Ishwar
Chand Jain Vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana
& Anr [1988] INSC 170 (26 May 1988)
Singh,
K.N. (J) Singh, K.N. (J) Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 1395 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 396 1988 SCC (3) 370 JT 1988 (2) 473 1988
SCALE (1)1188
CITATOR
INFO : RF 1992 SC 496 (26)
ACT:
Service
matter-Whether the High Court was right in recommending termination of the
services of the appellant, a judicial officer, on probation, on the ground that
his work and conduct were not satisfactory, on complaints of trifling nature
and complaints motivated and allegations unsubstantiated, against the
appellant.
HEAD NOTE:
This
appeal by special leave was directed against the Judgment of the High Court,
dismissing the appellant's writ petition challenging the order dispensing with
his services.
The
appellant was appointed as Addl. District and Sessions Judge on probation for
two years. While he was on probation, there were certain complaints against
him, and an inquiry was held by a Judge of the High Court, as a result whereof
the High Court by its resolution recommended the termination of the appellant's
services to the State Government. The appellant filed a writ petition before
the High Court, challenging the said resolution of the High Court. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition whereupon the State Government issued orders
terminating the appellant's services. Aggrieved, the appellant moved this
Court, challenging the orders of the High Court and the State government above
said.
The
appellant contended that since the High Court had resolved that his services
should be terminated on the basis of the inquiry report, the constitutional
protection available to him under Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the
principles of natural justice had been violated.
Counsel
for the High Court submitted that the inquiry held was merely to judge the
appellant's suitability for service, and the appellant was not entitled to the
constitutional protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, or to any
opportunity of hearing before taking the decision regarding the termination of
his probationary period.
Allowing
the appeal, the Court, 397 ^
HELD:
The High Court had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the
appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary
period. The material taken into consideration was non-existent, while the other
material was not relevant, and the allegations taken into consideration against
him remained unsubstantiated. The High Court erred in holding the appellant's
work and conduct to be unsatisfactory, and in terminating his services. [401
A-C] In one case, adverse remarks made against the appellant by the High Court
(Bains, J.) had been directed by this Court in appeal to be expunged as they
were found to be unjustified and unwarranted. In another case, members of the
Bar Association had passed a resolution condemning the appellant on a trifling
matter without applying their mind to the question involved. The members of the
Bar practising before the Court should be aware of the legal position and they
should not have passed the resolution condemning the appellant without there
being any justifiable cause. If the members of the Bar Association pass
resolutions against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts
without any justifiable cause, it would be difficult for the judicial officers
to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities in an
objective and unbiased manner.
The
High Court, instead of protecting the appellant, distressingly took the Bar
resolution into consideration in assessing the appellant's work and conduct.
[402B; 404B-D] The complaints against the appellant were enquired into by
Justice Surinder Singh, Vigilance Judge, and his report had formed the
foundation for the action taken by the High Court against the appellant. An
analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge showed that out of four
complaints, in respect of two of them the Vigilance Judge had expressed the
opinion that the matter needed further investigation and enquiry and he was not
in a position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those
complaints. As regards the third complaint, officers had committed no wrong in
postponing the pronouncement of the order, with a view to give time to the
parties to compromise. As regards the fourth matter-Khem Chand's complaint-the
Vigilance Judge had not expressed any opinion. The report of the Vigilance
Judge did not show that the work and conduct of the appellant were not
satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a judicial officer. The complaints
in respect of which the Vigilance Judge had observed that the same needed
further inquiry, could not at all be considered against the appellant. The High
Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding that the
appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory. [407H; 408A-D] 398 So far as
the annual entry on the appellant's confidential roll was A concerned, there
was no material against him to show that his work and conduct was
unsatisfactory. [408G-H] While considering complaints of irregularities against
the judicial officer on probation, the High Court should have kept in mind that
the incidents related to the very first year of appellant's service. Every
Judicial officer is likely to commit mistakes of some kind or the other in
passing orders in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial
officer would not do. If the orders are passed without any corrupt motive, the
same should be overlooked by the High Court and proper guidance should be
provided to him. If after the warning and guidance, the officer on probation is
not able to improve, his services may be terminated. [409C-E] While exercising
control over the subordinate judiciary under the Constitution, the High Court
is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An
honest, strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints
are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have
been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, and if the judicial
officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling
matters, and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no judicial
officer would feel, secure, and it would be difficult for him to discharge his
duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary
is a sine qua non for the Rule of law. It is imperative that the High Court
should take steps to protect its honest judicial officers by ignoring
ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and
litigants. [409E-G] In this case, the resolution passed by the Bar Association
against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by others
were motivated which did not deserve credit. Even the Vigilance Judge did not
record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that
he had not acted judicially. [409H; 410A] The orders of the High Court and the
State Government were set aside. The appellant was directed to be reinstated
with continuity of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other
benefits. [410B-C]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 811 of 1988.
