Adhunik
Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr [1989] INSC
72 (28 February 1989)
Oza,
G.L. (J) Oza, G.L. (J) Saikia, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 867 1989 SCR (1) 848 1989 SCC Supl. (1) 656 JT 1989 Supl. 46 1989
SCALE (1)511
ACT:
Rajasthan
Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963: Sections 2(b),
2(d), 2(f) and 7--'Estate'--What is--'Land' situated within boundaries of Umaid
Bhavan Palace--Held do not fall within definition of 'estate'.
Rajasthan
Urban Property (Restriction of Transfers) Act, 1973: Section 3(2)--Prohibition
on transfer of land--Trans- fer effected after August 16, 1971--Held not void.
HEAD NOTE:
After
attainment of Independence, the rulers of the erstwhile
princely States of Rajasthan entered into a Cove- nant with the Government of
India for integrating their States into one. Article 12 of the said Covenant
provided for the private properties of the rulers of the Covenanting States,
and clause (i) thereof prescribed that the ruler of each of the Covenanting
States; shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
properties. The immovable properties of the rulers were divided into three
categories, Category 'A', 'B' and 'C'.
The
Maharaja of Jodhpur was one such ruler who integrat- ed his State in the Union. Category 'C' of the Covenant listed the properties
of the Maharaja as his absolute property over which he had full rights of
disposal, and the property known as 'Umaid Bhavan Palace' was included in this
category.
The Maharaja
who was the signatory to the Covenant died in 1952, and after his death he was
succeeded by his son who was a minor at that time. Because the successor was a
minor an administrator was appointed for the purpose of adminis- tration of the
estate.
In
1964, the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the Rajasthan Land Reforms and
Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 which received the assent of the
President on 6th April,
1964. The Act was
enacted to provide for the acquisi- tion of the estates of land owners. Section
7 thereof pro- vided for the issuance of a Notification by the State Gov- ernment
appointing a date for the vesting in the State Government 849 of the estates of
all land owners situated anywhere in the State. Exercising powers under the
aforesaid section, a Notification was issued on 11th August, 1964 by which the State Government appointed 1st September, 1964 as the date of vesting of all the
estates of land owners.
The
three petitioners in the writ petitions were parties who had purchased
respective areas of land for price by registered sale deeds, two dated 4.11.71
and one dated 5.11.71 from the erstwhile ruler of Jodhpur state.
Notices
under section 9A of the Act were issued on 19.11.1975 to these parties by the
Collector stating that the transfers of the lands were null and void and they
shall deliver possession before 28th September, 1975 or within 10 days of the receipt of the notice whichever is
later to the Sub-Divisional Officer. This was followed by another notice on 8th
December, 1975 by which possession of the lands were taken by affixing a notice
as required by Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land
Owners' Estate Rules 1964.
The
petitioners contended in the courts below that their land was not liable to
acquisition under the Act and sought a direction that the orders and notices be
quashed. It was contended that in the definition of 'land' as defined in
section 2F, provide for properties which shall not be in- cluded within the
definition of 'land' and as the property in the instant case was excluded from
the definition of 'land' the properties of the petitioners could not be ac- quired
under section 7 of the Land Reforms Act.
A
Single Judge of the High Court on an examination of the list of Category 'C' to
the Covenant, and the material on the record came to the conclusion that the
lands fell within the property included in the Schedule of private properties
in Category 'C' and therefore it being a private property included in the
Inventory according to the Covenant the acquisition under the provision of the
Act was bad. It was further held that the transfer made by the ex-ruler in favour
of the petitioners was not bad.
The
trustees of the Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel
and Charitable Trust, the appel- lants in one of the appeals also filed a Writ
petition which came up before the High Court. The High Court relying on its
earlier decision allowed the petition and quashed the noti- fication.
850
Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the State Govern- ment and the Trust and
the Division Bench disposed of all the appeals and came to a different
conclusion than the Single Judge's who decided the writ petitions. The Division
Bench held that the repeal of the Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of
Transfers) Act, 1973 by the Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of
Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978, the cloud that had been cast on the title of the
purchases had been removed.
