Shivaji
Dayanu Patil & Anr Vs. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More [1991] INSC 158 (17 July 1991)
Agrawal, S.C. (J) Agrawal, S.C. (J) Ray, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 1769 1991 SCR (3) 26 1991 SCC (3) 530 JT 1991 (3) 133 1991 SCALE (2)92
ACT:
Motor Vehichles
Act, 1939: Sections 2(18) and 92A--`Motor Vehicle'--Petrol tanker used for
transporting petrol--Overturned due to collision with another motor
vehicle--Damaged to the extent that it became immobile--Whether ceases to be a
`Motor Vehicle'--Death due to explosion and fire taking place few hours after
the collision--Both connected and related events--Causal rela- tionship between
user of the vehicle and accident--Need not be direct and proximate--Death as a
result of accident arising out of `use of Motor Vehicle'--No fault
liability--Nature and scope of.
Bombay
Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989: Rules 291-A, 291-B, 297(2), 306-A to 306-D.
Adjudication of claims under Section 92A of the Act-Special Procedure to be
followed by Claims Tribunal for expeditious disposal--Normal procedure pre- scribed in respect
of claims under Section 110A--Need not be followed.
Words
& Phrases: `use'--`Arising out off--Meaning of.
HEAD NOTE:
Due to
a collision on the highway between a Petrol tanker and a truck, the Petrol
tanker went off the road and fell on its side at some distance from the
highway. As a result of it, petrol leaked out and collected nearby. Nearly four
hours after the collision an explosion took place in the petrol tanker
resulting in fire. A large number of persons who had assembled near the petrol
tanker sustained burn injuries; few of them succumbed to the injuries. Re- spondent's
son was of the persons who died as such.
Respondent
filed a claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of
the Motor Vehicles Act for Rs.75,000 as compensation. She also claimed Rs.15,000
as compensation under Section 92A of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the claim
under Section 92A on the ground that the explosion could not be said to be an
accident arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and so the provisions of
Sec- tion 92A were not attracted. It held that the explosion and the fire which
took place after about four hours of the accident had no connec- 27 tion with
the accident and it was altogether a different and independent accident, It
also observed that the villagers took benefit of the earlier accident and while
they were trying to pilfer petrol' from the tanker there was friction which
caused the ignition and explosion and since an outside agency was responsible
therefore the subsequent accident of explosion and fire could not be said to be
an accident arising out of the use of the tanker.
On
appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court disagreed with the finding of the
Tribunal that the explosion was a direct consequence of the attempt to pilfer
petrol from it and further held that in view of Sub-Section (4) of Section 92A
if there was a wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the deceased or
injured, the claim under Section 92A for compensation for no liability cannot
be rejected. He observed that the fact that at the material time, the tanker
was not driven on the highway but was lying turtle on the side of the highway,
would not make any difference and that the tanker was a vehicle lying on the
side of the highway and would be covered by the expression 'use' in Section 92A
of the Act and so compensation would be payable under 'no fault liability'.
The
petitioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision and a
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same affirming the findings of
the Single Judge. The Bench held that the collision between the tanker and the
other vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker
which ultimately resulted in explosion and fire were not unconnected but
related events.
It
rejected the claim of the petitioners that the first information report
recorded by the police and the panchnama indicated that the explosion and fire
near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a
match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette.
Aggrieved
by the said decision, the petitioners pre- ferred the present petition for
special leave to appeal.
On
behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the petrol tanker was not a
motor vehicle, as defined ln Section 2(18) of the Act, at the time the
explosion and fire took place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying
turtle and was not capable of movement on the road; that since before the
explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying immobile it could not be said
that the petrol tanker was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the
explosion and fire; that even if it is found that the petrol tanker was in use
as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and fire, there was no causal
relationship between the 28 collision which took place between the petrol
tanker and the truck and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took
place about four-and-half hours later and it cannot, therefore, be said that the
explosion and fire in the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the use
of a motor vehicle.
Dismissing
the petition, this Court,
HELD:
1. Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in the nature of beneficial
legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of
limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out
of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter
of interpretation of a bene- ficial legislation the approach of the courts is
to adopt a construction which advances the beneficient purpose underly- ing the
enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose.
[39E-G] Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi & Ors.,
[1982] 1 SCR 860; Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan &
Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752, relied on.
Manjusri
Raha & Ors. v.B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2 SCR 944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979]
3 SCR 184; Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [1980] 1 SCR
300; N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc., [1980] 3 SCR 101 and
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & Anr.,
[1987] 3 SCR 404, referred to.
2. The
petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose of transporting
petrol. It was a vehicle which had been adapted for such use and was suitable
for use on the road for transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol tanker
collided with the truck on the national highway, it was being used for the
purpose of transporting petrol. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the
said collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was
defined in section 2(18) of the Act. Merely because the petrol tanker had
turned turtle as a result of the collision and was lying at a short distance
away from the road, does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for
use on the road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle. It could be said that
as a result of the collision with the truck the petrol tanker was damaged to
such an extent that there was no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being
made mobile again. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that the petrol
tanker which was a motor vehicle when it collided with the 29 truck had ceased
to be a motor vehicle after the said colli- sion and it could not be regarded a
motor 'vehicle under Section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion
and fire took place. [40H; 41A-C, 42D-E] Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa. etc., [1975] 2 SCR 138; Newberry
v. Simmonds, [1961] 2 Q.B. 345 and Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B.
291, referred to.