399
From the Judgment and order dated 9.12.1986 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P.
No. 2213 of 1986 and C.M.P. No 1519 of 1986.
P.P. Rao,
K.K. Patel, P.S. Pradhan and Rajiv Dutta for the Appellant.
Dr.
Y.S. Chitale, S.C. Mahanta, S. Ramachandran, Mahabir Singh and C.V. Subba Rao
for the Respondents.
The Judgment
of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J. Special Leave granted.
This
appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana dated 9.12.1986 dismissing the appellant's writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 30. 12.1986
dispensing with the appellant's services as Addl. District and Sessions Judge
in terms of Rule 10(3) of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963.
Initially,
the appellant was an advocate practising law in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
He was selected for appointment to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service by the
High Court. On the recommendation of the High Court the State Government by its
order dated 14.4.1983 appointed the appellant as Addl. District and Sessions
Judge on probation for a period of two years in accordance with Rule 10(1) of
the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules 1963, as adopted by the State of Haryana
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The High Court by its order dated
27.4.1983 posted the appellant to Hissar as Addl. District and Sessions Judge
where he joined his duties on 2.5. 1983. While he was posted at Hissar certain
incidents took place as a result of which the Bar Association of Hissar passed
a resolution against the appellant and as a result of which he was transferred
from Hissar to Narnaul as Addl. District & Sessions Judge where he assumed
charge of his office on 5.5.1984. While the appellant was posted at Narnaul
inquiry into certain complaints against him was held by a Judge of the High
Court. After the inquiry the High Court at its meeting held on 21.3.1985
resolved that the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his
probationary period and as such his services deserved to be dispensed with
forthwith.
The
High Court forwarded its recommendation for terminating the appellant's
services to the State Government by its letter dated 28.3.1985. Before the
State 400 Government could issue any orders, the appellant filed a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court challenging the
High Court's decision. On 14.4.1985 this court permitted the appellant to
withdraw the petition with liberty to file the same before the High Court. The
appellant thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging
the resolution of the High Court as well as certain other consequential orders
to which reference shall be made at a later stage. A Division Bench of the High
Court by its elaborate order dated 9.12.1986 dismissed the writ petition on the
findings that the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory and as he
was on probation his services were rightly terminated without giving any
opportunity to the appellant. Thereafter, the State Government pursuant to the
recommendation of the High Court issued orders on 30.12.1986 terminating the
appellant's services in accordance with Rule 10(3).
Aggrieved,
the appellant has challenged the order of the High Court under appeal as well
as the order of the State Government terminating his services.
