Collector
of Central Excise, Baroda Vs. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises
[1989] INSC 240 (10
August 1989)
Mukharji,
Sabyasachi (J) Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J) Ray, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1990 AIR 59 1989 SCR (3) 784 1989 SCC (4) 112 JT 1989 (3) 341 1989 SCALE (2)255
CITATOR
INFO: R 1990 SC1893 (4)
ACT:
Central
Excises And Salt Act, 1944/Central Excise Rules, 1944: Sections 3, 4,11-A and
35L--'Goods '--Starch hydrolysate---Whether 'goods '--Whether duty leviable.
HEAD NOTE:
The
respondent was engaged in the manufacture of sorbitol, which fell under items
68 of the Central Excise Tariff.
During
a visit to the factory premises by the Central Excise Officers it was found
that the respondent also manufactured and captively consumed starch hydrolysate
which, according to the appellant, was glucose and fell under Item E of the
Central Excise Tariff. In reply to the show-cause notice issued by the
appellant, the respondent contended that starch hydrolysate was not 'goods'
since the same was not marketable and therefore no excise duty was payable on
it;
and
that even if the same was liable for duty it would not be under Item 1-E. There
were adjudication proceedings thereafter, and the adjudicator held that starch hydrolysate
was glucose and fell under item E, and that the respondent had suppressed the
fact of manufacture thereof. In the premises, the adjudicator ordered payment
of excise duty and further imposed a penalty.
The
Tribunal, however, allowed the respondent's appeal and held that starch hydrolysate
manufactured by the respondent was not, and never was, a marketable commodity,
and hence that would not be 'goods' on which excise duty could be charged.
The
Revenue appealed to this Court. Before this Court, it was inter alia contended
on behalf of the appellant: (i) that the Tribunal misdirected itself in
applying the proper test for the determination of the question, and that the
true test to determine in a matter of this nature was to consider not only
whether starch hydrolysate was actually marketable but also to consider whether
conceptually the said goods were capable of being marketed, and the Tribunal
should have examined or called for fresh evidence to determine that question;
and (ii) even transient items of articles could he 'goods'. provided these were
known in the market as distinct and separate articles having distinct and
separate uses, and if these were capable of being marketed even during short
period.
784
785 On behalf of the respondent it was contended that; (i) starch hydrolysate
which was utilised in the manufacture of sorbitol, was not being marketed and
was not capable of being marketed in view of its highly unstable character
resulting in fragmentation even if kept for a day or two;
and
(ii) starch hydrolysate was not marketable product and would not therefore be
"goods" on the manufacture of which excise duty could have been
demanded or would have been payable and therefore for non-payment of duty,
there had been no negligence or failure.
Dismissing
the appeal, this Court,
HELD:
(1) If the process or activity of the assessee brings into existence an article
different and distinct from what it was before the process and a new
identifiable article known in the market as such comes into being, then the use
of such article in the instant case starch hydrolysate--would attract duty on
the part of the assessee even in captive consumption. [788G] South Bihar Sugar
Mills Ltd., etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 SCR 21, referred to.
(2)
The word "manufacture" implies a change but every change in the raw
material is not manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and
different article emerges having a distinct name, character or use. [790D] Union of India v. Delhi
Cloth & General Mills Ltd.,[1963] Supp. 1 SCR 586.
(3)
Duty is levied on goods. As the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 does not
define "goods", the legislature must be taken to have used that word
in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning of the expression
is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the
market to be bought and sold and is known to the market. It would be such an
article which would attract 'duty' under the Act. [790E] Union Carbide India
Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., [1986] 24 ELT
169.