In the
appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acqui- sition of Land Owners' Estate Act, 1963 was
brought into force in 1964 and that according to the definition of 'e- state',
in section 2B it could refer to either land or right, title or interest in land
held by a land owner, and 'land' was defined in section 2F which was an
inclusive definition, and that it first refers to land held for the purpose of
agriculture and that the lands in the instant case, were not agricultural lands
they do not fail within the ambit of the definition of 'land'. It was also
contended that the Division Bench could not come to a different con- clusion
than that which was reached by the Single Judge.
On
behalf of the State, it was contended that the suit property fails within the
boundary of the Umaid Bhavan Palace according to the site plan and that
it could not be conclusively held that the properties were not agricultural
lands.
Allowing
the appeals, and setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court, this Court,
HELD:
1. No action under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition
of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 could be taken against the appellant and all
notices or actions taken are thus quashed. [864F-G]
2. It
is clear that the lands in the instant case will not fall within the definition
of 'land' as described in sec. 2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the
State not it would be acquired under the provisions of the Act and in that
event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and the question
whether the lands are agricultural or not is not very material. [858D-E]
3.
Section 2B clearly talks of land or right, title or interest in land held by
land owner and land is defined in Section 2F. It is therefore 851 clear that if
this property did not fail within the ambit of the definition of 'land' it
could not be said to be 'estate' under Section 2B and therefore could not vest
in the State under Section 7. [861F]
4. The
lands were within the boundaries of the Umaid Bhavan Palace which is the
private property in accordance with the inventory prepared and approved by
Government of India, and therefore will not fail within the ambit of the
definition of 'land' as defined in Section 2F and thus will not fail within the
ambit of the 'estate' which could vest under the provisions of this Section.
[863D]
5.
Section 3(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Property (Re- strictions of Transfers) Act,
1973 was enacted keeping in view the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act. Section
3(2) did not provide that the transfer will be invalid but it only provided
that in spite of the transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such
person thereby meaning the transferor so that when the Ceiling Act is brought
into force the transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to defeat the
provisions of the Ceiling Act. [859C]
6. In
fact, after the Ceiling Act was brought into force a prohibition was again
imposed on the transfer and admit- tedly the transfers in the instant case are
not after the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act 1972 which provided by
section 5 that the transfers made after the commencement of the Act was null
and void. It could not, therefore, be said that the transfers in the instant
case after August 16,
1971 were void. [859G]
(C.A. No. 1145/87--Naveen Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan
was permitted to be withdrawn, as the appellants had chosen to come to this
Court when in fact they were not parties in the judgment before the High
Court.). [864G-H]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1144-48 of 1987.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B.
Civil Special Appeal Nos. 3, 4, 5 of 1978 and 79 of 198 1 and 354 of 1984.
Dr.
L.M. Singhvi, G.L. Sanghi, V.M. Tarkunde, Dalveer Bhandari, Ms. Rachna Joshi,
K.N. Toshi, Lekh Rai Mehta, Gopal Singh, Sushil K. Jain and Sudharshan Atreya
for the Appellants.
852 G.
Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General P.S. Poti, Badridas Sharma, R.C. Maheshwari
and Manoj Jain for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J. These appeals have come to this
Court against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan
dated 29.9.86 wherein the learned Judges disposed of the following appeals by
the impugned judgment and against this after grant of leave these appeals are
before us:
(1)
The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. Prajapati Grah Nirman Samiti
Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 3 of 1978.
(2)
The State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Adhunik Grah Nirman Samiti
Limited, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 4 of 1978.
(3)
The State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. M/s. Jai Marwar Company
Pvt. Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 5 of 1978.
(4)
Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel
Charitable Trust v. The State of Rajasthan and Others, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 79 of 1981.
(5)
State of Rajasthan and another v. Maharaja Gaj Singh Ji,
D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 354 of 1984.
