Chandrakant
Khaire Vs. Dr. Shantaram Kale & Ors [1988] INSC 195 (29 July 1988)
Sen,
A.P. (J) Sen, A.P. (J) Natrajan, S. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 1665 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 725 1988 SCC (4) 577 JT 1988 (3) 175 1988
SCALE (2)103
CITATOR
INFO : D 1989 SC1289 (14,18)
ACT:
Municipalities:
Bombay Provincial Corporation Act 1949/Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation
Rules.
Section
453/Chapter II Rule 1(h)-Powers of Chairman- 'Adjourned for the day', adjourned
sine die, ' 'proceedings suspended'-Distinction between.
Section
6(2)-First meeting of the Municipal Corporation-Properly convened-Cannot be
adjourned for another day or sine die.
Words
and phrases: 'Adjourned for the day' 'adjourned sine die'-Meaning of.
HEAD NOTE:
After
the election of Members, the first meeting of the Aurangabad Municipal
Corporation was held on May 6, 1983 at 2 P.M. and the Municipal Commissioner
announced that the polling for the offices of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Members
of the standing Committee would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards. But at 2.30 P.M. some of the Councillors belonging to the Opposition
Party sat on the ballot boxes and some others surrounded the Municipal
Commissioner and demanded that the meeting be adjourned to a subsequent date.
The Councillors belonging to the ruling party demanded that the meeting and
election be held later on that day. Total confusion and bedlam prevailed and
the rival groups started throwing Chairs at each other, leading to a
pandemonium. It was a free for all, and even outsiders were present. When the
situation was brought under control, the Municipal Commissioner announced that
the meeting would continue and the elections would be held at 4.30 p.m.
The
petitioner filed a protest at 4.15 p.m.
stating that the meeting had been adjourned by the Municipal Commissioner for
the day and, therefore, the holding of the meeting later on the same day would
be improper and illegal.
Thereafter,
the opposition group abstained from participating in the meeting held at 4.30 p.m., in which Respondents 1 and 2 were declared elected
as Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively 726 and Respondents 3-8 as Members of
the Standing Committee.
In a
Writ Petition filed before the High Court, the appellant questioned the
election, on the basis that the meeting in which the election was held, was
invalid. The High Court held that the meeting was not adjourned for the day or
sine die, but was only postponed, to be held as soon as peace was restored on
the very day and upheld the election of Respondents 1 to 8. Against the judgment
of the High Court, the petitioner has filed the present special leave petition.
On
behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the meeting was not adjourned
to a definite point of time and must therefore be regarded as adjourned for the
day or adjourned sine die.
The
contention of the Respondents was that the meeting had not been adjourned sine
die but the proceedings had merely been suspended at 2.45 p.m. and the adjourned meeting held at 4.30 p.m. was a continuation of the original meeting and no
new notice of an adjourned meeting had to be given.
It was
also contended that there was no warrant for interference under Art. 136 of the
Constitution since a finding of fact had been reached by the High Court on
consideration of the material on record.
Dismissing
the petition, ^
HELD:
1. A properly convened meeting cannot be postponed. The proper course to adopt
is to hold the meeting as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to
a more suitable date. If this course be not adopted, members will be entitled
to ignore the notice of postponement, and, if sufficient to form a quorum, hold
the meeting as originally convened and validly transact the business thereat.