(4) It
is true that the goods with unstable character can be theoretically marketable
if there was a market of such transient type of articles which are goods. But
one has to take a practical approach. [792G] 786
(5) It
was the duty of the Revenue to adduce evidence or proof that the articles in
question were goods. If the Department was to charge duty of excise on this
starch hydrolysate as one form of glucose it would be the burden on the
Department to establish that starch hydrolysate was not merely marketable but
was being marketed as glucose in some form. The Revenue has not produced any
evidence whatsoever though asked to do so. Bhor Industries Ltd. Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, [1989] 1 SCC 602. [793A-F]
(6) It
appears that there was no market enquiry by the Revenue. In view of the fact
that there was positive evidence that starch hydrolysate was never marketed and
in view of further fact that in the light of the nature of the goods being
highly unstable, it was highly improbable that the goods were capable of being
marketed and there being in spite of the opportunities, no evidence produced at
all that the goods, in fact, were capable of being marketable, it must be held,
as did the Tribunal, that the starch hydrolysate were not dutiable under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944. [794G-795A]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 22 15(NA) of 1988.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 2.11.87 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control)
Appellate Tribunal, New
Delhi in Appeal No.
478 of 86--D (Order No. 877 of 1987-D.) A.K. Ganguli, T.V.S.N. Chari, P. Parmeswaran
and Sushma Suri for the Appellant.
Soli
J. Sorabjee, R. Narain, Kamal Mehta, P-K. Ram and D.N. Misra for the
Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an
appeal under section 35L(b) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appeal is directed against the
order dated 2nd
November, 1987 passed
by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Tribunal'). The respondent, viz., M/s Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises manufacture sorbitol
failing under item 68 of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff. There was a visit
to the factory premises of the respondent by the Central Excise Officers on 26th February, 1985. It was 787 allowed that it was
found that the respondent manufactured and captively consumed starch hydrolysate
but the respondent had failed to take out a licence with reference to the said
manufacture of starch hydrolysate and had been removing the same without,
according to the appellant, payment of duty and without observing the necessary
central excise formalities. It was the view of the revenue that starch hydrolysate
was glucose and, therefore, fell under Item 1-E of the Central Excise Tariff,
which covered glucose in whatever form including liquid glucose. Accordingly, a
show cause notice was issued to the respondent. A reply was filed on behalf of
the respondent contending that starch hydrolysate was not "goods"
since the same was not marketable and, therefore, no excise duty would be
payable on the same. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the proposed
adjudication by the Collector following the aforesaid notice was without jurisdiction
in view of section 11A of the Act.
It was
urged that starch hydrolysate is not glucose and that even if the same was
liable for duty it would not be under item E. According to him, starch hydrolysate
was an intermediate product in the manufacture of sorbitol and no duty could be
demanded on the same. There were adjudication proceedings thereafter. In the
said proceedings, affidavits were filed on behalf of the respondent, witnesses
on behalf of the revenue were cross-examined and the Collector also cross-examined
the witnesses of the respondent. By an order dated 6th December, 1985, the Collector of Central Excise, Baroda rejected frae contention of the
respondent. It was held by him that starch hydrolysate was glucose and fell
under item 1-E of the Central Excise Tariff and that the respondent had
suppressed the fact of manufacture thereof for consumption in the further
manufacture of sorbitol. In the premises, he ordered the respondent to pay
excise duty amounting to Rs.34,92,559.55 paise and imposed a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs.
Aggrieved by the said order of the Collector, the respondent preferred an
appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 2nd November, 1987, being the order under appeal, held
that starch hydrolysate manufactured by the respondent is not and never was
marketable commodity, and hence that would not be "goods" on which
excise duty could be charged. In the premises, the Tribunal allowed the appeal
filed by the respondent and set aside the order of the Collector. Aggrieved thereby,
the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court under section 35L(b) of the
Act.
