Singh & Anr Vs. Union of India & Ors  INSC 238
(23 August 1988)
M.N. (J) Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J) Misra Rangnath
1988 AIR 1979 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 546 1988 SCC (4) 170 JT 1988 (3) 448 1988
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966: Rule Il(vi)-Government
servant-Directly recruited to a particular post-Whether can be reduced to a
post lower in rank to the one that he was directly recruited.
Constitution of India, 1950-Article 311(2)-`Reduction in rank'-Whether a
government servant by way of punishment/penalty can be reduced in rank to a
post lower than that to which he was recruited directly-All reversions from
higher post are not necessarily reduction in rank.
Interpretation: Consequences do not alter statutory language-They only help to
fix its meaning.
to separate disciplinary proceedings the penalty of `reduction in rank' was
imposed on the appellants, Nyadar Singh and M.J. Ninama, reducing each of them
to a post lower than the one to which they were directly recruited.
Central Administrative Tribunals rejected the appellants' challenge to the
orders imposing the penalty.
this Court, the appellants' contention was that as a result of the imposition
of the penalty, they were reduced in rank to posts lower than the one to which
they were initially recruited, which on a proper construction of Rule 11 of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 was not
Additional Solicitor General, on the other hand, contended that this limitation
which might be appropriate in the case of a `reversion', was inappropriate in a
case of `reduction in rank' imposed as a penalty. The argument was that
`reduction in rank' had a wider import than `reversion' and there was no reason
why the power to impose this penalty which was permissible on the plain
language of the Rule, be whittled down by any other consideration.
547 PG NO 548 Disposing of the appeals, it was,
(1) The meaning to be given to a particular statutory language depends on the
evaluation of a number of interpretative-criteria. Shorn of the context, the
words by themselves are `slippery customers'. The general presumption is that
these criteria do not detract or stand apart from, but are to be harmonised
with, the well accepted legal principles. Considerations relevant to
interpretation are not whether a differently conceived or worded statute would
have yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness.
Consequences do not alter the statutory language, but might only help to fix
its meaning. [555H; 556A-B, G-H]
The expression `rank', in `reduction in rank' has, for purposes of Article
311(2), an obvious reference to the stratification of the posts or grades or
categories in the official hierarchy. It does not refer to the mere seniority
of the Government Servant in the same class or grade or category. [552B-C]
The penalty of `reduction in rank' of a Government servant initially recruited
to a higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a lower time-scale, grade,
service or post virtually amounted to his removal from the higher post and the
substitution of his recruitment to lower post, affecting the policy of
recruitment itself. ln conceivable cases, the Government servant might not have
the qualification requisite for the post which might require and involve
different, though not necessarily higher, skills and attainment. [551B-C, 557G]
[Worthington v. Robin,  75 Law Times
Reports 446, referred to.]
Rule 11 must be read in consonance with general principles and so construed the
expression `reduction' in it would not admit of a wider meaning. [557H; 558A] Babaji
Charan Rout v. State of Orissa,  1 SLJ 496; Shivalingaswamy
v. State of Karnataka,  ILR Kar. 1453; approved.
v. C.I.T.,  2 MLJ 508; Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India,  1 All India Ser. Law Journal 34;
1 SLR 161; S.N. Dey v. Union of India,  2 SLJ All. 114; C.S. Balakumar v. The lnspecting Asstt.
Commissioner of Income Tax,  1 All India SLJ 18, over-ruled.
548 P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India,  3 SLR 509 and Hussain Sasan
Saheb Kaldgi v. State of Maharashtra,  AIR SC 1627,
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3003 of 1988.
the Judgment and Order dated 8/9th April, 1986
of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in R.A. No. 2 of 1986 in TA No. T-564 of 1985.
Civil Appeal No. 889 of 1988.
the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.86 and 5.11.1986 in the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in O.A. No. 103 of 1986.
Bali and L.R. Singh for the Appellant in C.A.
No. 3003 of 1988.