Before
the High Court the appellant laid main stress on the question that the order of
termination which had been passed without holding an enquiry giving reasonable
opportunity to him to defend himself was violative of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution as the same was based on a number of complaints and allegations as
well as the report of a Judge of the High Court who had made inquiries into the
complaints against the appellant. The High Court considered the question in
detail and recorded its finding that since the appellant was a probationer his
services could be discharged without giving any opportunity to him in
accordance with the Rules. The High Court further held that the inquiry which
was held by a judge of the High Court was not for the purpose of taking any
disciplinary proceedings or imposing any punishment on the appellant instead
the inquiry was held to find out the appellant's suitability to the service. Shri
P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, challenged the findings of the
High Court and urged that since the High Court resolved to terminate the
appellant's services on the basis of the inquiry report submitted by a learned
Judge of the High Court, the constitutional protection available to the
appellant under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and the principles of
natural justice had been violated. On the other hand, Dr. Y.S. Chitale
appearing for the High Court submitted that the resolution of the High Court
did not cause any stigma to the appellant and the inquiry held by the High
Court was merely to judge his suitability for the service. The appellant was
not entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution nor he was entitled to 401 any opportunity of hearing before
taking the decision for terminating the appellant's probationary period. We do
not consider it necessary to deal with these rival submissions as in our
opinion the High Court had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion
that the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his
probationary period.
It
appears to us as we shall presently show that the material which was taken into
account was non-existent, while the other material was not relevant and further
the allegations which were taken into consideration remained unsubstantiated.
Having perused the entire material placed before us we are of the opinion that
the High Court committed error in holding that the appellant's work and conduct
was not satisfactory and that his services were liable to be terminated.
We
would now consider the facts and circumstances which persuaded the High Court
on its administrative side in taking the decision to dispense with the
appellant's services. On his selection the appellant was firstly posted at Hissar
where he joined his duties on 2.5.1983. While at Hissar the appellant decided a
criminal case under Sections 363/366 IPC (State v. Ram Niwas) on l0.9.1983. The
appellant acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 366 IPC but
convicted him under Section 363 IPC and released him on one year's probation.
The accused preferred appeal against his conviction to the High Court. Justice
A.S. Bains by his order dated 5.4.1984 allowed the appeal on the ground that
the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and therefore it was not safe to maintain his conviction. In
the course of his judgment Justice Bains made the following observations
against the appellant:
"I
am constrained to remark that the judgment recorded by the trial court is
extremely poor and is not based on the evidence on the record. The trial court
seems to have wrongly convicted the appellant." The appellant made
representation against the aforesaid remarks but the High Court refused to
grant any relief to the appellant on the ground that the remarks awarded to him
had been made in judicial proceedings. The appellant made a representation for
placing his representation before the learned Judge who had awarded remarks
against him but that too was not accepted. The appellant, thereafter,
approached the High Court in the judicial side by means of an application under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expunging the aforesaid
remarks but he could not get any relief. Ultimately, the appellant approached
this court by means of Criminal Misc. Peti- 402 tion No. 1377 of 1987 for
expunging the aforesaid remarks.
This
Court A by its order dated 7th September 1987 held that from the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be
said that the order and judgment of the Addl. District & Sessions Judge was
not based on the evidence on record and the remarks made by Justice Bains were
unwarranted. This Court directed that the aforesaid remarks should be expunged
from the judgment in appeal. These facts show that the remarks made by Justice Bains
against the appellant were unjustified, unwarranted and they ceased to be in
force.
On
26.9.1983 while the petitioner was recording the statement of an Assistant
Sub-inspector of police in a sessions case, an advocate of Hissar Sh. Nar Singh
Bishnoi, came into the appellant's court and made a request to the appellant
that Thakur Dass, the Assistant Sub-inspector of police whose statement was
being recorded as a witness in a sessions case should be directed to appear in
a complaint case against him (the Assistant Sub-inspector of police) pending in
the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar.
The
appellant told the Advocate Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi that the Chief Judicial
Magistrate should direct Thakur Dass the witness to appear in his court and Shri
Bishnoi might himself bring summons and serve the same on Thakur Dass. Sh. Bishnoi
went to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for bringing summons meanwhile
the statement of Thakur Dass was recorded and on being discharged from the
witness box he became free. The appellant waited for more than half an hour but
Shri Bishnoi did not turn up with the summons. Thereupon he discharged Thakur Dass.
