Hindustan
Zinc Ltd. Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Boards & Ors [1991]
INSC 124 (2 May 1991)
Verma,
Jagdish Saran (J) Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J) Ojha, N.D. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 1473 1991 SCR (2) 643 1991 SCC (3) 299 JT 1991 (2) 403 1991 SCALE
(1)869
ACT:
Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948: Ss. 4A, 16, 49, 59, 61, 63, 67, 67A, 68, 78-A-Orders No.
1014 and No. DE/COML/IV/2250/83/1 dated 13.12.1983 and Memo dated 18.11.1975.
S.
49-Tariffs-Power of fixation-No Unreasonable preference shall be shown to any
person.
S.
16-Electricity Tariff-Revision-State Electricity Consultative
Council-Non-consultation by State Electricity Board-Validity of.
S.
59-State Electricity Board-Finance-Tariff-Generation of
surplus-Non-specification of quantum by State Government- Whether board can
adjust its tariffs to generate a reasonable surplus.
Whether
the surplus generated could be called extravagant.
Whether
revision of tariffs fall within the scope of judicial review.
Fuel
cost adjustment-Charged only from particular category of consumers-Whether
reasonable.
S.
78A-Tariffs-Directions by State Government-Whether binding on the Board.
Administrative
Law: Delegated legislation-'Laying procedure'-Placing Electricity Board's
annual financial statement u/s 61 of the Electricity (Supply) Act before the
Legislature-Whether effectively controls exercise of Board's delegated power.
HEAD NOTE:
The
appellants are H.T. electricity consumers of various categories in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. The respondent-State Electricity
Board (the Board), by its orders B.P. Ms. No. 1014 dated 13.12.1983 revised
upwards the tariffs for various categories of consumers including H.T.
categories 1 (Industrial) and II (Non-Industrial); and by Memo No.
DE/COML/IV/2250/83/I of the same date it revised upwards the electricity
tariffs for highly power intensive industries falling under 644 H.T. Category
III. Tariffs consisted of three parts. The said three categories of H.T.
consumers fell in Part A. H.T.
consumers
availing supply of electricity for irrigation and agricultural purposes were
included in part B. Part C provided for miscellaneous and general charges.
Tariffs were not revised for consumers availing H.T. supply for purposes of
irrigation and agriculture falling in part B or L.T. supply for domestic
cottage industries, public lighting and small poultry farms units.
Besides
the energy charges, the H.T. consumers included in Part A were also required to
pay at different rates effective from 1.9.1982 an additional charge levied as
`fuel adjustment charges'; and some amount as `voltage surcharged' in
accordance with the terms of the agreement entered into by the individual
consumers with the Board.
The
writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging the said upward revision of
the Electricity Tariffs were dismissed by the High Court upholding the revision
of tariffs made by the respondent-Board. Aggrieved the appellants preferred
appeals by special leave to this Court.
It was
contended on behalf of the appellants that: (1) the upward revision of tariffs
by the State Electricity Board was invalid being made without prior
consultation with the State Electricity Consultative Council as envisaged by s.
16 of the Electricity (supply) Act, 1948; (2) without specification of any
surplus by the State Government the Board had no power to adjust its tariffs in
a manner which resulted in generating any surplus; (3) there is discrimination
in recovery of the entire full cost adjustment from the H.T. consumers alone;
(4) the upward hike of the tariffs for the H.T. consumers including power
intensive consumers was arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as it was not
related to the cost of generation and was based on irrelevant factors; and (5)
and the Board had acted with profit motive losing its public utility character.
Learned counsel representing the power intensive consumers also contended that
in the absence of a clause relating to fuel cost adjustment in the G.Os. issued
in respect of the power intensive units, they could not be governed by the
clause of fuel cost adjustment made applicable to the H.T.tariffs.
Dismissing
the appeals, this Court,
HELD:
1.1 The power of fixation of tariffs in the Board is provided by s. 49 of this
Supply Act which requires the fixation of uniform 645 tariffs ordinarily having
regard particularly to the specified factors and enables fixation of such
tariffs for any person having regard to the factors expressly stated and any
other relevant factors providing further that no unreasonable or undue preference
shall be shown to any person by the Board in exercise of its powers of fixing
the tariffs. S. 59, requiring the Board to adjust the tariffs for the purpose
of its finance is to be read along with s. 49. [667B-C; 668B-C] 1.2. The common
premise for the purpose of the instant case that the revision of tariffs by the
State Electricity Board is a question of policy may indicate that it would be
open to the Consultative Council to advise the Board also on the question of
revision of tariffs, and if such advice is given, then the Board must consider
the same before taking the final decision. That, however, does not necessarily
mean that where no such advice was taken from the Consultative Council or was
rendered on account of the absence of any meeting during the relevant period,
it would necessarily render invalid the revision of tariffs made by the Board.
[664A-B] Though it is advisable to seek advice of the Consultative Council
before revision of the tariffs yet failure to do so does not result in invalidation
of the revised tariffs. This consequence appears to be the logical and
reasonable view to take of the requirement of s. 16 alongwith other provisions
of the Act. [666A-B]
1.3
The consequence of non-compliance of s. 16 is not provided, and the nature of
function of the Consultative Council and the force of its advice being at the
best only persuasive, it cannot be said that revision of tariffs without
seeking the advice of the Consultative Council renders the revisions of tariffs
invalid. [664B-C]
1.4 It
is also significant that the annual financial statement containing all
particulars relating to revision of tariffs is required to be submitted to the
State Government in February each year and the State Government is required
after receipt of such statement to cause it to be laid on the table of the
House or Houses of the State Legislature and the said statement is open to
discussion therein. The Board is bound to take into consideration any comments
made on the said statement in the State Legislature. The 'laying procedure'
before the legislature effectively controls the exercise of the delegated power
of the Board. Thus there is ample provision for discussion on the revised
tariffs in the State Legislature with the Board being bound to take into consideration
any comments made thereon. [664C-D; 666A] 646 Kerala State Electricity Board v.
M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu & Bros. & Ors., [1986] 4 S.C.C. 198, relied
on.
2.1
Mere generation of surplus by the Board as a result of adjusting its tariffs
when the quantum of surplus has not been specified by the State Government
after the 1978 amendment of s. 59 of the Act, cannot invite any criticism
unless it is further shown that the surplus generated as a result of the
adjustment of tariffs by the Board has resulted in the Board acting as a
private trader shedding off its public utility character. If the profit is made
not merely for the sake of profit, but for the purpose of better discharge of
its obligations by the Board, it cannot be said that the public enterprise has
acted beyond its authority. [669C-E]
2.2
The general principle for the Boards finance indicated by s. 59 is that prior
to the 1978 amendment, tariffs could be adjusted to avoid any loss, but as a
result of the shift made by the 1978 amendment the power could be exercised to
generate a surplus and when the State Government specified the amount of
surplus then the Board was bound to adjust the tariffs to ensure generation of
the specified surplus. However, generation of a reasonable surplus in any year
of account without specification of the surplus amount by the State Government
was not contra- indicated in the provision inasmuch as the duty to generate a
surplus was implicit with the added obligation to ensure generating surplus to
the extent specified by the State Government when it was so specified by it. It
cannot be accepted as a reasonable view that in the absence of specification of
the surplus by the State Government, the Board could not adjust its tariffs to
generate even a reasonable surplus in any year of account. [668E-G]
2.3 In
the instant case the Board showed that the surplus resulting from upward
revision of tariffs applicable to the H.T. consumers was for the purpose of
better discharge of its other obligations under the Supply Act and in effect
the same has merely resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the concessional
tariffs provided earlier to the power intensive consumers which did not in its
opinion require continuance of the concessional tariffs any longer.
