F.S.
Gandhi Vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Allahabad [1990] INSC 174 (2
May 1990)
Agrawal, S.C. (J) Agrawal, S.C. (J) Kuldip Singh (J)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 1866 1990 SCR (2) 886 1990 SCC (3) 624 JT 1990 (3) 476 1990 SCALE
(1)89
ACT:
Wealth
Tax Act, 1957: Section 2(e) 2(iii)--Interest in respect of properties--Lease of
lands on which properties were standing expired--Tenancy continued on month to
month basis for unstated period--Whether liable to tax.
Words
and Phrases--'Is' and 'has been'--meaning of.
HEAD NOTE:
The
appellant-assessee owned certain properties on lease-hold lands. The leases in
respect of these lands expired in 1958 and 1963 and the lessor--State
Government issued notices to the assessee to hand over vacant posses- sion of
the leasehold lands. The properties were let out to the tenants and the assessee
was receiving rental income from the same.
In the
Wealth Tax Returns for the assessment years 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74 and
1974-75, the assessee valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental
income. In the assessment order the Wealth Tax Officer valued the properties at
fifteen times of the annual rental income. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner of Wealth Tax valued the said properties at twelve and a half
times of the annual rental income.
On
further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal valued the properties at ten
times of the annual rental income, but, at the request of the assessee,
referred to the High Court for its opinion certain questions of law, includ- ing
the questions whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the properties in
respect of which the leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been
issued to hand over the possession were assets within the meaning of Sec- tion
2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and its value was liable to be included in
the net wealth of the assessee and that, on correct interpretation of Section
2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, and relevant provisions of the Transfer of
Property Act, the interest of the appellant in respect of properties in dispute
was for a period of over six years.
887
The High Court held that after the determination of the earlier leases, the assessee
was lessee of properties under a new contract of tenancy, and it was a tenancy
from month to month under Section 116 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, and for an unstated period, and could not be said to be
precarious in nature, that the said tenancy was an asset as defined in Section
2(e) of the Act and was not excluded under sub-clause (v) because the said
interest had been available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years
from the date the new contract of tenan- cy came into existence. It, however
granted certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Allowing
the appeals, this Court,
HELD:
1. The properties in respect of which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and
notices had been received by the assessee to hand over the possession were not
assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act 1957
and the valuation of the same was not 'liable to be included in the net wealth
of the assessee. The Tribunal was not right in holding that the interest of the
assessee in respect of the properties in dispute was for a period over six years
for the purpose of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act.[898F-H]
2.1
The word "available" in Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act is preceded
by the word "is" and is followed by the words "for a period not
exceeding six years". The word 'is', although normally referring to the
present, often has a future meaning. It may also have a past signification as
in the sense of 'has been'. In view of the words "for a period not
exceeding six years" which follow the word "available", the word
'is' must be construed as referring to the present and the future. In that
sense, it would mean that the inter- est is presently available and is to be
available in future for a period not exceeding six years. [896C-D] The High
Court has construed the word 'is' to mean 'has been'. As per the construction
placed by the High Court in a case where an interest has been created for a
period exceed- ing six years it would be included in the assets of the assessee
under Section 2(e) of the Act only after the expiry of the period of six years
even though the interest is available to the assessee for a period exceeding
six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee. The con- struction
placed by the High Court attaching importance to the enjoyment of the interest,
instead of placing emphasis on the nature of the interest is not correct.
[894E-G]
2.3
The question as to whether the interest should be in- cluded or 888 excluded
from the assets of the assessee under Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act has to be
considered in the light of the nature of interest on the relevant date. Under
the said provision, the relevant date is the date on which the inter- est vests
in the assessee. Therefore, the matter has to be considered by examining the
nature of the interest on the date the interests vests in the assessee.
[894G-H] Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, [1969] 2 S.C.R.
1, relied on.
In the
instant case, after the expiry of the leases of the assessee in the years 1958
and 1963 the assessee contin- ued in possession under a new contract of tenancy
and the said tenancy was a tenancy from month to month for an un- stated
period. The said tenancy was precarious in nature because it could be
terminated by the lessor, at any time by a notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act.
