Collector
of Central Excise, Madras Vs. Standard Motor Products, [1989]
INSC 70 (24 February
1989)
Mukharji,
Sabyasachi (J) Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J) Natrajan, S. (J) Kania, M.H.
CITATION:
1989 AIR 1298 1989 SCR (1) 824 1989 SCC (2) 303 JT 1989 (1) 409 1989 SCALE
(1)490
ACT:
Supreme
Court Rules, 1966--Order VI, Rule 2(14)--Appli- cations for condonation of
delay--Whether Single Judge in Chambers has jurisdiction to dismiss--Whether
such practice just, fair and reasonable-Whether requires to be disturbed--Exception
in favour of applications under Art. 136 of the Constitution--Whether violative
of Art. 14 of the Constitution--Whether they form a separate and distinct
class-Different procedure for different applications--Wheth- er violative of
fundamental rights--Arranging the business of the Court--Whether within the
domain of the Court.
Constitution
of India, 1950: Arts. 136 and 137--Applica- tions
for condonation of delay--Whether a separate and distinct class--Longstanding
and settled practice of the Court--Whether can be disturbed.
HEAD NOTE:
An
application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner-Revenue alongwith
statutory appeals against the judgment/order of the Customs, Excise and Gold
Control Appellate Tribunal. The application was rejected by a Single Judge of
this Court under Order VI, Rule 2(14) of the Su- preme Court Rules, 1966.
The
Revenue filed review petitions on the ground that the application for condonation
of delay made in statutory appeals under several Acts should be heard by a
bench of at least two Judges. It was contended that the effect of the refusal
of condonation of delay was dismissal of the appeal itself, that the exception
in favour of Special Leave Peti- tions amounted to hostile discrimination
without any basis in that the Special Leave Petitions will be amenable to be
dealt with by two Judges, while a Single Judge will dispose of applications for
condonation of delay under statutory appeals, which was irrational and violative
of Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court should either hold
that as dismissal of application for condonation of delay amounted to dismissal
of the appeal itself, it should be heard by not less than two Judges in terms
of Order VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions or refer the matter to a larger
bench for re-consideration, in view of the decision 825 of this Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City versus R.H. Pandi, Managing Trustees of
Trust. Bombay, holding that the applications for condonation
of filing petitions of appeal were within the Chamber business under Order VI
Rule 2(14).
On the
question whether a Single Judge has jurisdiction to dismiss applications for condonation
of delay in statuto- ry appeals.
Dismissing
the review petitions,
HELD:
1.1 A Single Judge in Chambers is and was always competent to dismiss all
applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. There is nothing
repugnant in the same that it is not violative of Art. 14 of the Consti- tution.
[836G]
1.2
Order VI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that the powers of the
court in relation to a certain mat- ters may be exercised by a Single Judge
sitting in Chambers.
Rule
2(14) deals with applications for enlargement or abridgement of time with some
exceptions. Reading the rule simply, it means all applications for enlargement
or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the Single Judge in Chambers
except those applications, time for which is fixed by the court in terms of
Order VII and also applica- tions for condonation of delay in filing Special
Leave Petitions. [831E-F]
1.3 On
a proper reading, the exception made only in favour of the time fixed by the
court means court function- ing judicially in terms of Order VII Rule 1 as well
as time fixed by the rules of the court. All other applications for enlargement
or abridgement for time could be heard by the Single Judge. [831F-G]
1.4 If
a separate and distinct provision is made for application for condonation of
delay under Art. 136 of the Constitution, it is not violative of Art. 14 of the
Consti- tution. Applications under Art. 136 are a special class and are sui juris.
These are and should legitimately be treated separately other than all other
applications including applications under statutory appeals. Art. 136 is the resid-
uary power of this Court to do justice, where the court is satisfied that there
is injustice. These are class part.
There
is, therefore, no discrimination under Art. 14 of the Constitution or in Order
VI Rule 2(14). [836C-D]
2.1
Order VI demarcates the power of the Registrar and the Single Judge and Order
VII demarcates the constitution of the divi- 826 sion courts, powers of a
Single Judge and a Vacation Judge.