3. The
word 'use' has a wider connotationas to cover the period when the vehicle is
not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account
of the vehi- cle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down or
mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the
petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side
after the collision with the truck. [44F-G] Pushpa Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh
& Ors., [1975] ACJ 396; General Managar, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa
& Ors., [1979] ACJ 452 and Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Suman Navnath Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ 243, ap- proved.
Elliott
v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367 and Government Insur- ance Office of New South Wales
v. R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437, referred to.
4.1.
There is no ground for interfering with the find- ings recorded by the High
Court that those persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion
and fire in the petrol tanker did not indulge in any unlawful activity which
might have caused the explosion and fire. The matter has, therefore, to be
examined in the light of the meaning to be assigned to the words "arising
out of" In the expres- sion "accident arising out of the use of a
motor vehicle" in Section 92A of the Act. [46D-E]
4.2.
The words "arising out of" have been used in var- ious statutes in
different contexts and have been construed by Courts widely as well as
narrowly, keeping in view the context in which they have been used in a
particular legis- lation. [46F]
4.3.
In the context of motor accidents the expressions "caused by" and
"arising out of" are often used in statutes.
Although
both these expressions imply a causal relationship between the accident
resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the
degree of 30 proximity of such relationship. As compared to the expres- sion
"caused by" the expression "arising out of" has a wider
connotation and the causal relationship is not required to be direct and
proximate and it can be less immediate. [47G; 48E]
4.4.
The expression "caused by" was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii)
and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92A of the Act, Parliament, however,
chose to use the ex- pression "arising out of" which indicates that
for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92A, the causal
relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in
death or permanent disablementis not required to be direct and proximate and it
can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect- ed
with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct
and immediate. This construction of the expression "arising out of the use
of a motor vehicle" in section 92A enlarges the field of protection made
available to the victims of accident and is in consonance with the beneficial
object underlying the enactment. [48D-E] Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt.
Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970] 1 SCR 869; Government Insurance Office
of New South Wales v. R.J. Green & Ltyoyd Pl. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437; Heyman
v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356; Union of India v. E.B. Aaby's Rederi A/S,
[1975] A.C. 797 and Samick Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Antonis P. Lemos,
[1985] 2 WLR 468, referred to.
5. In
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the accident involving explosion
and fire in the petrol tanker was connected with the use of tanker as a motor
vehicle. The High Court was right in holding that the colli- sion between the
tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier and the escape of
petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were
not unconnected but related events and merely because there was interval of
about four to hour-and-half hours between the said collision and the explosion
and fire in the tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no
causal relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must be
held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the
death of the Respondent's son was due to an accident arising out of the use of
the motor vehicle viz., the petrol tanker. [48G-H; 49A-B]
6. The
object underlying the enactment of Section 92A is to make available to the
claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs.15,000 in case of death and
Rs.7,500 in case of permanent disable- 31 ment as expeditiously as possible and
the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under Section
110A of the Act. This would be apparent from the provision of Section 92B of
the Act which provides that a claim for compensation under Section 92A in
respect of death or perma- nent disablement of any person shall be disposed of
as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of
such death or permanent disablement under Section 92A and also in pursuance of
any right on the prin- ciple of fault, the claim for compensation under Section
92A shall be disposed of in the first place. With a view to give effect to the
said directive contained in Section 92B of the Act, the Maharashtra Government
has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims
under Section 92A in Rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A, 306B, 306C and 306D of the
Rules. The object underlying the said provi- sions is to enable expeditious
disposal of a claim petition under Section 92A of the Act. The said object
would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regu- lar trial
in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under Section 110A of
the Act. [52B-E]
7.
Rules 291A, 306A and 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehi- cles Rules, 1989 contain
adequate provisions which would ennable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself
in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under Sec- tion
92A of the Act and in view of these special provisions the Claims Tribunal is
not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the
Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim under Section 110A of the Act for
the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under Section 92A of the
Act. [53B-D]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14822 of 1990.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 16.8.1990 of the Bombay High Court in L.P.A. No.
65 of 1990.
G.L. Sanghi,
K.S.V. Murthy, S.M. Puri and Pramod Dayal for the Petitioners.
Ashok
H. Desai, George Kurian, A.P. Vaze and G.B. Sathe for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by 32 S.C. AGRAWAL, J. The questions raised
for consideration in this petition for special leave to appeal involve the
interpretation of the expression "arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle" contained in section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(hereinafter referred to as the Act').
On
October 29, 1987, at about 3 A.M., there was a colli- sion between a petrol
tanker bearing Registration No. MKL- 7461 and a truck bearing Registration No. MEH-4197
on the National Highway No. 4 near village Kavatha, in District Satara, Maharashtra. The petrol tanker was proceeding
from Pune side to Bangalore whereas the truck was coming from
the opposite direction. As a result of the said collision, the petrol tanker
went off the road and fell on its left side at a distance of about 20 feet from
the highway. As a result of the overturning of the petrol tanker, the petrol
contained in it leaked out and collected nearby. At about 7.15 A.M., an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker
resulting in fire. A number of persons who had assembled near the petrol tanker
sustained burn injuries and a few of them succumbed to the said injuries. One
of those who died as a result of such injuries was Deepak Uttam More. The
respond- ent is the mother of Deepak Uttam More. Petitioner No. 1 is the owner
of the said petrol tanker and Petitioner No. 2, the insurer of the same.
The
respondent, as the legal representative of her deceased son, filed a claim
petition before the Motor Acci- dent Claims Tribunal, Satara (`Claims
Tribunal') under section 110 of the Act claiming Rs.75,000 as compensation from
the petitioners. She also made a claim for payment of Rs. 15,000 as
compensation under section 92A of the Act. It appears that claim petitions were
also filed by the legal representatives of other persons who had died as a
result of the burn injuries sustained by them in the explosion and fire in the
petrol tanker. The petitioners contested the claim petitions filed by the
respondent and other claimants under section 92A of the Act and raised
objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to enter- tain
such petitions on the ground that explosion and fire resulting in injuries to
the deceased could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of a
motor vehicle.