It was
not proved that this assertion of the Board was incorrect or there was any
reasonable basis to hold that the upward revision of tariffs applicable to H.T.
consumers was merely with a desire to earn more profits like a private trader
and not to generate surplus for utiliasation of the funds to discharge other
obligations of the Board towards more needy consumers, such as agriculturists,
or to meet the needs of expansion of the supply to deserving areas. [669E- G]
647
3.1
The H.T. consumers, including the power intensive consumers, are known power
guzzlers and in power intensive industries, electricity is really a raw
material. This category of consumers, therefore, forms a distinct class
separate from other consumers like L.T. consumers who are much smaller
consumers. There is also a rational nexus of this classification with the
object sought to be achieved.
Moreover,
the power intensive consumers have been enjoying the benefit of a concessional
tariff for quite some time, which too is a relevant factor to justify this classification.
Placing the burden of fuel cost adjustment on these power guzzlers, who had the
benefit of concessional tariffs, for quite some time and have also a better
capacity to pay, cannot, therefore, be faulted since the consumption in the
power intensive industries accounts for a large quantity. [670B-C]
3.2 It
is not unreasonable to take the view that the thermal power has become costlier
on account of the increase in fuel cost and could notionally be allocated to
the consumption by H.T. and power intensive consumers and, therefore, the fuel
cost adjustment is made applicable to them alone. [671E-F]
4.1
The Court would not strike down the revision of tariffs as arbitrary unless the
resulting surplus reaches such a height as to lead to the inevitable decision
that the Board has shed its public utility character and is obsessed by the
profit motive of private entrepreneur in order to generate a surplus which is
extravagant. [672A-B]
4.2
The surplus generated by the Board as a result of revision of tariffs during
the relevant period cannot be called extravagant by any standard to render it
arbitrary permitting the striking down of the revision of tariffs on the ground
of arbitrariness nor is it discriminatory. It was pointed out on behalf of the
Board that its action was based on the opinion of Rajadhyaksha Committee's
report submitted in 1980 and the formula of fuel cost adjustment was on a
scientific basis linked to the increase in the fuel cost. This is a possible
view to take and, therefore, the revision of tariffs by the Board does not fall
within the available scope of judicial review. [672C-D] Kerala State
Electricity Board v. M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. & Ors., [1986] 4
S.C.C. 198, relied on.
Shri Sitaram
Sugar Company Limited & Anr. v. Union
of India & Ors., [1990] 3 S.C.C. 223, followed. 648
5. It
cannot be said that the term relating to fuel cost adjustment had no
application to the power intensive consumers during the relevant period. The
Memo dated 18.11.1975 did not merely extend the non-specified 'terms and
conditions of supply' applicable to normal H.T.
consumers
to the power intensive consumers but also "other charges" which were
merely illustrated by the words, "such as Misc. charges, terms and
conditions of supply not mention herein". This express provision in the
said Memo clearly provided that except for the provision specifically made for
power intensive consumers, in respect of all other provisions the power
intensive consumers were to be governed by the provisions, by whatever name
called, applicable to the normal H.T. consumers. However in the bills issued to
the power intensive consumers the terms relating to fuel cost adjustment was
specifically indicated. [673D-H; 674A] Nav Bharat Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. A.P.S.E.
Board Hyderabad, AIR 1985 A.P. 299, approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2567-70 of 1985.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.1985 of the Hyderabad High Court in Writ
Petition No. 9403 of 1984.
Kapil Sibal,
Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Anil B. Diwan, G. Ramaswamy, P.A. Choudhary,
Kailash Vasudev, Naunit Lal, M.J. Paul, C.S. Vaidyanathan, U.K. Khaitan,
Praveen Kumar, S. Murlidhar, Vineet Kumar, Vinod Bhagat and Mukul Mudgal for
the Appellants.
Shanti
Bhushan, V.R. Reddy, Rajendra Choudhary, S. Thananjayan, K. Ram Kumar for the
Respondents.
V.B. Sharya
for the Intervenor.
The Judgement
of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. These appeals by special leave are by
several industrial concerns against the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board
(hereinafter called 'the Board') challenging the common judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in writ petitions filed by these concerns challenging the
revision of the electricity tariffs by the Board by its proceedings contained
in B.P. Ms. No. 1014 (Commercial) dated 649 13.12.1983 which came in to force
on 15.1.1984. Prior to this revision, the tariffs were governed by B.P. Ms. No.
418 (Commercial) dated 12.1.1981. On 13.12.1983, two separate orders were
issued by the Board revising the various tariffs. By one of them, namely, B.P.
Ms. No. 1014, the tariffs for various categories of consumers including H.T.
categories I and II were revised. By the other order of the same date, namely,
Memo No. DE/COML/IV/2250/83/I, the tariffs for highly power intensive
industries were also revised upwards. Out of the appellants it was applicable
to five units, namely,
(1) Nav
Bharat Ferro Alloys Ltd.,
(2)
Andhra Sugars Ltd.,
(3)
Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd.,
(4) Grindwell
Norton Ltd., and
(5)
A.P. Carbides Ltd.
This
upward revision of tariffs made by the Board by its two orders dated 13.12.1983
which were made effective from 15.1.1984, was challenged by the appellants in
writ petitions filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds. The
High court rejected all the grounds and dismissed the writ petitions by its
common judgment now reported in A.I.R. 1985 A.P. 299. These appeals by special
leave are against the High Court Judgment.
The
appellants are all H.T. power consumers of one category or other. The tariffs
consist of three parts:
Part-A,
Part-B and Part-C. Part-A provides for H.T. tariffs; Part-B for L.T. supply;
and Part-C provides, inter alia, for miscellaneous and general charges. H.T.
consumers in Part-A are broadly classified into three categories: H.
T.
Category-I (Industrial); H.T. Category-II (Non- Industrial); and H.T.
Category-III comprising of power intensive consumers and some others. The Board
retained the power to decide in accordance with the guidelines as to which industries
were power intensive and which were not.
This
was the position in the tariffs of 1975. Subsequently, the Board began to deal
with the power intensive industries by notifying tariffs for them separately
from time to time.
In
effect, there were four classes of consumers availing H.T. supply;
(1)
H.T. consumers falling under H.T. Category- I (Industrial);
(2)
H.T. consumers falling under H.T. Category-II (Non-Industrial);
(3)
H.T. consumers falling under the category 'power intensive industries'; and
(4)
H.T. consumers availing supply of electricity for irrigation and agricultural
purposes included in Part-B.
The
tariffs for these different categories of H.T. consumers were enhanced from
time to time. For H.T. Category-I (Industrial), it was 21 paise in 1975,
increased to 30 paise in 1979, 33 paise in 1980, 40 paise in 1981 and 48 paise
in 1984. Likewise, there was corresponding increase in the energy rates for
H.T. Category-II (Non-Industrial), being 28 paise, 37 paise, 40 paise, 47 paise
and 56 paise. The tariffs for power intensive industries were, however, 650
increased by separate notifications issued by the Board from time to time. It
was 11 paise prior to 1975, raised to 12.2 paise in 1977, 16 paise in 1978,
18.5 paise in September 1979, 21 paise in November 1979, 25 paise in 1980, 32 paise
in 1981 and 45 paise in 1984. The H.T. consumers grouped in Part-B were
required to pay 15 paise under the 1975 tariffs and 16 paise thereafter.