Nair for the Appellant in C.A. No. 889
Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A. Subba Rao, C.V.S. Rao and Hemant Sharma
for the Respondents.
judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH, J. The special leave
petition and the appeal-by two Central-Government-servants- raise an
interesting point of construction of a service Rule whether a Disciplinary
Authority can, under Sub-Rule (vi) of Rule 11 of the Central Civil Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, (Rules for short), impose the
penalty of reduction on a Government Servant, recruited directly to a
particular post, to a post lower than that to which he was so recruited; and if
such a reduction is permissible, whether the reduction could only be to a post from
which under the relevant Recruitment Rules promotion to the one to which the
Government servant was directly recruited.
549 The petition and appeal are directed against the orders dated 8/9-4-1986 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi, and the order dated 29.10.1986 of
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Gujarat, respectively, affirming the
orders of the Disciplinary Authorities imposing on the petitioner and the
appellant the penalty of reduction in rank to post lower than the one to which
both of them were initially recruited.
is a divergence of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts on the point: The
Division Benches of the Orissa and Karnataka High Courts have held that such a
reduction in rank is not possible at all. [See: Babaji Charan Rout v. State of Orissa and Ors.,  1 SLJ 496;
v. State of Karnataka,  ILR Kar. 1453].
the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Allahabad High
Courts have held that there is no limitation on the power to impose such a
penalty. [See: Gopal Rao v. C.l.T.,  2 MLJ 508; Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India, 
1 All India Ser. Law Jour. 34; S.N. Dey v. Union of India & Ors.,  2 SLJ All. 114]. The
Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras, in C.S. Balakumar v. The lnspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax,
 1 All India SLJ 18 has also subscribed to this view.
is yet a third view, as typified in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller &
Auditor General of India,  3 SLR 509 and the one taken by the Central
Administrative Tribunal in the case from which the Special Leave Petition
arises, that such a reduction in rank is permissible provided that promotion
from the post to which the Government servant is reduced to the post from which
he was so reduced is permissible, or, as it has been put, the post to which the
Government servant is reduced is "in the line of promotion" and is a
leave is granted in SLP (C) 9509 of 1986. Both the cases are taken up for final
hearing, heard and disposed of by this common Judgment.
brief advertance to the facts of the cases is necessary.
(C) 9506 of 1986 is by a certain Nyadar Singh, the unsuccessful petitioner
before the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi, and is directed against
that the Tribunal's order No. T-564/85 (SBCWP No.- 1747/80) dated PG NO 550
28th February, 1986, rejecting his challenge to the order dated 4th Sept.,
1976, of the disciplinary authority imposing a penalty of `reduction in rank'
reducing the petitioner from the post of Assistant Locust Warning Officer to
which he was recruited directly on 31.10.1960 and confirmed on 27.12.1971 to
that of Junior Technical Assistant pursuant to certain disciplinary proceedings
held against him. In 1974, he was working as an Assistant Locust Warning
Officer at Nohar. On 4.11.1975 in respect of certain acts alleged to constitute
misconduct on his part certain disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
him which culminated in the order dated 4.9.1976 imposing the aforesaid
penalty. The statutory appeal before the appellate authority was, dismissed on
24.4.1979. Thereafter he filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court
which, after the coming into force of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act,
1985, stood transferred to and was disposed of by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi, by its order dated 28.2.1986, now under appeal. It is
relevant to mention that in the year 1981, after the period of penalty of five
years had spent itself out, the appellant was re-promoted to the post of
Assistant Locust Warning Officer.
Appeal No. 889 of 1988 is by M.J. Ninama, an Upper Division Clerk in the Post
& Telegraph Circle Office, Ahmedabad, preferred against the order No. OA
103 of 1986 dated 29.10.1986 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad,
rejecting appellant's challenge to the legality and correctness of the order
dated 15.5.1988 of the Post Master General who in modification of the earlier
orders imposing a penalty of compulsory retirement on him, substituted in its
place the order imposing the penalty of `reduction in rank' to the post of
Lower Division Clerk pursuant to the findings recorded against the appellant on
the charge of accepting illegal gratification. Appellant had been directly recruited
as an Upper Division Clerk in the Office of the Post Master General, Gujarat Circle, Ahmedabad. He was reduced to the
lower post of Lower Division Clerk until he was found fit after a period of
five years from 15.5.1986. However, the appellant's seniority on re-promotion
was directed to be fixed at what it would have been, without the reduction.
have heard Shri J.S. Bali, learned counse] for the appellant-Nyadar Singh and Shri
K.M.K. Nair, learned counsel for the appellant-Ninama; and Shri Kuldip Singh,
learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondents in both the appeals.