The
Claims Tribunal decided all the claim petitions filed under Section 92A of the
Act by a common order dated Decem- ber 2, 1989 whereby the said petitions were
dismissed on the ground that the explosion could not be said to be an acci-
dent arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and that the provisions of
section 92A of the Act were not attracted.
The
Claims Tribunal was of the view that the explosion and the fire which took
place after about four 33 hours had no connection whatsoever with the accident
which took place at 3
A.M. and that the
explosion and the fire was altogether an independent accident. The Claims
Tribunal also observed that the villagers tried to take the benefit of the
earlier accident and tried to pilfer petrol from the petrol tanker and while
thus pilfering the petrol there was fric- tion which caused ignition and
explosion and since an out- side agency was responsible for the explosion and
fire which situation was created by the villagers themselves the explo- sion
could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of the tanker. The
respondent filed an appeal against the said order of the Claims Tribunal before
the High Court.
The
said appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by judgment
dated February 5, 1990. The learned Single Judge disagreed
with the finding of the Claims Tribu- nal that the explosion was a direct
consequence of the attempt to pilfer petrol from the tanker and observed that
the Tribunal was not justified in proceeding on the assump- tion that all the
injured persons and deceased were engaged in pilfering the petrol and the
explosion was a direct consequence of the same. The learned Single Judge also
held that in view of sub-section (4) of section 92A of the Act if there is a
wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the deceased or the injured,
the claim under section 92A of the Act for compensation for no fault liability
cannot be rejected. With regard to the applicability of section 92A of the Act,
the learned Single Judge observed that the fact that at the material time the
tanker was not being driven on the Highway but was lying turtle on its side would
make no difference and that it was a vehicle lying on the side of the Highway
and would be covered by the expression 'use' in section 92A of the Act and
compensation would be payable under no fault liability of section 92A of the
Act. He, therefore, directed payment of Rs. 15,000 as compensation under
section 92A of the Act to the respondent. The Peti- tioners filed a Letters
Patent Appeal against the said decision of the learned Single Judge which was
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated August 16,
1990. The Appellate Bench of the High Court has affirmed the finding of the
learned Single Judge that there was no evidence whatsoever that the person or
persons in respect of whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section
92A were themselves committing theft or pilferage of petrol at the time of
their deaths and that these victims could have only been curious by-standers at
the site of the accident.
The
learned Judges have observed that the expression 'use of a motor vehicle'
covers a very wide field, a field more extensive than which might be called
traffic use of the motor vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not confined
to the periods when it Was in motion or was moving and that a vehicle would
still be is use 34 even when it was stationary The learned Judges were of the
view that merely' because there Was interval of about four and half hours
between the collision of the petrol tanker and the explosion and fire in the
tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation
between earlier event and the later incident of explosion and fire and that the
earlier collision if not the cause was at least the main contributory factor
for the subsequent explosion and fire in the tanker in question inasmuch as the
tanker was carrying petrol which was a highly combustible and volatile material
and after the collision-the petrol tanker had fallen on one of its sides on
sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and there was
grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker and
the tanker was allowed to remain in such a dangerous condition for hours
without any effort being made to prevent such great hazard of fire and explo- sion
from petrol escaping from the tanker. According to the learned Judges, the
collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and
the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explo- sion
and fire were not unconnected but related events. The learned Judges rejected
the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that in the instant case the
first information report recorded by the police and the panchanama indicated
that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless
act of throwing away of a match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette.
The learned Judges held that the papers and documents filed before the Claims
Tribunal under rule 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 did not
establish that the fire was ignited by someone carelessly throwing a match
stick. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Bench of the
Bombay High Court, the petitioner have filed this petition for special leave to
appeal. A notice for final disposal was issued on the petition and the learned counsel
for the parties have been heard at length.
Shri
G.L. Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has urged that
in the instant case, it cannot be said that the explosion and fire in the
petrol tanker which occurred at about 7.15 A.M., i.e., nearly four and half
hours after the collision involving the petrol tanker and the other truck, was
an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and therefore, the claim
petition filed by the respondent could not be entertained under section 92-A of
the Act. Shri Sanghi has made a three-fold submis- sion in this regard. In the
first place, he has submitted that the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle as
defined in section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion and fire
took place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying turtle and was 35
not capable of movement on the road. The second submission of Shri Sanghi is
that since before the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying immobile
it could not be said that the petrol tanker, even if it be assumed that it was
a motor vehicle, was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and
fire. Thirdly, it has been submitted by Shri Sanghi that even if it is found
that the petrol tanker was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the
explosion and fire, there was no causal relationship between the collision
which took place between the petrol tanker and the truck at about 3 A.M. and
the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took place about four and
half hours later and it cannot, therefore, be said that explosion and fire in
the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
Before
we proceed to deal with the aforesaid submissions of Shri Sanghi, it would be
relevant to mention that section 92A of the Act forms part of Chapter VII-A
which was intro- duced in the Act by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act
47 of 1982). The said Chapter bears the heading "LI- ABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
IN CERTAIN CASES" and contains sec-
tions 92A to 92E. The purpose underlying the enactment of these provisions, as
indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill, was as
follows:
"There
has been a rapid development of road transport during the past few years and
large increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road. The incidence of
road accidents by motor vehicles has reached serious propor- tions. During the
last three years, the number of road accidents per year on the average has been
around 1.45 lakhs and of these the number of fatal accidents has been around
20,000 per year. The victims of these accidents are generally pedestrians
belonging to the less affluent sections of society. The provisions of the Act
as to compensation in respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of
accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a result of a wrongful act
or negli- gence on the part of the owners or drivers of the vehicles concerned.