It was not strictly his duty as a Judge to detain the witness after his evidence
was recorded for the purpose of serving summons in a complaint case on him.
Shortly, thereafter Sh. Bishnoi, advocate, came to the appellant's court and
finding that the witness had already left the court he expressed his anger
towards the appellant who was still presiding over his court and threatened him
saying that he would see that no judicial officer would dare to act in such a
manner. Sh. Nar Singh Bishnoi, advocate, thereupon addressed a letter to the
President of Bar Association requesting that a meeting of the Bar Association
should be held which read as follows:
"To
The President, Distt. Bar Association Hissar, Subject: To consider the behaviour
of Sh. I.C. Jain, Additional Sessions Judge.
403
Sir, It is submitted that today i.e. On 26.9.1983, I had presented an
application in the court of Sh. I.C. Jain, Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar in
the presence and on behalf of my client, Sh. Punam Chand, for effecting the
service of summons on accused Thakur Dass S.I. At that time Thakur Dass S.I.
was appearing as witness in the witness box in the court of Sh. I.C. Jain, and
I.C. Jain refused to pass any order on my application and I was asked to bring
the summons. When after obtaining the Dasti summons from the court of Sh. L.N. Mittal,
C.J.M. Hissar, in whose court complaint was pending, I went to the court of Sh.
I.C. Jain, by that time Thakur Dass had already fled away and he was seen going
on Motor Cycle by my client. Behaviour meted out to me by Shri I.C Jain is in
fact wrong and mishehaviour with the lawyers community at large. I pray to all
the members of Bar Association, Hissar that matter may be considered by calling
for urgent meeting.
Sd/- Nar
Singh Bishnoi, Advocate Hissar" On the aforesaid letter a meeting of the
Bar was convened on 27.9.1983 and the following resolution was passed:
"Resolved
that the attitude and the behaviour of Shri I.C. Jain, Additional District
& Sessions Judge, Hissar towards the members of the Bar is most deplorable,
verges (sic) and condemnable for being rude un-cooperative and insulting."
The Bar Association forwarded a copy of the resolution to the High Court and
also to the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar. The appellant on getting
information about the resolution addressed a letter to the Registrar of the
High Court on 8.10.1983 giving his version about the incident and he further
sought advice of the High Court as to whether in the circumstances the witness
(Thakur Dass) should have been detained on the request of the counsel for a
party to enable him to bring summons for effecting service on him and further
whether it was the duty of the appellant as an Addl. District & Sessions
Judge to get the service effected without their being any requisition from the
404 court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It appears that the High Court did
not give any reply to the appellant and the guidance sought for by the
appellant remained unattended.
These
facts clearly show how the members of the Bar Association passed the resolution
condemning a judicial officer on trifling matter without applying their mind to
the question. The appellant being an Additional Sessions Judge was not bound by
law to detain the witness to enable counsel of a private party to bring Dasti
summons for effecting service on the said witness. The members of the Bar practising
before the court should be aware of the legal position and they should not have
indulged in passing a resolution condemning the appellant without there being
any justifiable cause for the same. If the members of the Bar Association pass
resolution against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts without
there being any justifiable cause it would be difficult for judicial officers
to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities in an
objective and unbiased manner.
We are
distressed to find that the High Court instead of protecting the appellant took
this incident into consideration in assessing the appellant's work and conduct.
In May
1984 the appellant was transferred to Narnaul and it appears that some
incidents took place there also and complaints were made to the High Court
against the appellant. On 14.9.1984 Ram Nath Mehlawat, an advocate-cum-
journalist publishing a local weekly newspaper named 'Jan Hirdey'and who was
also connected with a social organisation 'Janata Kalyan Samiti' was assaulted
by certain persons. On a complaint made by Sh. Mehlawat, a criminal case was
registered and it was committed to sessions for trial. The appellant convicted
the accused persons except one under Sections 325/324 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code. The appellant rejected the plea of the complainant Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat that he was a public servant that the injuries were caused to
him while performing public duty.