Rule 11 of the `Rules' enumerates the penalties which may for good and
sufficient reasons be imposed on a PG NO 551 Government servant. Sub-rule (vi)
of Rule 11 provides:
The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter
provided, be imposed on a Government servant namely:
penalties: Omitted as irrelevant here.
reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or Service which shall
ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the Government servant to the
time-scale of pay, grade, post or Service from which he was reduced, with or
without further directions regarding conditions of the restoration to that
grade, or post or Service from which the Government servant was reduced and his
seniority and pay on such restoration to that grade, post or Service;"
According to the contention of the appellants' learned counsel, the appellants
were, as a result of the imposition of the penalty, reduced in rank to a post
lower than the one to which they were initially recruited, which on a proper
construction of the Rule, is not permissible. Learned counsel relied upon the
decision of this Court in Hussain Sasan Sahed Kaldgi v. State of Maharashtra,
 AIR SC 1627.
Singh, Additional Solicitor General, however, contended that this limitation
which may be appropriate in the case of a `reversion' which, as the very
concept implies, could not be to a post which the Government servant did not
earlier hold, is inappropriate in a case of reduction in rank imposed as a
penalty. Reduction in rank, according to learned Additional Solicitor General,
has a wider import than `reversion' and there is no reason why the power to
impose this penalty which is permissible on the plain language of the Rule be
whittled down by any other consideration. The learned Additional Solicitor
General sought to rely upon certain pronouncements of the High Courts.
import of the expression `Reduction in rank' has been examined in the context
of the constitutional PG NO 552 protection afforded to Government servants
under Article 311(2) in relation to the three major penalties of 'dismissal',
'removal' and 'reduction in rank' and the constitutional safeguards to be
satisfied before the imposition of these three major penalties. In Article
311(2) the penalty of "reduction in rank" is classed along with
'dismissal' and 'removal' for the reason that the penalty of reduction in rank
has the effect of removing a Government servant from a class or grade or
category of post to a lessor class or grade or category. Though the Government
servant is retained in service, however, as a result of the penalty he is
removed from the post held by him either temporarily or permanently and
retained in service in a lesser post. The expression 'rank', in 'reduction in
rank' has, for purposes of Article 311(2), an obvious reference to the
stratification of the posts or grades or categories in the official hierarchy.
It does not refer to the mere seniority of the Government servant in the same
class or grade or category. Though reduction in rank, in one sense, might
connote the idea of reversion from a higher post to a lower post, all reversions
from a higher post are not necessarily reductions in rank. A person working in
a higher post, not substantively, but purely on an officiating basis may, for
valid reasons, be reverted to his substantive post.
would not, by itself, be reduction in rank unless circumstances of the
reversion disclose a punitiveelement.
submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General in substance, is that
while 'reversion' envisages that the lower post to which the Government servant
is reverted should necessarily to amongst those earlier held by him and from
which he had come on promotion, the idea of reversion being a mere antonym of
promotion-the importing of such a limitation into a case of "reduction in
rank" imposed as a penalty would be doing, violence of the express
statutory language and an unwarranted fettering of the power of the
disciplinary authority. The idea of reduction in rank, says the learned
Additional Solicitor General, is much wider than the ambit of the reversion and
there is no justification to whittle down the ambit of this expression
consciously employed by the rule-making-authority. Such a construction would
create more difficulties than It might appear to solve and become
counter-productive in the sense that even where the disciplinary-authority,
desires to retain a Government servant in service, though not in the same post
but in a lower one, the Authority would be rendered helpless by such a
construction being place of in the Rule.
553 The argument in favour of this construction of the Rule is stated by by a
learned Single Judge in Gopal Rao's case (supra) thus:
. . . . ln effect, what the learned counsel says is that there is no difference
between the order of reversion and an order of reduction in rank, that it is
well established that reversion can be only to a post which a person held
earlier and that reduction also can only be to a post or class of service which
the person occupied at any time before......." "'..... In my view,
the expression "reduction in rank" covers a wider field than
reversion to a lower post. It is true, the word "reversion" always
connotes "a return to the original post or place." But the word
"reduction" has no such limitation and therefore, reduction in rank
extends even to a rank which the officer concerned never held....."
