State of
Punjab Vs. Raj Kumar [1988] INSC 41 (11 February 1988)
Natrajan,
S. (J) Natrajan, S. (J) Sen, A.P. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 805 1988 SCR (2) 936 1988 SCC (1) 701 JT 1988 (1) 476 1988 SCALE
(1)319
CITATOR
INFO : R 1989 SC 811 (8)
ACT:
Punjab
Police Rules, 1934 framed under the Police Act 1861-Rule 16.38-Interpretation
of-Whether Mandatory or directory in nature-Scope of-Whether applicable to
departmental inquiries alone or would govern criminal proceedings also under
I.P.C. and other acts. Held- Applicable to departmental inquiries only.
HEAD NOTE:
% The
respondent was apprehended while taking bribe.
Investigation
was held and the respondent was charge sheeted before the Special Judge. The
respondent raised an objection to the framing of charges against him on the
ground that the investigation of the case was in contravention of rule 16.38 of
the Punjab Police Rules. The Special Judge overruled the objection and framed
charges and posted the case for trial.
The
respondent filed a petition before the High Court under section 561(A) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for quashing the proceedings against him
before the Special Judge. A full bench of the High Court held that rule 16.38
is mandatory and not directory in character and that the mandate would govern
criminal prosecution as well as departmental inquiries in equal measure. The
full bench having noticed that the investigation against the respondent had not
been done in accordance with rule 16.38 allowed the petition and quashed the charges
framed against the respondent. Hence this appeal filed by certificate issued by
the High Court.
Allowing
the appeal and setting aside the High Court's judgment this Court, ^
HELD:
The procedure prescribed in rule 16.38 has only a limited field of operation
that is applicable only to departmental inquiries and punishments. This could
be seen from the fact that clause 3 of the rule enjoins every Magistrate to
whom a complaint against a police officer is referred by the District
Magistrate for judicial enquiry to report the details of the case to the
District Magistrate in order to enable the District Magistrate to forward the
report to the Superintendent of Police. The clause further says that if the
District Magistrate himself takes cognizance of a case he should of his own
accord send a report to 937 the Superintendent of Police. Clause IV of rule
16.38 also throws light on the matter and brings out the objective in greater
clarity. This clause sets out that in order to protect the interest of police officers
serving in districts where petition mongering activities are notorious, the
District Magistrate can direct that all petitions complaining about police
officers shall be presented to him personally so that he can scrutinize them to
find out whether the petitions are of a frivolous nature or they have been
engineered by factious groups in the districts etc. In fact, the words used in
the clause are of a tell-tale nature viz. "complaints against police
officers in those districts where abuses of law with the object of victimising
such officers or hampering investigation is rife." [945F-H; 946A- B] The
purpose underlying the rule is to enable the District Magistrate and the
District Superintendent of Police to exercise personal control and supervision
over the complaints received against members of the police force in the
performance of their duties and enable the District Magistrate to ensure that
the complaint is not a baseless or mala fide one and secondly to determine
whether the complaint requires investigation by a police officer or by a
selected Magistrate. The procedure envisaged by the rule is for effective check
being exercised against victimisation of efficient and honest police officers
on the one hand and favouritism being shown to the delinquent police officers
on the other. These rules were not intended to replace and certainly cannot
over-ride the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. [946C-E] In the
instant case the Full Bench was in error in taking the view that the Punjab
Police Rules read in conjunction with the Police Act prescribe a different
procedure for the investigation and prosecution of offences committed by Police
Officer under the I.P.C. or other Acts in connection with their relations with
the public and that the rules constitute a special statute and take precedence
over the provisions of the Cr. P.C. The Full Bench has failed to note that Rule
16.38 only mandates the investigation of cases pertaining to departmental
enquiries and the holding of departmental enquiries in accordance with the
procedure prescribed thereunder.[948B-C] Raj Kumar, A. S. I. v. The State of Punjab, [1976] IV CLR (Pb. & Har.)
page 39, overruled.
State
of Punjab v. Charan Singh, [1981] 2 SCC 197,
referred to/agreed to.
Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah,
[1969] 3 S.C.R. 653; 938 Union of India v. Ram Kishan, [1971] 2 S.C.C. 349; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2
S.C.R. 679; Maulud Ahmad v. State of U.P.,
[1963] (Supp.) 2 S.C.R. 38; Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 145
and S.N. Sharma v. Bipan Kumar Tiwari & Ors.,[1970] 1 S.C.C. 653, referred
to.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 580 of 1976.
From
the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.1975 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Miscellaneous
No. 772-M of 1974.
R.S. Sodhi
for the Appellant.
Gopal Subramaniam,
Amicus Curiae for the Respondent.
The
Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN, J. This appeal by certificate
granted under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution is directed against the
judgment of a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Raj Kumar,
A.S.I. v. The State of Punjab, [1976] IV C.L.R. (Pb. & Har.) page 39
allowing a petition under Section 561(A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
filed by the respondent. The objective in filing the appeal, it was conceded by
Mr. R.S. Sodhi, learned counsel for the State is the determination of a larger
issue transcending the narrow confines of the quashing of the criminal
proceedings against the respondent viz. the construction of Rule 16.38 of the
Punjab Police Rules and its applicability to criminal prosecutions launched
against the members of the Punjab Police Service for offences under the Indian
Penal Code and other Acts.
The
controversy regarding the ambit of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules has
arisen in the following circumstances. One Jamuna Devi Mukhtiar Kaur gave a
report against the respondent, who was an Assistant Sub Inspector in the Punjab
Police Service, to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Patiala alleging command of illegal
gratification of Rs.200 by him for releasing her husband and brother on bail
bonds in a case pertaining to a land dispute. A first information report was
registered and a trap was laid for the respondent and he was apprehended as
soon as the marked currency notes treated with phenolophthalene were handed
over to him and the marked currency 939 notes were recovered from him. After
completion of investigation, the respondent was chargesheeted before the
Special Judge, Sangrur. The respondent appeared before the Special Judge and
raised an objection to the framing of charges against him on the ground the
investigation of the case was in contravention of Rule 16.38. The Special Judge
over-ruled the objection and framed charges and posted the case for trial.
The
respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Section 561(A) of the
Criminal Procedure Code 1898, for quashing the proceedings against him before
the Special Judge. As there were conflicting decisions of the High Court in the
interpretation of Rule 16.38, a learned Single Judge referred the matter to a
Division Bench and in turn the Division Bench referred the matter to a Full
Bench. A Full Bench of the High Court reviewed the earlier decisions and held
that Rule 16.38 is mandatory and not directory in character and secondly the
mandate would govern criminal prosecutions as well as departmental enquiries in
equal measure and as such any prosecution launched or departmental enquiry held
in violation of the terms of the Rule would vitiate the proceedings concerned.
Having interpreted Rule 16.38 thus, the Full Bench noticed that the
investigation against the respondent had not been done in accordance with Rule
16.38 and therefore the bench allowed the petition and quashed the charges
framed against the respondent. The High Court, however, granted a certificate
under Article 134(1)(c) to the State to file an appeal to this Court and that
is how the appeal is before us.
What,
therefore, calls for consideration is whether the procedure prescribed in Rule
16.38 calls for observance in the case of departmental enquiries alone or
whether it would govern criminal prosecutions also for offences under the
Indian Penal Code and other Acts, and secondly whether the Rule is mandatory in
character or only directory. Our task has been considerably lightened by a
pronouncement on the first question, with which we are primarily concerned, by
another Bench of this Court in the State of Punjab v. Charan Singh, [1981] 2
SCC 197 declaring that Rule 16.38 cannot govern criminal prosecutions against
the members of the Police Force as it cannot over-ride the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. In spite of the said pronouncement, with which we are
in respectful agreement, we feel it necessary to deal with the matter at some
length because of certain misconceptions contained in the judgment of the High
Court under appeal.
940
Before we advert to the decisions pertaining to Rule 16.38, we may refer to
certain provisions of the Police Act 1861 and the Punjab Police Rules framed
there under. Section 3 of the Police Act, confers the right of superintendence
of the Police Force throughout the general police district on the State
Government and vests in such Government the right to exercise such powers in
that behalf. Section 7 deals with the appointment, dismissal, etc. of inferior
officers. The Section lays down that the "Subject to the provisions of
Article 311 of the Constitution, and to such Rules as the State Government may
from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector
General, Asstt.