The
appellant held that no offence under Sections 332/353 IPC was made out. Sh. Ram
Nath Mehlawat made a complaint to the High Court against the appellant alleging
that the appellant had adjourned the case on several dates and he had acquitted
the accused of offence punishable under Sections 332/353 IPC on extraneous
consideration. He further alleged that the appellant had accepted illegal
gratification in acquitting the accused and further releasing the convicting
accused persons on probation. The allegations contained in the complaint of Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat were enquired into by Justice Surinder Singh. As regards
correctness of the judgment is concerned it is relevant to note that Sh. Ram Nath
Mehlawat filed appeal before the High Court 405 against the appellant's order
releasing accused persons on probation and also a criminal revision against the
order of acquittal on the charges under Sections 332/353/149 and 148 of Indian
Penal Code and also against the order of releasing the convicted accused
persons on probation. The appeal was dismissed on merits by Justice Tiwana, who
observed that he found no infirmity in the conclusion recorded by the trial
judge. The learned Judge held that Ram Nath Mehlawat, Advocate, was not a
public servant though he may have been a Project Director of Adult Education
Project run by a social organisation. The learned Judge further held that the
conclusion of the trial judge (appellant) was correct and there was no merit in
the appeal. In this view both appeal and revision filed by Sh. Ram Nath Mehlawat
were dismissed and the order passed by the appellant was upheld.
These
facts show that Ram Nath Mehlawat failed in his attempt to get the appellant's
order set aside by the High Court. Having failed to do so on the judicial side
he made several complaints against the appellant making wild allegations
against him about the aforesaid cases. It appears he was instrumental in
getting complaints made about other matters also. These complaints were
referred to the vigilance judge, who enquired into those matters and the report
of the vigilance judge was placed before the full court of the High Court on
27.7.1985. After considering the appellant's confidential roll the High Court
resolved to dispense with the appellant's services.
It is
asserted on behalf of the High Court that since the appellant's work and
conduct were not found satisfactory during the period of probation of two years
the court decided to dispense with his services forthwith.
Consequently
it made recommendation to the State Government for issuing necessary orders.
The decision to dispense with the appellant's services was taken at the full
court meeting of the High Court held on 21st March, 1980. Along with agenda a
note was circulated to the Hon'ble Judges, referring to five complaints out of
which four complaints had been inquired into by Justice Surinder Singh and the
fifth complaint remained without any inquiry. The report of Justice Surinder
Singh was considered by the High Court along with appellant's service record.
The High Court formed opinion that the appellant's work and conduct was not
satisfactory. Since the report of Justice Surinder Singh vigilance judge formed
foundation for taking action against the appellant, we consider it necessary to
refer to the same in detail. A copy of the report is on file on perusal of the
same we find that in all four complaints were referred to Justice Surinder
Singh who was Vigilance Judge for inquiry.
The
first complaint was by R.N.