Similar view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of the the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India and Anr.,  1 SLR  :
The Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules provide
for several penalties which can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons. One
of the major penalties contemplated by Rule II is "reduction to a lower .
. . . . grade, post or service . . . . .", and I see m, reason why this
penalty cannot be imposed upon a person who, on the date of imposition of
penalty, is continuing in the same post to which he was appointed by direct
recruitment. This is not a case of reversion of a Government servant to his
substantive post for want of vacancy or otherwise, but this is a case of
reduction by way of punishment. I am unable to read any limitation upon the
power of the disciplinary authority to impose this punishment on the
petitioner, as suggested. No decision has also been brought to my notice
supporting this contention It must, however, be observed that in the above case
the High Court upheld the challenge of the appellant that there was no
misconduct at all. The other observations as to the scope of the Rude were,
therefore, unnecessary for the decision of the case.
opposite view is taken by the Orissa High Court in Babaji Charan Rout v. State
of Orissa and Ors.,  1 All India SLJ 496 and by a Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in Shivalingaswamy v: State ot Karnataka, [l985] ILR Kar.
1453. In the first case, there is no discussion of the matter as the Division
Bench merely followed an earlier unreported decision of another Division Bench
of the same High Court. In the Karnataka case, a person who had been directly
recruited as "Village-Accountant had been reduced by the Disciplinary
Authority to the post of "daftarband".
Division Bench interpreting an analogous rule in the State's Service Rules,
held the reduction impermissible, observing:
Rule 8 [v] of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957, as amended, in our opinion, does not justify such an action. It
will lead to most unreasonable results if a person directly recruited to a post
is reduced to a post which he never came to hold in service. That is not the
scheme of the CCA Rules and therefore we have no hesitation in holding that the
Deputy Commissioner had no competence to impose the penalty of reducing the
appellant to the post of Daftar- band-Attender when in fact he entered service
only as Village Accountant. If the disciplinary authority felt that the gravity
of the charges proved warrants that the appellant should be removed from
service it was open to the authorities to make an order either dismissing or
removing him from service .. . . ."
third view of the matter which while holding such a reduction is permissible,
but subject to the post to which the Government servant is reduced being one
from which promotion to the post from which reduction is effected is
permissible, is to be found in Srinivasa Sastry's, case (supra) where Rama Jois,
J. of the Karnataka High Court held:
It is no doubt true that normally penalty of 'reduction in rank' is imposed
only so as to bring down a civil servant to a lower time scale, grade, service
or post, held earlier by him before promotion and not below the post, grade,
service, or time-scale to which a civil servant was directly recruited, and it
appears, that it is also PG NO 555 reasonable to do so. The learned counsel,
however, could not substantiate the point-with reference to the rule which
empowered the disciplinary authority to impose the penalty of reduction in rank
as it does not make any such differentiation ......." [See 1979 3 SLR 509
at 515, para 91.
is also the view taken by the Tribunal in the first of the appeals now before
us. The Tribunal held :
In the light of the aforesaid discussion we find that rule 11 (vi) of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, on its
true construction permits reduction in rank in the case of a direct recruit if
the post to which he is reduced is in the line of promotion i.e. is a feeder
service . . . . ." But as against this judicial-opinion in Srinivasa Sastry's
case, the learned Judge, as auther, [See 'Services under the State': Indian Law
Institute, page 220] expressed the view:
it is reasonable to take the view that a civil servant earns promotion by
exhibiting his merit and ability and suffers reduction in rank instead of
removal or dismissal for misconduct or inefficiency during his service in the
higher post unless he is unworthy of being retained in the service and that the
word 'reduction in rank' is used in Article 311 in this sense. It appears that
the punishment by way of reduction in rank can be inflicted only against a
civil servant who held a lower post and who has been promoted to the higher
contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that when a
legislative-authority uses the expression "reduction in rank" without
imposing any limitations there is no justification to fetter or otherwise limit
the plenitude of the idea of 'reduction', looks, at the first blush, seemingly
plausible and even somewhat attractive. The view has commended itself for
acceptance to some of the High Courts and Tribunals.