Even if the relevant rules do not give the chairman power to adjourn the meeting,
he may do so in the event of disorder. Such an adjournment must be for no
longer than the chairman considers necessary and the chairman must, so far as
possible, communicate his decision to those present. [739F-G]
2.1 In
the instant case, the High Court was right in holding that the first meeting of
the Municipal Corporation fixed by the Municipal Commissioner for May 6, 1988
was not 'adjourned for the day' or 'adjourned sine die' but had only been put
off to a later hour i.e. the proceedings had only been suspended, to
re-commence when peace and order were restored. [740D-E] 727
2.2
There is nothing on record to sustantiate the petitioner's submission that the
first meeting scheduled to be held on May 6, 1988 at 2 P.M. was 'adjourned for
the day' or 'adjourned sine-die' without transacting any business i.e. without
consideration of the agenda for the day. On the contrary, it is not in dispute
that the business for the day was partly transacted when the Councillors met at
2 p.m. as scheduled and the Municipal
Commissioner declared that the polling would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards. The trouble started at 2.30 p.m. when the Councillors belonging to the petitioner's
party prevented the casting of votes by snatching away the ballot boxes from
the polling booths and sat upon them. There was a pre-determined plan on their
part not to allow the first meeting to be held on that day. But the Municipal
Commissioner did not give way to the commotion and pandemonium and he did not
put off the meeting to another day. In the prevailing situation, the Municipal
Commissioner had no other alternative but to adjourn the meeting. Under the
scheme of the Act, when the term of the elected Councillors is a period of five
years which in terms of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act is deemed to
commence on the date of the first meeting, the Municipal Commissioner obviously
could not adjourn the meeting for another day or adjourn it sine die. If the
contention that the meeting having been adjourned without specifying a definite
point of time were to prevail, it would give rise to a serious anomaly. The
effect of adjourning the first meeting to another day would imply the coming
into existence of another deemed date under s. 6(2) of the Act for commencement
of the term of the Councillors. The fact that the Municipal Commissioner did
not leave the House or vacate the seat lends support to the version that he had
merely suspended the proceedings till order was restored. [737A-E] Smt. Menaka Bala
Dasi v. Hiralal Gobindalal & Anr., 37 CWN 583 and Sheokumar Shashtri v.
Municipal Committee, Rajnandgaon, AIR 1964 MP 195 Distinguished.
Shackelton
on the Law & Practice of Meeting, 7th Edn. p. 44, Horsley's Meetings
Procedure, Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, p. 84, para 1002 referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7508 of 1988.
From
the Judgment and order dated 28.6.1988 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Writ
Petition No. 800 of 1988.
728
S.N. Kacker, U.R. Lalit, V.D. Joshi, B.D. Joshi, S.C. Bora and Kailash Vasdev for the
Petitioner.
Dr.
Y.S. Chitale, V.A. Bobde, V.J. Francis, N.M. Popli and Miss Almjit Chauhan for the Respondents.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. This special leave petition is
directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated June
28, 1988 upholding the election of respondents nos. 1 and 2 Dr. Shantaram Kale
and Takiqui Hassan as Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively, and respondents nos.
3-8 as Members of the Standing Committee at the first meeting of the Aurangabad
Municipal Corporation at the Alankar Hall, held on May 6, 1988 at 2 p.m. The
issue involved is whether the first meeting of the Corporation called for that
day at 2.45 p.m. by the Municipal Commissioner, respondent no. 9, who presided
over the meeting, was adjourned for the day or adjourned sine die and therefore
had to be called on some subsequent date to be fixed by him and thus
necessitated the giving of seven days' clear notice as required by r. 1(h),
Chapter II of the Rules framed under s. 453 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporation Act, 1949.
Since
the question involved was a matter of moment and the affidavits filed by the
petitioner Chandrakant Khaire, the leader of the Shiv Sena Party which is the
largest single group in the Corporation consisting of 18 Concillors, and by
some of the Councillors as well as their supporters, and the
affidavits-in-opposition filed by the Party-in power Congress-I which has
formed a coalition with the splinter groups commanding a majority of 32 Councillors
in a House of 60, raise controverted facts as to whether the proceedings of the
meeting had been adjourned sine die or merely suspended, we thought it better
to have the minutes of the proceedings before us. Shri Vinod Bobde, learned
counsel appearing for the Municipal Commissioner has placed the minute books
written in Marathi along with a translation thereof in English. At the last
occasion we were left with the impression that the word used by the Municipal
Commissioner was 'tahkub' while adjourning the meeting at 2.45 p.m. amidst unprecedented scenes of complete disorder,
commotion and pendemonium. We now find the word used in the minutes is 'sthagit'
but in the translation furnished the word used is 'adjourned'.