The
fact that such a notice was not given cannot mean that the interest created by
the said new tenancy was an interest available to the assessee for a period
exceeding six years from the date the interest vested in the assessee. In the
circumstances, in view of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) the said interest could not be
treated as an asset of the assessee for the purpose of the Act. [897C-D]
[Section 2(e)(v), as amended in 1964, was substituted by the Finance Act,1969
and the relevant provision applicable to the instant case was Section
2(e)(2)(iii). However, in the reference to the High Court, the Tribunal
referred to sub-clause (v) of clause (e) of Section 2, as it stood prior to the
1969 amendment and the High Court also did not notice it. This Court observed
that since the provisions of Section 2(e)(v) as amended in 1964, were identical
with the provi- sions of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) as substituted by the 1969
amendment the error was of no consequence and examined the matter in the light
of the provisions contained in Section 2(e) as substituted by the 1969
amendment.] [893G-H; 894A]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3752- 3755 of 1982.
Appeal
by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 2.2.1982 of the Allahabad High
Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.
S.C. Manchanda,
Raja Ram Agarwal, Dr. Meera Agarwal and R.C. Mishra for the Appellant.
889
Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Manoj Arora and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.C. AGRAWAL, J. These appeals, by
certificate granted by the High Court under Section 29(1) of the Wealth Tax
Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') are directed against the
judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated February 2, 1982 in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.
The
appellant, F.S. Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee'), owns
properties situate at Mahatma Gandhi Marg and Sardar Patel Marg in Civil Lines
area at Allahabad.
The
lands on which these buildings stand were leased out to the assessee by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh. The leases in respect of these properties, except
the property situate at 30-A, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, expired in 1958 and the
lease in respect of the property situate at 30-A Mahatama Gandhi Marg expired
in 1963. The Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notices to the assessee to hand
over vacant possession of the leasehold lands. The properties are let out to
the tenants and the assessee was receiving rental income from the same. For the
assessment years 197 1-72, 1972-73, 1973- 74 and 1974-75 the assessee submitted
the Wealth Tax returns wherein he valued the properties at ten times of the
annual rental income. The Wealth Tax Officer passed assessment orders wherein
he valued the properties at fifteen times of the annual rental income. On
appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax, valued the said
properties at twelve and a half times of the annual rental income. On further
appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinaf- ter referred to as 'the
Tribunal') valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income.
At the
request of the assessee the Tribunal referred the following questions of law to
the High Court:
"1.
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was fight in
holding that properties in respect of which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963
and notices had been received to hand over the possession were assets within
the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act and its value was liable
to be included in the net wealth of the assessee? 890
2.
Whether on correct interpretation of Section 2(e)(v) and relevant provisions of
Transfer of Property Act, the Tribunal was right in holding that the interest
of the appellant in respect of properties in dispute was for a period over six
years?
3.
Whether there was any material before the Tribunal to hold that on the relevant
valuation date the property situated at 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg worth ten
times of its annual was rental income while in previous years the value of the
said property was shown and accepted at Rs. 1, 19,000?
4.
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the property at 30-A, Mahatama
Gandhi Marg, was to be valued on the basis .of its annual income along with
other properties notwithstanding the property in question was commercial
property while other properties were residential houses and whether the
multiple upheld by the Tribunal is justified in law and on facts?
5.
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the multiple of ten times of
rental income in respect of property at 30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, is not
excessive and wholly unjustified?" By order dated February 2, 1982, the
High Court answered the said questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of
the Department and against the assessee. Thereafter the assessee moved an
application under Section 29(1) of the Act for grant of certificate of fitness
for appeal to this Court. By 'order dated July 8, 1982, the High Court granted
certificate of fitness on the view that the following ques- tion is a question
of law which is of general importance and as such this was a fit case in which
an appeal could be filed before this Court:
"Whether
on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was fight in holding that
the properties in respect to which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and
notices had been received to hand over the possession were assets within the
meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act and its valuation was liable
to be included in the net wealth of the assessee?" 891 This question was
amongst the questions referred to the High Court. While dealing with the said
question the High Court has held:
"on
the determination of a lease by efflux of time or by notice, it is the duty of
the lessee to deliver vacant possession of the demised premises to the lessor.
