Ranjit
Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Anr [1991] INSC 208 (23 August 1991)
Verma,
Jagdish Saran (J) Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J) Ojha, N.D. (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 2296 1991 SCR (3) 742 1991 SCC (4) 304 JT 1991 (3) 550 1991 SCALE
(2)396
ACT:
Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Ss. 427, 433A--Life convict --Convicted of another
murder--Subsequent Sentence of life imprisonment--Whether superimposition to
the earlier life sentence-Remissions or commutation in respect of earli- er
sentence--Whether available ipso facto in respect of Second sentence.
Indian
Penal Code, 1960: S. 302--Life convict--Trial for second
murder--Conviction--Imposition Of Life sentence--Whether both life sentences to
run concurrently.
Constitution
of India: Article 32--Offender--Separately sentenced to life imprisonment for
two different offences under section 302 IPC--Court's direction that in case of
remissions or commutation in respect of earlier sentence, the latter sentenced
to run thereafter-Interpretation of- Writ Petition challenging the
sentence--Whether maintain- able.
HEAD NOTE:
The
petitioner who was convicted under section 302-IPC on 6.3.1979 and sentenced to
life imprisonment; was also tried for a second murder committed while he was on
parole after his conviction and sentence for the first murder, and was
convicted under s. '303 IPC. Altering the conviction to one under s. 302 IPC,
for the second murder this Court sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of
death sentence and by its judgment dated 30.9.1983 directed that in case any
remission and commutation in respect of his earlier sentence 'was granted, the
latter sentence should commence thereafter.
The
petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. praying
for his release on the ground that both the life sentences had to run
concurrently in accord- ance with s. 1427(2) Cr. P.C., and as he had undergone
14 years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time of filing the
writ petition on .February 19, 1990, he was entitled to be released.'It was
contended that this Court's direc, tion dated 30.9.83 was .contrary to s.
427(2) of the Code of Criminal 743 Procedure, 1973 since it amounted to
directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment were to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
On
behalf of the respondents it was contended that the direction of this Court,
properly construed, was not contrary to.s. 427(2) Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the
question of issuing any writ or directions as claimed by the peti- tioners did
not arise.
Disposing
of the petition treating it as one for clari- fication of the judgment dated
30.9.1983 this Court,
HELD:
1.1 A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima
facie be treated as trans- portation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life unless the remaining
sentence is 'commuted or remitted by the appropri- ate authority. This being so
at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier
sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and,
therefore, there can b no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for
a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in
sub-s (1) ors. 427, Cr. P.C. [747G; 749D-E]
1.2
The earlier sentence of imprisonment-for life being under stood to mean as
sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted
by the appropri- ate authority and a person having only one life span, the
sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment
for life as envisaged by s. 427(2) of the Cr. P.C., can only be superimposed to
the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life
span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. [749F-G] It
cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment is to b treated asasentence
of imprisonment for a fixed term. [748B] Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The Stateof Maharashtra
& Ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 440 and MaruRam v. Union of India & Anr.,
[1981] 1 S.C.R 1196, followed.
2.1
The operation of the superimposed subsequent sen- tence of Iife imprisonment
should not be wiped out merely because in respect of to correspondingI earlier
sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation was granted by the appropriate.authority.
[75lF-G] 744
2.2 In
the instant case, the last sentence in the direc- tion meant that in case, any
remission or commutation was granted in. respect. of the earlier sentence of
life impris- onment alone then the benefit of that remission or commuta- tion
would not ipso facto be available in respect of the subsequent sentence of life
imprisonment which would contin- ue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation
in respect of the earlier sentence alone. The consequence would be that the
petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation
in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen-
tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent
sentence was also granted to the petitioner.
It was
in this manner that the direction 'was given for the two sentences of life
imprisonment not to run concurrently.
[750E-H;
751A] The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life had, therefore, to run
concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the
petitioner. [750C-D]
3. The
general rule enunciated in sub,section (1) of s. 427 Cr. P.C. is that without
the Court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecu-
tively. [749G] The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed
to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence iS
provided for in sub,section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible
controversy based on sub,section (1) if there being no express direction of the
Court to that effect. [749G-H; 750A] Sub,section (2) is in the nature of an
exception to the general rule enacted under sub-section (1) of section 427 0Cr.
P.C. [T50A]
4.1
The mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprison- ment prescribed by s. 433A
Cr. P.C. which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and short-sentencing
statutes made by the various States would not operate against those whose cases
were decided by the trial court before the 18th Decem- ber, 1978 when s. 433A
Cr. P.C.'came into force but the section would apply to those sentenced by the
trial court after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior to
that date. [748D-E] Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr., [1981] 1 S.C.R.
1196, followed. .