The
facts revealed in the counter-affidavits filed by the Munici- 729 pal
Commissioner, Collector and the Superintendent of Police show that a serious
law and order situation had arisen due to which both the Collector and the
Superintendent of Police had to rush to the venue of the meeting. They both
have sworn to the fact that not only the Councillors but many outsiders were
present in the hall where the meeting was being held. There were also a large
number of supporters of the rival parties, spectators and journalists. The
Municipal Commissioner was surrounded by some 20-25 persons apart from the Councillors,
one group insisting upon the meeting being adjourned for the day i.e. the Councillors
belonging to the majority Shiv Sena Party while the other group consisting of the
Congress-I Party and the splinter groups forming the coalition demanding that
the meeting be continued. The Collector has sworn to the fact that there was
'total confusion and bedlam inside the hall apart from the fact that the entire
atmosphere was surcharged with commotion' and no business could be transacted.
He has further sworn to the fact that respondent no. 9, the Municipal
Commissioner, the presiding officer, appeared to be 'in a very agitated state
of mind' and told him that he could not hold the meeting in the unruly and
disorderly situation prevailing and complained that despite his repeated
requests to the Councillors to maintain peace, it had no effect and they kept
on shouting, raising slogans and fighting amongst themselves and thereby making
it impossible for him to transact any business. The meeting was scheduled to be
held at 2 p.m. and respondent no. 9 announced that
the polling for the offices of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Members of the Standing
Committee would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards.
What
happened thereafter reveals a very disturbing feature which unfortunately has
become too common these days and shows the strain through which our democratic
system is passing. At about 2.30 p.m. some
of the Councillors belonging to the Shiv Sena Party sat on the ballot boxes and
others belonging to that Party and its supporters surrounded the Municipal
Commissioner demanding that the meeting be adjourned to a subsequent date.
Thereupon, the Councillors belonging to the Party-in-power i.e. Congress-I,
started shouting at him that the meeting be held later on that day, being
apprehensive that if the meeting were to be adjourned, they might lose the
contest. There followed shouting of slogans, hurling of abuses and thumping of
the tables. The Councillors belonging to the rival groups then started throwing
chairs at each other leading to a pandemonium. That the fact that not only Councillors
but also many outsiders were present in the hall where the meeting was being
held who really had no business to be there, is clearly brought out in the
affidavits sworn by the Municipal 730 Commissioner, Collector and the
Superintendent of Police.
They
also show a large number of persons freely entering and leaving the hall. It is
apparent from the affidavit of the Superintendent of Police that during the
time when all this happened, Viswasrao Deshmukh, Revenue Minister, Government
of Maharashtra came into his office and left the premises while he was actually
busy in supervising the bandobust. We have been shown photographs showing the
presence of a large number of policemen wielding lathis inside the hall. The
Collector's affidavit reveals that the Superintendent of Police personally
requested Chagan Bhujbal, a sitting Member of the State Legislative Assembly
belonging to the Shiv Sena Party, to keep himself away from the premises of the
meeting hall. Be that as it may, it appears that both the officers asked the
outsiders to clear out of the hall, requested the Councillors to take their
places so as to permit the Municipal Commissioner to transact the business for
the day and brought the situation under control. They have sworn to the fact
that after the Councillors had calmed down and order was restored, both of them
left the hall. Thereafter, the Municipal Commissioner apparently announced on
the mike that the meeting would continue and the elections would be held at 4.30 p.m. The petitioner Chandrakant Khaire being the leader
of the Shiv Sena Party, filed a written protest at 4.15 p.m. that the meeting had been adjourned by the Municipal
Commissioner for the day and therefore the holding of the meeting later on that
day would be improper and illegal. After this, the Councillors belonging to the
opposition group abstained from participating in the meeting held at 4.30 p.m. at which respondents nos. 1 and 2 Dr. Shantaram Kale
and Takiqui Hassan were declared elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively
and respondents nos. 3-8 as Members of the Standing Committee, each of them
having polled 32 votes.