meaning to be given to a particular statutory language depends on the
evaluation of a number of interpretative-criteria. Shorn of the context, the
words by themselves are "slippery customers". The general presumption
PG NO 556 is that these criteria do not detract or stand apart from, but are to
be-harmonised with, the well accepted legal- principles. In a difficult case,
the number of relevant interpretative-criteria may be so high that the task of
the court in assessing their effect is, correspondingly, difficult. Even the
statutory-language apparently free from the sins of semantic ambiguity might
not, in the context of the purpose, connote or convey its lexicographic thrust;
but would acquire a different shade or colour imparted to it by the variations
of the interpretation-criteria. The ambiguity need not necessarily be a
grammatical ambiguity, but one of appropriateness of the meaning in a
Bennion in his "Statutory lnterpretation" refers to the nature of the
task in weighing the factors:
is necessary for the interpreter to assess the respective weights of the
relevant interpretative factors and determine which of the opposing constructions
they favour on balance . . . . ." "We may speak of the factors
tending in a certain direction as a bundle of factors. This is figurative, but
then so is the idea of factors being 'weighed'. The court is unlikely even to
consider the factors one by one, and certainly will not proceed in any
mechanistic way . . . . ." "We find that one bundle of factors favours
one of the opposing constructions of the enactment. while the other bundle favours
the other construction. [As to opposing constructions see s. 84 of this Code. ]
may be factors drawn from a single interpretative criterion in both bundles . .
. . ." [See `Statutory lnterpretation' by Francis Bennion. 1984 End.- page
390] It is true that where statutory language should be given its most obvious
meaning-to accord with how a man in the street might answer the problems posed
by the words'-the Statute must be taken as one finds it. Consideration relevant
to interpretation are not whether a differently conceived or worded statute
would have yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness.
Consequences do not alter the statutory Ianguage, but may only help to fix its
to whether a person initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade or
service or post can be reduced by way of punishment, to a post in a lower
time-scale, grade, service or post which he never held before, the
statutory-language authorises the imposition of penalty does not, it is true,
by itself impose any limitations. The question is whether the
interpretative-factors, relevant to the provision, impart aNy such limitation.
On a consideration of the relevant factors to which we will presently refer we
must hold that they do.
the idea of reduction may not be fully equivalent with 'reversion', there are
certain assumptions basic to service law which bring in the limitations of the
latter on the former. The penalty of reduction in rank of a Government servant
initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a lower
time-scale, grade, service or post virtually amounts to his removal from the
higher post and the substitution of his recruitment to lower post, affecting
the policy of recruitment itself.
Worthington v. Robin, [l896] 75 Law Times Reports 446 where a supervisor of
Inland Revenue was reduced in rank by statutory authority, referring to the
effect of reduction in rank. though in a different context, brought about by
the order of the statutory authority, the Court of appeals understood the
process as a dismissal from the higher post and reappointment to the Iower
post. Rigby. L.J observed:
. . . . . 1 treat what has happened as a dismissal, because, though in effect
he has been reduced to a lower position, his new appointment is in fact a
could see any point in this action upon which there might be a possibility of
his succeeding, we should be most anxious to give him the opportunity . . . .
." But action was dismissed because the civil servant was holding the
office at the pleasure of the Commissioners under the Inland Revenue Regulation
Act governing the situation.
are, therefore, certain considerations of policy that might militate against
such a wide meaning to be given to the power. In conceivable cases, the
Government servant may not have the qualifications requisite for the post which
may require and involve different, though not necessarily higher, skills and
attainments. Here enter considerations of the recruitment-policy. The rule must
be read in consonance PG NO 558 with the general principles and so construed
the expression `reduction' in it would not admit of a wider connotation.