This
is arranging the business of the court, this is within the power of the court.
[831G]
2.2
Different treatment in respect of different applica- tions has always been
within the domain of Court's arrange- ment of business. These do not involve
any violation of the fundamental rules. [836F) P.N. Eswara Iyer etc., etc. v.
The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, [1980] 2 SCJ 119 relied on.
3.1
The practice of one Single Judge disposing of in Chambers applications for
delay in statutory appeals is just, fair and reasonable. There is no reason either
to upset that practice or to cast doubt on the proprietory of such practice,
which has been valid since 1966, and which has been sanctified by the judicial
decision. There is reason in the decision and the practice. [836E; 831D-E]
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi Managing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, [1975] 2 SCR 7 affirmed.
3.2 In
the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the provisions of
the Rules, it cannot be said that the earlier decision of this Court in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City versus R.H. Pandi was clearly erro- neous
and, therefore, it is not necessary to refer this question to a larger bench or
to disturb the settled prac- tice of this Court. [836B] Keshav Mills Co. Ltd.
v. C.I.T. Bombay North, [1965] 2 SCR 908 and Pillani Investment Corporation
Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, "A" Ward, Calcutta, and Another, [1972]
83 I.T.R. 217, relied on.
Promotho
Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee, AIR 1921 Calcutta 415
and M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Punjab, [1956] SCR 166, distinguished.
Cooker
v. Tempest, 17 M & W 502, referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petition Nos. 557- 564 & 571,594/1987.
IN 827
CIVIL MISC. PETITION NOS. 25279, 13195, 19336, 18600, 1563, 15031-33, 19552,
20695/1986.
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3005, 1599, 2194, 2067, 158 2148-50, 2902/86, 2533/86,223/88.
G. Ramaswamy
Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Ganguli, P.P. Singh, R.P. Srivastava and P. Parmeswaran
for the Petitioner.
J.
Ramamurthy, B. Parthasarthi, V.J. Francis, C.S Vai- dyanathan, S.R. Setia, Harish
N. Salve, Ravinder Narain, D .N. Misra, S. Padmanabha Mahale, Mrs. Leelawati,
K.K. Gupta V. Balachandran and Uma Dutta for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKIIARJI, J. In these
matters, the question that arises for consideration is, whether a learned
Single Judge sitting in Chambers is competent to dismiss applica- tion for condonation
of delay in statutory appeals under Order XX-A of the Supreme Court Rules,
1966, regarding appeal under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act, 1969 as well as under Order XX-B re- garding appeals under
Section 130-E of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 35-L of the Central Excises
& Salt Act, 1944. It appears that an application for condonation of delay
came before a learned Single Judge and in the circumstances mentioned in the
Review Petition No. 557 of 1987, the appli- cation was dismissed by the learned
Single Judge. That application was dismissed by one of us on 11.1 I. 86. That order was passed by learned Single Judge
under Order VI rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The application had
been filed for the condonation of delay along with the Statutory Appeal against
the Judgment/Order of the Customs, Excises and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal.
The revenue being the Collector of Central Excise, Madras in this case filed a review
petition on the ground that the application for condonation of delay made in
Statutory Appeals arising out of final orders of the Tribunal under several
Acts should be heard by a bench of at least two Judges. The matter was posted
before this bench for consideration wheth- er the learned Single Judge had
jurisdiction to dismiss such application for condonation of delay or not.
In
order to decide this question, it is necessary to have a cons- 828 pectus of
the relevant rules. In the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Rules'), as amended in 1983, under Order XX-B, of the said rules,
provision has been made for appeals under clause (b) of Section 130-E of the
Customs Act, 1962 and under Section 35-L of the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944. According to Rule 1 thereof, the petition of appeal shall, .subject to
the provisions of Sections 4, 5 & 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 be
presented within 60 days from the date of the order sought to be appealed
against or within 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be
appealed against is communicated to the Appellate, whichever is later. The time
required for obtaining a copy of the order should be excluded. There is,
however, no provision providing for limitation in the con- cerned Statutes.