We had
benefit of hearing Shri S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr.
Y.S. Chitale, learned counsel appearing for respondents nos. 1-8 and Shri Vinod
Bobde, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 9, the Municipal
Commissioner. After a protracted hearing we at the end of the day reserved
orders. Having given the matter our anxious consideration, we find it difficult
to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
In
view of the conflicting affidavits, the petitioner and his supporters asserting
that the Municipal Commissioner had adjourned the meeting for the day and
respondent no. 2 reiterating the version of the Municipal Commissioner that he
had only suspended the proceedings so that the meeting could be held later in
the day and the business for 731 the day, namely, election of the Mayor, Deputy
Mayor and Members of the Standing Committee, could be transacted, the High
Court relying on the 'preponderance of probabilities' has come to the
conclusion that in the facts and circumstances the affidavit of the Municipal
Commissioner, respondent no. 9, appeared to be 'more impressive, probable and
convincing' and therefore they were inclined to accept it as 'one inspiring
confidence'. Acting upon the affidavit sworn by respondent no. 9, the Municipal
Commissioner, the High Court has found as a fact that the meeting was not
adjourned for the day or sine die but it was to be held as soon as peace was
restored on the very day i.e. the meeting had only been postponed. That is an
inference drawn from affidavits and we find no just and compelling reasons to
upset the same.
Shri
S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the High Court
erred in proceeding on probabilities in deciding the present matter which has
far- reaching ramifications affecting the democratic principles.
It is
said that the High Court having found that because of unruly and provocative
atmosphere prevailing in the meeting hall, the Municipal Commissioner was
required to adjourn the meeting in order to restore peace and to re-arrange the
furniture which was helter-skelter as the Councillors, it is stated, threw
chairs at each other, erred in taking the view that the meeting was not
adjourned for the day or sine die but had merely been suspended when in fact,
the business for the day, namely, elections to the offices of Mayor, Deputy
Mayor and Members of the Standing Committee, could not obviously be transacted.
He further contended that when the Municipal Commissioner on his own showing
had to adjourn the proceedings in view of the prevailing atmosphere and since
he felt it was impossible to continue the election process in that situation,
it was wrongly held by the High Court that the meeting was not adjourned sine
die when the Municipal Commissioner unequivocally admits that such adjournment
was necessary to enable him to decide and announce the time for the resumption
of the further proceedings. In substance, the contention is that the meeting
was not adjourned to a definite point of time and must therefore be regarded as
adjourned for the day or adjourned sine die. The learned counsel referred to
several law dictionaries to bring out the meaning of the expression 'adjourned
sine die' and relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Menaka
Bala Dasi v. Hiralal Gobindalal & Anr., 37 CWN 583 and that of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Sheokumar Shashtri v. Municipal Committee, Rajnandgaon,
AIR (1964) MP 195, and also to a passage from Shackleton on the Law &
Practice of Meetings, 7th edn. at p. 44 for the 732 submission that in the case
of adjournment sine die, the meeting stands adjourned to an unspecified date
and as such a fresh notice calling for the meeting is necessary.
Dr.
Y.S. Chitale appearing for respondents nos. 1-8 and Shri Vinod Bobde for
respondent no. 9, on the other hand, contended that the meeting had not been
adjourned sine die but the proceedings had merely been suspended at 2.45 p.m. and the adjourned meeting at 4.30 p.m. was a continuation of the original meeting and no
new notice of an adjourned meeting had to be given. It was contended further
that there was no warrant for interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution
since a finding of fact has been reached by the High Court on a consideration
of the Material on record. It was also contended that the petitioner having
failed to make good the averment in the writ petition that the meeting had been
'adjourned for the day', the High Court was justified in declining to
interfere.