Initially
the three writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Rajasthan by
i) Prajapati
Grah Nirman Samiti Limited,
ii) Adhunik
Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. and
iii)
M/s. Jai Marwar Company Private Limited. It was alleged that these three
parties purchased respective areas of land for price by registered sale deeds
two dated 4.11.71 and one dated 5.11.71 from Shri Gaj Singh, the erstwhile
ruler of the Jodhpur State. These lands form part of Khasra No. 42 1 in the revenue
records. There is yet another adjacent land which also was in dispute in other
matters than these three which was Khasra No. 426.
Facts
which are not in dispute are that after attainment of independence on 15th
August, 1947 the rulers of the erstwhile princely States of Banswara, Bikaner, Bundi,
Dungarpur, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kishangarh, Kota, Mewar, Partabgarh,
Shahpura and Tonk entered into a Covenant with the Government of India 853
integrating these states into one. Article 12 of the said Covenant provided for
the private properties of the rulers of the Covenanting States. In clause (1)
of this article it was prescribed that the ruler of each of the Covenanting
State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
properties (as distinct from State properties), belonging to him on the date of
his making over the administration of the State. In accordance with the
aforesaid clause in the Covenant, a list of private proper- ties of the ruler
of the former State of Jodhpur was pre- pared and.it was approved by the
Government of India on 24th March, 1949. In the said list of private properties
the immovable properties were divided into three categories.
Category
'A' consists of properties which were to be regard- ed as the family property
of the Maharaja of Jodhpur and which will not be transferred. Category 'B'
consists of properties which were to be regarded as family properties of
Maharaja of Jodhpur but which will be disposable by him if he and his heir
agree to do so. Category 'C' consists of property which is the absolute
property of the Maharaja of Jodhpur with full rights of disposal. In the case
in hand we are only concerned with Category 'C' property and in this category Umaid
Bhawan Palace alongwith the area as per plan attached including the Chittar
Tank and the Bijolai Tank and buildings was included.
Maharaja
Hanwant Singh who was the signatory to the Covenant died in 1952 and after his
death he was succeeded by his son Shir Gaj Singh who was minor at that time.
During the minority of Shri Gaj Singh an administrator was appoint- ed for the
purpose of administration of the estate of the minor Maharaja.
In
1964 the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the Act which received the
ascent of the President of India on 6.4.1964 and was published in the Rajasthan
Gazette dated 13.4.1964. The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi- tion
of the estates of landowners. Under Section 7 of the Act a provision was made
for issuing a notification by the State Government appointing a date for the
vesting in the State Government of the estates or all landowners situated
anywhere in Rajasthan. In exercise of the powers under Section 7 a notification
was issued on 11th August, 1964 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette
dated 13.8.1964 and by this notification the State Government appointed
1.9.1964 as the date of vesting of all the estates of land- owners situated
within the State.
Notice
under Section 9A of the said Act were issued on 19.11.1975 to the petitioners
by Collector, Jodhpur stating that trans- 854 fers of the aforesaid lands are
null and void and they shall deliver possession before 29.11.1975 or within 10
days of the receipt of the notice whichever is later, to the Sub Divisional
Officer, Jodhpur. It appears that one more notice dated 8.12.1975 was issued by
the Sub Divisional Officer, Jodhpur by which he appears to have taken the
possession of the aforesaid lands by affixing a notice as required by Rule 8 of
the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Rules, 1964.
The
petitioner's case before the Court below was that this land is not liable to
acquisition under the said Act and therefore they sought a direction that the
said orders and notices be quashed. It was contended before the Court below
that in the definition of 'land' as defined in Section 2F after sub-clause (d)
of this Act provide for properties which shall not be included in the
definition of 'land' and as this property fell within the ambit of that
property which was excluded from the definition of 'land' it was contended that
it could not be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Land
Reforms and Acquisition of Land-owners' Estate Act.