On
behalf of the appellant, Shri Ganguly contended that the Tribunal misdirected
itself in applying the proper test for the determination of the question. He
urged that the true test to determine in a 788 matter of this nature was to
consider not only whether starch hydrolysate was actually marketable but also
to consider whether conceptually the said goods in question were capable of
being marketable. It was urged by Shri Ganguly that the Tribunal had
misdirected itself in not appreciating this aspect of the matter and did not as
such examine or view the evidence on record in the proper perspective. He urged
that in the aforesaid light and in view of the findings made by the Collector,
there was no ground for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of the
Collector. He further submitted that in any event, if the Tribunal was not
fully satisfied with the evidence on record to determine whether starch hydrolysate
were goods in the sense of being marketable, then the Tribunal should have, in
the facts and the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice,
remanded the matter back for appraisement and examination in the light of the
true principle or the Tribunal should have examined or called for the fresh
evidence to determine this question. The Tribunal not having done so, has
failed to render justice and as such the order of the Tribunal is bad,
according to Shri Ganguly. Shri Ganguly further submitted that in starch hydrolysate
the percentage of dissolved solids present is 64. It was submitted that the
criterion laid down in the IS Specification for liquid glucose or glucose
syrup, the two terms are being used synonymously by the Indian Standard
Institution, was not satisfied in this case. The IS Specification defines
liquid glucose or glucose syrup as "a refined and concentrated non-crystalizable
aqueous solution of d-glucose, maltose and other polymers of d-glucose,
obtained by controlled hydrolysis of starch containing material". The
United States Pharmeopeia XIX describes liquid hydrolysis of starch, consisting
chiefly of dextrose, dextrins, maltose and water and in these circumstances and
in view of the components and the dictionary meaning as discussed by the
Tribunal in its order, it is urged that it cannot be said that the said goods
is the same thing as glucose or glucose syrup. In the premises, it was
contended that the Tribunal has not considered this aspect of the matter.
We are
concerned in this appeal with starch hydrolysate and, therefore, if the process
or activity of the assessee brings into existence an article different and
distinct from what it was before the process and a new identifiable article
known in the market as such comes into being, then the use of such starch hydrolysate
captively would attract duty on the part of the assessee even in captive
consumption. It is not in dispute as the Tribunal noted in the instant case
that starch is hydrolysed by the respondent. The operation of hydrolysis, it is
contended, results in bringing into being starch hydrolysate which is utilised
in the manufacture of sorbitol. The question is--whether 789 starch hydrolysate
is "goods". The case of the respondent was that the starch hydrolysate
being wholly unstable and quickly fragmented and losing its character in a
couple of days, the same could, therefore, neither be stored nor marketed. In
the premises, it was the case of the respondent that starch hydrolysate was not
marketable product and would not, therefore, be "goods" on the
manufacture of which excise duty could have been demanded or would have been
payable and, therefore, for non-payment of duty, there has been no negligence
or failure on the part of the respondent and as such section 11-A of the Act
was not applicable. In this connection, it would be instructive to refer and it
would be necessary to rely on the principles laid down by this Court in South
Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd., etc. v. Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 SCR 21.
There, the appellant companies manufactured sugar by carbonation process and
paid excise duty on sugar manufactured by them under Item I of Schedule I to
the Act. According to one affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, filed
in those proceedings, these manufacturers employed a process of burning
lime-stone with coke in a lime kiln with a regulated amount of air whereby a
mixture of gases was generated consisting of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen
and a small quantity of carbon monoxide.