Inspector
General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend
or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think
remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same" or
to award any of the lesser punishments prescribed under clauses (a) (b) (c) (d)
for discharge of duty in a careless or negligent manner etc. Besides the power
conferred on the State Government to make Rules under Section 7, there is also
provision under Section 12 for the Inspector General of Police, subject to the
approval of the State Government, to frame such orders and rules as he shall
deem expedient relative to the organisation, classification and distribution of
police force, the places at which the members of the police force shall reside,
the services to be performed by them etc. for ensuring the efficiency of the
police force in the discharge of its duties. It is in exercise of the powers
conferred by Sections 7 and 12 of the Police Act that the Punjab Police Rules
1934 have been framed. The Rules have been categorised under 28 Chapters for
dealing with various matters such as organisational setup, uniforms, arms and
ammunition, leave, pension, promotions, rewards, punishments, training,
supervision, investigation, prosecution etc. The matters covered by the Rules
make it clear that the Rules have been framed for regulating the set up and the
service conditions of the police force as well as for awarding them rewards and
departmental punishments and other matters of internal administration for
keeping efficient and disciplined one. It is in that perspective Rule 38 of
Chapter 16 has to be viewed.
The
very first Rule in Chapter 16 sets out the scope and purpose of the Rule
comprised in that chapter. Rules 16.1 reads as follows:
"(1)
No police officer shall be departmentally punished otherwise than as provided
in these rules;
(2)
The departmental punishments mentioned in the second 941 column of the
subjoined table may be inflicted on officers of the various ranks shown in the
heading Nos. 3 to 9, by the officers named below each heading in each case, or
by any officer of higher ranks".
(Emphasis
supplied) Rule 16.38 with which we are concerned, contains 7 sub- clauses. For
our purpose it is enough if we extract sub- clauses. 1 to 4 and refer in
general terms to the contents of Clauses 5 to 7.
"16.38(1)
Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate or any
complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the
commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his
official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether
the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or
made over to a selected magistrate having 1st class powers.
(2)
When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a
judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally
only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it
is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.38
shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred
to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.
(3)
Ordinarily a magistrate before whom a complaint against a police officer if
laid proceeds at once to judicial enquiry. He is, however, required to report
details of the case to the District Magistrate, who will forward a copy of this
report to the Superintendent of Police.
The
District Magistrate himself will similarly send a report to the Superintendent
of Police in cases of which he himself takes cognizance.
(4)
The Local Government has prescribed the following supplimentary procedure to be
adopted in the case of complaints against police officers in those districts
where abuses of the law with the object of victimising such officers or
hampering investigation is rife. The District Magistrate will order that all petitions
against police officers shall be 942 presented to him personally. If he
considers that these petitions are of a frivolous or factious nature, it is
within his discretion to take no action on them. When he considers an enquiry
to be necessary he will use his discretion whether to send the papers to the
Superintendent of Police or to a magistrate for judicial enquiry.
In the
case of formal criminal complaints, the District Magistrate will arrange for
all cases to be transferred from other courts to his own.
Clauses
5 to 7 relate to strictures passed by the High Court and other courts against
police officers and the manner of communication of the strictures to the
District Magistrate and the Government.
Different
interpretations were given by different Benches of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana regarding the scope and force of rule 16.38. In Criminal Revision No.
1100 of 1972 (Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab) H.R. Sharma, J. held that Rule 16.38 debarred criminal proceedings if
the same had been instituted without a prior sanction of the District
Magistrate. In Ram Prakash, Asstt. Sub-Inspector v. The State, [1974] Chandigarh
Law Reporter 205 Gurnam Singh, J. took a diametrically opposite view. In Hoshiar
Singh v. The State, [1965] PLR 438 a Division Bench of the High Court held that
Rule 16.38 was attrected in the case of departmental enquiries only and the
departmental enquiry would be vitiated if the papers had not been produced
before the District Magistrate for getting his sanction at the initial stage. In
Nand Singh v. The Superintendent of Police and another, Current Law Journal(Pb)146
it was held that the Rule was mandatory. The said view was affirmed by a Full
Bench in Nand Mandan Sarup v. The District Magistrate and others, [1966] Current
Law Journal (Pb) 608. It was in that backdrop of conflicting decisions, the
petition filed by the respondent herein under Section 561(A) for quashing of
the proceedings against him before the Special Judge came to be referred to a
Full Bench.