In
order to appreciate the point in controversy, it is necessary to set out the
relevant statutory provisions bearing on the question. It is needless to stress
that a Municipal Corporation cannot function without the Mayor, Deputy Mayor
and Members of the Standing Committee who are entrusted with certain functions
and duties under the Act.
Sub-s.
(1) of s. 19 of the Act provides that 'the Corporation shall at its first
meeting after the general elections ........... elect from amongst the Councillors
one of its members to be the Mayor and another to be the Deputy Mayor', their
term of office being one year. Sub-s. (2) of s. 20 enacts that 'the Corporation
shall at its first meeting after the general elections appoint 12 persons out
of its own body to be Members of the Standing Committee'.
The
term of office of the elected Councillors, as provided by s. 6(1), is a period
of five years which in terms of sub- s. (2) is deemed to commence on the date
of the first meeting called by the Municipal Commissioner. The relevant Rules
framed under s. 453 of the Act relating to the proceedings of the Corporation
are as follows:
"1(b).
The first meeting of the Corporation after general elections shall be held as
early as conveniently may be on a day and at a time and place to be fixed by
the Commissioner, and if not held on that day shall be held on some subsequent
date to be fixed by the Commissioner." "1(h). At least seven clear
days' notice shall ordinarily be given of every meeting, other than any
adjourned meeting....
733
1(m). Any meeting may, with the consent of a majority of the councillors
present be adjourned from time to time to a later hour on the same day or to
any other, but no business shall be transacted and, except as is hereinafter
provided, no proposition shall be discussed at any adjourned meeting other than
the business or proposition remaining undisposed of at the meeting from which
the adjournment took place." "2(3). The Presiding Officer may in case
of grave disorder suspend the meeting for a period not exceeding three
days." It is therefore quite obvious that the first meeting of the
Corporation is of prime importance. Learned counsel for the parties have agreed
that cl.(m) may not govern the first meeting of the Corporation but relates to
subsequent meetings. The question before us is whether the first meeting 'could
not be held on that day' within the meaning of cl.(b) of r. 1 and therefore had
to be held 'on some subsequent date to be fixed by the Municipal Commissioner'.
The
affidavits on record clearly show that the Municipal Commissioner who presided
over the meeting, was constrained to adjourn the meeting at 2.45 p.m. when some
of the Councillors belonging to the Shiv Sena Party, of which the petitioner is
the leader, went inside the booth and forcibly removed the ballot boxes and sat
upon them to prevent casting of any votes, giving rise to commotion and
pandemonium. What actually happened is best stated by the Municipal
Commissioner in his affidavit:
"As
a result there was tremendous confusion, chaos and uproar in the house and
there was tremendous noise and nothing could be heard clearly.
I say
that there was tremendous tension and the situation was going out of control
and it was not possible to conduct the election at the moment of time and
therefore I announced that the meeting is adjourned and that the Councillors
should restore peace. I also said that I shall soon announce the time of
meeting.
I say
that I did not leave the house and remained in the chair of the Presiding
Authority hoping that the peace would be restored and I would be able to announce
the time of the meeting.
Thereafter
Shri Man Mohan Singh 734 Oberoi raised the point of order that the meeting
should not be adjourned and that he along with another Councillor Dr. Sancheti
insisted that meeting should continue. At this stage the situation in the house
worsened and in fact there was hot exchange of words and shouting between
different groups of Councillors. An attempt was made to throw chairs at each
other and in fact the furniture in the house was scattered and several Councillors
surrounded me and some spoke in favour of adjournment and some spoke in favour
of continuation. My efforts to restore peace and order were futile, and there
was serious law and order situation.