The
gas thus produced was thereafter compressed so as to achieve pressure exceeding
atmospheric pressure and then passed through a tank containing sugarcane juice
so as to remove impurities from it and to refine the juice. For that process of
refining it was only the carbon dioxide in the gas which was used and the other
gases, i.e., nitrogen, oxygen and carbon monoxide escaped into the atmosphere
by a vent provided for the purpose. The carbon dioxide content in this mixture
of gases ranged from 27 to 36.5%. Similarly, another company manufactured Soda
ash by solvay ammonia soda process for which also carbon dioxide was required
and this was produced by the petitioner therein by burning lime-stone with coke
in a kiln in the same manner as the appellant sugar manufacturing companies
employing the carbonation process. The respondents therein regarded all the
companies as manufacturers of compressed carbon dioxide and levied excise duty
on them under Item 14-H in Schedule I to the Act. Writ petitions were filed in
the High Court challenging the validity of the excise duty but the same
petitions were dismissed. It was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the
appellants therein that the lime kiln was maintained to generate a mixture of
gases and not carbon dioxide and at no stage in the process of generating this
mixture and passing it through the sugarcane juice was carbon dioxide--which
formed one of the contents of the mixture--either compressed, liquidified or
solidified. The mixture of gases so generated was not carbon dioxide as known
to the market nor was it accord790 ing to the specifications laid down by the
Indian Standards Institution which required the carbon dioxide content to be at
least 99%. It was, therefore, contended that the excise duty sought to be
recovered on the contend of carbon dioxide in the mixture of gases could not
fall under Item 14-H. It was further contended that the duty being on goods it
could be charged only on goods known as carbon dioxide in the trade and
marketable as such. As is evident from the said narration of facts the
contentions urged were more or less similar to the contentions involved in the
instant appeal before us. It was held by this Court that the gas generated by
the appellant companies was kiln gas and not carbon dioxide as known to the
trade, i.e., to those who dealt in it or who used it. The kiln gas in question,
therefore, was neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as
such to the commercial community and therefore, could not attract item 14-H in
the First Schedule. This Court reiterated at p. 31 of the report that the Act
in question charges duty on manufacture of goods. The word
"manufacture" implies a change but every change in the raw material
is not manufacture. There must be such a transformation that a new and different
article must emerge having a distinct name, character or use. The duty is
levied on goods. As the Act does not define goods, the legislature must be
taken to have used that word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The
dictionary meaning of the expression is that to become goods it must be
something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is
known to the market. It would be such an article which would attract duty under
the Act. This Court referred to the previous decision in the case of Union of
India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd., [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 586.
Therefore, in this instant appeal, in order to determine whether starch hydrolysate
was "goods" or not, it is necessary to determine whether there was
any application of process to the raw materials and as a result of that
application there emerged new and different article having a distinctive name,
character or use and the resultant product being goods in the sense of being
marketable or marketed. In this connection, Shri Soli Sorabjee referred us to
the observations of this Court in Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India
and Ors., [1986] 24 ELT 169. There, this Court reiterated that in order to
attract excise duty, the article manufactured must be capable of being sold to
a consumer. Entry 84 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution specifically
speaks of "duty of excise on tobacco or other goods manufactured or
produced in India" and it is now well accepted that excise duty is an
indirect tax, in which the burden of the imposition is passed on to the
ultimate consumer. This Court held that in that context, the expression
"goods manufactured or produced" must refer to articles which 791 are
capable of being sold to a consumer. To become "goods", an article
must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and
sold. The Court found in that case that aluminium cans prepared by the
appellants therein were employed entirely by it in the manufacture of
flashlights and were not sold as aluminium cans in the market. It also appeared
from the records that aluminium cans at the point of levy of excise duty
existed in a crude and elementary form which were incapable of being employed
as a component in a flashlight. These cans had sharp uneven edges and in order
to use them as a component in making flashlight cans, these cans had to undergo
various processes such as trimming, threading and redrawing. After that these
were reeded, beaded and anodized or painted, it was at that point only that
these became distinct and complete component capable of being used as
flashlight cans for housing battery cells and having a bulb fitted to the can.
This Court noted that it was difficult to believe that the elementary and
unfurnished form in which these existed immediately after extrusion sufficed to
attract a market. The assertion of the appellant on affidavit that aluminium
cans were unknown in that form in the market had not been proved to the
contrary by any satisfactory material by the respondents therein.
This
Court further found that not a single instance had been provided by the respondents
domenstrating that such aluminium cans had a market. The conduct of the
appellants in the past, having regard to the circumstances of the case, would
not serve as evidence of the marketability of the aluminium cans, it was in
that case. This Court noted that record disclosed that whatever aluminium cans
were produced by the appellants were subsequently developed by it into a
completed and perfected component for being employed as flashlight cans. In
those circumstances, the aluminium cans produced by the appellants were not
liable to excise duty under section 3 of the Act read with Item 27 of the
Central Excise Tariff.
