Khanjan
Pal Vs. State of U.P [1990] INSC 219 (3 August 1990)
Fathima
Beevi, M. (J) Fathima Beevi, M. (J) Kuldip Singh (J)
CITATION:
1990 SCR (3) 606 1990 SCC (4) 53 JT 1990 (3) 359 1990 SCALE (2)167
ACT:
Indian
Penal Code, 1860: Sections 300, 302 and 304--Injury afflicted without intention
to cause death--Acting on spur of moment without pre-meditation--Resulting in
death--Conviction thereof- Applicability of Section 304.
HEAD NOTE:
The
appellant was charged with the murder of a co-worker at the factory in which
they were working. The Trial Court discarded the testimony of eye-witnesses and
other circum- stances and acquitted the appellant, by giving him the benefit of
doubt.
On
appeal, the High Court accepted the testimony of the eyewitnesses and convicted
the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life
imprisonment.
This
appeal is against the High Court's judgment.
Allowing
the appeal in part,
HELD:
1. The High Court had interfered with the order of acquittal for cogent reasons
and that the conclusion of the High Court that the appellant has caused the
death of the deceased, by stabbing with a knife in the manner alleged by the
prosecution is unassailable. The approach by the trial court was clearly wrong
and the finding is perverse. The testimony of the two independent eye-witnesses
had not been properly appreciated. Their presence at the scene could not at all
be doubted in the light of what P.W. 3 has deposed.
They
are probable witnesses and there had not been any infirmity in their evidence.
[608F-G]
2.
However, the offence is not murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, and that
the act of the appellant as proved would fail only under Section 304 Part-II,
IPC. The appel- lant had admitted that there had been an altercation between
the two and the deceased received the injury in the course of a scuffle. The
evidence clearly established that the whole incident was a sudden development
and that the appel- lant had acted at the spur of the moment and without any
pre-meditation.
607
There had been no ill-will or enmity between the two. A casual remark made by
the appellant provoked the deceased and the altercation ensued which culminated
in the stabbing with knife. The appellant used the knife only once and did not
act in any cruel manner. It was in the sudden quarrel in heat of passion that
the appellant inflicted the injury on the deceased without any intention to
cause death but having knowledge that such act was likely to cause the death of
the deceased. [609B-D]
3. The
conviction is altered to one under Section 304, Part-II, IPC. Appellant had
already undergone imprisonment for over one year. He had been released on bail
by order of this Court. The appellant, a young man who had been at large for
over nearly 12 years, cannot be committed to prison for any further period at
this stage. [609E]
4. To
meet the ends of justice, it is directed that the appellant should pay a fine
of Rs.50,000 in addition to the term of imprisonment he has already suffered.
This amount would be paid to the father of the deceased and other legal heirs.
In case of default in payment of fine, the appellant should undergo further
imprisonment for six months. [609F-G]
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 328 of 1979.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 2.1.1979 of the Alla- habad High Court in
Government Appeal No. 663 of 1973.
Pramod
Swarup for the Appellant.
Manoj Swarup,
Prashant Choudhary and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by FATHIMA BEEVI, J. Khanjan Pal, the
appellant, was con- victed by the High Court for the offence punishable under
Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, in reversal
of the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, Agra. The brief facts of the case are as under:
The
appellant, Khanjan Pal, and the deceased, Deep Singh, were working in the
bangles welding factory of Data Ram in Mohalla Rajputana, Thana Firozabad. The
prosecution case was that while working in the factory at about 2.30 P.M. on 8.4.1972, the appellant 608 said to the deceased
that he had illicit relationship with one Tara.
Deep Singh said that he considered Tara
to be his sister. The altercation ensued between the appellant and the deceased
and in the course of the altercation, the appellant stabbed the deceased with a
knife and this incident was witnessed by P.W. 2, Ram Pratap Singh, and P.W. 4, Maharaj
Singh besides Umrao Singh, P.W. 1. The injury sustained by the deceased was a
punctured wound penetrating into chest cavity. The occurrence was reported at
the police station by Umrao Singh, father of the deceased at 3.00 P.M. the same day. In the course of the investigation,
blood-stained shirt was seized from the appellant and sent for chemical examina-
tion. The certificate was to the effect that it was stained with human blood.