Besides the energy charges as stated above, the H.T. consumers were also
required to pay at different rates effective from 1.9.1982 an additional charge
levied as 'fuel cost adjustment charges'. The H.T. consumers were also required
to pay some amount as 'voltage surcharge' in accordance with the terms of the agreement
entered into by the individual consumers with the Board.
The
comparison of the aforesaid tariffs shows that the tariffs for power intensive
industries to begin with were much less than the tariffs for H.T. Category-I
(Industrial) and H.T. Category-II (Non-Industrial). In course of time, the
concession in tariffs for the power intensive industries was progressively
withdrawn. The concessions were, however, continued in respect of consumers
availing H.T. or L.T. supply for purposes of irrigation and agriculture or L.T.
supply for domestic, cottage industries, public lighting and small poultry
farming units. It is the admitted position that the power generation in the
State of Andhra Pradesh is both hydro and thermal, each source contributing
almost equally to the total power generation in the State. The H.T. categories
have been consuming more than one-half of the total power generated in the
State against the much larger number of individual L.T. consumers availing the
remaining power.
The
main attacks to the upward revision of the tariffs for H.T. consumers in the
writ petitions before the High Court were:
(1)
The Board, as a public utility undertaking, is expected to function in the most
efficient and economical manner;
(2) It
cannot plan its activities with a view to drive any sizeable profits on its
undertaking except in accordance with Section 59 of the Electricity (Supply)
Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Supply Act');
(3)
The Board Could not generate a surplus in excess of that specified under
Section 59 of the Supply Act which it had been doing;
(4)
The Board was preparing its financial statement incorrectly in a manner contray
to section 59 of the Supply Act by improperly taking into account expenses
chargeable to capital by showing such expenses as charged to revenues;
(5)
The steep upward revision to tariffs from 1980 made by the Board is invalid,
being arbitrary and in contravention of Section 49 and 59 of the Supply Act;
and
(6)
There was no justification for the Board to have revised the tariffs either in
1981 or in 1984 or to have levied any 651 fuel surcharge in terms of Section 49
and 59 of the Supply Act. It was also contended that the tariffs revision was
made without prior consultation with the State Electricity Consultative Council
as required by Section 16(5) of the Supply Act which also rendered it invalid.
Prior
to 30.7.1982, it was usual for the Board to take into account various
escalation charges such as pay revisions and increases in the cost of fuel and
revise its tariffs from time to time. This was done in 1975 and 1981.
Thereafter,
the Board took the view that to avoid making frequent tariff revisions
necessitated by frequent escalations in the cost of fuels like coal and diesel
oil, the formula known as "fuel cost adjustment" be evolved.
Accordingly,
the Board in its proceedings contained in B.P.
Ms.
No. 589 dated 30.7.1982, set out the formula known as "fuel cost
adjustment". This formula was introduced as condition No. 11 in H.T.
tariffs Part-A. Ever since September 1982, all categories of H.T. consumers in
Part-A including the power intensive consumers are subject to this condition.
Immediately after 30.7.1982, the fuel cost adjustment was fixed as 2.74 paise
per unit, which was increased gradually to 2.95 paise, 3.79 paise and 11.68 paise.
Thereafter, 3.79 paise was absorbed as part of the tariffs applicable to these
H.T. consumers and the remaining increase of 7.89 paise alone was indicated as
the fuel cost adjustment charges. The grievance made by all H.T. consumers
before the High Court was that:
(1) the
fuel cost adjustment could not be recovered as part of the tariffs;
(2) there
is discrimination in recovering the entire fuel cost adjustment from H.T.
consumers alone;
(3) fairness
demands that a reasonable proportion of the burden should be shared also by
Part-B consumers; and
(4) that
fuel cost adjustment charge is excessively computed.
The
High Court rejected all these contentions. It held that this was a matter of
policy which could be changed from time to time and it was permissible to
gradually withdraw the pre-existing concessional tariffs given to the power
intensive industries for which the tariffs earlier were much lower as compared
to the other consumers and even after the increase , they were not excessive.
It was held that electricity was a raw material for power intensive industries
and no grievance could be made against the increase of its cost just as such a
grievance was untenable against increase in the cost of any other raw material.
The challenge on the ground of discrimination was rejected on the ground that
H.T. consumers including power intensive industries formed a separate class and
the reason which justified grant of concession to them earlier also justified
the gradual withdrawal of that 652 concession. It held that prior consultation
with the State Electricity Consultative Council according to Section 16(5) of
the Supply Act was not obligatory before revising the tariffs. The High Court
held that the Board was justified in adjusting its tariffs to ensure
progressive minimizing of losses and the failure of the State Government to
specify the surplus it could generate in accordance with Section 59 of the
Supply Act, did not detract from the Board's power to adjust its tariffs and
generate a surplus on principles of commercial expediency applicable to a
public utility undertaking. Fixation of tariffs was held to be a matter of
major policy in respect of which the Government can effectively issue
directions under Section 78-A of the Act.
It was
held that the H.T. consumers including power intensive industries were bound to
pay according to the revised higher tariffs fixed from time to time under the
agreement as contemplated by Section 49 of the Supply Act.
The
condition of fuel cost adjustment, introduced as condition No. 11 in H.T.
tariffs Part-A, was held applicable to power intensive consumers also. An
additional argument that this added burden became unbearable for the power
intensive consumers was rejected on the ground that such inability of the
industry to survive is not a compelling consideration for deciding the Board's
power in adjusting it tariffs. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ
petitions and upheld the revision of tariffs made by the Board by the impugned
B.P. Ms. No. 1014 (Commercial) dated 13.12.1983 w.e.f. 15.1.1984. The High
Court having refused to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court,
the appellants have preferred these appeals by special leave.
It may
be mentioned at this stage that the controversy raised in these appeals was
also the controversy in another bunch of civil appeals arising out of a
judgment of the Kerala High Court wherein a similar challenge had been upheld
and the Kerala State Electricity Board had come in an appeal to this Court. In
those matters, the contention of the Kerala State Electricity Board which would
be the same as that of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board before us,
was accepted and the judgment of the Kerala High Court taking the view contrary
to that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was reversed (Kerala State Electricity
Board v. M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. and Others., [1986] 4 S.C.C. 198.)
All the hearing before us, it was contended by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned
counsel for the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board that the Kerala decision
concludes these points against the present appellants. On the other hand, Shri
G. Ramaswamy and other learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, made an
attempt to 653 distinguish the decision in the Kerala case. The question,
therefore, is: Whether any ground has been made out by the present appellants
to persuade us to take a view different from the one taken by this Court in the
Kerala case? Before considering the arguments in these appeals, we would refer
to the controversies in the Kerala case and the view taken therein.
The
decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. M/s. Govinda Prabhu and Bros. and
Others, [1986] 4 S.C.C. 198 arose out of the decision of the Kerala High Court
in a similar situation. The Kerala High Court struck down the upward revision
of tariffs made by the Kerala State Electricity Board unlike the Andhra Pradesh
High Court which has upheld the upward revision of tariffs in the present
appeals. The main question in the Kerala case also related to the extent of
authority of the Kerala Board to increase the electricity tariffs under the
Electricity (Supply) Act 1948. The principal ground of challenge which was
accepted by the Kerala High Court was that the Kerala State Electricity Board
acted outside its statutory authority by formulating a price structure intended
to yield substantial revenue to offset not merely the expenditure properly
chargeable to the revenue account for the year as contemplated by Section 59 of
the Supply Act but also expenditure not so properly chargeable. The Kerala High
Court had held that in the absence of a specification by the Government, the
Board was not entitled to generate a surplus at all and it acted entirely
outside its authority in generating a surplus to be adjusted against items of
expenditure not authorised to be met from revenue receipts.
this
view of the Kerala High Court was based primarily on the construction made of
section 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Accordingly, the Kerala High
Court struck down the upward revision of tariffs made by the Kerala State
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Accordingly, the Kerala High Court struck down
the upward revision of tariffs made by the Kerala State Electricity Board in
the years 1980, 1982 and 1984. It may here be mentioned that Section 59 of the
Supply Act, as it stood prior to 1978, was amended by Act No. 23 of 1978 and
thereafter, by Act No. 16 of 1983, which came into effect from April 1, 1985
only.