406 Mehlawat,
Project Director, Adult Education. He raised a grievance A that on July 25,
1984 the appellant convicted the four accused but he went out of the way to
institute an inquiry against Ranjit Singh accused and also against the defence
witness for forging a document. He further released all the convicted accused
persons on probation. Shri Mehlawat was aggrieved that though he was a public
servant the accused were not convicted under Section 332 of the Indian Penal
Code. He alleged that he had received information that the appellant had
received illegal gratification to the tune of Rs.25,000 from the accused for
taking lenient view in the matter. The vigilance judge recorded the statement
of the appellant and other relevant persons in his report he stated that it was
difficult for him to come to a definite finding although the allegations
contained in the complaint filed by Shri Mehlawat could not be said without any
basis but he recommended that the complaint required further investigation. We
have earlier noted that Mehlawat had filed appeal and revision against the
appellant's order but he failed. Justice Tiwana found no merit in the appeal
and revision and he upheld the order of the appellant. Justice Tiwana expressly
held that Mehlawat was not a public servant even though he was a project
Director of the Adult Education Project, and the conclusion of the trial court
was correct and there was no merit in the appeal and revision. We are
distressed to notice that even though the High Court had upheld the appellant's
order on the judicial side it took exception to the appellant's conduct in
passing the orders against Sh. Mehlawat. Sh. Mehlawat had also made allegations
that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification in instalments in giving
judgment in his case but during the enquiry by the vigilance judge he could not
produce any evidence to that effect. It is a matter of common knowledge that
many a time when a litigant is unsuccessful he makes allegations against the
presiding officer stating that he had received illegal gratification. Sh. Mehlawat
was an unsuccessful litigant and he was highly prejudiced and biased against
the appellant.
Any
complaint made by him against the appellant could not be taken at its face
value specially so when the appellant's order had been upheld by the High
Court. The vigilance judge did not record any finding against the appellant. He
observed that the complaint required further investigation.
The
second matter in respect of which the vigilance judge held inquiry was on the
basis of an annonymous complaint pertaining to a civil appeal entitled Sher
Singh & ors v. Mahender Singh in which it was alleged that the appellant
had during the course of arguments tried to persuade the respondent to
compromise the matter. It was alleged 407 that after the arguments were
concluded the case was adjourned for several dates for judgment. There was no
allegation of any corruption or dishonest motive. The vigilance judge came to
the conclusion that the adjournment of the case was unnecessary as the case was
a very old one.
However
the vigilance judge, further held that the complaint being annoymous it
required further probe. The third complaint was made by Mukut Bihari Sanghi, an
advocate, practising at Narnaul. He alleged that the appellant heard civil
appeal entitled Mohan Lal v. Honda Ram on 20th September 1984 and fixed the
same for orders for 22nd September, 1984 but the judgment was pronounced on
10th october, 1984. We have perused the copy of the complaint made by Shri Sanghi
but there is no allegation that the appellant committed any misconduct or that
he acted on any extraneous reasons in granting adjournment. The appellant
stated before the vigilance judge that after arguments were completed he had
fixed a date for order but as the parties wanted to compromise, he postponed
the delivery of judgment for few days in order to enable the parties to settle
the dispute but since no settlement was communicated to the court he pronounced
the judgment on 10th october, 1984. The vigilance judge, however, made an
observation that the case was glaring example of the manner of working of the
appellant in judicial cases. In the absence of any extraneous circumstances, we
do not find any impropriety in a judicial officer postponing the pronouncement
of the order to enable the parties to settle the dispute. It is interesting to
note that Sh. Mukut Bihari Singhi, advocate, was twice held guilty for contempt
of court. He was convicted for contempt of court by the High Court. He wanted
to browbeat the appellant. His complaint, however, did not contain any allegation
of corruption. The High Court failed to appreciate that no appeal was preferred
against the appellant's judgment in the case of Mohan Lal v. Honda Ram as the
parties were satisfied with the judgment. In our opinion the complaint deserved
no consideration it should have been rejected out-right. The fourth complaint
had been made by one Khem Chand, his grievance had been that his Rent Control
Appeal had been dismissed by the appellant on 24th November 1984 and he had
allowed him two months time to vacate the premises. He applied for obtaining a
certified copy of the judgment but he could not get the same. Instead he got
the same, after inordinate delay. The appellant's explanation was that the
copying section was not under his control or supervision therefore he could not
be blamed for the delay caused in supplying certified copy of the judgment to Khem
Chand. The vigilance judge did not express any opinion on this matter.