Having regard to the nature of circumstances in which road acci- dents take
place, in a number of cases, it is difficult to secure adequate evidence to
prove negligence. Further, in what are known as "hit-and-run"
accidents, by reason of the identity of the vehicle involved in the acci- dent
not being known, the persons affected cannot prefer any claims for
compensation. It is, therefore, considered necessary to amend the 36 Act
suitably to secure strict enforcement of road safety measures and also to make,
as a measure of social justice, suitable provisions first for compensation
without proof of fault or negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the
vehicle and, secondly, for compensation by way of solatium in cases in which
the identity of the vehicle causing an accident is unknown..... " In this
context, it may be pointed out that before the said amendment this Court had
highlighted the need for legislation providing for no fault liability in motor acci-
dents claims in a number of decisions. (See: Manjusri Raha & Ors. v. B.L.
Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2 SCR 944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi
& Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 184; Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr.,
[1980] 1 SCR 300 and N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc.,
[1980] 3 SCR 10 1.
Section
92A which made provision for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on
the principle of no fault read as under:
"92-A.
Liability to pay compensation in cer- tain cases on the principle of no
fault--(1) Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted
from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles,
the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the
vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect
of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2)
The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in
respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand
rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect
of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven
thousand five hundred rupees.
(3) In
any claim for compensation under sub- section (1), the claimant shall not be
re- quired to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in
respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrong- ful act, neglect
or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of
any other person.
37 (4)
A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason
of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death
or permanent disa- blement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of
compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be
reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such
death or permanent disablement." Section 92-B preserved the right to pay
compensation for death or permanent disablement under other provisions of the
Act and it provided as follows:
"92-B.
Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent
disable- ment (1) The right to claim compensation under Section 92A in respect
of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any
other right (hereafter in this section referred to as the right on the
principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect there- of under any other
provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
(2) A
claim for compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or permanent
disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and
where compen- sation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent
disablement under Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the princi-
ple of fault, the claim for Compensation under Section 92A shall be disposed of
as aforesaid in the first place.
(3)
Notwithstanding anything con- tained in subsection (1), where in respect of the
death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay
compensation under section 92A is also liable to pay com- pensation in
accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall
pay the first-mentioned compensation and-- (a) if the amount of the first-
mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned, he
shall be liable to pay (in addition the first-mentioned compensa- tion) only so
much of the second-mentioned compen- 38 sation as is equal to the amount by
which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;
(b) if
the amount of the first-men- tioned compensation is equal to or legs than the
amount of the secondmentioned compensa- tion, he shall not be liable to pay the
sec- ond-mentioned compensation." In section 92-C of the Act, the
expression 'permanent disablement for the purpose of Chapter VII-A was
explained.
Section
92-D made the provisions of Chapter VII-A applicable in relation to any claim
in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) resulting from an accident of the nature
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 92-A.
Section
92-E of the Act gave overriding effect to the provi- sions of Chapter VII-A
over any other provisions of the Act or of any law for the time being in force.
In
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & Anr.,
[1987] 3 SCR 404 a reference has been made to the background in which Chapter
VII A was introduced in the Act and it has been observed:
"When
the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855' was enacted there were no motor vehicles on the
roads in India. Today, thanks to the modern civilisation,
thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of
injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor
vehicles acci- dents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of
traffic, the motor vehi- cles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as
coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher, [1968]
LR. 3 HL 330, 340. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this
country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous.
`Hit and run' cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the
accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without
negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently
or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled
to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning
at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to
the 39 deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous
agitation through out the world to make the liability for dam- ages arising out
of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault. In order to meet the
above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission Chapter
VIIA was introduced in the Act. (pp. 4 15-4 16)" In that case, this Court
after taking note of the provi- sions contained in section 92A has further
observed:
"It
is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted under section
92-A of the Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on
account of motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs.15,000 without proof
of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other
person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law princi-
ple that a claimant should establish negli- gence on the part of the owner or
driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compen- sation for the death or
permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident.
To
that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified." (pp.
41.6-4 17) It is thus evident that section 92-A was in the nature of a
beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious
payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an
accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault
liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the
approach of the courts is to adopt a con- struction which advances the beneficient
purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to
defeat that purpose. The same approach has been adopted by this Court while
construing the provisions of the Act. See: Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji
Keshavji Modi & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 860 and Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben
Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752.
The
expression 'arising out of the use Of motor vehi- cles" was also used by
Parliament in sub-section (1) of section 110 of the Act wherein provision was
made for con- stitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for speedy and
expeditious adjudication of claims of compensation in re- spect of accidents
involving death or bodily injuries to 40 persons arising out of the use of
motor vehicles or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both.
Fur- thermore, by subsection (1) of section 94 of the Act an obligation was
imposed that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any
other person to,use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force
in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as
the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of
Chapter VIII of the Act.
Section
95 prescribed the requirements of such insurance policies as well as limits of
liability. In clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95, it was laid down
that the policy of insurance required must be a policy which insures the person
or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in
sub-section (2) against (i) any liability which may be incurred by him in
respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any
property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in
a public place and (ii) the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a
public service vehi- cle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in
a public place. While construing the expression "arising out of the use of
a motor vehicle" in sub-section (1) of section 92-A of the Act, regard
will have to be had to the fact that expressions to the same effect were also
contained in sec- tions 95 and 110 of the Act.