The Kerala
case also was decided on the basis of Section 59 as it stood amended by the
1978 (Amendment) Act, prior to its amendment w.e.f. April 1, 1985 by Act No. 16 of 1983.
For
our purposes also, Section 59 as it stood amended by the 1978 Act, prior to the
1983 amendment, is relevant.
This
Court expressly rejected the submission which had found favour with the Kerala
High Court that in the absence of a specification by the State Government, the
position would be as it was before the 1978 amendment, that is, the Board was
to carry on its affairs and 654 adjust the tariffs in such a manner as not to
incur a loss and no more. While rejecting the submission, this Court held as
under:
"We
are of the view that the failure of the government to specify the surplus which
may be generated by the Board cannot prevent the Board from generating a
surplus after meeting the expenses required to be met. Perhaps, the quantum of
surplus may not exceed that a prudent public service undertaking may be
expected to generate without sacrificing the interests it is expected to serve
and without being obsessed by the pure profit motive of the private
entrepreneur. The Board may not allow its character as a public utility
undertaking to be changed into that of a profit motivated private trading or
manufacturing house.
Neither
the tariffs nor the resulting surplus may reach such heights as to lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the Board has shed its public utility character.
When that happens the court may strike down the revision of tariffs as plainly
arbitrary. But not until then. Not, merely because a surplus has been
generated, a surplus which can by no means be said to be extravagant.
The
court will then refrain from touching the tariffs. After all, as has been said
by this Court often enough 'price fixation' is neither the forte nor the
function of the court." Further, it said:
"Turning
back to Section 59 and reading it along with Section 49, 67, 67-A etc. We
notice that the Electricity Supply Act requires the Electricity Board to follow
a particular method of accounting and it is on the basis of that method of
accounting that the Board is required to generate a surplus.
Broadly,
Section 59 requires that a surplus should be left from the total revenues, in
any year of account, after meeting all expenses properly chargeable to
revenues. It has to be remembered that apart from subventions which may be
received from the State Government, which depend entirely on the bounty of the
government, the only revenues available to the Board are the charges leviable
by it from consumers. Bearing this in mind, we may now consider what expenses
are properly chargeable to revenues under the Electricity Supply Act. For this
purpose, we may not be justified in having recourse to the principles of
corporate 655 accounting or the rules which determine what is revenue
expenditure under the Income Tax Act. It appears to us that the Electricity
Supply Act prescribes its own special principles of accounting to be followed
by the Board...." This Court also held that the prescribing of different
tariffs for high and low tension consumers and for different classes of
consumers, such as industrial, commercial, agricultural and domestic, appears
to be reasonable and far from arbitrary and is based on an intelligent and
intelligible differentia. Accordingly, the judgment of the Kerala High Court
upholding challenge to the validity of the upward revision of tariffs was set
aside.
Broadly
speaking, the substance of the main arguments advanced before us in these
matters was repelled by this Court in the Kerala case. However, learned counsel
for the appellants attempted to distinguish the Kerala decision and also tried
to advance some additional arguments. We shall refer to those arguments
presently.
It
would be appropriate at this stage to quote the relevant provisions of the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, with reference to which the arguments advanced
have to be considered. Section 2 of the act relates to interpretation and give
the meaning of the expressions defined therein.
Section
3 deals with the constitution of the Central Electricity Authority. Section 4-B
contains the rule-making power of the Central Government. Section 5 provides
for the constitution and composition of State Electricity Boards.
Section
12 provides for the incorporation of the Board.
Section
12-A relates to the capital structure of the Board.
Section
78 contains the rule-making power of the State Government. Section 79 contains
the power of the Board to make regulations. Some of the provisions of the Act which
may be quoted in extenso are as under:
"4A.
Directions by Central Government to the Authority. (1) In the discharge of its
functions, the Authority shall be guided by such directions in matter of policy
involving public interest as the Central Government may give to it in writing.
(2) If
any question arises as to whether any such direction relates to a matter of
policy involving public interest, the decision of the Central Government
thereon shall be final." xxx xxx xxx 656 "16. State Electricity Consultative
Council.
(1)
The State Government shall constitute a State Electricity Consultative Council
for the State, and in cases to which Section 6 and 7 apply, the State
Government concerned shall constitute such one or more State Electricity Cousultative
Council or Councils and for such areas as they may by agreement determine.
(2)
The State Electricity Consultative Council shall consist of the members of the
Board and, if there are any Generating Company or Generating Companies
operating in the State, one representative of the Generating Company or each of
the Generating Companies, to be nominated by the Generating Company concerned,
and such other persons being not less than eight and not more than fifteen as
the State Government or the State Governments concerned may appoint after
consultation with such representatives or bodies of representative of the
following interests as the State Government or the State Governments concerned
thinks or think fit, that is to say, local self- government, electricity supply
industry, commerce, industry, transport, agriculture, labour employed in the
electricity supply industry and consumers of electricity, but so that there
shall be at least one member representing each such interest in the Council.
(3)
The Chairman of the Board shall be ex officio Chairman of the State Electricity
Consultative Council.
(4)
The State Electricity Consultative Council shall meet at least once in every
three months.
(5)
The functions of the State Electricity Consultative Council shall be as
follows:- (i) To advise the Board and the Generating Company or Generating
Companies, if any, operating in the State on major questions of policy and
major schemes;
(ii) to
review the progress and the work of the Board and the Generating Company or
Generating Companies, if any, operating in the State from time to time;
657
(iii) To consider such other matters as the Board or the Generating Company or
Generating Companies, if any, operating in the State may place before it; and
(iv) To consider such matters as the State Government may by rules prescribe.
(6)
The Board shall place before the State Electricity Consultative Council the
annual financial statement and supplementary statement, if any, and shall take
into consideration any comments made on such statement in the said Council
before submitting the same to the State Government under Section 61." xxx xxx
xxx "49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons
other than licensees. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations,
if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not
being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may
for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs.
(2)In
fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any of the
following factors, namely:- (a) The nature of the supply and the purposes for
which it is required;
(b)
The co-ordinated development of the Supply and distribution of electricity
within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular
reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or
adequately served by the licensee;
(c) the
simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such
supplies;
(d)
The extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed
areas.
658
(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the
power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different
tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee,
having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the
supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.
(4) In
fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the
Board shall not show undue preference to any person." xxx xxx xxx Section
59 prior to 1978 "General principles for Board's finance. The Board shall
not, as far as practicable and after taking credit for any subventions from the
State Government under Section 63, carry on its operations under this Act at a
loss, and shall adjust its charges accordingly from time to time:
Provided
that where necessary any amounts due for meeting the operating, maintenance and
management expenses of the Board or for the purposes of clauses (i) and (ii) of
Section 67 may, to such extent as may be sanctioned by the State Government, be
paid out of capital." Section 59 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1978
"General principles for Board's finance. (1) The Board shall, after taking
credit for any subvention from the State Government under Section 63, carry on
its operations under this Act and adjust its tariffs so as to ensure that the
total revenues in any year of account shall, after meeting all expenses
properly chargeable to revenues, including operating, maintenance and
management expenses, taxes (if any) on income and profits, depreciation and
interest payable on all debentures, bonds and loans, leave such surplus, as the
State Government may, from time to time, specify.