According
to Rule 2 of Order XX--B, Rules 1 to 7 of Order XX-A of the Rules relating to
appeals under Section 51 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
1969 shall with necessary modifications and adaptations, apply to appeals under
that Order.
Rule 3
of Order XX-A provides as under:
"After
the appeal is registered, it shall be put up for hearing ex-parte before the
Court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all
necessary par- ties, or may make such orders as the circum- stances of the case
may require".
According
to this provision, it appears that all such statutory appeals have to be placed
before a Court for ex- parte admission.
According
to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
"Any
appeal or any application .... may be admitted after a prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for
not prefer- ring the appeal or making an application within such a
period." Some grounds, according to the appellant, had been made for condonation
of delay. Apparently, in the facts of the case, the learned Single Judge did
not find any merit in those grounds and refused to condone the delay.
Consequently, it was contended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of
delay was dismissal of the appeal following as a result thereof. The question
is, can the learned Single Judge do it9 The 829 learned Single Judge has done it
by virtue of Rule 2(14) of Order VI of the said Rules. Order VI deals with the
'Busi- ness in Chambers'. Order VI, Rule 1 provides that the powers of the
Court in relation to the matters enumerated thereun- der would be exercised by
the Registrar. Order VI, Rule 2 provides that the powers of the Court in
relation to certain matters may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in Cham-
bers. Thereafter 28 such matters are enumerated. Rule 2(14) of Order VI
provides as follows:
"Applications
for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the
Court and except applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave
petitions".
Reading
the rule simply, it appears to us that it means all applications for the
enlargement or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the learned Single
Judge in Chambers except, those applications time for which has been fixed by
the Court in terms of Order VII and also applications for condonation of delay
in filing special leave petitions. This appears to us to be logical and literal
meaning of the said rule. The question, however, has been posed is this--an
application for condonation of delay or an application for enlargement or
abridgement of time. This question, it ap- pears to us, is concluded by the
decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi
Manag- ing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, [1975] 2 SCR 7. There a bench of three
learned Judges of this Court had occasion to con- sider this question. A
question arose there as to whether the application for condonation of delay in
filing petition of appeal could be heard by the Judge in his Chambers. Ray,
C.J. observed in the said judgment an argument was advanced before the Hon'ble
Judge in Chambers that if an application for condonation of delay was refused
by the Judge in Cham- bers it would amount to dismissal of the appeal by the
Judge in Chambers. Therefore, it was said that these applications should be
heard by 'the Court' which alone was competent to dismiss the appeal. By Court,
it was urged, meant a bench of two learned Judges. After giving notices to the
learned Attorney General and the Bar Association, the matter was discussed by
this Court and it was held that in view of Order VI, Rule 2(14) of the Rules
set out hereinbefore, all applications for enlargement or abridgement of time
except the three cases mentioned in Order VI, Rule 2(14) were to be heard by
the Judge in Chambers. At the relevant time, the three matters included, inter alia,
deposit of security.
This
Court observed in the said decision that an important exception was the
application for condonation of delay in 830 filing special leave petitions. It
was observed that Order XLVII Rule 3 of the Rules stated that the Court might
en- large or abridge any time appointed by these rules or fixed by any order
enlarging time, for doing any act or taking proceedings, upon such terms, if
any, as the justice of the case might require, and any enlargement might be
ordered, although the application therefore was not made until after the
expiration of the time appointed or allowed. A petition of appeal was required
under Order XV of the Rules to be presented within 60 days from the grant of
certificate of fitness. The time to present the petition of appeal was fixed by
the Rules of this Court. It was observed, there- fore, that Order XLVII Rule 3
should apply with regard to enlargement or abridgement of any time appointed by
the Rules for doing any act. This Court was of the view that Order VI Rule
2(14) spoke of the applications for enlarge- ment or abridgement of time. Here
the words "enlargement or abridgement of time" took in applications
for enlargement of time appointed by the Rules, that is to say, according to
this Court, fixed by the Rules. The significant feature of the Rules was that
applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions were excepted
from the busi- ness of a Chamber Judge. The natural presumption was that but
for the exception the Rule would have to be included also applications for condonation
of delay in filing special leave petitions. Any application for condonation of
delay in filing petition of appeal was therefore included in applica- tions for
enlargement or abridgement of time. This Court noted that the practice of the
Chamber Judge hearing appli- cations for condonation of delay in filing
petitions of appeal within the time appointed by the Rules of this Court had
been followed ever since 1966. Cursus curiae est lex curiae. The practice of
this Court is the law of the Court.