The
first submission of Shri Sanghi is based on the definition of the expression
"motor vehicle" contained in sub-section (18) of section 2 of the Act
which was as under:
"2(18)
"motor vehicle" means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for
use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an
external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been
attached and a trailer, but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails
or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any
other enclosed premises" Shri Sanghi has urged that the word
"adapted" in the aforesaid provision has been construed by this Court
in Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa etc., [1975] 2 SCR 138 to mean
suitable or fit for use on the roads and that in the instant case, it cannot be
said that at the time when the explosion and fire took place the petrol tanker
which was lying turtle was suitable or fit for use on the road. We find it
difficult to accept this contention. The petrol tanker was a vehicle
manufactured for the purpose of trans- porting petrol. It was a vehicle which
had been 41 adapted for such use and was suitable for use on the road for
transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol tanker collided with the truck
on the national highway, it was being used for the purpose of transporting
petrol. It can- not, therefore, be disputed that when the said collision took
place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined in section
2(18) of the Act. Did it cease to be motor vehicle after the collision with the
truck on account of its lying turtle on its side at some distance from the road
as a result of the said collision? In our view, this question must be answered
in the negative. Merely because the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result
of the collision and was lying at a short distance away from the road, does not
mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the road and it had
ceased to be a motor vehicle.
No
material has been placed on record to show that the petrol tanker would not
have been in a position to move after it was put back on the wheels.
The
question whether a vehicle has ceased to be a me- chanically propelled vehicle
has been considered by the English Courts in cases involving prosecution for
offence under Section 15 of the Vehicles (Excise) Act, 1949 which imposed a
penalty on a person using on a public road any mechanically propelled vehicle
for which a licence under the said Act was not in force. In Newberry v. Simmonds,
[1961] 2 Q.B. 345 the prosecution was in respect of a motor-car whose engine
had been stolen some time prior to the period in question. It was contended by
the owner that since the engine of the motor-car had been stolen it had ceased
to be a mechanically propelled vehicle. Negativing the said con- tention, it
was held.
"We
are, however, satisfied that a motor-car does not cease to be a mechanically
propelled vehicle upon the mere removal of the engine if the evidence admits
the possibility that the engine may shortly be replaced and the motive power
restored." (p. 350) In Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291 a similar
question arose. Here the defendant had bought a car for Pounds 2 and
subsequently sold it as scrap for 30s. It was found that the engine was in a
rusty condition and was incomplete and it did not work, and there was no
gear-box or electric batteries; and the car was incapable of moving under its
own power, having been towed from place to place and that it could only have
been put in running order again by supplying a considerable number of spare
parts and ef- fecting considerable repairs, the ' cost of which would have been
out of all proportion to its value. In 42 support of the prosecution it was
urged that every vehicle which starts its life as a mechanically propelled
vehicle remains such until it is physically destroyed. Rejecting the said
contention, Lord Parker, C.J. observed:
"
...... it seems to me as a matter of common sense that some limit must be put,
and some stage must be reached, when one can say:
"This
is so immobile that "it has ceased to be a mechanically propelled
vehicle." Where, as in the present case, and unlike Newberry v. Simmonds,
there is no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile again, it
seems to me that, at any rate at that stage, a vehicle has ceased to be a
mechanically pro- pelled vehicle". (p. 298) We are inclined to agree with
this formulation.
In the
instant case, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker as a result of the
collision with the truck was damaged to such an extent that was no reasonable
prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile again. In the circum- stances,
it cannot be held that the petrol tanker which was a motor vehicle when it
collided with the truck had ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said
collision and it could not be regarded a motor vehicle under Section 2(18) of
the Act at the time when the explosion and fire took place.
The
second submission of Shri Sanghi was that even if it be assumed that at the
time when the explosion and fire took place in the petrol tanker it was a motor
vehicle, the tanker was not being used as a motor vehicle at that time inasmuch
as it was lying immobile on its side. It is, howev- er, not disputed by Shri Sanghi
that at the time when the petrol tanker had collided with the truck, it was
being used as a motor vehicle but his submission was that the said user came to
an end on such collision when the petrol tanker turned turtle and was rendered
immobile. This contention postulates a restricted meaning for the word
"use" in the expression "use of the motor vehicle" by
confining it to a situation when the vehicle is mobile. The learned counsel,
for the respondent has, on the other hand, suggested a wider connotation for
the word "use" so as to include the period when the vehicle is
stationary and has invited our attention to the observations in Elliott v.
Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367; Government Insurance Office South Wales v. R.J. Green
& Lloyd Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437; Pushpa Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh
& Ors., [1975] ACJ 396; 43 General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa & Ors., [1979] ACJ 452 and
Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru &
Ors., [1985] ACJ 243.
Elliott
v. Grey, supra related to prosecution for of- fence under section 35(1) of the
Road Traffic Act, 1930 for using a motor car on road without there being in
force in relation to such user an insurance policy in respect of third-party
risks complying with the requirements of Part 2 of the said Act. The motor car
of the appellant was standing on the road outside the appellant's house for the
past few months, after it broke down and in the meanwhile the insur- ance cover
of the motor car had terminated. While it was thus parked, another motor
vehicle had collided with appel- lant's motor car. On that date, the appellant
had cleaned the car, sent the battery to be recharged and had replaced the old carburettor
with a new one. The car could not be mechanically propelled because the engine
would not work. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the ordinary use
of the words "to use" in relation to a motor car contem- plates some
active movement, either driving it or taking part in a journey in it or moving
it and the word "use" is quite inapt in relation to a motor car which
cannot be used because it is out of action. The said contention was reject- ed.