(2) In
specifying the surplus under sub- section (1), 659 the State Government shall
have due regard to the availability of amounts accrued by way of depreciation
and the liability for loan amortization and leave.
(a) a
reasonable sum to contribute towards the cost of capital works; and (b) where
in respect of the Board, a notification has been issued under sub-section (1)
of Section 12-A, a reasonable sum by way of return on the capital provided by
the State Government under sub-section (3) of that section and the amount of
the loans (if any) converted by the State Government into capital under
sub-section (1) of Section 66A." Section 59 as further amended by Act No.
16 of 1983 "General principles for Board's finance. (1) The Board shall,
after taking credit for any subvention from the State Government under Section
63, carry on its operations under this Act and adjust its tariffs so as to
ensure that the total revenues in any year of account shall, after meeting all
expenses properly chargeable to revenues, including operating, maintenance and
management expenses, taxes (if any) on income and profits, depreciation and
interest payable on all debentures, bonds and loans, leave such surplus as is
not less than three per cent, or such higher percentage, as the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this
behalf, of the value of the fixed assets of the Board in service at the
beginning of such year.
Explanation.
- For the purposes of this sub- section, "value of the fixed assets of the
Board in service at the beginning of the year" means the original cost of
such fixed assets as reduced by the aggregate of the cumulative depreciation in
respect of such assets calculated in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and consumers' contribution for service lines.
(2) In
specifying any higher percentage under sub-section (1), the State Government
shall have due regard to 660 the availability of amounts accrued by way of
depreciation and the liability for loan amortization and leave- (a) a
reasonable sum to contribute towards the cost of capital works; and (b) where
in respect of the Board, a notification has been issued under sub-section (1)
of Section 12-A, a reasonable sum by way of return on the capital provided by
the State Government under sub-section (3) of that section and the amount of
the loans (if any) converted by the State Government into capital under
sub-section (1) of Section 66-A." xxx xxx xxx "61. Annual financial
statement. -(1) In February of each year the Board shall submit to the State
Government a statement in the prescribed form of the estimated capital and
revenue receipts and expenditure for the ensuing year.
(2)
The said statement shall include a statement of the salaries of members and
officers and other employees of the Board and of such other particulars as may
be prescribed.
(3)
The State Government shall as soon as may be after the receipt of the said
statement cause it to be laid on the table of the House, or as the case may be,
Houses of the State Legislature; and the said statement shall be open to
discussion therein, but shall not be subject to vote.
(4)
The Board shall take into consideration any comments made on the said statement
in the State Legislature.
(5)
The Board may at any time during the year in respect of which a statement under
sub-section (1) has been submitted, submit, to the State Government a
supplementary statement, and all the provisions of this section shall apply to
such statement as they apply to the statement under the said sub-section."
xxx xxx xxx 661 "63. Subventions to the Board.-The State Government may,
with the approval of the State Legislature, from time to time make subventions
to the Board for the purposes of this Act on such terms and conditions as the
State Government may determine." XXX XXX XXX "65. Power of Board to
borrow.-(1) The Board may, from time to time, with the previous sanction of the
State Government and subject to the provisions of this Act and to such conditions,
as may be prescribed in this behalf, borrow any sum required for the purposes
of this Act.
(2)
Rules made by the State Government for the purposes of this section may empower
the Board to borrow by the issue of debentures or bonds or otherwise and to
make arrangements with bankers, and may apply to the Board with such
modifications as may be necessary to be consistent with this Act, the
provisions of the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1914 (9 of 1914), and the rules
made thereunder as if the Board were a local authority.
(3)
The maximum amount which the Board may at any time have on loan under
sub-section (1) shall be ten crores of rupees, unless the State Government,
with the approval of the State Legislative Assembly, fixes a higher, maximum
amount.
(4)
Debentures or bonds issued by the Board under this section shall be issued,
transferred, dealt with and redeemed in such manner as may be prescribed."
XXX XX XXX "67. Priority of liabilities of the Board.-The Board shall
distribute the surplus referred to in sub-section (1) of section 59 to the
extent available in a particular year in the following order, namely:- (i)
repayment of principal of any loan raised (including redemption of debentures
or bonds issued) under Section 65 which becomes due for payment in the 662 year
or which became due for payment in any previous year and has remained unpaid;
(ii)
repayment of principal of any loan advanced to the Board by the State
Government under Section 64 which becomes due for payment in the year or which
became due for payment in any previous year and has remained unpaid;
(iii) payment
for purposes specified in sub- section (2) of Section 59 in such manner as the
Board may decide.
67-A.
Interest on loans advanced by State Government to be paid only after other
expenses.- Any interest which is payable on loans advanced under Section 64 or
deemed to have been advanced under Section 60 to the Board by the State
Government and which is charged to revenues in any year may be paid only out of
the balance of the revenues, if any, of that year which is left after meeting
all the other expenses referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 59 and so
much of such interest as is not paid in any year by reason of the provisions of
this section shall be deemed to be deferred liability and shall be discharged
it, accordance with the provisions of this section in the subsequent year or
year, as the case may be.
68.
Charging of depreciation by Board-(1) The Board shall provide each year for
depreciation such sum calculated in accordance with such principles as the
Central Government may, after consultation with the Authority, by notification
in the Official Gazette, lay down from time to time.
(2)
Omitted (3) The provisions of this section shall apply to the charging of depreciation
for the year in which the Electricity (Supply) Amendment Act, 1978, comes into
force." XXX XXX XXX "68-A. Directions by the State Government.- (1)
In 663 the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such
directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State
Government.
(2) If
any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a
question is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the
Authority whose decision thereon shall be final.'' We shall first consider the
common arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants in all
these matters before taking up some additional arguments advanced in some of
these matters.
The
first argument is that the requirement of consultation with the State
Electricity Consultative Council before the revision of tariffs in accordance
with Section 16 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, not having been made,
the upward revision of tariffs is invalid on account of non-compliance of Section
16 of the Supply Act. It was urged that revision of tariffs being a major
question of policy as envisaged by clause (i) of Sub-section (5) of Section 16,
it is one of the functions of the Consultative Council to advise the Board on
this question and without such advice of the Consultative Council, the revision
in tariffs could not be made. It was argued that the consumers' interest is
also represented on the Consultative Council as indicated by Sub-section (2) of
Section 16 providing for its constitution, and therefore, it was necessary to
know the viewpoint of the consumers through their representative in the
Consultative Council before deciding upon an upward revision of the tariffs for
H.T. consumers. Though the Board may not be bound by the advice of the
Consultative Council, yet it was urged, such consultation with the Council was
a condition precedent. It was suggested that Section 16 must be read with
Section 61 of the Supply Act which requires the Board to submit to the State
Government the annual financial statement in February each year.
