Mohan Lal
Vs. Jai Bhagwan [1988] INSC 81 (23 March 1988)
Mukharji,
Sabyasachi (J) Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J) Rangnathan, S.
CITATION:
1988 AIR 1034 1988 SCR (3) 345 1988 SCC (2) 474 JT 1988 (2) 61 1988 SCALE
(1)675
CITATOR
INFO : RF 1989 SC1841 (5)
ACT:
Haryana
Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 Section
13(2)(ii)(b)-Tenant-Eviction of-Use of building for purpose other than for
which leased.
Landlord-Renting
out shop-Tenant-To run business of English Liquor Vend-Do sale of liquor-Liquor
licence not renewed-Tenant doing business of general merchandise-Whether change
in user.
Statutory
Interpretation: Statutes-Words and expressions-Meaning must be found in the
felt necessities of the time.
HEAD NOTE:
% The
appellant-tenant took on rent the suit premises from the respondent-landlord on
a monthly rent of Rs.120 and executed a rent note in his favour on 19th April, 1975.
Clause
4 of the rent note provided that the tenant was to run the 'business of English
Liquor Vend, and do sale of liquor in the shop.' The respondent filed a
petition for eviction under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent
& Eviction) Act, 1973 against the appellant on the ground of ground of rent
from 1st April, 1979 to 31st August, 1979 and change of user from liquor vend
business to that of general merchandise.
The
appellant tendered the entire arrears of rent at the first date of hearing, and
contested the eviction petition by filing a written statement contending that
after March, 1979 the licence of liquor-vend in his favour was not renewed, and
he had to discontinue that business at the suit premises, and had to start the
business of general merchandise. It was, further, contended that the purpose of
user still remained commercial and that there was no clause in the rent note
prohibiting the appellant to change to any other business.
The
Rent Controller held that the appellant had changed the user of the shop in
dispute and that he was liable for eviction under the Act.
346
The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The High Court also dismissed the
Civil Revision and upheld the order of eviction.
Allowing
the Appeal, this Court, ^
HELD:
1. The business purposes must be adjudged in the light of the purposes of the
Rent Act in question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom.
[349C]
2. In
the expanding concept of business nowadays and the growing concept of
departmental stores, it cannot be said that there was any change of user in the
instant case, when the tenant converted the use of the building from liquor
vend business to that of general merchandise. The building was rented for the
purpose of carrying on a business. It was used for another business which would
not in any way impair the utility or damage to the building, and the business
could be conveniently carried on in the said premises. No nuisance was also
created. The case would, therefore, not attract the mischief of s. 13(2)(ii)(b).
[349D, 350E]
3. So
far as the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held in the Full Bench decision in Sikander
Lal v. Amrit Lal, (1984 Punjab Law Reporter 1) that allied business would not
amount to change of user but for a business which is not allied for the
business for which it was let out would amount to change of user come within
the mischief of clause (b) of section 13(2)(ii) of the Act, the same must be
read with reservation. [348H, 349A]
4.
When Parliament legislates to remedy a defect or a lacuna in the existing law,
and the judiciary interprets them, it has to be borne in mind that the meaning
of an expression must be found in the felt necessities of time.
[349G-H,
350C-D] Duport Steels Ltd. & others v. Sirs and others, [1980] 1 All.E.R. 529
at 541. referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1988.
From
the Judgment and order dated 14.8.87 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Civil Revision No. 2836 of 1982.
Dr. Meera
Aggarwal for the Petitioner.
347
A.B. Rohtagi, Mukul Rohtagi, Atul Tewari and Ms. Bina Gupta for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by
special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
dated 14th August, 1987. The appellant took on rent the
premises in dispute from the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 120 and executed
a rent note in his favour on 19th April, 1975.
Clause 4 of the said rent note provided, inter alia, as follows:
"That
the tenant will run the business of English Liquor Vend in the shop-will do
sale of Liquor." The landlord, respondent herein filed a petition under
section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973
(hereinafter called 'the Act') against the appellant on the ground of arrears
of rent from 1.4.1979 to 31.8.1979 and change of user from Liquor Vend business
to that of general merchandise at the shop in dispute by the appellant.
The
appellant tendered the entire arrears of rent at the first date of hearing and
thereafter he contested by filing written statement. The appellant submitted
that after March, 1979, the licence of liquor-vend in his favour was not
renewed and he had to discontinue that business of liquor-vend at the shop in
dispute and had to start the business of general merchandise. According to the
appellant the purpose of the user still remains commercial and that in the rent
note there was no clause prohibiting the appellant to change any other business
in the shop in dispute.