745
4.2 In
the instant case, s. 433A Cr. P.C. was applicable to petitioner in respect of
both sentences of life imprison- ment since the conviction by the trial court
even for the first murder was after 18.12.1978, the second offence itself being
committed after 18.12.1978. The mandatory minimum of 14years' actual
imprisonment as required by s. 433A even for the first sentence of life
imprisonment was not served out by the petitioner, and, therefore, irrespective
of the points raised in the instant petition on the basis of s. 427(2) Cr. P.C.
the petitioner could not claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the
Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the
Government. [748E-G]
5. The
petitioner's incarceration was the result of a valid judicial order and,
therefore, there could be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental
right which alone could be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the
Constitution. [747E-F]
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 116 of 1990.
(Under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
R.K. Garg, N.D. Garg, Rajiv
Kr. Garg and P.C. Choudhary for the Petitioner.
U.R. Lalit
and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. The short question arising for
decision by us is the true meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 427 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and its effect.
For an
Offence of murder committed on 17.9.1978 the petitioner, Ranjit Singh, was
convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge on 6..3.1979 and
sentenced to life imprisonment which was confirmed by the High Court of Punjab
& Haryana. While the petitioner was on parole after his conviction and
sentence for first murder, he was tried for the second murder committed On October 25, 1980 and convicted under Section 303
I.P.C. This conviction was altered to one under Section 302 I.P.C. and for the
second murder, also the petitioner was sentenced by this Court on 30.9. 1983 to
life imprisonment instead of death sentence.
This
Court while disposing of the. petitioner's appeal, in this manner, directed as
under:
746
"We feel that life imprisonment would be the proper sentence that should
be imposed-upon the appellant. We accordingly reduce the sentence of death
imposed upon him and, sen- tence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.
However, since the present murder was committed by him within a span of one
year of his earlier conviction and that too when he was released .on parole we
are clearly of the view that the instant sentence of imprisonment for life
awarded to him should not run concur- rently with his earlier sentence Of life
imprisonment. We therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation in
respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him the present sentence should
.commence thereafter." The petitioner has now filed this Writ Petition
under Arti- cle 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a suitable writ or
direction to correct,the above direction given in the 0order dated September
30, 1983 to bring it in consonance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and
consequently for his re- lease on the ground that both life sentences had to
run concurrently in accordance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and he is entitled
to relief because he has undergone fourteen years sentence of imprisonment with
remissions at the time of filing the Writ Petition on February 19, 1990. This
is how the question of construction of Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. arises in the
present case.
Section
427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under:
"427.
Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence--(1) When a person
already undergoing a sentence of im- prisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
con- viction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment' or
imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to
which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the
subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:
Provided
that where a person, who has, been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under
Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such
sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the
making of such order, the latter sen- tence shall commence immediately.
747
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sen-
tenced on a subsequent conviction to. impris- onment for a term or imprisonment
for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
Sentence .' ' Shri R.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner strenu- ously
urged that this Court's above quoted direction in the judgment dated 30.9.1983
passed in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 while affirming the conviction under
Section 302 I.P.C. for the second murder and imposing the punishment of life
imprisonment for it 'also amounts to directing that the two sentences of life
imprisonment are tO run consecutively and not concurrently which is in direct
conflict with Sub- section (2) of Section 427 Cr. P.C. He ,urged that the life
'span of a person Could be only one and therefore ,any subsequent life sentence
must run concurrently and not consecutively which is the clear mandate :of
Section 427(2).
On
this basis, it was, urged that this Court's direction in the above manner on
the petitioner'S conviction for the second offence of murder is contrary-to
Section 427(2) of the Code 01 Criminal Procedure, 1973. This is the basis of
the reliefs claimed on behalf of the .petitioner. In reply, Shri U.R. Lalit. appearing.
on behalf of respondents, con- tended that the direction of this Court properly
construed is not contrary to Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the
question of issuing any writ or directions claimed by the petitioner does not
arise.
We may
straightaway mention that the question of grant of relief under Article 32 of
the Constitution does not arise on the above facts. The petitioner's
incarceration is the result of a valid judicial order and, therefore,' there
can be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which alone
can be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the COnstitution. The only
question, it ap- pears, therefore, is about the correct construction of the
direction given by this Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal
Appeal No. 418 of 1982 in the fight of the true meaning of Section427(2) Cr.
P.C.
The
meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for life is no longer res integra; It was
held by a Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra
and Others, [1961] 3 S:C.R. 440 that a sentence of transportation for life or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation Or
imprisonment for the whole of the remain- ing period of the convicted person's
natural life. It was further held:
748
"Unless the said sentence is commut- ed or remitted by appropriate
authority under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of
Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law
to serve the life term in prison." The contention that a sentence of life
imprisonment was to be treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term
was expressly rejected. This view was followed and reiterat- ed in Maru Ram v.
Union of India & Ant., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 1196 while considering the effect of
Section 433A introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with effect
from 18.12.1978. The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised one of its
conclusions as under:
"We
follow Godse's case (supra) to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the
last breath, and whatever the length of remissions earned, the prisoner can
claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Govern- ment."