power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower
time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his
The Second, and perhaps equally relevant, consideration, is the anomaly that a
pushing to its logical limits of such power might produce. In Srinivasa Sastry's
case, (supra), the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court visualised these
. . . . Acceptance of the contentions urged for the respondents would lead to
incongruous and absurd results. To illustrate, could a Doctor be reduced in
rank to the post of a Compounder, or an Engineer to the post of a Fitter, or a
Teacher in a High School to the post of a Peon, or a Scientific Officer to the
post of a ministerial officer, in the absence of any provision in the rules for
the consideration of the case of the civil servant concerned, for promotion from
the latter category to the former category? It appears to me that on a fair and
proper construction of rule II (vi) of the Rules, the condition precedent for
the exercise of power under that rule by way of imposing penalty of reduction
in rank to a lower post is, that the higher post from which the concerned civil
servant is sought to be reduced must be a promotional post in relation to the
lower post to which he is sought to be reduced . . . . . [See 1979 3 SLR 509 at
516]." The argument that the rule enables a reduction in rank to a post
lower than the one to which the civil servant was initially recruited for a
specified-period and also enables restoration of the Government servant to the
original post, with the restoration of seniority as well, and that, therefore,
there is nothing anomalous about the matter, does not, in our opinion, wholly
answer the problem. It is at best one of the criteria supporting a plausible
view of the matter. The rule also enables an order without the stipulation of
such restoration. The other implications of the effect of the reduction as a
fresh induction into a lower grade, service or post not at any time earlier
held by the Government servant remain unanswered. Then-again, there is an
inherent anomaly of a person recruited to the higher grade or class of post
being asked to work in a lower grade which in certain conceivable cases might
require different qualifications. It might be contended that these anomalies PG
NO 559 Could well be avoided by a judicious-choice of the penalty in a given
fact-situation and that these considerations are more matters to be taken into
account in tailoring-out the penalty than those limiting the scope of the
punitive power itself. But, an over-all view of the balance of the
relevant-criteria indicates that it is reasonable, to assume that the
rule-making-authority did not intend to chothe the disciplinary-authority with
the power which would produce such anomaious and unreasonable situations. The
contrary view taken by the High Courts in the several decisions referred to
earlier cannot be taken to laid down the principle correctly.
pronouncement of this Court in Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaldgi v. State of Maharashtra, [l987[ AIR (SC) 1627 relied upon
by the appellant is one which deals with a case of 'reversion'. Appellant in
that case who, while working as a primary-teacher in the services of the
District Local Board, offered himself for and was selected by direct
recruitment to the post of the Asst. Deputy Educational Inspector. But after
four years he was sought to be reverted to the post of primary-teacher. His
suit for the declaration that the purported reversion was illegal and void was
decreed by the trial court, but was dismissed by the High Court in appeal.
court restored the decree of the trial court. As rightly pointed out by the
learned Additional Solicitor General, the case dealt with the scope and
limitations of the process of 'reversion' and is of no assistance in deciding
the point under consideration. But this does not make any difference to the
conclusion we have reached.
The point now is as to what orders are to be made in these appeals. Appellants
in the two appeals have been reduced to posts lower than these to which they
were initially directly recruited. As these penalties cannot be sustained in
the view we take of the rule, in the normal course the penalties imposed would
require to be set aside and the disciplinary authority directed to re-consider
which other penalty which it would now choose to impose. But, we are of the
opinion that it would be somewhat unfair that at this distance of time the
matters are re-opened. We think, having regard to all the circumstances of the
cases the orders that commend themselves appropriate in the two cases are in
the first of the appeals, appellant-Nyadar Singh, has, after the period of the
reduction in rank has spent itself out, been restored to the original position.
It would, therefore, be sufficient to set aside the penalty imposed on him and
direct that the period of service in the PG NO 560 reduced post be treated as
service in the post held by him prior to imposition of the penalty, subject to
the condition, however, that the appellant shall not be entitled to any
difference of salary for and during the period of reduction. In view of this,
we think that the proceedings taken against him should come to an end and there
is no need to remit the matter to the Disciplinary-Authority for selection and
imposition of a fresh penalty.
In the case of M.J. Ninama the penalty of reduction in rank is set aside and he
shall be restored to the post which he held before the imposition of the
penalty. However, for the period, if any, served by him in the lower post
pursuant to the penalty imposed on him, he shall not be entitled to the
difference of salary. It will also not be necessary to remit his case for fresh
consideration of the choice of the penalty having regard to the lapse of time.
ordered and the appeals disposed of accordingly.
Appeals disposed of.