See
Broom's Legal Maxims at p. 82. Where a practice had existed it was convenient
to adhere to it because it was the practice. It was noted that the power of
each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all
Courts. Reliance was placed on the observations in Cooker v.
Tempest,
17 M & W 502. Therefore, this Court held that applications for condonation
of delay in filing petitions of appeal were within the Chamber business under
Order VI Rule 2(14). Learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the
aforesaid decision requires reconsideration. He submit- ted that a prior
decision of this Court and a decision of Calcutta High Court were not adverted
to. He further submit- ted that this Court spoke of "enlargement or abridgement
of time" fixed by the Rules. Therefore, it could not be con- tended that
the application for condonation of delay would come within this purview.
Furthermore, it was argued that if the exceptions in favour of special leave
petitions are maintained, there would be hostile discrimi- 831 nation without
any basis, namely, special leave petitions being amenable to be dealt with by
the two Judges, while the learned Single Judge will dispose of the application
for condonation of delay under Statutory Appeals. This, it was submitted, is
irrational and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the Rules should
not be so construed. The Learned Additional Solicitor General, therefore,
submitted before us that we should hold that as dismissal of applica- tion for condonation
of delay amounts to dismissal of the appeal, it should be heard in terms of
Order VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions, namely, it should be heard by not
less than two Judges. He submitted that if we were not inclined to accept this
submissions in view of the decision of this Court in C. 1. T., Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi Manag- ing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, (supra), we should refer the
matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the matter.
We
have considered the matter. We are unable to accept the submission of the
learned Additional Solicitor General.
We
accept the reasoning to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of
Income-tax v. R.H. Pandi, (supra). We find that was the practice of the Court.
That has been sanctified by the judicial decision. We also see reason in the
decision and the practice. We do not find any reason for holding that the
practice of this Court followed since 1966 requires to be altered. Arranging
the business of the Court is within the domain of the Court. These Rules have
been framed by this Court with the approval of the President of India.
Under
Order I Rule 2(1)(g) of the Rules, 'Court' means the Supreme Court of India.
Sub-rule (14) of Rule 2 of Order VI empowers a Single Judge to decide certain
matters which speaks of applications for enlargement or abridgement of time
except where the time is fixed by the Court and except, inter alia,
applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. On a
proper reading, it appears to us that the exception made only in favour of the
time fixed by the Court means Court functioning judicially in terms of Order
VII Rule 1 as well as time fixed by the Rules of the Court. All other
applications for enlargement or abridgement of time could be heard by the
learned Single Judge. As is clear, Order VI demarcates the power of the
Registrar, and the learned Single Judge and Order VII demarcates the con- stitution
of the Division Courts, powers of a Single Judge and the Vacation Judge. This
is arranging the business of the Court. This is within the power of the Court.
Two deci- sions were referred to us by the learned Additional Solici- tor
General. Our attention was drawn to the observations in the Division Bench
Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee, AIR 1921 Calcutta 415. There the Court was concerned
832 with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, Section 109.
The
Court observed that an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation
prescribed therefore after further refusing an application under section 5 of
the Limitation Act to admit the appeal after the prescribed time, was 'passed
on appeal' under Section 109. Sanderson, C.J. doubt- ed the said conclusion but
observed that this involved a substantial question of law. That was an
application by the defendant for a certificate that the decree of this Court,
from which the appeal was sought to the Privy Council in- volved a claim of Rs.