Another conclusion in Maru Ram was that the mandatory mini- mum of 14 years'
actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A which has supremacy over the
Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by the various States will
not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before
the 18th December, 1978 when Section 433A came 'into force but Section 433A
would apply to those sentenced 'by the trial court after 18.12.1978 even though
the offence was committed prior to that date. From these decisions it is
obvious that the mandatory minimum of 14 years'. actual imprisonment prescribed
by Section 433A is applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of
life imprisonment since the conviction by the trial court even for the first
murder was after 18.12.1.978, the second offence itself being committed after
'18.12.1978. There is no dispute that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual
imprisonment, as required by Section 433A even for the first sentence of life
imprisonment, has not been served out by the petitioner and, therefore,
irrespective of the points raised in this petition on the basis of Section
427(2) Cr. P.C. the petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ under
Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being
remitted by the Government. This alone is sufficient to refuse any relief under
Article 32 of the Constitution.
The
question now is of the meaning of Section 472(2) Cr. P.C, and its effect, in
the present case, in view of the above quoted direc- 749 tion Of this Court in
its judgment dated 30.9.1983.
Sub-section
(1) of Section 427Cr. P.C. provides for the situation when a person already
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction
to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, Sub- section (1) of
Section 427 Cr. P.C. deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a
fixed term is' subse- quently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for
life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires
on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made.,
Sub-section (1) says that in' such a situation, the date of expiry of the first
sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the
subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of
imprisonment unless the Court .directs the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases' covered by
Sub-section (1)where the sentence is for a fixed' term, the subsequent sentence
Can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the
other hand, pro- vides for an offender "alreadly undergoing sentence of
imprisonment for life" who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well-settled since the decision of
this Court in Gopal Vinayaka Godse and reiterated in Maru Ram that imprisonment
for life is a sentence for the remainder or the life of the offender unless the
remaining sentence is commuted or remit- ted by the appropriate authority. This
being so at-the.stage of sentencing by the Court On a subsequent conviction,
the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner
and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of. impriosnment
for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid
down in Sub-. section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended'by Shri Garg,
and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life
being understood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison
unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having
only one life' span, the sentence on a subse- quent conviction of imprisonment
for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier
life sen- tence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of
the offender or for that 'matter anyone is beyond .human might. It is this
obvious situation which is stated in sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the
general' rule enunciated in sub-section (1) thereof is that without the Court's
direction the subse-. quent sentence will. not run concurrently, but
consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed
to make the subse- quent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence
is 750 provided for in Sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any
possible controversy based on Sub-section. (1) if there be no express direction
of the Court to that effect.
Sub-section
(2) is in the nature of anexCeption to the general rule enacted in Sub-section
(1) of Section 427 that'a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry
of the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run concurrently. The
meaning and purpose of Sub-sections (1) & (2)of Section 427 and the object
of en,acting Sub-section ?)is, therefore, Clear..
We are
not required to say anything regarding the practical.
effect
of remission or commutation of the sentences since that question does not arise
in the present case. The limited controversy before us has been indicated. The
only question now is of 'the meaning and effect of the above quoted direction
in this Court's judgment dated 30.9.1983 It is obvious that the direction .of
this Court must be con- strued to harmonise with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. which
is the statutory mandate apart from being the obvious truth.
The
subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life has, there- fore, to run
concurrently with the read as sentenceof imprisonment for life awarded to the
petitioner. Thed exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction
which re under:
"We,
therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation .in respect of his
earlier sentence is grant- ed to him the present sentence should commence
thereafter." It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the
proceeding portion has to be read. This last sentence in the direction means
that in case, any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the
earlier. sentence. of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that
remission or .commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the
sub. sequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be
unaffected by the remission or commuta- tion in respect of the earlier sentence
alone. In other WordS, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sen- tence,
of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out .merely because in respect of the
corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or
commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority. The consequence is
that the petitioner would not 'get any practical 'benefit of any remission or
commutation respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed
subsequent life sen- tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of
the subsequent sentence. is also .granted tO the petitioner.
It is
in this manner that the direction is given for the, two Sentences of life impri-
751 sonment not to run concurrently.
The
ultimate direction contained in the last sentence is obviously for this
purpose. So construed the direction of this Court in the judgment dated 30.9.1983
in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 fully harmonises with Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. This is the clarification we make of this Court's judgment dated 30.9.
1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 18 of 1982.
We
have already stated that this petition 'for the issuance of a writ Under
Article 32 of the Constitution is untenable. We have, there- ' fore, treated it
as a petition for clarification of the judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal
Appeal No. 418 of 1982.
Accordingly,
the petition is disposed of with this clarifi- cation.
R.P.
Petition disposed of.
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