Kishan
Lal & Ors Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors [1990] INSC 110 (23 March 1990)
Sahai,
R.M. (J) Sahai, R.M. (J) Shetty, K.J. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 2269 1990 SCR (2) 142 1990 SCC Supl. 742 JT 1990 (1) 553 1990 SCALE
(1)555
ACT:
Rajasthan
Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961:
Section
40 and Schedule--Market fee--Levy of--On Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as
agricultural produce--Validity of.
Constitution
of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19, 301, 304, 246, 254(2), Seventh Schedule, List
I Entry 52, List H Entries 28, 66 and List 111 Entry 33--Market Fee--Levy
of--On Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural produce--State
Legislature--Competency of--Rajasthan Agri- cultural Produce Markets Act, 1961
Section 40 and Schedule--Repugnancy and validity of.
Words
and Phrases: 'Sugar'--'Agricultural produce'--Meaning of.
HEAD NOTE:
In the
Writ Petition flied in this Court, the validity of Rajasthan Agricultural
Produce Markets Act, 1961, levying market-fee on sale and purchase of
agricultural produce was challenged for lack of legislative competence, and
arbitrary inclusion of Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as agricul- tural
produce in the Schedule. It was contended that inclu- sion of sugar was
arbitrary inasmuch as it being a declared commodity of public importance under
Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII, the State Legislature was precluded from
legislating on it and that being a mill or factory produce, it could not be
deemed to be agricultural produce, which was basically confined to produce of or
from soil.
Dismissing
the Petitions, this Court,
HELD:
1.1 Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the
Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Mar- kets Act, 1961, statutorily, right from the
inception. Such inclusion is found in many States. Whether it was subse- quently
deleted or re-included or regrouped or was added later was immaterial, as
Section 40 of the Act empowered State Government to amend or include any item
in the Sched- ule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is
143 usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed
out in it. Any challenge, therefore, round- ed on excessive delegation of
legislative power was miscon- ceived. [144H, 145A-B]
1.2
The definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the Act includes
all produce whether agricultural, horticul- tural, animal husbandry or
otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include
and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not
exhaustive but inclusive, neither excludes any item produced in mill or
factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. Nor switch over from
indigenous method of produc- ing anything to scientific or mechanical method
changes its character. To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or
factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the
statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act
in statutes of other States. [145C-D, F] Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, [1979] 3 SCR 1217; Ramesh Chandra
v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 166; Rathi Khandsari Udyog
v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCR 966; Sreenivisa General Traders v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1264; Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. State [1980] 3 SCR 194
and State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill, [1985] SCR 87-88, re- ferred to.
Halsbury's
Law of England, Vol. I and Paragraph 1845, re- ferred
to.
2. In
view of the settled position of law that sugar legislations are within the
scope of Entry 33 of Concurrent List, no further discussion on clash between
Entry 52 of List I of Vllth Schedule and Entry 28 of List II is neces- sary.
There is no repugnancy in the Central and State legis- lation. Even if there
would have been any, the Act having received assent of the President is fully
protected by Article 254(2) of the Constitution. [146B-D] Choudhary Tika Ram
and Others v. State of U.P., [1956] SCR 393, followed.
ORIGINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1555 of 1979 etc. etc.
(Under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
144
D.N. Dwivedi and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners.
Dr.
L.M, Singhvi, B.D. Sharma, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, Shrid Rizvi and D.K.
Singh for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M. SAHAI, J. Validity of Rajasthan
Agricultural Pro- duce Markets Act, 1961 (for brevity the Act) levying
market-fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce in market-yard or sub-marketyard
was challenged by dealers for lack of legislative competence, violation of
Articles 14, 19, 30 1 and 304 of Constitution, absence of any quid pro quo in
the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and arbi- trary inclusion of
manufactured articles such as Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural
produce in the sched- ule etc.
Acts
of other States, for instance, Punjab and Haryana
and U.P. were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions,
which appear to be identical, are reproduc- tion of any of those petitions,
which were pending in this Court from before is not relevant but various group
of petitions of Punjab and Haryana dealers challenging consti- tutionality and
legality of Act and its provisions including Gut, Khandsari and Shakkar as
agricultural produce in the schedule of Punjab Act have been dismissed by
different benches presumably because of decisions in Kewal Krishan Puri v.
State of Punjab, [1979] 3 SCR 1217; Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3
SCR 166; Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCR 966 and Sreenivisa
General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
AIR 1983 SC 1264.
Despite
these decisions spelling out basic principles for determining validity of
marketing legislations dealing with agricultural produce the petitioners were
not willing to take it lying down probably because none of these deci- sions
dealt with sugar. It was urged that inclusion of sugar in the Schedule of the
Act was arbitrary., primarily because it being a declared commodity of public
importance under Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII the State legislature was
precluded from legislating on it. Its inclusion in the Schedule was also
assailed as it being a Mill or Factory produce it could not be deemed to be
agricultural produce which is basically confined to produce of or from soil.
Sugar
is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to the Act, statutorily,
right from its inception.
Such
inclusion is found in 145 Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or
re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was immaterial as Section 40 of
the Act empow- ered State Government to amend or include any item in the
Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegat- ed power is usual
feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it.
Any challenge, there- fore, rounded on excessive delegation of legislative
power was misconceived.
Inclusion
of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it was not produced out
of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural produce. Fallacy of the submis- sion
is apparent as it was in complete disregard of defini- tion of the word
"agricultural produce" in the Act which includes all produce whether
agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the
Schedule.
The
legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart,
the definition which is not ex- haustive but inclusive neither excludes any
item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from
soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall
stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the expression "or
otherwise as specified in the Sched- ule." Nor switch over from indigenous
method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its
character. Khandsari sugar, which is produced by open pan process and is not
different from sugar produced by vacuum pan process except in composition,
filterability and conduc- tivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog, (supra) was
held to be agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on
method of production, namely, by modern plant and machinery. To say, therefore,
that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be
agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial
interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States.
Rice or dal produced in mills have been held to be agricultural produce in Ramesh Chandra v.U.P. State, [1980] 3 SCR 194 and State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill, [1985] SCR 87-88.
Even
in Halsbury Law of England,' Vol. I the word agricultural produce for purpose
of agricultural marketing schemes is understood as, 'including any product of
agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly
manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds
of wool) and the skins of animals'. In the same volume products covered by the
provisions of EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the
Brussels Nomenclature of 1965) are men- tioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one
of them.
146
Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to legislate on
sugar or of repeated argument of occupied field was more attractive than of any
substance.
Reliance
on Article 246 of the Constitution was academic only. As far back as 1956
Constitution Bench of this Court in Choudhary Tika Ram and others v. State of
U.P., [1956] SCR 393 examined the matter in detail and held sugar legis- lations
to be within the scope of Entry 33 of concurrent list. It was observed that all
'Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar
and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of concurrent jurisdic- tion'. Effect of
it was described thus, 'The Provincial Legislature as well as the Central
Legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no ques-
tion of legislative competence would arise'. Any further discussion on clash
between Entry 52 of List I of VII Sched- ule with Entry 28 of List II in the
circumstances is unnec- essary. As regards the submission of occupied field
suffice it to say that there is no repugnancy m the Central and State
legislation. At least none was made out. Even if there would have been any the
Act having received assent of the President it is fully protected by Article
254(2).
For
these reasons these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.
N.P.V.
Petitions dismissed.
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