The word "use"was construed in a wider sense to mean "to have
the advantage of a vehicle as a means of transport including for any period or
time between journeys". In taking this view, Lord Parker, C.J. stated that
he was influenced by the fact that section 35. appeared in Part 2 of the Road
Traffic Act under the heading "Provisions against third party risks
arising out of the use of motor vehicles" which is intended for protection
of third parties.
Similarly
in Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green & Lloyd
Pty. Ltd., supra Barwick, CJ, while construing the word 'use' in Motor Vehicles
(Third Party Insurance) Act, 1942-1951 (N.S.W.) has observed that the said Act
indicated an intention to cover a very wide field, a field more extensive than
what might be called the traffic use of the motor vehicle. The learned Chief
Justice has further observed: "In my opinion, the relevant use of the
vehicle cannot be confined to the periods it is in motion, or its parts moving
in some operation. It may be in use though stationary".
In Pushpa
Rani Chopra & Ors. v. Anokha Singh & Ors., supra a learned Judge of the
Delhi High Court, while con- struing the word 'use' in section 110 of the Act,
has held that the said word has been used in a wider sense and it covers all
employments of the motor vehicle on the 44 public places including its driving,
parking, keeping sta- tionarys repairing, or leaving unattended on the road or
for any other purpose. In that case, the truck in question was stationary as
its axle had broken down and it was parked on the road at the time of the
accident.
In
General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa and Ors.,' supra the vehicle in
question was a transport bus which was stationed by its driver on a slope
unattended. The bus suddenly started moving and dashed against a tea shop.
It was
held by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court that the bus was in use at
that time.
In
Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Suman Nav- nath Rajguru and Ors.,
supra a petrol tanker was parked near' the footpath on the road in front of a
petrol pump and it burst and explOded causing fatal injuries to a passerby.
A
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rejected the contention that at the
material time, the petrol tanker was not in 'use'.
These
decisions indicate that the word "use", in the context of motor
vehicles, has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the
vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and
when it is not in a position to move due to some break-down or mechanical
defect. Relying on the abovementioned decisions, the Appellate Bench of the
High Court had held that the expression "use of a motor vehicle" in
section 92-A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion
and when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the present. case the
learned Judges have observed that the tanker in question'while proceeding along
National Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry
was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision
the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. We are in
agreement with the said approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word
"use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is
not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account
of the vehicle having been ren- dered immobile on account of a break-down or
mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the
petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side
after the collision with the truck.
The
only other question which remains to be considered is whether the explosion and
fire which caused injuries to the deceased son of the respondent can be said to
have taken place due to an 45 accident arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle viz. the petrol tanker. Shri Sanghi has urged that the expression
'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' implies a causal relationship between
the user of the motor vehicle and the accident which has resulted in death or
disablement and that in the present case it cannot be said that the explosion
and fire which took place in the petrol tanker four and half hours after' the
collision and after the tanker had turned turtle was an accident arising out of
the use of the petrol tanker. In this regard, Shri Sanghi has emphasised that
the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in
the-petrol tanker were pilfering petrol which had leaked out from the petrol
tanker and the explosion and fire was the result of the said unlawful activity
of those persons and that it was not on account of the user of the petrol
tanker. Shri Sanghi, in this 'connection, has placed reliance on the decision
in Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970] 1
SCR 869 wherein this Court has construed the expression 'arising out of
employment' appearing in section 3 of the Workmen's Compen- sation Act, 1923
and has laid down that there must be a causal relationship between the accident
and the employment.
Shri Sanghi
has urged that similarly there must be a causal relationship between the
accident and the user of the motor vehicle for the purpose of maintainability
of a claim under section 92A of the Act.
With
regard to the submission of Shri Sanghi that the persons who sustained injuries
as a result of the explosion and fire in the' petrol tanker were pilfering
petrol which had leaked out from the tanker and that the explosion and fire was
the result of this unlawful activity of those persons, we find that Claims
Tribunal has recorded a finding that persons from the village Kavatha had
gathered with their tins and barrels with the intention to pilfer petrol from
the tanker and while pilfering the petrol probably ignition was caused by
friction, but the said finding of the Claims Tribunal has not been upheld by
the High Court. The learned Single Judge has observed:
"The
learned member was influenced by the fact that certain villagers were trying to
pilfer from the tanker to indicate that the explosion was a direct consequence
of the attempt of pilfering the petrol from the tanker. In my view, the learned
member was not justified in proceeding on the assumption that all the injured
and the deceased were engaged in pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a
direct consequence of the same...............
It
would not be just to hold that all the injured as also the deceased 46 who met
their fate on account of the explosion were all engaged in the crime of
pilfering of the petrol." The Appellate Bench affirming the said finding
of the learned Single Judge has laid down:
"The
learned Single Judge has also rightly pointed out that there was also no
evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of whose deaths
compensation had been claimed under section 92-A were themselves actually
committing theft or pilferage of petrol at the time of their deaths. These
victims could have been only curious bystand- ers at the site of the
accident.... We find that in the instant case the papers and docu- ments
including the F.I.R. and the panchnama produced before the Tribunal did not
establish that the fire was ignited by someone careless- ly throwing a match
stick." We find no ground for interfering with these findings recorded by
the High Court and we must proceed on the basis that the persons who sustained
injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker were not
indulging in any unlawful activity which may have caused the said explosion and
fire. The matter has, therefore, to be exam- ined in the light of the meaning
to be assigned to the words "arising out of" in the expression
"accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A.