The
learned Judge Justice M.L. Jain, after examining the list of private properties
and the material placed on record by both the parties came to the conclusion
that these lands failing within Survey No. 421 which fell within the property
included in the schedule of private properties in category 'C' and therefore it
being a private property included in the inventory prepared according to the
Covenant, the acqui- sition under the provisions of this Act was held to be
bad.
The
learned Judge on the basis of documents also came to the conclusion that on
1.9.64 which was the relevant date noti- fied as the date of vesting this
property was not agricul- tural land and was also included in the private
property of the ruler of Jodhpur shown within the boundary of the site plan of Umaid
Bhawan Palace. Consequently the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the
transfer made by the ex- ruler in favour of these petitioners was not bad.
The
learned Judge considering the submissions came to the conclusion:
"Now,
Shri Gaj Singh is an Ex-Ruler and therefore a landown- er. The Schedule I of
the Inventory of his private proper- ties also specified the properties which
are his absolute property with full rights of disposal. Item No. 1(a) relat- ing
to Jodhpur is as follows:
855
(a) Umaid Bhawan Palace as per. plan attached including the Chittar Tank.
A plan
was attached to the inventory which contains the heading "site plan of Umaid
Bhawan Palace. Private property of His Highness and Maharaja Sahib Sahadir,
Jodhpur, is shown in the red." It is admitted that the land in dispute to
which these writ petitions relate fails within the area bounded by the red line
in the said site plan. It is, there- fore futile on the part of the State
Government to contend that the land though covered by the site plan, is not
part of the palace as specified in the inventory. The State maintains that the Umaid Bhawan Palace has its own walled enclosure and
further a long line of hills separates the land in dispute from the main
palace. The learned Dy. Gov- ernment Advocate urged that what the law excludes
is the palace and not all the lands which are shown in the site plan. The Word
'palace' should be constructed only to in- clude the area of the palace which
is bounded by walls. I do not see any force in this argument because the
definition of land excludes the palace as specified in the inventory and the
inventory specifies the area of the Umaid Bhawan Palace as per plan attached and the attached plan includes the
land in dispute. I am, therefore unable to give the word "palace" a
restricted meaning as convassed by the learned Dy. Govern- ment Advocate. That
being so, the disputed land fails out- side the estate and has consequently not
vested in the State Government." The learned Judge after considering
various documents which were filed and which were the records of the Government
as regards the nature of the land as to whether it is agricul- tural land or
not came to the conclusion that:
"The
documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute is not an agricultural
and rather it forms part of the Abadi land. In the revenue records, Khasra Nos.
are allotted not only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to Banjar
land and to Abadi land as well. The copies of the Jamabandi and Girdwari filed
by the State shows that the land is Padat and does not carry and land revenue.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi land is not
covered by the provisions of the Act. It appears 856 as has been contended that
the land in order that it vests in the State Government, should be an
agricultural land. The amended long title of the Act states that it is an Act
to provide for the acquisition of the Estates of landowners and for other
measures of agrarian reforms removal of intermedi- aries allotment of land to
landless person, development of agriculture. If the acquired land is meant for
allotment to agriculturist then the land must be an agricultural land as
indicated above. The land in question was not an agricultur- al land and if at
all it was so at any time in the past, it long ago ceased to be so at least as
early as in 1948, when according to the private property settlement, it was includ-
ed in the Umaid Bhawan Palace premises." Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari
Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel Charitable Trust also filed a
petition before the Rajasthan High Court. This pertains to Survey No. 426 and
this came up for heating before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri
K.D. Sharma who while considering the matter observed:
"At
the outset, I may observe that it is not disputed before me that Umaid Bhawan
Palace situated in Jodhpur is the absolute property of Maharaja Gaj Singh of
Jodhpur, who has full rights of disposal thereof. This fact is borne out by the
inventory marked Annexure 1 which was prepared and approved by the Government
of India in pursuance of Article 12 of the Covenant entered into by late
Maharaja Hanwant Singh with the Government of India at the time of accession of
the former Jodhpur State to the Union of India. It will not be out of place to
mention that the term 'land' defined in section 2 of the Act as amended by the
amendment Act, 1975, does not include forts, palaces, buildings and build- ing
plots specified in the inventory. Hence, Umaid Bhawan Palace of which Maharaja Gaj
Singh is the absolute owner, does not fall within the purview of the definition
of the word 'land' given in the section 2 of the Act as amended upto
date." In Misc. Petition No. 1872/75 filed by Maharaja Shri Gai Singh came
up for consideration before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri Justice
Banerjee and by order dated 20.12. 1983 relying on the judgment passed by
Justice M.L. Jain in the case of Prajapati 857 Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. v. State
of Rajasthan allowed the petition of Maharaja Gaj Singh and quashed the notices
which were issued.
