. A large number of police
constables participated in a mass agitation on April 14, 1967. The services of the agitating police constables were
terminated on that account without specifying that reason for the termination.
The petitioner claims that his service was similarly terminated on 3.8.1967 due
to his participation in the agitation with other police constables.
Apart
from terminating their services, many of those police constables were also
prosecuted. It appears that as a result of the demand by some Members of
Parliament, many of the dismissed constables were taken back in service as
fresh entrants and the Home Minister also directed withdrawal of prosecution
against them. Some of the dismissed constables who were not taken back in
service even as fresh entrant field writ petitions in the Delhi High Court in
1969 and 1970 which were allowed by the High Court on October 1, 1975 quashing
the orders of termination of those petitioner.
Subsequently,
some other constables whose services were similarly terminated also filed writ
petitions in the Delhi High Court in 1978 which too were allowed rejecting the
objection raised on the ground of delay and laches. Another set of similarly
dismissed constables then filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court
challenging the termination of their services contending that their claim was
identical with that of the petitioners in the writ petitions filed in 1978.
These writ petitions were transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal
which held that the 973 petitioners therein were entitled to the same relief as
was granted to the petitioners in the writ petitions filed in the High Court in
1978. The Delhi Administration preferred appeals in this Court against that
decision. Those appeals were dismissed by the judgment in Lt. Governor of Delhi and v. Dharampal and others, [1990]
4 SCC 13.
petitioner,
Bhoop Singh, claiming to be a similarly dismissed police constable filed O.A.
No. 753 of 1989 in the Central Administrative Tribunal praying for
reinstatement in service and all consequential benefits on the ground that his
case and claim is similar to that of the police constables who had succeeded in
the earlier rounds of litigation. The Tribunal has rejected the petitioner's
application on the ground that it is highly belated and there is no cogent
explanation for the inordinate delay of twenty-two years in filing the
application on 13.3.1989 after termination of the petitioner's service in 1967.
Shri Gobinda
Mukhoty, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the
petitioner is entitled to the relief of reinstatement like the others dismissed
with him and then reinstated and the question of delay or laches does not
arise. Learned counsel contended that the Delhi Administration was duty bound
to reinstate the petitioner also with the others and in not doing so, it has
discriminated the petitioner. On this basis, it was urged, the question of laches
or delay does not arise. Shri Mukhoty places strong reliance on the decision in
Dharampal (supra) to support his submission.
The
real question is : whether, the mere fact that termination of petitioner's
service as a police constable in 1967 is alleged to be similar to that of the
other police constables so dismissed in 1967 and then reinstated in the above
manner is sufficient to grant him the relief of reinstatement ignoring the fact
that he made the claim after the lapse of twenty-two years in 1989? It has,
therefore, to be seen whether this fact alone is sufficient to classify to
petitioner with the earlier reinstated police constables for granting the
relief reinstatement claimed in 1989 when those reinstated had made their claim
several years earlier.
In Dharampal
(supra) there is no consideration or discussion of this question and in that
case this Court had refused to interfere with the relief 974 granted by the
Tribunal. The question here is of interfering with the Tribunal's order since
the Tribunal has refused relief on this ground. Unless it can be held that
delay of several years in claiming the relief of reinstatement must be ignored
simply because some other similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result
of their success in the petitions filed many years earlier, the Tribunal's
order cannot be reversed in the present case. Dharampal is of no assistance for
this purpose. Whether, the delay in making the claim has been explained
satisfactorily to negative the objection of laches is a question of fact in
each case. In Dharampal the Tribunal had apparently been satisfied with the
explanation for the delay and this Court declined interference with the
Tribunal's view. In the present case, there has been a much longer delay and
the Tribunal has stated that the same has not been explained. Dharampal does
not, therefore, help the petitioner to circumvent this obstacle.
The
petitioner was appointed in 1964 and his service terminated after about three
years in 1967. It is in 1989 after a lapse of about twenty-two years from the
date of termination of his service that the petitioner chose to assail his
dismissal, not with standing the fact that some of the dismissed constables
challenged their dismissal as early as 1969 and 1970, with a period of two to
three years, and others too did so soon after to success of the first batch in
getting reinstated. No attempt has been made by the petitioner to explain why
he chose to be silent for so long, if he too was interested in being reinstated
and had not abandoned his claim, if any. If the petitioner's contention is
upheld that lapse of any length of time is of no consequence in the present
case, it would mean that any such police constable can choose to wait even till
he attains the age of superannuation and then assail the termination of his
service and claim monetary benefits for the entire period on the same ground.
That would be a startling proposition. In our opinion, this cannot be the true
import of Article 14 or the requirement of the principle of non-discrimination
embodied therein, which is the foundation of petitioner's case.
It is
expected of a government servant who has a legitimate claim to approach the
Court for the relief he seek within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed
period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the
administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for
years. During the interregnum those who have been 975 working gain more
experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by lateral
entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience
during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years
before making the claim. Apart from the consequential benefits of reinstatement
without actually working, the impact on the administrative set-up and on other
employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless
the delay is satisfactorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant.
This is a material fact to be given due weight while considering the argument
of discrimination in the present case for deciding whether the petitioner is in
the same class as those who challenged their dismissal several years earlier
and were consequently granted the relief of reinstatement. In our opinion, the
lapse of a much longer unexplained period of several years in the case of the
petitioner is a strong reason to not classify him with the other dismissed
constables who approached the Court earlier and got reinstatement. It was clear
to the petitioner latest in 1978 when the second batch of petitions were filed
that the petitioner also will have to file a petition for getting
reinstatement. Even then he chose to wait till 1989, Dharampal's case also
being decided in 1987. The argument of discrimination is, therefore, not
available to the petitioner.
There
is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is
by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the
merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent
for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others
that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in
acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are
required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the
termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any
cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly
dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being
allowed. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service
jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested
by the petitioner. Article 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an
equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must
itself be founded on equity and not be alien to that concept. In our opinion,
grant of the relief to the 976 petitioner, in the present case, would be
inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned
counsel for the petitioner. We are further of the view that these circumstances
also justify refusal of the relief claimed under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
Special
Leave Petition is dismissed.
N.V.K.
Petition dismissed.
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