Chief of
Army Staff & Ors Vs. Major S.P. Chadha [1990] INSC 401 (21 December 1990)
Kania,
M.H. Kania, M.H. Misra, Rangnath (Cj)
CITATION:
1991 AIR 460 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 691 1991 SCC (2) 288 JT 1991 (1) 54 1990 SCALE
(2)1312
ACT:
Army
Act, 1950: Sections 3(ii), (vii), (viii) and (xvii), 117, 121, 126 and 127. Army
Instruction No.1/6/74 (As amended by Army Instruction No. 2/76) and No. 81 of
1986.
Criminal
Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of juris- diction) Rules, 1978: Rules 3
and 4. Army Officer--Civil offence--Disciplinary
proceedings--Attachment--Reduction in Rank--Suspension--Trial-Choice between
criminal court and Court-Martial--Prohibition of second trial--Accused put on
trial before General Court-Martial-Dissolution of Court- Martial--Accused
whether can be tried by an ordinary crimi- nal court for the same
offence--Validity of attachment, reduction in rank and suspension--Purpose of
attachment----Explained.
'Offence'--'Civil
Offence'--'Court-Martial'--'Criminal Court' Meaning of.
Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 190(1) (a) and 475.
HEAD NOTE:
The
respondent, a Lt. Colonel, was alleged to have committed a civil offence. He
was attached to another regi- ment for purposes of completing the disciplinary
proceed- ings, made to relinquish his acting rank of Lt. Colonel, on the basis
of Army Instruction No. 1/6/74 and suspended from service. The Army authorities
opted for his trial by a General Court-Martial under the Army Act, 1950. He
filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging action of the Army
Authorities. However, the Court-Martial was dissolved under Section 117 of the
Army Act and the respondent was handed over to civil authorities for trial of
the same offence by a regular criminal court. Consequently, the Supreme Court
dismissed his writ petition.
Pursuant
to the handing over of the respondent to the civil authorities, a complaint was
filed against him before a Magistrate's court under Section 190(1) (a) of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, 1973. The respondent filed a writ peti- tion in the Punjab and Haryana High Court praying for resto-
ration of his acting rank and for revocation of 692 his suspension. A Single
Judge of the High Court ordered restoration of his acting rank by holding that
since the authorities opted for his trial under the Army Act he could not be
handed back to civil authorities for trial by an ordinary Criminal Court on the
ground that trial by a Court-Martial was not feasible; and in view of his
attach- ment to other regiment suspension should not have been resorted to.
The
Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants against the decision of the
Single Judge was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court.
In
appeal to this Court, against the decision of the Division Bench of the High
Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that (i) since the
Court-Martial could not be completed against the respondent there was no legal
bar to his trial by an ordinary criminal court; (ii) Until the trial was
completed, the respondent was neither entitled to get back his rank nor have
his suspension revoked.
On
behalf of the respondent it was inter alia contended that since he was sent to
a regular criminal court for trial his attachment could no longer survive.
Allowing
the appeal, this Court,
HELD:
1. Section 127 of the Army Act, 1950 deals with successive trials by a criminal
court and Court-Martial and sub-section (1) of section 127 specifically
provides that a person convicted or acquitted by a Court-Martial may, with the
previous sanction of the Central Government, be tried again by a criminal court
for the same offence or on the same facts. Under this section there is no
general bar as such prohibiting successive trials by a Court-Martial and by a
criminal court and perusal of the section shows that even where a person has
been convicted or acquitted by a Court- Martial of the offence in question, he
can be tried for the same offence by a criminal court, with the previous
sanction of the Central Government. In the instant case the question of
sanction of the Central Government never arose because the respondent was
neither convicted nor acquitted by the Court-Martial or dealt with under
sections 80, 83, 84 or 85. [698H, 699A-C]
2.
Section 121 of the Army Act, deals with the prohibi- tion of second trial. It
has no application to the instant case as the respondent was neither acquitted
nor convicted by the Court-martial or by a criminal court nor has he been dealt
with under Sections 80, 83, 84 or 85 of the Act. [698G] 693
3.
Army Instruction No. 31 of 1986, inter alia provides that an officer who ceases
to carry out the duties of his appointment by being attached to another Unit
for discipli- nary purposes will vacate his appointment or relinquish any
acting rank after 21 days. It further provides that if such an officer is
subsequently acquitted or for any purpose not brought to trial or his character
is vindicated to the satisfaction of the appropriate authorities at Army Head-
quarters vide such inquiry as is made under para 346 of the Regulations for the
Army, such officer will be reappointed to the post vacated by him and the
acting rank of the offi- cer will be deemed to have been held by him
continuously with effect from the date he relinquished it. The respondent
vacated his appointment and his acting rank 21 days after his attachment to a
different regiment for purposes of completing the proceedings against him. As
he has not yet been acquitted nor has his character been vindicated to the
satisfaction of the appropriate authorities at Army Head- quarters and he is to
be tried by the criminal court, till the trial is completed or given up or till
he is acquitted or his character vindicated to the satisfaction of the
appropriate authorities, there is no case for revocation of the order of his
suspension or restoration of his acting rank. [698C-D, 699G-H, 700A]
4. The
only purpose of attachment of an army officer to a different unit is that the
disciplinary proceedings against him could be speedily and satisfactorily
completed without any interference by him. In view of the respondent being sent
to the ordinary criminal court for trial, there was no question of his
interfering thereafter with the disciplinary proceedings and in view of that,
the order of attachment against him is set aside. Accordingly the orders of the
High Court are set aside except to the extent that the attachment of the
respondent to the other Unit will cease and he will be reverted to his original
unit. [699E-F, 700B]
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