It is
thereafter that the State Government in the mat- ters decided by Justice M.L.
Jain and by Justice Banerjee and the trust, in the case decided by Justice K.D.
Sharma went up in appeal under Letters Patent and by the impugned judgment, the
Division Bench disposed of all these appeals and hence these appeals have come
before us after grant of leave.
Learned
counsel for the appellants contended that this Act i.e. Rajasthan Land Reforms
and Acquisition of Land- owners Estate Act, 1963 was brought into force in
1964.
According
to the definition of 'Estate' it could refer to either land or right, title or
interest in land held by landowner. The land, according to the learned counsel,
is defined in section 2 sub-clause (f). This definition is an inclusive
definition and it first refers to land held for the purpose of agriculture.
Thereafter it has been further stated that it does not include forts, palaces,
buildings, building plots specified in the inventory and the inventory has also
been defined in Section 2 sub-clause (g) which refers to the inventory of the
private properties made in pursuance of the Covenant and finally approved by
the Cen- tral Government. Learned Counsel for the appellants mainly raised two
questions: i) that as these lands were not agri- cultural lands they do not
fall within the ambit of this definition of 'land'. It was also contended that
in any event as it fails within the boundaries of Umaid Bhawan Palace which is
a property included in the inventory as the private property of the rulers of
Jodhpur approved by the Government of India, this will not fall within the
ambit of the definition of 'land' in Section 2F. Consequently it could not be
said to be an estate as defined in Sec. 2b and as such by application of this
Act this could not vest in the State Government and in this view it was
contended that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench has omitted to
decide this question and for no reason felt that let a reference under Section
12 be decided. It was also contended that the Division Bench could not come to
a different con- clusion then one which was reached by Justice M.L. Jain and Hon'ble
Chief Justice Shri Banerjee.
Learned
counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan attempted to contended that this
property falls within the boundary of the Umaid Bhawan Palace according to the
site plan could not be conclusively held as an attempt was also made to suggest
that the original plan should have been summoned from the Central Government
but the 858 learned counsel could not explain the admissions made at the various
stages in these proceedings about the plan which was filed in these petitions
and also could not give any expla- nation as to why when these proceedings have
been going on since 1975, the State Government could not obtain an offi- cial
copy of the site plan from the Government of India and produce it before the
High Court. In fact the admission in the documents and affidavits filed before
the High Court and the orders passed by the revenue authorities which have been
at length dealt with by the learned counsel and relied upon by the High Court
could not be explained by the learned counsel appearing for the State.
Similarly the question as to whether this land was agricultural or not also was
dis- puted by the learned counsel on the basis that the revenue record entry
showed that this has been agricultural land although the record referred to by
the counsel for the appellants also indicated that this area during the State
times was included in the development plan of the Jodhpur town.
Counsel
for parties frankly conceded that if the lands in dispute fail within the
boundaries of the Umaid Bhawan Palace as shown in the site plan which was part
of the inventory prepared at the time of the Covenant and approved by
Government of India, it is clear that these lands will not fall within the
definition of 'land' as described in Sec. 2(g) and therefore it could not vest
in the State nor it could be acquired under the provisions of this Act and in
that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and the question
whether the lands are agricultural or not is not very material.