The
Rent Controller held that the appellant had changed the user of the shop in
dispute and he was liable for eviction under the Act. There was an appeal to
the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal.
The appellant went in civil revision to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The High Court dismissed the civil revision and upheld the eviction. Hence this
appeal.
The
question is, whether a ground for eviction was made out under clause (b) of
section 13(2)(ii) of the Act. The said Act was passed to control the increase
of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of
urban areas, and the eviction of the 348 tenants therefrom. Section 13(2)(ii)(b)
of the Act reads as follows:
"13(2)
A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller, for
direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied:
(i) XX
XX XX (ii) that the tenant has after commencement of 1949 Act, without the
written consent of the landlord (a) XX XX XX (b) used the building or rented
land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased." The High
Court of Punjab and Haryana has relied on a Full Bench decision of the said
High Court in Sikander Lal v. Amrit Lal, [1984] Punjab Law Reporter 1. That was
a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949.
The
Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the facts
and circumstances of that case held that it was a common ground that the premises
was originally leased for the business of handlooms. Thereafter it was used for
small carding machine not occupying a space of more than 4 feet x 4 feet which
converted cloth into thread. It was held that there was no change of user. The
Full Bench, however, observed that it emerged from the long line of authorities
that where the subsequent use of the premises is merely ancillary to the
specific original purpose then it would imply no change of user within the
meaning of the statute.
If by
custom or convention or on the finding of the Court it could be held that the
added use of the premises was ancillary to the main original purpose then in
the eye of law it would be deemed to have been within the terms of the original
lease. It was further held that both on principle and on binding precedent it
emerged that the specified original purpose could not be, according to the Full
Bench, extended by adding to it any and every purpose thereto, and the same
must be confined within the limitation of being either a part or parcel of, or
ancillary to, the original purpose. There the Court was concerned with section
13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act which is an identical provision as the present one. So
far as the High Court held in that case that allied business would not amount
to change of user but for a business which is not allied for the business for
which it was let out would amount to change 349 of user come within the
mischief of clause (b) of section 13(2)(ii) of the Act, the same must be read
with reservation.
Our
attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in Maharaj Kishan Kesar v. Milkha
Singh and others, (Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1964 decided on 10th of November,
1965.
That
was a decision under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. There on
the facts the Court found that selling petrol was an allied business of the
workshop and as such it is a part of the business. The Court held that there is
no evidence to show that in the trade a petrol pump is not regarded as a part
of motor workshop business.
The
sale of petrol is an allied business and would not amount to conversion to a
different business or change of user. There is nothing in the said decision
which would give any assistance to the respondent in this case. The business
purposes must be adjudged in the light of the purposes of the Rent Act in
question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom. In the
expanding concept of business now-a-days and the growing concept of
departmental stores, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that there
was any change of user in the facts of this case which would attract the mischief
of the provisions of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The building was rented
for purpose of carrying on a business, using it for another business, it will
not in any way impair the utility or damage the building and this business can
be conveniently carried on in the said premises. There was no nuisance created.
Our
attention was drawn to the observations of Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd.
and others v. Sirs and others, [1980] 1 All.E.R. 529 at 541. That was a
decision in respect of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. Lord Diplock said:
"My
Lords, at a time when more and more cases involving the application of
legislation which gives effect to policies that are the subject of bitter
public and parliamentary controversy, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that
the British Constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the
separation of powers: Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them.
When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its members at the
time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the
written law enacted by existing statutes or the unwritten common law as it has
been expounded by the judges in decided cases), the role of the judiciary is
confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament 350 has approved as
expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it.
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for
the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give
effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the
consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In
controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is
room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what
is morally justifiable.
Under
our constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount.
While
respectfully agreeing with the said observations of Lord Diplock, that the Parliament
legislates to remedy and the judiciary interpret them, it has to be borne in
mind that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt necessities
of time. In the background of the purpose of rent legislation and in as much as
in the instant case the change of the user would not cause any mischief or
detriment or impairment of the shop in question and in one sense could be
called an allied business in the expanding concept of departmental stores, in
our opinion, in this case there was no change of user which attract the
mischief of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, was in
error.
In
that view of the matter this appeal is allowed and the order of eviction is set
aside. The parties will pay and bear their own costs.
N.V.K.
Appeal allowed.
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