In the
case of Bhor Industries Ltd., Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay,
[1989] 1 SCC 602, this Court had to deal with the liability to duty on
intermediate products and it was reiterated that liability to excise duty
arises only when there is manufacture of goods which is marketable or capable
of being marketed. It was held that excise is a duty on goods as specified in
the Schedule. The taxable event in the case of excise duties is the manufacture
of goods. Under the Act, in order to be goods as specified in the Entry, it was
essential that as a result of manufacture goods must come into existence. For
articles to be goods, these must be known in the market as such or these must
be capable of being sold in the market as goods. Actual sale 792 is not
necessary. User in the captive consumption is not determinative but the
articles must be capable of being sold in the market or known in the market as
goods. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether these are goods, that is
to say, articles as known in the market as separate distinct identifiable
commodities and whether the tariff duty levied would be as specified in the
Schedule. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be
dutiable under the Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. In that case,
the Court found that crude PVC firms as produced by the appellant were not
known in the market and could not be sold in the market and was not capable of
being marketable. The Court further reiterated that it was the duty of the
revenue to adduce evidence or proof that the articles in question were goods.
The Tribunal went wrong, it was held, in not applying the test of
marketability. There being no contrary evidence found by the Tribunal in that
case, it was held that in those circumstances, no excise duty should be
charged.
It is
in this light, therefore, that the evidence discussed by the Tribunal in this
case, have to be viewed in order to test the validity of the order impugned.
The case of the respondent had always been that starch hydrolysate was not
being marketed and is not capable of being marketed in view of its highly
unstable character resulting in fermentation even if kept for a day or two. Shri
Ganguly appearing for the revenue sought to urge that the Tribunal was wrong in
approaching the problem in that light. The test was not whether the starch hydrolysate
was not of a highly unstable character and resulted in fermentation even in a
day or two, but whether it was capable of being marketable.
He
submitted that the test applied was not the true test. He urged that even
transient items of articles can be goods, provided that these were known in the
market as distinct and separate articles having distinctive and separate uses,
these would still become goods if these were capable of being marketed even
during short period. From a conceptual and jurisprudential point of view, Shri Ganguly
is right.
But we
are concerned with the question whether actual goods in question were marketed
or, in other words, if not, whether these are marketable or not. It is true
that the goods with unstable character can be theoretically marketable if there
was a market of such transient type of articles which are goods. But one has to
take a practical approach. The assessee produced evidence in the form of
affidavit. One Shri Khandot. who filed an affidavit in support of the case of
the respondent, had stated in his affidavit that completely hydrolysed starch
would start fermenting and decomposin and at higher concentration it would
start crystalizing out within two or three days. This is evidence indicat793 ing
propensity of its not being marketed. It is good evidence to come to this
conclusion that it would be unlikely to be marketable as it was highly
unstable. There was evidence as noted by the Tribunal that it has not been
marketed by anyone. There is also an admission of the Superintendent of the
appellant that no enquiry whatsoever was conducted by the Department as to
whether starch hydrolysate was ever marketed by anybody. It was pointed out by
the revenue that even according to the respondent, it stored starch hydrolysate
in tanks before transporting it through pipes but according to the appellant,
the storage of starch hydrolysate was only for a period of a few hours only as
a step in the process of transfer thereof to sorbitol. It, therefore, appears
to us that there was substantial evidence that having regard to the nature of
the goods that this was unlikely that the goods in question were marketable.