In the
circumstances aforesaid there was no alternative and I felt that it was my duty
to seek the Police help and I called the Police to restore order. Thereupon
some of the Councillors objected and actually resisted the entry of the Police.
Thereafter
on my directives the Police soon left.
Some
of the Shiv Sena Councillors were in aggressive mood and they came to my table
and violently thumped the table and shouted that they would not allow this
meeting to take place. During this period I even suggested that the Councillors
should go out. This was necessary as I felt that without that the furniture
cannot be re-arranged and further steps for resuming the meeting will not be
possible. In the meantime the District Magistrate Shri R.R. Sinha and Supdt. of
Police Shri T.C. Wankhede entered the Hall. S.P. Shri Wankhede appealed the Councillors
on the mike to restore peace. I say that discussions took place between myself
and the Dist. Magistrate with a view to restore the peace. The Dist. Magistrate
Shri Sinha also appealed to restore peace.
Thereafter
the Councillors were calmed down and the order was restored. On the peace being
restored both the District Magistrate and the S.P. left the house at 3.45 p.m. I announced on the mike that meeting would continue
and election would be held at 4.30 p.m." ******* ******* ".... in
effect the adjournment declared by me as aforesaid amounts to suspension of the
meeting because of the grave disorder ...." ******* ******* 735 "I
also said that I shall soon make an announcement about the time for resuming
the meeting." ******* ******* "I had to adjourn the proceedings in
view of the prevailing circumstances set out hereinabove and since I felt that
it was impossible to continue the election process in that situation. It was
also necessary to enable myself to decide and announce the time for the
resumption of the further proceedings of the meeting." While setting out
the facts we have already adverted to the facts sworn by the Collector and the
Superintendent of Police. There is no reason not to act on these affidavits.
The
Collector says that 'there was total confusion and bedlam inside the hall'
apart from the fact that 'the entire atmosphere was surcharged with commotion',
and 'the Municipal Commissioner was in a very agitated state of mind and said
that he could not hold the meeting in the unruly and disorderly situation
prevailing'. There can be no doubt that such unruly scenes witnessed on that
day gave rise to a serious law and order situation but both the Collector and
the Superintendent of Police were able to restore order in the House and
prevailed upon the outsiders to vacate the meeting hall in order that the
proceedings could be resumed.
The
fact that the Municipal Commissioner did not leave the House or vacate the seat
does lend support to the version that he had merely suspended the proceedings
till order was restored. There is no reason to doubt the affidavit sworn by the
Municipal Commissioner that he announced on the mike at 3.45 p.m. that the
proceedings would be resumed at 4.30 p.m. for transacting the business for the
day.
It is
quite obvious that the meeting was not 'adjourned for the day' or 'adjourned
sine die'. Shri Kacker, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when
the affidavits of the three officers showed that utter confusion prevailed and
there was pandemonium all around with strangers moving about in the meeting
hall, it must necessarily follow that no business could be transacted on that
day. The contention is that the meeting was not adjourned to a definite point
of time and must therefore be regarded as 'adjourned for the day' or 'adjourned
sine die'.
He
referred to the decisions in Menaka Bala Dasi and Sheokumar Shashtri, as also
to various law dictionaries, besides a passage from Shackleton on the Law and
Practice of Meetings, 7th edn. at p. 44. On the strength of these authorities,
it was submitted that 736 the meeting was adjourned not to a definite point of
time and must therefore be regarded as 'adjourned for the day' or 'adjourned
sine die'. He accordingly submitted that the Municipal Commissioner should have
fixed another date for the meeting and issued fresh notice therefor. We are afraid,
we cannot accept this line of reasoning.
According
to the ordinary meaning, the expression 'sine die' as given in Shorter Oxford
Dictionary, 3rd edn., vol.
II at
p. 2000 means:
"Without
any day being specified (for reassembling, resumption of business etc.);
indefinitely."