If he continues in possession even after the determination of the lease, his
possession is secured inasmuch as the lessor cannot evict him otherwise than in
due course of law and if he continues in possession without the assent or
dissent of the landlord, he would be a tenant at sufferance. His pos- session
would be wrongful but not unlawful. It is wrongful because the erstwhile tenant
continues in possession beyond the expiry of the period fixed in the lease. It
is not unlawful because the landlord cannot take law into in his own hands and
evict him. But in case the landlord expresses his assent by acceptance of rent
or otherwise to his contin- uing in possession this wrongful possession would
be con- verted into a lawful one. The landlord's assent may be expresse or
implied." Taking into consideration the facts of the present case the High
Court has found that the leases of the properties expired in 1958 and that of
30-A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg in 1963. The High Court has observed:
"There
is nothing on record to show that any attempt was made whatsoever by the State
Government to enforce those notices given by it and the assessee had continued
in peace- ful possession and enjoyment of these properties all along.
In our
opinion, therefore, the assent of the landlord to the assessee's continuing in
possession of these properties can be inferred and that being so that assessee
would be treated to be a tenant of the same by holding over." According to
the High Court after determination of the earlier leases the assessee is lessee
of properties under a new contract of tenancy and this tenancy is a tenancy
from month to month under Section 116 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act. The High Court has further held that the present tenancy is a
tenancy from month to month for an unstated period and it could not be said to
be precarious in nature. The High Court was of the view that the said tenancy
is an asset. as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and is not 892 excluded
under sub-clause (v) because the said interest has been available to the assessee
for a period exceeding six years from the date the new contract of tenancy came
into existence.
In the
Act, as originally enacted, Section 2(e)(v) read as under: "In .this Act,
unless the context otherwise re- quires-- X X X X X X (e) "assets"
includes property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not
include-- X X X X X X (v) any interest in property where the interest is
available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years." By the
Wealth Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 which came into force with effect from April
1, 1965, the words "from the date the interest vests in the assessee"
were inserted at the end of sub-clause (v) and thereafter, sub-clause (v) read
as under:
"any
interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a
period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee."
By the Finance Act, 1969 clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act was substituted by
the following provision:
"(e)--"assets"
includes property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not
include-- (1) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of
April, 1969 or any earlier assessment year- (i) agricultural land and growing
crop, grass or standing trees on such land;
(ii) any
building owned or occupied by a cultivator of, or receiver of rent or revenue
out of, agricultural land:
Provided
that the building is on or in the immediate 893 vicinity of the land is a
building which the cultivator or the receiver of rent or revenue by reason of
his connection with the land requires as a dwelling house or a store:house or
an outhouse;
(iii) animals;
(iv) a
right to any annuity in any case where the terms and conditions relating
thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lump-sum grant;
(v)
any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a
period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee;
(2) in
relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1970 or any
subsequent assessment year-- (i) animals;
(ii) a
right to any annuity in any case where the terms and conditions relating
thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lump-sum grant;
(iii) any
interest in property where the interest is avail- able to an assessee for a
period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee."
As a result of the aforesaid amendment the provision which is applicable in
relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1970 and
subsequent assessment years is sub-clause (2) of clause (e) of Section 2. Since
the assessments in question relate to assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75 the
matter has to be considered in the light of the provisions contained in clause
(e) of Section 2 of the Act as substituted by Finance Act, 1969. In framing
questions Nos. 1 and 2 for reference to the High Court the Tribunal has
erroneously made a reference to sub-clause (v) of clause (e) of Section 2 as it
stood prior to the 1969 amendment. The High Court, while answering these
questions and granting the certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court, did
not notice this error. The provisions of Section 2(e)(v) as amended in 1964 are
identical with the provisions of Section 2(e)(2)(iii), as substituted by the
1969 amend- ment. The error is, therefore, of no consequence and the matter has
been examined by us in the 894 ight of the provisions contained in clause (e)
of Section 2, as substituted in 1969.
Shri
R.R. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the appel- lant, has not disputed the
findings recorded by the High Court that the assessee was n possession of the
leasehold properties as a tenant holding over and hat the said tenancy was a
tenancy from month to month for an restated period.
The
submission of Shri Agarwal is that the interest of he assessee under the said
tenancy could not be regarded as an 'asset' ruder Section 2(e) of the Act and
that it has to be excluded because he said interest cannot be regarded as an
interest available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the
date the interest vests in the assessee.