This should be judged in the background of the evidence that the goods have not
been marketed in a pregmatic manner. All this again would have to be judged in
the light of the fact that revenue has not adduced-any evidence whatsoever
though asked to do so. It was pointed out that if the Department was to charge
duty of excise on this starch hydrolysate as one form of glucose it would be
the burden on the Department to establish that starch hydrolysate was not
merely marketable but was being marketed as glucose in some form. This would be
so since what is liable for duty under item E is glucose in any form and,
therefore, in order to demand duty under that section, the Department must
establish that the product on which duty was demanded was known in the market
as glucose in one form or the other. There .is no such evidence as observed by
the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted and, in our opinion, rightly that revenue
cannot be said to have discharged its burden of establishing that by applying
the process of hydrolysis to starch for production of starch hydrolysate the
respondent manufacturers any excisable goods in the sense of being goods known
in the market and being marketed or marketable. Our attention was drawn to the
affidavit of Shri P.D. Khander, Chemist, who was a Food Technologist and was
holding a degree of B.Sc. (Chemistry).
He was
carrying on business of dealing in glucose. He stated in his affidavit as
follows:
. "
14. I have been the starch hydrolysate made by Sarabhai M. Chemicals. It is
completely hydrolysed starch. It appears as aqueous syrup containing about
66-71% reduc ing sugars expressed as Dextrose. It is neither glucose or
dextrose in any form nor glucose in liquid state nor liquid glucose. In order
to find out the market for completely hydrolysed starch as is made in Sarabhai
M. Chemicals, at 794 their instance, I had made trade inquiries.
However,
there is no market for such substance. Since it can act only as an intermediate
product for the manufacture of Sorbitol.
Dextrose
or Glucose and Fructose and every manufacturer of Glucose, Dextrose, Sorbitol
and Fructose would have his own plant for hydrolysing starch, it is
commercially not a viable proposition both the manufacturers of Glucose,
Dextrose, Sorbitol or Fructose or the persons undertaking the process of hydrolysing
starch either to purchase completely hydrolysed starch from the market or sell
or undertake process of hydrolysing starch for the purpose of sale in the
market, because at lower concentration, starch which is completely hydrolysed
would start fermenting and decomposing. At higher concentration, it would start
crystallising out within two or three days." This affidavit evidence
remains uncontradicted Shri Ganguly, however, drew our attention to an order of
the Tribunal in M/s. Anil Starch Products Ltd., Ahmedabad v. The Collector of
Central Excise, Ahmedabad being Appeal No. ED(SB)(T) 1534/81-D arising out of
the Revision Order No. 820/81. He referred to the observations at page 117 of
the Paper Book which dealt with the evidence of one Shri Khabholia, where,
according to Shri Ganguly, the Tribunal came to a different conclusion. But the
Tribunal in that case relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the
case of Union of India v. Union Carbide India Ltd., [1978] ELT 1.
There
the Allahabad High Court held that things would be nevertheless goods even
these did not have a general market, where they can be easily bought and sold. The
High Court hold that the fact that products might not be known to the general
public or to the traders in general would not change the position and therefore
the test did not appear to be sound. This decision of the Allahabad High Court
which was relied upon by the Tribunal was set aside by this Court in Appeal in
the case of Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (supra). In
view of the test laid down and in view of the evidence discussed, it is
difficult to sustain the order of the Tribunal. In this connection, it appears
that there was no market enquiry by the Revenue. Reference may be made to the crossexamination
of Shri Shukla, Superintendent (Central Excise) by Shri Nanawati as appears at
pp. 235-237 of the present paper book. In view of the fact that there was
positive evidence that starch hydrolysate was never marketed and in view of
further fact that in the light of the nature of the goods being highly
unstable, it is highly improbable that the goods were capable of being marketed
and there being in spite of 795 the opportunities, no evidence produced at all
that the goods, in fact, were capable of being marketable, in our opinion, it
must be held as did the Tribunal that the starch hydrolysate were not dutiable
under the Act.
In the
premises, the revenue has failed to discharge its onus to prove that starch hydrolysate
was dutiable. In the premises, the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed
any error. The appeal must, therefore, fail and is, accordingly, dismissed. In
the facts and the circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no orders
as to costs.
R.S.S.
Appeal dismissed.
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