The
trial court acquitted the appellant discarding the testimony of the eye
witnesses mainly for the reasons that the occurrence could not have happened at
the alleged time and place as the place of occurrence was not mentioned in the
first information report, the postmortem report referred to the presence of
undigested food in the abdomen of the deceased, the presence of Umrao Singh
(P.W. 1), Ram Pratap Singh (P.W. 2), and Maharaj Singh (P.W. 4) was doubtful in
the light of the conduct of P.W. 3, Data Ram and that since the attendance
register was not produced, it was doubtful whether the factory was opened on
that day or not. The appellant was therefore given the benefit of doubt by the
trial court.
The
High Court on a careful analysis of the entire evidence dislodged the finding
of the trial court, accepted the testimony of P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 and concluded
that the prosecution had established the charge against the appel- lant. We
have been taken through the judgments' and the relevant records of the case. We
are satisfied that the High Court had interfered with the order of acquittal
for cogent reasons and that the conclusion of the High Court that the appellant
has caused the death of the deceased, Deep Singh, by stabbing with a knife in
the manner alleged by the prose- cution is unassailable. The approach by the
trial court was clearly wrong and the finding is perverse. The testimony of the
two independent eye witnesses had not been properly appreciated. Their presence
at the scene could not at all be doubted in the light of what P.W. 3 has
deposed. They are probable witnesses and there had not been any infirmity in
their evidence as rightly pointed out by the High Court. The evidence of P.W. 1,
rejected by the trial court was also not accepted by the High Court. The
reasoning adopted by the trial court, in our opinion, was so perverse that the
High Court was justified in upsetting the finding and 609 arriving at an
independent conclusion which is fully sup- ported by the evidence on record. We
do not, therefore, see any merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the appel-
lant that the conviction is wrong.
We. however,
agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that on the basis of the facts
proved, the offence is not murder punishable under Section 302, I.P.C., and
that the act of the appellant as proved would fail only under Section 304
Part-II, I.P.C. The appellant had in statement under Section 3 13, Cr.P.C.,
admitted that there had been an altercation between the two and the deceased
received the injury in the course of a scuffle. The evidence clearly
established that the whole incident was a sudden development and that the
appellant had acted at the spur of the moment and without any pre-meditation.
There had been no ill-will or enmity between the two. A casual remark made by
the appellant provoked the deceased and the altercation ensued which culminated
in the stabbing with knife. The appellant used the knife only once and did not
act in any cruel man- ner. It was in the sudden quarrel in heat of passion that
the appellant inflicted the injury on the deceased without any intention to
cause death but having knowledge that such act was likely to cause the death of
the deceased. In such circumstances. the act of the appellant falls under Excep-
tion 4 to Section 300, I.P.C., and the appellant is liable to be convicted only
under Section 304, Part-II, I.P.C.
We
accordingly alter the conviction to one under Section 304, Part-II, I.P.C. We
are told that the appellant had already undergone imprisonment for over one
year. He had been released on bail by order of this Court dated 16.7. 1979. The
appellant, a young man who had been at large for over nearly 12 years, in our
opinion, cannot be committed to prison for any further period at this stage. To
meet the ends of justice, we direct the appellant to pay a fine of Rs.50,000 in
addition to the term of imprisonment he has already suffered. We, thus modify
the sentence awarded by the High Court. We also direct that the fine, if realised,
shall be paid to P.W. 1, Umrao Singh, the father of the deceased and other
legal heirs of Deep Singh. In case of default in payment of fine, the appellant
shall undergo further imprisonment for one year. The appeal is partly allowed.
G.N.
Appeal partly allowed.
Back