The
reasoning of the Full Bench for allowing the respondent's petition can be summarised
thus:
"The
Police Act vests the right of superintendence of the police force in a State on
the State Government. Section 7 of the Police Act empowers the State Government
to frame rules regarding disciplinary matters and Section 12 em- 943 powers the
Inspector General of Police, subject to the approval of the State Government,
to frame orders and rules relating to the organisation, classification and
distribution of the police force, the services to be performed by them
etc." Hence the rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under section
7 and 12 have the force of law and they constitute a special legislation which
takes precedence over the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 4
of the Police Act inter alia lays down that the administration of the police,
within the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, shall under his general
control and direction, be vested in a District Superintendent and Assistant
District Superintendents as the Government may appoint.
Consequently,
the District Magistrate has statutory authority to exercise control over the
administration of the police force in his District including the launching of
criminal prosecutions or holding of Departmental enquiries against a member of
the police force. Rule 16.38 contains a mandatory provision regarding the
procedure to be followed when any complaint is received by the Superintendent
of Police against a member of the police force regarding the commission of an
offence by him in connection with his official relations with the public. The
said rule will apply with equal force to investigations relating to criminal
offences for which a prosecution is to be launched as it would to enquiries for
taking departmental action through disciplinary proceedings. On the basis of
such reasoning, the Full Bench over-ruled the decision in Hoshiar Singh v.
State of Punjab (supra).
We
will now refer to the decision in Hoshiar Singh (supra), since it has been
approved by this Court in State of Punjab v. Charan Singh (supra), and then
advert to some decisions of this Court relevant for consideration. In that case
a Sub-Inspector of Police was challaned under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and Section 161, Indian Penal Code and was suspended from
service and charge sheeted and thereafter a departmental enquiry followed. When
a show cause notice was served on him on the conclusion of the enquiry
intimating him the proposed punishment, he objected to the legality of the
enquiry on the ground that no permission of the District Magistrate in
accordance with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules had been obtained. The
objection was sustained and the departmental enquiry was quashed. Thereafter,
the challan was put into Court and 944 once again an objection was raised that
in the absence of a reference to the District Magistrate and his orders thereon
directing prosecution, the Special Judge could not take cognizance of the case.
The Special Judge over-ruled the objection holding that his powers under the
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act were not trammelled by the Punjab Police Rules. A
criminal revision was filed before the High Court against the order of the
Special Judge and the High Court dismissed the criminal revision holding thus:
"I
do not think Rule 16.38 was intended or could have the effect of imposing as a
condition precedent to the trial of a police officer in a Court of Law, a
sanction or an order by the District Magistrate, as contemplated therein. The
language appears to me to be confined only to departmental enquiries. The
investigation for establishing a prima facie case is merely meant to guide the
District Magistrate, uncontrolled by the opinion of the Superintendent of
Police, whether or not a departmental proceeding should be initiated against
the guilty party, and it is the procedure and the punishment controlling the
departmental proceedings alone, which appear to have been prescribed by this
rule."