It is
unnecessary in the present case to decide whether the revision of tariffs falls
within the ambit of `major questions of policy' occurring in Section 16(5)(i)
of the Supply Act since the arguments from both sides proceeded on the basis
that revision of tariffs for the purpose of this case may be treated as a
`question of policy' which expression finds place also in Section 78-A of the
Supply Act. The question, therefore, reduces itself to this:
Whether
the failure of the Board to place the matter before and seek the advice of the
Consultative Council on this question renders the revision of tariffs made by
it 664 invalid? The common premise for the purpose of this case that revision
of tariffs by the Board is a question of policy may indicate that it would be
open to the Consultative Council to advise the Board also on the question of
revision of tariffs, and if such advice is given, then the Board must consider
the same before taking the final decision. That, however, does not necessarily
mean that where no such advice was taken from the Consultative Council or was
rendered on account of the absence of any meeting of the Consultative Council
during the relevant period, it would necessarily render invalid the revision of
tariffs made by the Board. The consequence of non-compliance of Section 16 is
not provided and the nature of function of the Consultative Council and the
force of its advice being at the best only persuasive. it cannot be said that
revision of tariffs without seeking the advice of the Consultative Council
renders the revision of tariffs invalid. It is also significant that the annual
financial statement containing all particulars relating to revision of tariffs
is required to be submitted to the State Government in February each year and
the State Government is required after receipt of such statement to cause it to
be laid on the table of the House or Houses of the State Legislature and the
said statement is open to discussion therein. The Board is bound to take into
consideration any comments made on the said statement in the State Legislature.
Thus, there is ample provision for discussion on the revised tariffs in the
State Legislature with the Board being bound to take into consideration any
comments made thereon.
Shri Shanti
Bhushan sought to make a distinction between the provisions of sub-section (5)
of section 16 pertaining to the functions of the `Consultative Council'
empowering or enabling the Council to advice the Board on `major questions of
policy' and the provision in sub-section (6) as to the obligation of the Board
to place certain matters before the `Council' to emphasise his point that
sub-section (6) does not envisage any obligation on the part of the `Board' to
place before the Council the proposal for revision of tariffs. He sought to
distinguish between the functions of the `Council' to tender advice and the
obligation of the Board to specifically seek and invite such advice. Shri Shanti
Bhushan said that the very concept of consultation does imply mandatory
obligation or duty attaching the pain of nullity to the transaction.
Provisions
of the Electricity Act 1947 in England
contain certain express statutory stipulations as to the scope of the
Consultative Council's functions which do not, in terms, obtain in the Indian
statute. For instance, Section 7 of the English Act which contemplates 665 the
establishment of `Consultative Council' specifically provides in Section 7(4) :
``(4)
Each of the said Councils shall be charged with the duties- (a) of considering
any matter affecting the distribution of electricity in the area, including the
variation of tariffs and the provision of new or improved services and
facilities within the area, .............
(b)
xxx xxx xxx (c) of considering any matter affecting the variation of any tariff
regulating the charges for the provision of bulk supplies of electricity by the
Generating Board for distribution in the area, being a matter which is either
the subject of a representation made to them by consumers or other persons
requiring supplies of electricity in the area, or which appears to them to be a
matter to which consideration ought to be given apart from any such
representation, and, where after consultation with the Area Board action appears
to them to be requisite as to any such matter, of notifying their conclusions
to the Generating Board;
(d) xxx
xxx xxx (rest of the Section omitted as unnecessary) Section 37(1) of the
English statute again provides:
``37
Fixing and variation tariffs (1) The prices to be charged by the Generating
Board for the supply of electricity by them to Area Boards shall be in
accordance with such tariffs as may be fixed from time to time by the
Generating Board after consultation with the Electricity Council; the different
tariffs may be fixed for different Area Boards.'' (rest of the Section omitted
as unnecessary) The pattern of the provisions in the Indian statute is quite
different.
666
The `laying procedure' before the legislature effectively controls the exercise
of the delegated power of the Board.
We are
of the opinion that though advisable yet failure to seek advice of the
Consultative Council before revision of the tariffs does not result in
invalidation of the revised tariffs. This consequence appears to us to be the
logical and reasonable view to take of the requirement of Section 16 along with
other provisions of the Supply Act.
One of
the arguments addressed at length before us relates to Section 78-A of the
Supply Act. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that any direction of the
State Government relating to tariffs was on a question of policy within the
meaning of Sub-section (1), and, therefore, the Board is bound by such
direction subject only to the adjudication, if any, in accordance with
Sub-section (2), if any dispute is raised by the Board in that behalf. It was
urged that in the present case the Board was, therefore, bound by the
directions of the State Government granting the concession to the power
intensive consumers since no dispute was raised by the Board in accordance with
Sub- section (2), of Section 78-A. Learned counsel for the Board did not for
the purpose of this case, dispute this position, but contended that all
directions of the State Government were obeyed by the Board and, therefore, the
question does not really arise. The Board's contention is that it has acted
according to the directions of the State Government and, therefore, the
question of non-compliance with any such directions giving rise to the argument
based on Section 78-A does not arise.
For
consideration of the main controversy, it is advisable at this stage to deal
with Sections 49 and 59 of the Supply Act. Section 49 makes provision for the
sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees.
Sub-section
(1) starts with the words `Subject to the provisions of this Act and of
regulations, if any, made in this behalf'. This means that the provision made
therein is subject to other provisions of the Supply Act and the regulations.
It then proceeds to say that the Board may supply electricity to any person not
being a licensee upon `such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit' and
may for the purposes of such supply supply frame `uniform tariffs'. Sub-section
(2) then enumerates several factors which the Board is required to `have regard
to' in fixing the uniform tariffs. The meaning of the expression `have regard
to' is well-settled. It means that the factors specifically enumerated shall be
taken into account while performing the exercise which in this case is the
fixation of uniform tariffs. Ordinarily, therefore, uniform tariffs are
required to be framed by the Board for making such supply. Sub-section (3) then
proceeds to 667 say that nothing in the earlier enacted provisions shall derogate
from the power of the Board, `if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix
different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person', having regard
to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose
for which supply is required and `any other relevant factors'. Sub-section (4)
then says that in fixing the tariffs and terms and conditions for the supply of
electricity, `the Board shall not show undue preference to any person'. In
other words, Sub-section (4) provides against any unreasonable discrimination
in fixing the tariffs and terms and conditions for supply of electricity.
The
power of fixation of tariffs in the Board is provided in this manner by Section
49 of the Supply Act which requires the fixation of uniform tariffs ordinarily
having regard particularly to the specified factors and enables fixation of
such tariffs for any person having regard to the factors expressly stated and
any other relevant factors, providing further that no unreasonable or undue preference
shall be shown to any person by the Board in exercise of its powers of fixing
the tariffs.
The
next important provision is Section 59 of the Supply Act. For appreciating the
argument based on Section 59, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction
in Section 59 as it stood prior to 1978, as amended by Act No. 23 of 1978 and
finally as amended by Act No. 16 of 1983, quoted earlier.
Prior
to 1978, Section 59 required the Board, as far as practicable and after taking
credit for any subventions from the State Government under Section 63, not to
carry on its operations under this ACt at a loss and for this purpose, it was
empowered to adjust its charges accordingly from time to time. Under the
provision as it then existed, the main thrust was to avoid the Board incurring
any loss and for that purpose, it could adjust its charges accordingly from
time to time. Section 59 as amended by Act No. 23 of 1978 required the Board,
after taking credit for any subventions from the State Government under Section
63, to carry on its operations under this Act and to adjust its tariffs so as
to ensure that the total revenues in any year meeting all expenses properly
chargeable to revenue including those specified, left such surplus as the State
Government specified from time to time. The shift was, therefore, towards
having a surplus as the State Government specified from time to time.
Sub-section (2) then provided guidelines for the State Government in specifying
the surplus under Sub-section (1) and mentioned the factors to which regard was
to be had for this purpose. The effect of the amendment made in Section 59 by
Act No. 16 of 1983, which came into effect from 1.4.1985, was to provide for a
668 minimum surplus of three per cent or such higher percentage as the State
Government is to specify in this behalf. In other words, prior to 1978
amendment, the requirement from the Board was to avoid incurring any loss,
after the 1978 amendment the shift was towards ensuring a surplus as specified
by the State Government, and after the 1983 amendment the Board is required to
ensure a surplus of at least three per cent unless the State Government
specifies a higher surplus. This is the scheme of Section 59 and it is Section
59 as amended by 1978 Act but prior to its amendment by the 1983 Act, with
which we are concerned in the present case.