Similarly, in Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, International edn., the
meaning given is more or less the same:
"Without
a day; indefinitely: an adjournment sine die (that is, without setting a day
for ressembling)." The same is the legal meaning. In Black's Law
Dictionary, Deluxe 4th edn. at p. 1556, the meaning of the expression sine die
is:
"Without
day; without assigning a day for a further meeting or hearing." The legal
meaning given in Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd edn., vol. II at p.
1663 reads:
"Without
a day being fixed. The consideration of a matter is said to be adjourned sine
die when it is adjourned without a day being fixed for its resumption."
The passage in Shackleton at p. 44 on which the learned counsel relies reads:
"Adjourned
meetings: Notice. An adjournment, if bona fide, is only a continuation of the
meeting and the notice that was given for the first meeting holds good for and
includes all the other meetings following up it. If however the meeting is
adjourned sine die, a fresh notice must be given.
No new
business can be introduced unless notice of such new business is given."
737 There can be no dispute with the proposition but the difficulty is about
the applicability of that principle to the facts of the case. Literally, there
is nothing on record to substantiate the petitioner's submission that the first
meeting scheduled to be held on May 6, 1988 at 2 p.m. was 'adjourned for the day' or
'adjourned sine die' without transacting any business i.e. without
consideration of the agenda for the day. On the contrary, it is not in dispute
that the business for the day was partly transacted when the Councillors met at
2 p.m. as scheduled and the Municipal
Commissioner declared that the polling would commence from 2.30 p.m. onwards. The trouble started at 2.30 p.m. when the Councillors belonging to the petitioner's Shiv
Sena Party prevented the casting of votes by snatching away the ballot boxes
from the polling booths and sat upon them. There was a pre-determined plan on
their part not to allow the first meeting to be held on that day. But the
Municipal Commissioner did not give way to the commotion and pandemonium and he
did not put off the meeting to another day. In the prevailing situation, the
Municipal Commissioner had no other alternative but to adjourn the meeting.
Under the scheme of the Act, when the term of the elected Councillors is a
period of five years which in terms of sub- s. (2) of s. 6 of the Act is deemed
to commence on the date of the first meeting, the Municipal Commissioner
obviously could not adjourn the meeting for another day or adjourn it sine die.
If the contention that the meeting having been adjourned without specifying a
definite point of time were to prevail, it would give rise to a serious
anomaly. The effect of adjourning the first meeting to another day would imply
the coming into existence of another deemed date under s. 6(2) of the Act for
commencement of the term of the Councillors. The Municipal Commissioner has
unequivocally asserted that he only suspended the proceedings in order that
they could be resumed for transaction of the business for the day, and the
business for the day had to be transacted on May 6, 1988, the date of the first meeting, as fixed by him.
Admittedly, the Municipal Commissioner did not leave the meeting hall nor
vacate his seat. He showed exemplary courage in not yielding to the threats of
violence wielded by the party in opposition, because he knew that in law the
first meeting had to be held on that day and could not be adjourned to another
day. There is no reason to disbelieve the Municipal Commissioner that when he
adjourned the meeting he simultaneously made an announcement that he would
later announce the time when the meeting was to be resumed. He is candid enough
to say that he had to adjourn the proceedings in view of the prevailing
situation when he felt that it was impossible to continue the election process
hoping that peace would soon be restored and he would be able to announce the
time of the 738 meeting. One of the reasons given for the adjournment was that
he adjourned the meeting to enable him to decide and announce the time for the
resumption of the further proceedings of the meeting.