10,000 and that the appeal involved some substantial question of law. The
question was whether such application should be allowed. A point was taken on
behalf of the plaintiff that the decree of the High Court was not one 'passed
on appeal' within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 109 of the Civil
Procedure Code. There it appears that the order of Mr. Justice Greaves against
which the appeal was directed, was made on 26th July, 1918. On the 30th August, 1918, being
the last date of sitting of the Court, at about 5.00 P.M. after the Court of
Appeal had risen an application was made to Mr. Justice Chaudhuri sitting on
the Original Side for leave to file the memoran- dum of appeal without a copy
of the order against which the defendant desired to appeal. The learned Judge
granted leave to the defendant to file the memorandum of appeal subject to any
objection which might be taken on behalf of the plain- tiff. When the matter
came before the appeal Court, the plaintiff took the point that the appeal was
out of time.
The
appeal Court decided that the appeal was out of time, being barred by the
Limitation Act, and the Court further refused an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act to admit the appeal after the prescribed time and the appeal
was dismissed. Having regard to the above mentioned facts, Sanderson, C.J.
observed that it cannot be held that the order was not one 'passed on appeal'.
Sanderson, C.J. had some doubts on that proposition but agreed with Woodroffe,
J. that the appeal involved substantial question of law. In that appeals, a
certificate was granted. In our opinion, this decision is not relevant for the
issue before us.
Whether
an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in case of
Statutory Appeal is an order or appeal is not quite in issue here and is not
decisive of the mat- ter. It does not solve the question whether a learned
Single Judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a statutory
appeal. After all, the Court functions by its arrangement under the Rules.
Order VI mentions the Chamber Business and the Business to be transacted by the
Registrar and Single Judge sitting in Chambers. The powers of the Court, that
is to say, the whole Court and the powers of Division Bench normally, except
those mentioned in Order VI, will be as enjoined by Rule. 1 of Order VII, 833
that is to say, a bench consisting of not less than two Judges. In that view of
the clear provisions of the Rule, we are of the opinion that the said decision
of the Calcutta High Court upon which reliance has been placed does not in any
manner detract the decision of this Court in C. 1. T., Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi.
Our attention was also drawn to a decision of this Court in M/s. Mela Ram &
Sons v. The Com- missioner of Income-Tax, Punjab, [1956] SCR 166. There the
appellant firm had filed appeals against orders assessing it to income-tax and
super-tax for two years 1945-46 and 1946- 47 beyond the time prescribed by
Section 30(2) of the Income Tax Act. The appeals were numbered and notices were
issued for their hearing under Section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. At the
hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the
Department took the objection that the appeals were barred by time. The
appellant prayed for condonation of delay, but that was refused, and the
appeals were dismissed as time-barred. The appellant then preferred appeals
against the orders of dismissal to the Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act,
and the Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assist-
ant Commissioner were in substance passed under Section 30(2) and not under
Section 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay against them under Section 33 of
the Act. This Court observed that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal
and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one 'passed in appeal'. Section 31
of the Act was the only provision relat- ing to the hearing and disposal of
appeals and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation as in the
present case is one passed in appeal it must fall within Section 31 and as
Section 33 confers a right of appeal against all orders passed under Section
31, it must also be appealable. These observations, in our opinion, were made
entirely in different statutory context and cannot be used in the context in
which the question has arisen before us in the present case. Learned Additional
Solicitor General submitted before us that in view of the fact that these two
decisions were not considered by this Court in C. 1. T., Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi,
(supra) and in view of the fact that this argument in favour of statutory
appeals to be heard by the learned Single Judge while the applications for condonation
of delay in respect of the special leave peti- tions to be heard by the bench
of two learned Judges will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and
as such this contention should be heard by a larger bench. We are unable to
accept this submission.