It
cannot be doubted that Section 59 requiring the Board to adjust its tariffs for
the purpose of Board's finance is to be read along with Section 49 which
provides specifically for fixation of tariffs and the manner in which that
exercise has to be performed while dealing with any question relating to the
revision of tariffs.
It was
argued on behalf of the appellants that Section 59 as amended by the 1978 Act
did not empower the Board to adjust its tariffs to generate any surplus unless
the surplus had been specified by the State Government and when specified, the
surplus generated could not exceed the specified surplus. In other words, it
was argued that when the State Government did not specify any surplus, the
Board had no power to adjust its tariffs in a manner which resulted in
generating any surplus. We are unable to construe Section 59 in this manner.
The general principle for the Board's finance indicated by Section 59 is that
prior to the 1978 amendment, tariffs could be adjusted to avoid any loss, but
as a result of the shift made by the 1978 amendment, the power could be
exercised to generate a surplus and when the State Government specified the
amount of surplus then the Board was bound to adjust the tariffs to ensure
generation of the specified surplus. However, generation of a reasonable
surplus in any year of account without specification of the surplus amount by
the State Government was not contra-indicated in the provision inasmuch as the
duty to generate a surplus was implicit with the added obligation to ensure
generating surplus to the extent specified by the State Government when it was
so specified by the State Government. It cannot be accepted as a reasonable
view that in the absence of specification of the surplus by the State
Government, the Board could not adjust its tariffs to generate even a
reasonable surplus in any year of account. The effect of 1983 amendment, which
came into force from 1.4.1985, is that the Board is entitled to adjust its
tariffs to ensure generating a surplus of not less than three per cent even
without such specification 669 by the State Government and when the State
Government specifies a higher surplus, then the Board must ensure generating the
higher specified surplus. This is, of course, subject to the accepted norm of
the Board acting in consonance with its public utility character and not
entirely with a profit motive like that of a private trader.
The
pre-1978 concept of the Board's functioning to merely avoid any loss is
replaced by the shift after 1978 amendment towards the positive approach of
requiring a surplus to be generated, the quantum of surplus being specified by
the State Government, with a minimum of three per cent surplus in the absence
of the specification by the Government of a higher surplus, after the 1983
amendment. This construction made of Section 59, as it stood at different times
in Govinda Prabhu's case (supra) indicated earlier, cannot be faulted in any
manner. In Govinda Prabhu's case (supra) the same argument which is advanced
before us was expressly rejected. We are of the same view.
It is
, therefore, obvious that mere generation of surplus by the Board as a result
of adjusting its tariffs when the quantum of surplus has not been specified by
the State Government after the 1978 amendment of Section 59 of the Supply Act,
cannot invite any criticism unless it is further shown that the surplus
generated as a result of the adjustment of tariffs by the Board has resulted in
the Board acting as a private trader shedding off its public utility character.
In other words, if the profit is made not merely for the sake of profit, but
for the purpose of better discharge of its obligations by the Board, it cannot
be said that the public enterprise has acted beyond it authority.
The
Board in the present case has shown that the surplus resulting from upward
revision of tariffs applicable to the H.T. consumers made in the present case,
was for the purpose of better discharge of its other obligations under the
Supply Act and in effect, it has merely resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the
concessional tariffs provided earlier to the power intensive consumers which do
not in its opinion require continuance of the concessional tariffs any longer.
In fact, no material has been placed before us to indicate that this assertion
of the Board is incorrect or there is any reasonable basis to hold that the
upward revision of tariffs applicable to H.T. consumers is merely with a desire
to earn more profits like a private trader and not to generate surplus for utilisation
of the funds to discharge other obligations of the Board towards more needy
consumers, such as agriculturists or to meet the need of expansion of the
supply to deserving areas. The argument with reference to statistics that the
upward revision of tariffs for the H.T. consumers results in earning amounts in
excess of the cost of generation does not, therefore, merit a more detailed
consideration.
670 It
was also contended on behalf of the appellants that the generation of
electricity by the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board is both thermal as well as
hydro, the quantity from each source being nearly equal and the entire
electricity generated is fed into a common grid, from which is supplied to all
categories of consumers. On this basis, it was argued that the rise in the fuel
cost which led to the fuel cost adjustment applicable only to the H.T.
consumers was unreasonable and discriminatory since the burden of rise in fuel
cost was placed only on the H.T. consumers. In our opinion, this argument has
no merit. The H.T. consumers, including the power intensive consumers, are
known power guzzlers and in power intensive industries, electricity is really a
raw material. This category of consumers, therefore, forms a distinct class
separate from other consumers like L.T. consumers who are much smaller
consumers. There is also a rational nexus of this classification with the
object sought to be achieved.
Moreover,
the power intensive consumers have been enjoying the benefit of a concessional
tariff for quite some time, which too is a relevant factor to justify this
classification. Placing the burden of fuel cost adjustment on these power
guzzlers, who had the benefit of concessional tariff for quite some time and
have also a better capacity to pay, cannot, therefore, be faulted since the
consumption in the power intensive industries accounts for a large quantity.
Shri Sibal
submitted that the prescription and imposition of disparate tariffs, unrelated
to the production cost, on a particular section of consumers would be a case of
misplaced philanthrophy on the part of the statutory authority. The Board, Shri
Sibal says, cannot use its powers in order to confer "social or economic
benefits on particular sections of the community" at the cost of the other
sections. Shri Sibal contended that while it may be permissible for the Board
to supply electricity to the weaker and under-privileged sections of the
society at prices which may even be lower than the costs of generation and
distribution, however subsidies for such social objectives must come from
subventions from Government and should not be made good by unjustifiable higher
charges on other sections of electricity consumers. Shri Sibal read to us the
following passage in Wade's Administrative Law (6th Edn.):
"Statutory
authorities have sometimes made use of their wide general powers in order to
confer social or economic benefits on particular sections of the community. In
several such cases they have gone beyond the true limits of their powers. The
policy of the courts is in general hostile to the 671 use of public funds, such
as rates, for new social experiments. Local authorities are subject to a
fiduciary duty to use their revenues with due restraint." (at p. 424)
After referring to decided cases on the point, the learned author says:
"...
The idea that runs through these cases is that public money must be
administered with responsibility and without extravagance. This appears to mean
it is not available for charity.
The
generosity of local authorities, in particular, is restrained by the doctrine
that they owe a fiduciary duty to their ratepayers analogous to that of
trustees. This means that, in deciding upon their expenditure, they must hold a
balance fairly between the recipients of the benefit and the ratepayers who
have to bear the cost." (at p.426) Shri Sibal contends that in the case of
class of consumers respecting which the tariff is enhanced, the enhancement is
not justified on the ground of making good the loss on supply to others at
cheaper rates. The increase is attributable to higher costs of generation of
thermal power.
It is
not unreasonable to take the view that the thermal power has become costlier on
account of the increase in fuel cost and could nationally be allocated to the
consumption by H.T. and power intensive consumers, and, therefore, the fuel
cost adjustment is made applicable to them alone. In our opinion, the argument
on behalf of the Board in this behalf is not unreasonable.