Learned
counsel for the respondent State distinguished the case of Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti
on a different footing as they claimed to be the transferees from Jai Marwar Compa-
ny Private Limited and this transfer Was at a time when the transfer was
prohibited and that question has not been gone into by the High Court as these
petitioners have chosen to come to this Court when in fact they were not
parties in the judgment before the High Court. Learned counsel for the
petitioner in the petition by Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti in view of the
objections raised by learned counsel for the respondent State frankly conceded
that this petition was not before the High Court and in view of this he submitted
that he may be permitted to withdraw this petition.
Learned
counsel for the respondent also raised an objec- tion about the transfer of
these lands in view of Section 3(2) of Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions
of Transfers) Act, 1973. Section 3(2) of 859 this Act provided that after the
16th day of August, 1971 if any person has transferred any urban property owned
by such person such transfer shall be deemed to be a transfer made to defeat
the provisions of this Act and the property so transferred shall for the
purposes of this Act be deemed to be owned by such person. On this basis it was
contended that as the transfers have been effected by Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh
after 16th August, 1971 they will be void whereas learned counsel for the
appellants contended that this Act was enacted in contemplation of the
Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act which was to be enacted and it was for the
purpose of that Act that Sec. 3(2) of this Act was enacted to restrict transfer
of urban property but it did not de- clare transfer to be void but said that in
spite of the transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such person
i.e. transferor. The idea was that while applying the law of ceiling the holder
of the property may not defeat the provisions of that Act by these transfers
and ultimately this Act was repealed and the repeal was by Rajasthan Urban
Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978 and that Act did not
protect anyone of these provisions. In fact this question was raised before the
Division Bench and the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the impugned judg-
ment observed:
"In
view of the repeal of 1973 Act the cloud which has been cast on the title of
the petitioners in the writ petitions giving rise to these. appeals by section
3(2) of the 1973 Act, was removed, and, therefore, we are unable to accept the
contention of the learned Government Advocate." It is apparent that this
Section prohibiting transfers was enacted keeping in view the Act on ceiling in
contemplation and that is why as indicated earlier Section 3(2) did not provide
that the transfer will be invalid but it only pro- vided that in spite of the
transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning
the trans- feror so that when the ceiling Act is brought into force the
transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to defeat the provisions of
the Ceiling Act. In fact after the Ceiling Act was brought into force a
prohibition was again imposed on the transfer and admittedly the transfers with
which we are concerned are not after that as it is clear that the Rajasthan
Urban Property Ceiling Act, 1972 when was enacted provided by Section 5 of that
Act that the transfers which were made after the commencement of the Act was
declared null and void. In fact the learned Judges of the Division Bench
considered this aspect of the matter and negatived the contention advanced by
the learned counsel for the respond- ents in the words indicated above and in
our opinion that conclusion could not be assailed.
860 As
regards the question as to whether the lands in dispute i.e which fail within Khasra
Nos. 421 and 426 fall within the purview of the definition of 'land' as
contained in Section 2F of the Act is concerned it is consistently held by the
High Court that as the land fell within the exception of Section 2F it would
not fail within the defini- tion of 'land' (Section 2(f) reads:
"land"
means and land held or let for purposes of agricul- ture or for purposes ancilliary
thereto including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of
buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agri- cultural labourers
and village artisans and includes—
(a) tanks,
lakes, ponds, river and water channels held for purposes of irrigation.
(b) surface
of hills,
(c) landing
grounds or strips, and
(d) shikargah
but does not include forts, palace buildings and building plots, specified in
the inventory." The last part of this provisions "but does not
include forts, palace buildings, building plots specified in the
inventory" is the relevant portion of the definition which was considered
by the Court below and is the question which deserves to be considered. The
Inventory has also been defined in Section 2(d) which means inventory of the
private property of the ruler prepared in pursuance of Article 12 of the Convenant
and finally approved by the Government of India.