The
aforesaid contention of Shri Agarwal involves inter- pretation of the words
"where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding
six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee" contained in
Sec- tion 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act. The word "available" is pre- ceded
by the word "is" and is followed by the words "for a period not
exceeding six years." The word 'is', although normally referring to :he
present often has a future mean- ing. It may also have a past signification as
in the sense of 'has been' (See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn. P. 745) We are
of the view that in view of the words "for a period not exceeding six
years" which follow the word "available" the word is' must be
construed as referring to the present and the future. In that sense it would
mean that the inter- est is presently available and is to be available in
future for a period not exceeding six years. The High Court has construed the
word 'is' to mean 'has been'. As per the construction placed by the High Court
in a case where an interest has been created for a period exceeding six years
it would be included in he assets of the assessee under Section 2(e) of the Act
only after the expiry of the period of six years even though the interest is
available to he assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the
interest tests in the assessee. The construction placed by the High Court
instead of placing emphasis on the nature of the interest attaches importance
to the enjoyment of the interest. We are unable to subscribe to that view. In
our opinion the question as to whether the interest should be included or
excluded from the assets of the assessee under Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act
has to be considered in the light of he nature of interest on the relevant
date. Under the said provision he relevant date is the date on which the
interest vests in the assessee. Therefore, the matter has to be considered by
examining the nature of the interest on the date the interest vests in the assessee.
895
This view of ours finds support from the decision of this Court in Commissioner
of Wealth Tax, Madras v. Smt.
Muthukrishna
Ammal, [1969] 2 SCR 1 wherein the provisions of Section 2(e)(v). as it stood
prior to the amendment of 1964, have been considered. In that case the
respondent-assessee had obtained on lease from Government certain salt pans
under two agreement dated January 1, 1943 and January 1, 1945, and each lease
was to endure for 25 years but was liable to be determined by notice on either
side at the close of any salt manufacturing season. In relation to wealth tax
assessment years 1959-60, a question arose as to whether the assessee's
interest in the salt pans for the unexpired period of the two leases was liable
to be included in the computation of her net wealth. This Court held that the
interest of the lessee under each lease was precarious inasmuch as it was
liable to be determined by notie by the Government at the expiry of any
manufacturing season and that the leasehold interest in the salt pans was not
avail- able to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the valuation
date. It was urged on behalf of the Revenue that since the assessee had enjoyed
the rights under one lease for 16 years and in the other lease for 14 years and
on the valuation date both the leases were outstanding, the rights were
"assets" within the meaning of the Act and that the expression
"is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" in
clause (v) of Section 2(e) means 'is and has been available to an assessee for
the period of six years before the date of valuation.' It was also urged that
if interest in property though revocable has remained unre- voked for more than
six years before the valuation date, the interest would be an asset within the
meaning of Section 2(e). This Court rejected the said contention and held as
under:
"We
are unable to agree with that contention. The expression used by Parliament is
"is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years",
and it must mean that the assessee though he has interest in property at the
valuation date the interest will remain available for a period not exceeding
six years. If it is to remain available for six years or for a shorter period
the interest will fall within the exception: if it is to remain available for a
period exceeding six years it will fall within the definition of
"assets" and its value will be liable to be included in the net
wealth of the assessee. ' ' In that case this Court has noticed the amendment
intro- duced in sub-clause (v) of Section 2(e) by the Wealth Tax (Amendment)
Act, 896 1964 but did not consider it necessary to deal with it because the
said matter related to the period prior to the said amendment.
The
High Court has sought to distinguish this decision on the view that the
position has changed after the amend- ment introduced in 1964 and that the
insertion of the words 'from the date the interest vests in the assessee' means
that if an interest has been available to the assessee for a period exceeding
six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee, it would be an
asset while prior to its amendment if the interest was not available to an assessee
for a period not exceeding six years it could not be treated as an asset. The
High Court has observed that as a result of the amendment of 1964, Section 2(e)(v)
can be interpreted to mean that if an interests has been available to an assessee
for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee,
it would be asset. We are unable to agree with the said view. While construing
the words "is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six
years" this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal,
(Supra) has rejected the contention urged by the Revenue that the said words
mean "is and has been available to the assessee for a period of six
years" and this Court has construed the said words to mean that "the
interest will remain available for a period not exceed- ing six years"
meaning thereby that the interest must be such that on the relevant date it is
available presently and is available for a period not exceeding six years in
future.
The
only change which was brought about in Section 2(e)(v) as a result of the
amendment introduced in 1964, whereby the words "from the date the
interest vests in the assessee" were inserted in that sub-clause, was that
prior to the said amendment the relevant date was the valuation date and the
availability of interest had to be seen with reference to that date and as a
result of the amendment of 1964, the relevant date became the date on which the
interest vests in the asseses and, therefore, the availability of the interest
was to be seen with reference to the date on which the interest vests in the assessee.