In Delhi Administration v. Chanan Shah, [1969]
3 S.C.R. 653 an Asstt. Sub Inspector was censured, after summary enquiry for
having received illegal gratification in a case he was investigating. The
Deputy Inspector General of Police revoked the order of censure and directed
departmental action being taken. The departmental enquiry culminated in an
order of dismissal against Chanan Shah. An appeal and revision to the higher
authorities having failed, Chanan Shah filed a writ petition which was
dismissed by a Single Judge but allowed in writ appeal by a Division Bench and
the order of dismissal was quashed. The Delhi Administration came in appeal to
this Court and this Court held that irrespective of whether Rule 16.38 is
mandatory or directory, the authorities had failed to substantially comply with
the provisions of the Rule and, therefore, the laches vitiated the departmental
enquiry. The same view was taken in a later case Union of India v. Ram Kishan,
[1971] 2 S.C.C. 349 which related to the dismissal of a constable from service
pursuant to a disciplinary enquiry being set aside in a civil suit filed by the
dismissed constable. The decree of the Trial Court was affirmed by the
Appellate Court and the High Court and in further appeal to this Court, it was
held that as no immediate information was given to the District Magistrate in
respect of the complaint received 945 against the plaintiff (constable) and
secondly since the District Magistrate has also not decided whether the
investigating agency should be a police officer or a magistrate, as prescribed
by Rule 16.38, the departmental enquiry was vitiated and, therefore, the
plaintiff's suit had been rightly decreed. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2
S.C.R. 679 the view taken by the majority of the Bench was that paragraph 486 Rule
1 of U.P.
Police
Rules was mandatory in character and hence the departmental action taken
against the respondent police officer in disregard of the rule was invalid.
It may
be noticed that the three decisions of this Court which have been referred to
above related to departmental enquiries and not criminal prosecutions for
offences committed by the delinquent police officers. The pronouncements in
these cases will therefore govern only cases where departmental enquiries are
held in contravention of the procedure prescribed by the Police Rules. The
reason for a special procedure being prescribed in the Rules for investigations
before departmental enquiries are held against delinquent police officers is
not far off to see. In the very nature of their duties, the members of the
police force would often stand exposed to criticism and complaints by not only
the members of the public but also by the members of the force themselves and
consequently they stand placed more vulnerable than members of other Government
services, of being implicated in false or exaggerated charges. In order to
protect them from false implications and resultant proceedings, the Government
had thought it necessary to have an initial screening of the complaints
received against members of the police force by the District Magistrate. Such
screening would however extend only to matters which fall within the zone of
departmental action and it could never extend to cases where the offences
alleged to have been committed would attract investigation under the Criminal
Procedure Code in the same manner the investigation would be attracted if the
offences complained of had been committed by any member of the public. That the
procedure prescribed in Rule 16.38 has only a limited field of operation i.e.
applicable only to departmental enquiries and punishments could be seen from
the fact that clause 3 of the Rule enjoins every Magistrate to whom a complaint
against a police officer is referred by the District Magistrate for judicial
enquiry to report the details of the case to the District Magistrate in order
to enable the District Magistrate to forward the report to the Superintendent
of Police. The clause further says that if the District Magistrate himself
takes congnizance of a case, he should of his own accord send a report to the
Superintendent of Police. Clause IV of Rule 16.38 also throws light on the
matter and brings out the 946 objective in greater clarity. This clause sets
out that in order to protect the interests of police officers serving in
districts where petition mongering activities are notorious, the District
Magistrate can direct that all petitions complaining about police officers
shall be presented to him personally so that he can scrutinize them to find out
whether the petitions are of a frivolous nature or they have been engineered by
factious groups in the districts etc. In fact, the words used in the clause are
of a tell-tale nature viz. "complaints against police officers in those
districts were abuses of law with the object of victimising such officers or
hampering investigation is rife." All these features make it clear that
the purpose underlying the rule is to enable the District Magistrate and the
District Superintendent of Police to exercise personal control and supervision
over the complaints received against members of the police force in the
performance of their duties and enable the District Magistrate to ensure that
the complaint is not a baseless or mala fide one and secondly to determine
whether the complaint requires investigation by a police officer or by a
selected magistrate. The procedure envisaged by the Rule is for effective check
being exercised against victimisation of efficient and honest police officers
on the one hand and favouritism being shown to the delinquent police officers
on the other. These rules were not intended to replace and certainly cannot
over-ride the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Full Bench was
therefore in error in taking the view that the Rules lay down a special procedure
for investigation of all offences committed by the members of the police force
and, that they have over-riding effect over the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code in terms of Sections 4 and 5 of the Code.