In the
High Court in all these petitions the plea raised was that the inventory of the
private property of the ex- ruler of the Jodhpur State Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh
contained an item of property shown as Umaid Bhawan Place and the boundaries
therein were indicated to be in red in the site plan attached alongwith it. So
far as the inventory and inclusion of this property in the .inventory of the
private property is concerned it is not disputed even before us. In the High
Court the site plan and the properties included in the red boundary forming
part of the property Umaid Bhawan Palace was also not disputed. All the
judgments in the High Court are based on this admission and appa- 861 rently
the affidavits filed on behalf of the State before the High Court clearly and
categorically admitted this position and even went to the extent of saying that
this was verified and found to be correct and the plan filed with the petition
having a red boundary was admitted and therefore it was not disputed that Khasra
Nos. 42 1 and 426 fell within the boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace which in
accordance with the definition of 'land' quoted above will be excluded from the
definition and what is excluded from the definition of 'land' in Section 2F
could not vest in the State in view of language of Section 7. Section 7 reads:
Acquisition
of estates-(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the
Government may for the purpose of carrying out agrarian reform in accordance
with the provisions of this Act, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint
a date for the acquisition of landowner's estates in the State and for their
vesting in the State Government.
(2)
The date appointed under this Section in relation to the acquisition of
landowners' estates in the State in this Act referred to as the date of vesting
of such estates." This talks of the vesting of the estate and the estate
itself has been defined in Sec. 2B which reads:
"estate"
means land or right, title or interest in land held by a landowner;" This
clearly talks of land or right, title or interest in land held by landowner and
land as already discussed above is defined in Section 2F it is therefore clear
that if this property did not fall within the ambit of the definition of land
it could not be said to be estate under Section 2B and therefore could not vest
in the State under Section 7.
It was
in this view that counsel for both the parties frankly conceded that if this
falls within the exception to the definition of 'land' provided in Section 2F
the further question about the land being agricultural or not is of no
consequence.
An
attempt was made by the learned counsel during the course of arguments to
suggest that it is no doubt true that all through the State Government and on
behalf of the State Government the affidavits that were filed in the High Court
this was admitted that these lands in 862 dispute fell within the red boundary
of the site plan and the site plan is the site plan of the Umaid Bhawan Palace
which is included in the inventory of the private property of the ruler finally
approved by the Government of India. It is also not seriously disputed that
there are orders passed by some revenue officers in respect of these matters
where it has been held that these lands fell within the red bound- ary which is
the correct boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace in the inventory approved by the
Government of India as the private properties of the ex-ruler. Only an attempt
was made by Additional Solicitor General who appeared for the State to suggest
that the Central Government alone may have the original and therefore wanted
this Court to summon the original but learned counsel had no explanation why
this could not be done in all these years to which he had no answer and
therefore it is plain that so far as these facts are concerned the State could
not now be permitted to raise any objection in respect of the site plan and the
boundary in red of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
After
the hearing was concluded an attempt has been made on behalf of the State and
certain papers have been filed which pertains to some returns filed in
connection with the assessment in respect of the building Umaid Bhawan Palace
which has been described as Hotel Marudhar and on that basis probably a
suggestion is made that in this the ex-ruler has submitted a plan for
assessment of the property tax wherein he has not showed this part of the
property which is the subject matter of the dispute. Apparently these papers
pertain to some proceedings of assessment of property per- taining to Marudhar
Hotel with which we are not concerned and on that basis it could not be said
that what has been admitted all through as the boundary of the Umaid Bhawan
Palace is not correct. No reliance could be placed on these additional papers.
Before
the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1924/75 Additional Collector Jodhpur who is
also described as the Officer Incharge of the case has filed a counter in
return and in this it is stated:
That
the Photostat copy and the true copy of the Covenant and the site plan
submitted by the petitioner alongwith the aforesaid application have been got
verified to be the true and exact copies of the original covenant and the plan
attached with the inventory of the private properties of the Ex-ruler of
Jodhpur. The duly verified copy of the plan is being submitted for your
perusal." 863 and the same reply filed by the said Additional Collector has
been verified on affidavit by the same officer who in his affidavit states:
"That
the photostat copy of the convenant as also the true copy of the plan referred
in the Schedule of the inventory of the private properties of Ex-ruler.