The
above analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge would 408 show that out of
four complaints the vigilance judge expressed opinion that matter relating to
item no. 1 and 2 needed further investigation and enquiry as he was not in a
position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those
complaints. As regards the third complaint of Mukut Bihari Sanghi there was
nothing wrong in postponing the pronouncement of the order with a view to give
time to the parties to compromise the matter. Finally, as regards Khem Chand's
complaint the vigilance judge did not express am, opinion on the matter. The
report of the vigilance judge does not show that the appellant's work and
conduct were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a Judicial
officer. While considering this question it must be kept in mind that complaints,
in respect of which the learned Judge observed that the same needed further
inquiry into the matter, could not at all be considered against the appellant.
If the inquiry had been held and the appellant had been given opportunity to
place his version before the inquiry officer, correct facts would have emerged.
But in the absence of any further inquiry as suggested by the vigilance judge,
the High Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding
that the appellant's work and conduct was not satisfactory.
As
regards the confidential roll of the appellant is concerned it is noteworthy
that when the High Court considered the matter on 2 1.3.1985 the appellant's
annual report was available only for the first year of his service namely 1983-84.
The report for that year was satisfactory.
Entry
for the year 1984-85 was awarded by Justice S.P. Goyal who was Inspecting Judge
on 15.4.1985. He awarded Grade 'B' plus to the appellant which means that
appellant's work was good. But this entry could not be taken into consideration
by the High Court as it had already taken the decision on 21.3.1985 to dispense
with the appellant's services. We are distressed to find that when the
aforesaid entry for 1984-85 came up for consideration before the full court of
the High Court it modified the same and down-graded the entry from 'B' plus to
'C' which means appellant's work was unsatisfactory. During the hearing we
asked the learned counsel appearing for the High Court to produce material on
the basis of which the High Court modified the entry given by Justice S.P. Goyal
for the year 1984-85 but he was unable to place any material before us to
support the decision of the High Court in modifing the entry. The modification
of the entry is therefore without any material and is not sustainable in law.
It is thus clear that so far as annual entry on the appellant's confidential
roll is concerned there was no material against him which could show that the
appellant's work and conduct was unsatisfactory. The facts and circumstances
discussed earlier clearly show that the appellant's 409 services were
terminated merely on the basis of the report made by the vigilance judge which
we have discussed in detail earlier. The note appended to the agenda of the
meeting referred only to the inquiry report and it did not refer to any other
matter. The Vigilance Judge failed to express any positive opinion against the
appellant instead he observed that the complaints required further
investigation. If the High Court wanted to take action against the appellant on
the basis of the complaints which were the subject of enquiry by the vigilance
judge, it should have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant,
then the appellant could get opportunity to prove his innocense. We have
already discussed in detail that the facts stated in the complaints and the
report submitted by the vigilance judge did not show any defect in appellant's
work as a judicial officer. While considering complaints of irregularities
against a judicial officer on probation the High Court should have kept in mind
that the incidents which were subject matter of enquiry related to the very
first year of appellant's service. Every judicial officer is likely to commit
mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his
service which a mature judicial offficer would not do. However, if the orders
are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be
over-looked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him. If
after warning and guidance the officer on probation is not able to improve, his
services should be terminated.
Under
the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary.
While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide
and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to
have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on
trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the
High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it
would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent
manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If
judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on
trifling matters and if High Court encourages annonymous complaints to hold the
field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an
independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court
should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived
or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
Having
regard to facts and circumstances of the instant case we have no doubt in our
mind that the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant
was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Sh. Mehalawat and 410 others
were motivated which did not deserve any credit. Even the vigilance judge after
holding enquiry did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any
corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All that was said against
him was that he had acted improperly in granting adjournments.
In
view of our discussion we allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 9.12.1986
and order of the State Government dated 30.12.1986. We direct that appellant
shall be reinstated in service, with continuity of service and arrears of
salary and allowances and other benefits. The appellant is entitled to the
costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000.
S.L.
Appeal allowed.
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