We may
now refer to some other decisions where it has been laid down that the
provisions of the Police Act cannot prevail over the provisions of the Indian
Penal Code. In Maulud Ahmad v. State of U.P., [1963] (Supp) 2 S.C.R. 38, the
appellant who was a head constable contended that the prosecution launched
against him was barred by limitation under Section 42 of the Police Act because
the prosecution had been launched beyond the period of three months prescribed
by Section 42. The contention was rejected and it was pointed out that the
period of three months prescribed under Section 42 for commencing a prosecution
would govern only prosecutions of a police officer for something done or
intended to be done by him under the provisions of the Police Act or under
general police powers given by the Act and Section 42 would not apply to
prosecutions against a police officer for anything done under the provisions of
any other Act or under 947 Police powers conferred under any other Act. It was
also brought to focus that Section 36 of the Police Act explicitely provides
that nothing contained in the said Act shall be construed to prevent any person
from being prosecuted under any Regulation or Act for any offence made
punishable by the Act or for being liable under any other Regulation or Act or
any other or higher penalty or punishment that is provided for such offence by
the Police Act. The above ratio was followed in Ajaid Singh v. Joginder Singh,
[1969] 1 S.C.R. 145.
In yet
another case viz. S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari & Ors., [1970] 1 S.C.C.
653 it was held that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable
offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate and it is only in cases where the
police decided not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene
and either direct an investigation, or in the alternative himself proceed or
depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case and
that the powers of the police to investigate have been made independent of any
control by the Magistrate.
Lastly,
we come to the decision in the State of Punjab v. Charan Singh (supra) where
the identical question under consideration had come up for determination by
this Court.
The
respondent therein was convicted by the Special Judge, Ludhiana of an offence
under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act and sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and
to pay a fine of Rs. 100. On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court acquitted
the respondent on the ground the prosecution was vitiated by reason of
non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules,
1934. In the appeal preferred by the State, this Court allowed the appeal and
held as follows:
"A
perusal of Chapter XVI of the Punjab Police Rules shows that the provisions of
the Chapter deal with departmental punishments and the procedure to be followed
in imposing such punishments. Guidance is given as to how police officers
guilty of misconduct and criminal offences may be dealt with .............It is
clear that Rule 16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the
launching of a prosecution in a criminal court; it is in the nature of
instructions of the department and is not meant to be of the nature of a
sanction or permission for a prosecution nor can it over-ride the provisions of
the Cr.P.C. and the Prevention of Corruption Act. We agree with the
observations of Dua and Mahajan, JJ in Hoshiar Singh v. State (supra)."
948 Though the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court which is now
under consideration had not been brought to the notice of the Learned Judges
when they rendered judgment in State of Punjab v. Charan Singh, we are in full
agreement with the pronouncement of the Bench as the conclusion therein accords
with our own conclusion and the reasons therefore. We therefore hold that the
Full Bench was in error in taking the view that the Punjab Police Rules read in
conjunction with the Police Act prescribe a different procedure for the
investigation and prosecution of offences committed by Police officers under
the I.P.C. or other Acts in connection with their relations with the public and
that the rules constitute a special statute and take precedence over the
provisions of the Cr.P.C. The Full Bench has failed to note that Rule 16.38
only mandates the investigation of cases pertaining to departmental enquiries
and the holding of departmental enquiries in accordance with the procedure
prescribed thereunder. We therefore hold that the decision of the Full Bench
under appeal in Raj Kumar, A.S.I. v. The State of Punjab (supra) is not in
accordance with law and has to be set aside. However, as mentioned at the
outset, the State is not interested in reviving the charges against the
respondent and pursuing the trial because of the long lapse of time. Therefore,
while allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, we
leave undisturbed the quashing of the charges framed against the respondent.
Since
the respondent did not enter appearance or engage a counsel to contest the
appeal in spite of the notice served on him, we requested Mr. Gopal Subramaniam,
Advocate, to act as amicus curiae and render assistance to the Court on behalf
of the respondent. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam readily complied with our request and
placed all the authorities for our consideration and we thank him for his
assistance and place on record our appreciation of the services rendered by
him.
H.S.K.
Appeal allowed.
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