Ex-ruler Jodhpur supplied to the respondents have been got verified from the
Chief Engineer P.W.D. B & R Rajasthan, Jaipur and the office of the General
Administration Department, Rajasthan, Secre- tariat, Jaipur." In view of
these circumstances therefore so far as the land in dispute i.e. Khasra Nos.
421 and 426 is concerned the admission made by the State and which was also
clear from various documents which have been considered by the High Court in
their judgments in these petitions clearly show that these lands were within
the boundaries of the Umaid Bhawan Palace which is the private property in
accordance with the inventory preparted and approved by Government of India and
therefore which will not fall within the ambit of the definition of the 'land'
as defined in Section 2F and thus will not fall within the ambit of the
'estate' which could vest under the provisions of this Section and in this view
of the matter even without going into the the question about whether land being
agricultural or not the view taken by Justice M.L. Jain is the only view which
could be sus- tained.
Even
as regards the question as to whether this land is agricultural or not it will
be relevant to note. Learned counsel for the State has relied on some Khasra, Girdwari
and Jamabandi of Sam vat 2030to 2032 relating to Khasra No. 421. It is
described as Padat and it is contended that this land will be agricultural land
as it also includes waste land. Even on the basis of the record on which
reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the State that no land revenue is
assessed on this land. On the contrary counsel for the appellant referred to a
notification published in the Jodhpur Government Gazette dated February 10,
1934 and this notification states that the Development Department shall have
control over the disposal of land for building sites and the building
regulation shall operate over the area within a radius of three miles from the Sojati
Gate and it is not disputed that these lands fell within three miles radius
from Sojati Gate. Learned counsel also referred to a letter written to Urban
Improvement Trust. The Settlement Officer is alleged to have stated that the
plan was careful- ly perused, checked and tallied with the corresponding old
settlement record of Samvat 1979 together with the site plan of Umaid 864 Bhawan
Palace which indicates the private property of His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur
Jodhpur duly verified on 12.11.1958 by the then Deputy Secretary, G.A.D. and
the Commissioner, Jodhpur Division, Jodhpur wherein the said land is included
in the premises of Umaid Bhawan Palace. The Settlement Officer further added
that the fact that this land had never been assessed to rents, that it never
has been cultivated and that it is included within the Umaid Bhawan Palace is sufficient to show that it is
"abadi land" within the meaning and definition under Section 158 of
the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. The view expressed by the Government that
this land does not appear to be agricultural land is fully established and it
was on the basis of these documents that the learned Judge Shri M.L. Jain came
to the conclusion that:
"The
documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute is not an agricultural
and rather it forms part of the Abadi land. In the revenue records, Khasra Nos.
are allotted not only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to Banjar
land and to Abadi land as well. The copies of the Jamabandi and Girdwari filed
by the State shows that the land is Padat and does not carry any land revenue.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi land is not
covered by the provisions of the Act." It is clear that the contention
raised by the learned coun- sel for the respondent that this land is an
agricultural land also cannot be accepted and in view of our conclusions
reached above it is clear that the view taken by learned Judge Shit M.L. Jain
is the only view which could be taken.
Consequently
the appeals filed by the appellants including Prajapati Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti
Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. are allowed. The judgment passed by the
Division Bench of High Court of Rajasthan in the appeals is set aside and it is
held that no action under the provisions of Rajasthan Land Reforms and
Acquisition of Landowners' Estate Act, 1963 could be taken against the
appellants and all notices or actions taken are hereby quashed. The appel- lants
shall be entitled to costs of these appeals. Costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.
So far
as Civil Appeal No. 1145/87 Naveen Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan is concerned we see no reason not
to permit him to withdraw. The petition and appeal is therefore permitted to be
withdrawn.
N.V.K.
Appeals allowed.
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