Rankin,
CJ in Menaka Bala Dasi's case in repelling the contention that adjournment sine
die of an application for making a decree in a mortgage suit final, was a
discontinuance of it, observed:
"(W)hatever
may be the old authorities on that point, I have no doubt myself that with us
to-day 'adjournment sine die' differs altogether from discontinuance. It is
after all an adjournment-an adjournment to a date that is not at the moment
fixed." The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sheokumar Shasthri's
case relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is clearly
distinguishable. In that case, it was admitted that the meeting of the
Municipal Committee summoned for January 17, 1962 at which the motion of no
confidence was to have been moved was adjourned sine die for want of quorum and
the High Court held relying upon the proviso to s. 32 of the Madhya Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1961, that a meeting convened for consideration of a no
confidence motion could not be adjourned sine die, but had to be adjourned to
'some other day' for which a fresh notice was necessary, P.V. Dixit, CJ
speaking for himself and K.L. Pandey, J. observed:
"It
is settled law that where there is a power of adjournment and a meeting is
adjourned, then the adjourned meeting is a continuation of the original meeting
and no new notice of an adjourned meeting need be given unless the relevant
statutory provisions or rules so require. But in the case of an adjournment
sine die a fresh notice is necessary, (See: Scadding v. Lorant, [1851] 3 HLC
418; and Wills v. Murray, [1850] 4 Ex 843. The proviso to section 32 of the
C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, laid down that:
"If
at any ordinary or special meeting of the committee a quorum is not present,
the Chairman shall adjourn the meeting to such other day as he may think fit
........" Under this proviso, a meeting could be adjouned to some fixed
date and not sine die." 739 The decision in Sheokumar Shashtri is
therefore of no avail.
Shackleton
on the Law & Practice of Meetings, 7th edn. apart from the passage at p. 44
already quoted, gives the different shades of meaning of adjournment as
understood in legal parlance, in the following words:
"Adjournment
is the act is postponing a meeting of any private or public body or any
business until another time, or indefinitely, in which case it is an
adjournment sine die. The word applies also to the period during which the
meeting or business stands adjourned. An Adjournment may be:
1. For
an interval expiring on the day of the adjournment.
2. For
an interval expiring on some later date.
3. For
an indefinite time (i.e. sine die).
4. Until
a fixed time and date.
5. To
another place."
The
learned author then sets out the different causes giving rise to an adjournment
which may be by (1) Resolution of the meeting. (2) Action of the chairman, and
(3) Failure to achieve or maintain a quorum.
A
properly convened meeting cannot be postponed. The proper course to adopt is to
hold the meeting as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to a
more suitable date. If this course be not adopted, members will be entitled to
ignore the notice of postponement, and, if sufficient to form a quorum, hold
the meeting as originally convened and validly transact the business thereat.
Even if the relevant rules do not give the chairman power to adjourn the
meeting, he may do so in the event of disorder. Such an adjournment must be for
no longer than the chairman considers necessary and the chairman must, so far
as possible, communicate his decision to those present.
The
law relating to adjournment has been put succinctly in Horsley's Meetings
Procedure, Law and Practice, 2nd edn., edt. by W. John Taggart at p. 84, para
1002:
740
"The word 'adjournment' tends to be used loosely in connection with
meetings. Indeed, as a result, the word is possibly in process of acquiring a
further, derived meaning of 'close, conclude or finish', whereas a meeting or a
debate is adjourned when its further proceedings are postponed to some
subsequent time or to enable it to reassemble at some other place; to a later
hour in the same day, to some future date, or indefinitely, i.e. sine die
(without a day being named). The business (of the whole meeting or the debate
respectively) is indeed suspended, but with an intention of deferring it until
resumption at a later time." The learned author goes on to say that the
word 'adjourn' has been in use for almost five centuries in connection with
meetings, with an early meaning of 'to put off or defer proceedings to another
day', and adds:
"This
in due course gave rise to the added meaning 'to break off for later
resumption'." On an overall view of the facts and circumstances, we have
no hesitation in upholding the finding that the first meeting of the Municipal
Corporation fixed by the Municipal Commissioner for May 6, 1988 was not
'adjourned for the day' or 'adjourned sine die' but had only been put off to a
later hour i.e. the proceedings had only been suspended, to re- commence when
peace and order were restored.
In the
result, the special leave petition must fail and is dismissed. No costs.
G.N.
Petition dismissed.
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