It was
argued on behalf of the appellants with considerable force that the upward hike
of tariff for the H.T. consumers including power intensive was arbitrary and
discriminatory inasmuch as it was not related to the cost of generation and was
based on irrelevant factors. It was argued that the L.T. tariffs and
agricultural tariffs were relieved of this burden and the liabilities of the
Board even of a capital nature were taken into account for increasing the
tariff applicable to power intensive units.
The
contention is that these factors are irrelevant and do not permit exercise of
the power to increase the tariffs.
This arguments
was considered at length in Govinda Prabhu's case before it was 672 negatived.
We agree with the reasons given in that decision to repel this contention. In Govinda
Prabhu, it was pointed out that the Court would not strike down the revision of
tariff as arbitrary unless the resulting surplus reaches such a height as to
lead to the inevitable decision that the Board has shed its public utility
character and is obsessed by the profit motive of private entrepreneur in order
to generate a surplus which is extravagant. The limited power of judicial
review in the field of price fixation was also indicated. This limited scope of
judicial review in striking down revision of tariffs resulting in generation of
surplus applied in Govinda Prabhu cannot be faulted in view of the long line of
decisions of this Court on the point and reiteration of the same principle by a
Constitution Bench in Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and Another. v. Union of India and
Others, [1990] 3 S.C.C. 223. The surplus generated by the Board as a result of
revision of tariffs during the relevant period cannot be called extravagant by
any standard to render it arbitrary permitting the striking down of the
revision of tariffs on the ground of arbitrariness. We have already indicated
that it is not also discriminatory as was the view taken in Govinda Prabhu. It
has been pointed out on behalf of the Board that the Board's action is based on
the opinion of Rajadhyaksha Committee's Report submitted in 1980 and the
formula of fuel cost adjustment is on a scientific basis linked to the increase
in the fuel cost. This is a possible view to take and, therefore, the revision
of tariffs by the Board does not fall within the available scope of judicial
review.
One of
the contentions of Shri G. Ramaswamy, on behalf of the appellant was that the G.Os.
issued in respect of the power intensive units amounted to a special tariff for
them resulting in their exclusion from the category of H.T. consumers and,
therefore, the clause relating to fuel cost adjustment inserted by amendment to
the H.T. tariffs did not apply to the power intensive consumers without
insertion of a similar clause in the special tariff applicable to them.
It was
urged that for this reason the power intensive consumers could not be governed
by the clause of fuel cost adjustment made applicable to H.T. tariffs. Shri Ramaswamy
advanced elaborate arguments to distinguish "terms and conditions of
supply" from "terms and conditions of tariff".
According
to the learned counsel, B.P. Ms. No. 778 dated 18.10.1975 excluded the power
intensive units from applicability of the Notification date 17.9.1975 to it. It
is unnecessary to repeat the history of the H.T. tariffs by which power
intensive tariffs were separated. It would be sufficient in this context to
quote the relevant portion of Memo. dated 18.11.1975 which, in our opinion,
negatives this argument. It was provided in this Memo., inter alia as under:
673
"With regard to other charges, such as Miscellaneous charges, terms and
conditions of supply, not mentioned specifically herein, those applicable to
normal H.T. consumers will apply".
The
expression "other charges" is wide enough to include within its ambit
the fuel cost adjustment admittedly made applicable to all H. T.consumers as a
result of the escalation in fuel prices. The method adopted was to prescribe a
formula linking it to the increase in fuel cost so that it was not necessary to
revise the tariffs each time as a result of increase in fuel prices, the same
being taken care of by the relevant factors in the formula for fuel cost
adjustment. It was in this context that Shri Ramaswamy contended that the
`terms and conditions of supply' are different from the `terms and conditions
of tariff' and fuel cost adjustment being a term or condition of tariff and not
a term or condition of supply, the above provision in the Memo dated 18.11.1975
did not have the effect of applying the term relating to fuel cost adjustment
to the power intensive tariff. It is sufficient to state that the Memo dated
18.11.1975 did not merely extend the non-specified `terms and conditions of
supply' applicable to normal H.T. consumers to the power intensive consumers
but also "other charges" which were merely illustrated by the words
following, namely, "such as Misc. charges, terms and conditions of supply
not mentioned herein". In other words, this express provision in the Memo,
dated 18.11.1975 clearly provided that except for the provisions specifically
made for power intensive consumers, in respect of all other provisions the
power intensive consumers were to be governed by the provisions, by whatever
name called, applicable to the normal H.T. consumers. A further discussion of
this distinction sought to be made by Shri G. Ramaswamy of the `terms and
conditions of supply' and `terms and conditions of tariff' is, therefore,
unnecessary. Shri Ramaswamy also urged that there was no communication to the
appellant of the applicability of the term relating to fuel cost adjustment
during the relevant period which also relieves the power intensive consumers of
this liability. On the view we have already taken about the applicability of
the term relating to fuel cost adjustment to the power intensive tariffs this
point is not material. However, it has also been shown that in the bills issued
to the power intensive consumers the same was specifically indicated. If any
communication was needed, this indication in the bills issued to the power
intensive consumers satisfied that requirement. We are, therefore, unable to
accept the contention that the term relating to fuel cost adjustment made
applicable to H.T. consumers 674 had no application to the power intensive
consumers during the relevant period.
Shri Kapil
Sibal appearing on behalf of some of the appellants confined the challenge to
the mode of exercise of power by the Board. He laid great emphasis on the
effect of absence of consultation with the Consultative Committee under Section
16 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. He also claimed that the quantum of
increase could at best be justified only to the extent of one-half and no more.
Shri Sibal claimed that certain extraneous factors had been taken into account
for the purpose of revising the tariffs. The irrelevant considerations,
according to Shri Sibal, taken into account are the capital sums owed by the
Board and the overall losses incurred by the Board which according to him is
impermissible under Section 59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. He also argued
that the upward revision of H.T. tariffs is intended to subsidise another class
of consumers which is not permissible. His arguments are already covered by our
earlier discussion. Similarly, the arguments of Shri K.N. Bhat, for the
appellant in C.A. No. 5379 of 1985 to the same effect, need to further
discussion.
The
details of the several factors taken into account for the revision in tariffs,
to the limited extent they can be gone into within the permissible scope of
judicial review in such a matter also do not require any further consideration.
Shri
Anil Divan, on behalf of the appellant in C.A No. 2569 of 1985, submitted that
the increase in tariffs for the power intensive unit in his case was 47 per
cent as against 15 per cent for ordinary H.T. consumers. According to him, even
ignoring the FCA, the increase is 40 per cent from 32 paise to 45 paise. This
is disputed on behalf of the Board. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to go
into this question any further for the reasons already given by us.
Shri
Divan also contended that the Electricity Board's stand has been conflicting at
different stages. In our opinion, any detailed decision on this aspect also is
unnecessary on the view taken by us about the Board's power to revise tariffs,
no case for striking down the same as arbitrary and discriminatory having been
made out. In view of the earlier decision of this Court in Govinda Prabhu, with
the conclusion as well as reasoning of which we respectfully concur and
reiteration of the Court's limited power of judicial review in Shri Sitaram
Sugar Company Limited recently decided by a Constitution Bench, we do not find
any reason to accept any of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants
by their learned counsel. In fact, the decision in Govinda Prabhu con- 675 cludes
the controversy against the appellants and some detailed discussion by us has
become necessary only on account of an attempt on behalf of the appellants to distinguish
the decision and the emphasis placed on the requirements of Sections 16, 49 and
59 of the Electricity (Supply) Act.
We
find no merit in these appeals/special leave petition and the same are
dismissed. All interim orders in favour of the appellants/petitioner stand
vacated. No costs.
R.P.
Appeals dismissed.
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