The
words "arising out of" have been used in various statutes in
different contexts and have been construed by Courts widely as well as
narrowly, keeping in view the context in which they have been used in a
particular legis- lation.
In Heyman
v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356 while con- struing the arbitration clause in a
contract, Lord Porter expressed the view that as compared to the word
"under", the expression "arising out of" has a wider
meaning. In Union of India v. E.B. Aaby's Rederi A/S, [1975] A.C. 797 Viscount Discount
Dilhorne and Lord Salmon stated that they could not discover any difference
between the expression "arising out of" and "arising under"
and they equated "arising out of" in the arbitration clause in a
Charter Party with "arising under".
In Samick
Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Antonis P. Lemos, [1985] 2 WLR 468 the House of
Lords was considering the question 47 whether a claim for damages based on
negligence in tort could be regarded as a claim arising out of an agreement
under section 20(2)(1)(h) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 and fell within the
Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court.
The
words "any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of
goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship" in section 20(2)(i)(h)
were held to be wide enough to cover claims, whether in contract or tort
arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a vessel and
it was also held that for such an agreement to come within paragraph (h), it
was not necessary that the claim in question be directly connected with some
agreement of the kinds referred to in it. The words "arising out of were
not construed to mean "arising under" as in Union of India v. E.B. Aaby's
A/S, supra which decision was held inapplicable to the construction of section
20(2)(1)(h) and it was ob- served by Lord Brandon:
"With
regard to the first point, I would readily accept that in certain contexts the
expression "arising out of" may, on the ordi- nary and natural
meaning of the words use, be the equivalent of the expression "arising under",
and not that of the wider expression "connected with". In my view
however; the' expression "arising out of' is, on the ordi- nary and
natural meaning of the words used, capable, in other contexts; of being the
equivalent of the Wider expression "connected with". Whether the
expression "arising out of has the narrower or the wider meaning in any
particular ease must depend on the context in which it is used".
keeping
in view the context in Which the expression was used in the statute it was
construed to have the wider meaning viz. "connected With".
In the
context of motor accidents the expressions "caused by" and
"arising out of" are often used in statutes.
Although
both these expression's imply a causal relation- ship: between the accident
resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the
degree of prox- imity of such relationship. This distinction has been lucid- ly
brought out in the decision of the High Court of Austra- lia in Government
Insurance Office of N. S.W. v. R.J.
Green's,
case supra wherein Lord Barwick, CJ has stated:
"Bearing
in mind the general purpose of the Act I think the expression 'arising out of
must be taken to require a less 48 proxionship of the injury to the relevant
use of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the words `caused by'. It may be
that an associa- tion of the injury with the use of the vehicle while it cannot
be said that that use was causally related to the injury may yet be enough to
satisfy the expression 'arise out of' as used in the Act and in the
policy." (p. 433) In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as under:
"The
words 'injury caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle' postulate a
causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury. `Caused by'
connotes a `di- rect' or 'proximate' relationship of cause and effect. 'Arising
out of' extends this to a result that is less immediate; but it still carries a
sense of consequence." (p. 447) This would show that as compared to the
expression "caused by", the expression "arising out of" has
a wider connotation. The expression "caused by" was used in sections
95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In section 92-A, Parliament,
however, chose to use the expression "arising out of" which indicates
that for the purpose of awarding compensation under section 92-A, the causal rela-
tionship between the use of the motor vehicle and the acci- dent resulting in
death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and
it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect- ed
with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct
and immediate. This construction of the expression "arising out of the use
of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made
available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the
beneficial object underlying the enactment.
Was
the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker connected with
the use of tanker as a motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this question must be answered in the affirma-
tive. The High Court has found that the tanker in question was carrying petrol
which is a highly combustible and vola- tile material and after the collision
with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on
sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and that there
was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker.
In the 49 light of the aforesaid circumstances the learnedJudges of the High
Court have rightly concluded that the collision between the tanker and the
other vehicle which had occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the
tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected
but related events and merely because there was interval of about four to four
and half hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the
tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no Causal relation
between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must be held that the
explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam
More was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz.
the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461.
Shri Sanghi
has also raised a question as to the proce- dure to be followed by the Claims
Tribunal while/adjudicat- ing claims under section 92A of the Act and has
submitted that such claims have to be adjudicated upon like other claims under
section 110A of the Act and that claimant must first adduce evidence to
establish his/her case and that the owner as well as the insurer of the vehicle
in question must have a right to adduce evidence to rebut the same. In this
context, it may be mentioned that procedure for adjudication of a claim
petition under Section 110A of the Act by the Accident Claims Tribunal is
contained in Rules 291 to 311 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989,
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The said Rules prescribe a form for
filing a claim petition and the documents to be filed along- with it (Rule
291), examination of the applicant (Rule 293), issue of notice to the opposite
party (Rule 297), filing of written statement by the opposite party (Rule 298),
framing of issues (Rule 299), recording of evidence (Rules 300 and 301), local
inspection (Rule 302) and judgment and award of compensation (Rule 306).
After
the enactment of section 92-A, amendments have been made in the Rules in 1984.
In
Rule 291A which has been inserted by such amendments, it has been provided
that:
"Notwithstanding
anything contained in rule 291, every application, for a: claim under section
92A shall be filed before the Claims Tribunal in triplicate and shall be signed
by the appellant and the following documents be appended to every such
application, namely, 50 (i) Panchnama of the accident;
(ii)
First information report;
(iii)
Injury CertifiCate or in case of death, postmortem report or death certificate
and;
(iv) a
certificate regarding ownership and insurance particulars of vehicle involved
in the accident from the Regional Transport Officer or the Police".