But the requirement that on the relevant date the interest would be available
in future for a period exceeding six years, as held by this Court in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra), remained
unaltered.
In
this context, it may also be mentioned that Commis- sioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra) was decided by this Court on September 6, 1968. The
Finance Act, 1969, whereby clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act was substi- tuted,
was enacted by Parliament on May 13, 1969. In the amended provisions of clause
(e), Parliament has repeated the same language, namely, "where the
interest is avail- 897 able to an assessee for a period not exceeding six
years" in item (v) of sub-clause (1) and in item (iii) of sub-clause (2).
It must be assumed that while enacting the Finance Act, 1969, Parliament was
aware of the construction placed by this Court on these words in Commissioner
of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra). In repeating the said words
in the amended clause (e) of Section 2, Parliament must be taken to have used
the said words to bear the mean- ing which has been put upon them by this Court
in Commis- sioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra).
In the
instant case, it has been found that after the expiry of the leases of the assessee
in the years 1958 and 1963 the assessee continued in possession under a new
con- tract of tenancy and the said tenancy was a tenancy from month to month
for an unstated period. The said tenancy was precarious in nature because it
could be terminated by the lessor, viz., the Government of Uttar Pradesh, at
any time by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The
fact that such a notice was not given cannot mean that the interest created by
the said new tenancy was an interest available to the assessee for a period
exceeding six years from the date the interest vested in the assessee.
In the
circumstances in view of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) the said interest could not be
treated as an asset of the asses- see for the purpose of the Act.
Our
attention has been invited to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Purshottam
Dass Tandon and Others v. State of U.P.,
Lucknow and Others, A.I.R. 1987 All. 56.
From the said decision it appears that a number of petitions were filed in the
Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by lessees
who had been granted leases of nazul lands in Civil Lines area of Allahabad and
whose leases have expired and who were seeking renewal of those leases. After
considering the various orders that were passed by the Government of Uttar
Pradesh, from time to time, the High Court, while disposing of the said
petitions, has given the following to the opposit parties:
(i) grant
fresh leases to all those who had deposited the premium or at least one instalment
on terms and conditions mentioned in 1959 Order read with 1960 Order;
(ii)
issue notices to all those lessees to whom no notice was issued and determine
their premium etc. on terms and conditions mentioned in 1959-60 Orders
expeditiously;
898
(iii)
determine premium etc. of others to whom notices were issued but it could not
be finalised for one reason or other at an early date;
(iv) determine
rate of premium etc. for premises which are used as residential cum commercial
purpose in light of 1965 Order;
(v) determine
rate of premium used for commercial purpose in light of various Orders issued
till 1965; and
(vi)
lessees shall after grant of fresh leases file the necessary forms etc. within
one month before the Prescribed Authority under Urban Ceiling Act, 1976 (Act 33
of 76) if it had already not been filed who shall proceed to decide the same as
expeditiously as possible.
In
view of the aforesaid directions that have been given by the High Court it can
be said that the assessee whose leases expired in 1958 and 1963, can ask for
grant of fresh leases on the terms and conditions mentioned in 1959 and 1960
Orders issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. In other words it can be said
that in the relevant assessment years the assessee had the right to obtain
fresh leases for the lands of the properties in question. But there is noth- ing
to show that in pursuance of the said right fresh leases have been granted by
the Government of U.P. in respect of those lands and such leases were available
to the assessee during the assessment years in question.
For
the reasons aforesaid it must be held that the properties in respect of which
leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received by the assessee
to hand over the possession were not assets within the meaning of section 2(e)(2)(iii)
of the Act and the valuation of the same was not liable to be included in the
net wealth of the assessee. Question No. 1 referred by the Tribunal to the High
Court must, therefore, be answered in the negative i.e.
in favour
of the assessee. Question No. 2 referred by the Tribunal to the High Court is
connected with Question No. 1 and both the questions were considered by the
High Court together. Since Question No. 1 is answered in Favour of the assessee,
Question No. 2 must also be answered in the nega- tive i.e., in favour of the assessee
and it must be held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the
interest of the assessee in respect of the properties in dispute was for a
period over six years for the purpose of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act.
899 In
the result the appeals are allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court
is set aside insofar as it relates to Questions Nos. 1 and 2. The said
questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
No
order as to costs.
N.P.V.
Appeals allowed.
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