This
Court had occasion to consider the situation in which question settled by this
Court can be reviewed. Refer- ence may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar,
CJ in the Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. 834 v. C.I.T., Bombay North, [1965] 2 SCR 908
at page 921 the learned Chief Justice observed:
"In
dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this Court in
the New Jehangir Mills, [(1960)] 1 SCR 249] case, and the Petlad Ltd. case
[(1963)] Supp. 1 SCR 871] should be reconsidered and revised by us, we ought to
be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala
has not disputed the fact that in a proper case, this Court has inherent
jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so, the
abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this Court or not need
not detain us. In exercising this inherent power, however, this Court would
naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant
to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier
decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial
reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law
involving ques- tions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two
views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a
choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making
is often very difficult and delicate. When this Court hears appeals against
decisions of the High Courts and is required to consider the propriety or
correctness of the view taken by the High Courts on any point of law, it would
be open to this Court to hold that though the view taken by the High Court is
reasonably possible, the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is
better and should be preferred.
In
such a case, the choice is between the view taken by the High Court whose judgment
is under appeal, and the alterna- tive view which appears to this Court to be
more reasonable; and in accepting its own view in preference to that of the
High Court, this Court would be discharging. its duty as a Court of Appeal. But
different considerations must inevita- bly arise where a previous decision of
this Court has taken a particular view as to the construction of a statutory
provision as, for instance, Section 66(4) of the Act. When it is urged that the
view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised, it may not
necessarily be an ade- quate reason for such review and revision to hold that
though the earlier view is a reasonably 835 possible view, the alternative view
which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing
and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether in the
interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it
is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides
questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts
within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and
concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and conti-
nuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this
Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view
pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may inci-
dentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be
consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the
Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should
hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to
be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satis- fied with a fair amount of
unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully
justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be
inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the
Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier
decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations:--What
is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and
revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent
aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not
drawn to any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed?.
Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in
the earlier view? What would be impact of the error on the general administra- tion
of law or on public good?. Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent
occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts?. And, would the reversal
of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief?.
These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind
whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and
revise its earli- er decisions." 836 This view was again reiterated by
this Court in the Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer,
"A" Ward, Calcutta, and Another[1972] 83 I.T.R. 217.
In the
facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the provisions of the said
Rules as noticed before, we cannot say that we are satisfied that the earlier
decision of this Court in C.I.T. Bombay City v. R.H. Pandi, (supra) was clearly
erroneous. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer this
question to a larger bench or to disturb the settled practice of this Court.
There
is no substance in the contention of any discrimi- nation under Article 14 of
the Constitution or in Order VII rule 2(14). Applications under Article 136 is
a special class and are sui juris. These are and should legitimately be treated
separately other than all other applications including applications under
Statutory Appeals. If a sepa- rate and distinct provision is made for
application of condonation of delay under Article 136 of the Constitution, we
do not see any conceivable ground which can be taken for contending that it is violative
of Article 14 of the Consti- tution. After all Article 136 is the residuary
power of this Court to do justice where the Court is satisfied that there is
injustice. These are class apart.
The
practice of the learned Single Judge disposing of in Chambers applications for condonation
of delay in statutory appeals is just, fair and reasonable. Every court has the
right to arrange its own affairs. We find no reason either to upset that
practice or to cast doubt on the propriety of such practice. In this
connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in P.N. Eswara lyer
etc., etc. v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, [1980] 2 SCJ 119 where
this Court upheld the circulation system for the disposal of the Review
Petitions and held that early hearing was the essential requirement if a review
petition is found devoid of substance. Such different treatment in respect of
different applications has always been within the domain of Court's arrangement
of business. These do not involve any violation of the fundamental right. In
the premises, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed. We
hold that a Single Learned Judge in Chambers is and was always competent to
dismiss all applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. We find
nothing repugnant in the same and no substance in the contention that otherwise
the same would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Review
Petitions therefore, fail and are dis- missed.
N.P.V.
Petitions dismissed.
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