Rule
297 was substituted by the fallowing, provision:
"297.
Notice to opposite party (1) If the application is not dismissed under rule
296, the Claims Tribunal shall, on an application in writing made to it by the
applicant, sent to the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both from whom the
applicant claims relief (here in after re- ferred to as "the opposite
party") and the insurer, a copy of the application, together with a notice
of the date on which it will dispose of the application, and may call Upon the
parties to produce on that date any evi- dence which they may wish to tender.
(2)
Where the applicant makes a claim for compensation under section 92A, the
Claims Tribunal shall give notice to the owner and insurer, if any, of the
vehicle involved in the accident directing them to appeal on a date not later
than ten days from the date of issue of such notice The date so fixed for such
appearance shall also be not later than fifteen days from the receipt of the
claims application filed by the claimant. The Claims Tribunal shall state in
such notice that in case they fail to appear on such appointed date the
Tribunal will, proceed ex parte on the presumption that they have no contention
to make against the award of compensation." Rule 306 A empowers the Claims
Tribunal to obtain what- ever supplementary information and documents which may
be found necessary from the police, medical and other authori- ties and proceed
to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice to appear or not
on the appointed date.
Rule
306B lays down:
51
"(1) The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim of compensation
under section 92A on the basis of (i) registration certifi- cate of the motor
vehicle involved in the accident;
(ii) insurance
certificate or policy relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third
party risks;
(iii) panchnama
and first information report;
(iv)
post-mortem certificate or death certifi- cate; or certificate of injury from
the medi- cal officer; and
(v) the
nature of the treatment given by the medical officer who has examined the
victim.
(2)
The Claims Tribunal in passing orders, shall make an award of compensation of
fifteen thousand rupees in respect of the death and of seven thousand five
hundred rupees in respect of the permanent disablement to be paid by insurer or
owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.
(3)
Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall
also specify the amount payable to each of them.
(4)
The Claims Tribunal in passing order under subrule (2) shall direct the insurer
or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident to pay the amount of
compensation to the claimant within two weeks from the date of the said order.
(5)
The Claims Tribunal shall as far as possible dispose of the application for
compensation within forty-five days from the date of receipt of such
application".
Rule
306C prescribes the procedure of disbursement of compensation under Section 92A
to the legal heirs in case of death. The submission of Shri Sanghi is that in
spite of the aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules after
the enactment of section 92A, the Claims Tribunal is required to follow the
procedure contained in the other rules before awarding compensation under
section 92A of the Act. In other words, it must proceed to adjudicate the claim
52 after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to file the written
submission under Rule 298, by framing issues under Rule 299 and after recording
evidence in accordance with rules 300 and 301 and that it is not permissible
for the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis of the documents
referred to in Rules 29 IA, 306A and 306B. In our opinion, the said submission
of Shri Sanghi cannot be accepted. The object underlying the enactment of
section 92A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the
extent of Rs. 15,000 in case of death and Rs.7,500 in case of permanent
disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made
before adjudication of the claim under section 110A of the Act. This would be
apparent from the provisions of section 92B of the Act. Section 92B(2) of the
Act provides that a claim for compensation under section 92A in respect of
death or permanent disable- ment of any person shall be disposed of as
expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such
death or permanent disablement under section 92A and also in pursuance of any
right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under section 92A
shall be dis- posed of'as aforesaid in the first place. With a view to give
effect to the said directive contained in section 92B of the Act, the Maharashtra
Government has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect
of claims under section 92A in rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A, 306B, 306C and
306D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provisions is to enable
expeditious disposal of a claim petition under Section 92A of the Act. The said
object would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular
trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section 110
A of the Act. Morever, for award- ing compensation under section 92A of the
Act, the Claims Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the
following matters:
(i) an
accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle;
(ii) the
said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making
the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is making the
claim;
(iii) the
claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved
in the accident;
The
documents referred to in Rules 291A and 306B will enable the Claims Tribunal to
ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. The panchnama and the
First information Report will show 53 whether the accident had arisen out of
the use of the motor vehicle in question. The Injury Certificate or the post-
mortem report will show the nature of injuries and the cause of death. The
Registration Certificate and Insurance Certif- icate of the motor vehicle will
indicate who is the owner and insurer of the vehicle. In the event of the
Claims Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or genuine- ness of any
of these documents or if it considers it neces- sary to obtain supplementary
information or documents, Rules 306A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain
such supplemen- tary information or documents from the Police, medical or other
authorities. This would show that Rules 291A, 306A and 306B contain adequate
provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect
of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 92A of the Act
and in view of these special provisions which were introduced in the Rules by
the amendments in 1984, the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the
normal proce- dure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to
adjudication of a claim under section 110A of the Act for the purpose of making
an order on a claim petition under section 92A of the Act.
In the
result, we find no merit in this special leave petition which is accordingly
dismissed. By order dated January 7, 1991, while directing issue of notice on
the special leave petition, it was ordered that the issue of the said notice
shall be subject to the condition that the petitioners shall deposit a sum of
Rs.5,000 in the Registry of this Court towards cost of the respondent and that
the notice shall be issued only after the amount of cost has been deposited and
the said amount shall be paid over to the respondent on her putting in
appearance in this Court and the payment of the amount of cost to the
respondent shall be irrespective of the result of the special leave petition.
In view of the said order, no further direction with regard to costs is
necessary.
G.N.
Petition dismissed.
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